1. The three most important matters amongst Ms Cheung's claims are these:
   • (a) Ever since she began to occupy her apartment there have been unauthorised entries into it. Somehow trespassers have been able to enter her apartment, steal goods from it, use her appliances (including her printer), befoul her bathroom and leave other traces of their entry. This has occurred even though she has what should be the only keys to her apartment and the corridor near it has CCTV camera coverage; according to the OCs, there has been no evidence of entry by strangers captured on the CCTV footage. Ms Cheung complains that her reports to the OCs of the trespassers have not been taken seriously enough and that the OCs have not taken sufficient precautions to prevent them. She claims financial compensation from the OCs.
   • (b) The OCs and their building manager Mr Delves have permitted and actively assisted people to enter the car park and perform acts which have been to her financial detriment. One of those persons was a process server who lay in wait bedside her car and served her with court process leading to her bankruptcy. The other was a person who repossessed a car she had been hiring; inside the car were goods to the value of $2,100.00.
   • (c) Since 2012 she has been denied access to the fifth floor of the building, which is common property and where there is a gymnasium, a pool and a meeting room. Following an incident near the pool in 2012, so she says, the building manager Mr Delves deactivated the swipe card that gave her access to the fifth floor. The OCs have refused to re-activate the card, claiming that they are entitled to deny her access to the fifth floor because she owes owners corporation fees.
2. As will appear below, I consider that only the third of those complaints is justified.
3. There has been a miscellany of other complaints, ranging from the serious to the trivial. At the serious end of the range are allegations that Mr Francis, other committee members and Mr Delves had bound the OCs to contracts that were to their personal financial advantage and not in the OCs' best interest. At the trivial end of the range is a complaint about the colour that the OCs had painted the front door to her apartment. None of those complaints has been made out, although I will be giving her leave to begin a fresh proceeding about one of them should the need arise.

1. Ms Cheung had served summonses on various persons to attend the hearing and give evidence. Those persons included Ms Francis, Mr Delves and Ms Darray, all of whom were called as witnesses by the OCs. There were five others, four of whom had past or present connection with the OCs. Two of those four answered their summons and were present when the case was called on for hearing.
2. During directions hearings earlier in the proceeding I had told Ms Cheung that there was no point in serving summonses to witness unless she had reason to believe that the persons served would give evidence that would assist her case, and that if she did call them as witnesses she would not be allowed to cross-examined them but would have to accept whatever answers they gave to her questions. I repeated all that at the beginning of the hearing. The upshot was an arrangement that the two witnesses could be sent away but if Ms Cheung wanted to insist on calling them as witnesses the OCs' solicitors could notify them that they would be required to return on a later day. On the afternoon of final day of the hearing, after the OCs had closed their case, Ms Cheung told me that she wanted to call the witnesses to give evidence. By that time it was too late to give the two putative witnesses any reasonable notice to attend and I refused to require them to attend. Nothing that had transpired during the hearing gave one any reason to suppose that evidence from people who were or had been in the OCs' camp would have assisted Ms Cheung's case in any way.
3. Ms Cheung cross-examined Ms Francis Mr Delves and Ms Darray, as she was entitled to do.
4. By the time the evidence finished it was too late for either side to make a final address. I gave directions for written submissions about the only two matters which appeared to me to warrant a final address. I directed that the OCs could serve within fourteen days a submission about whether a rule of the OCs on which they relied was a valid exercise of their rule-making power. I directed that Ms Cheung could file and serve within a further fourteen days a submission about whether there was anything that the OCs could have done, but failed to do, to prevent unauthorised entry into her apartment. In each case I stipulated that the submission should not exceed five pages in length.
5. The OCs did file and serve their submission. Ms Cheung filed and served a submission which did not address the issue of what the OCs could have done but did not do to prevent the trespassing, raised matters that were not the subject of evidence during the hearing, and ignored the stipulation that the submission must not exceed five pages. Nevertheless, I have considered her submission as well as the OCs' submission.
6. I shall proceed to deal with the three matters that I identified in paragraph 6 above and then, briefly, with other complaints.

1. Ms Cheung purchased her apartment in 2004. Until 2007 she let it to tenants. In 2007 she and her young daughter moved into the apartment and have occupied it to the present day.
2. From about 2010 onwards, according to her evidence, there have been repeated entries into her apartment by a person or persons who carry out petty thefts of books and other objects, who use her stove and washing facilities (on one occasion, stopping her washing machine in the middle of the cycle), and urinate and defecate on her bathroom floor. She has reported the incidents to Mr Delves and to his assistant manager, and, at their suggestion, to the police who, she said, "laughed at" her.
3. A resident of Watergate Apartments uses a swipe card to gain access to a lift and to the floor of the building on which the resident's apartment is situated, and uses a key to open the door. The only rational explanation for how a trespasser could gain entry into Ms Cheung's apartment without breaking in would be that the trespasser somehow got hold of a swipe card to get to the ninth floor and then used a duplicate key or master key to open the door. Ms Cheung believed that a master key existed because, when she engaged the locksmith who services the building to change the lock on her door, he told her (she said) that there was a master key to the apartments. Both Mr Delves and Ms Darray gave evidence that there is no master key. Mr Delves told me that if a resident was accidentally locked out of an apartment he had to assist the resident to call the locksmith to open the door and change the lock, or, in a emergency (which happened once), the door had to be forced open. I accept that evidence and find that there has never been a master key or any key other than a resident's own key for entry into the resident's apartment.
4. Moreover there is CCTV coverage of the corridors. Mr Delves gave evidence that in response to early reports by Ms Cheung of trespassing into her apartment he viewed CCTV footage for the time-range that she gave him for her absence and that the footage showed nothing. Thereafter he advised her to report the matter to the police. There has never been any CCTV footage that captured a trespasser entering her apartment.
5. In those circumstances it seems improbable that there could have been the trespassers of which Ms Cheung has complained. Nevertheless, her evidence about the trespassers was not challenged during the hearing and it gains credibility from another event suggesting that there is a person or persons, who may or may not be residents in the building, have a grudge against her. That other event was the slashing of the tyres to her car while it was parked in space 901 in the car park. The OCs gave their attention to maintaining that they had done everything they could reasonably have done to prevent the trespassing and to identify the trespassers. Despite its improbability I accept Ms Cheung's evidence about the trespassing.
6. The evidence of the OC's witnesses was that:
   • (a) a person cannot obtain access to the ninth floor, or to any floor, without having a swipe card that enables entry to that floor;
   • (b) the only person who holds a key to a resident's apartment is the resident;
   • (c) tradespersons and visitors have to sign a record in the building manager's office before being permitted entry onto a floor;
   • (d) there are 110 security cameras installed within the building for CCTV surveillance;
   • (e) the corridor on the ninth floor outside Ms Cheung's apartment is covered by the CCTV cameras;
   • (f) the building manager and his assistant manager regularly observe the CCTV coverage from monitors inside their office;
   • (g) whenever requested by Ms Cheung to do so the building manager or his assistant has viewed CCTV footage; and
   • (h) there are two security guards who patrol the building on Friday and Saturday nights between 7.00pm and 3.00am.
7. The OCs accepted that their obligations to exercise due care and diligence included an obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised entry into or through the building. I agree with their submission that they discharged that obligation by operating the security system described above. Ms Cheung has not suggested any other precautions which the OCs might have taken. Obviously it would be most unreasonable to require them to have a guard on continuous watch of the area near Ms Cheung's front door.
8. Relations between Mr Delves and Mr Appleton on the one side and Ms Cheung on the other became hostile after incidents that I shall be describing below. Mr Delves told me that he had allowed Mr Appleton to borrow swipe cards that were available for tradesmen and that those cards gave them access to Ms Cheung's floor. I had wondered whether that was a clue for solving the mystery of the trespasses into Ms Cheung's apartment. But it was not, because both Mr Delves and Mr Appleton left the building in mid-2018 and, as I understood Ms Cheung's evidence, the trespasses have continued since that time.
9. Ms Cheung has not made out a claim against the OCs in relation to the unauthorised entries into her apartment.

1. On 2 February 2011 a process server, Peter Lowe, served Ms Cheung with court process by waiting beside her car parked in its space within the building's car park. Following the service of that process upon her, a Federal Court made a sequestration order on 17 February 2011 and she became bankrupt.
2. Ms Cheung was infuriated by what she thought had happened, namely, that Mr Delves had allowed the process server into the building and either had escorted him to her car parking space or had identified to him the number of her car parking space and had allowed him into the car park. On the same day, 2 February 2011, she wrote to the committee demanding that Mr Delves be dismissed. On 30 July 2011 (after the date of her bankruptcy) she wrote

again to the committee to repeat her demand[2]. In the letter of 30 July 2011 she identified five dates in June and July 2010 when, she alleged, Mr Delves had let the process server into the building and disclosed "private information" to him; presumably those dates were of unsuccessful attempts to find her within the building and serve her with process. Ms Cheung has alleged that the OCs had breached a duty to her and had thereby caused all the financial loss that had flowed from her having been made bankrupt.

1. Mr Delves gave evidence that he had provided access to the process server Mr Lowe on two occasions. On the first occasion Mr Lowe had identified himself by producing a licence. He (Mr Delves) telephoned Ms Cheung but there was no answer. He allowed Mr Lowe onto the ninth floor on that occasion and on the second occasion. Evidently Mr Lowe was unable to serve her with process on either occasion. On 2 February 2011 he did not have anything to do with Ms Cheung's encounter with Mr Lowe in the car park beside her space. After Ms Cheung complained about that he viewed CCTV footage of the entry to the car park and observed that the process server in his car had "tailgated" another car and had gained entrance to the car park in that way, by following the other car in. He did not tell the process server where Ms Cheung parked her car. Once he knew her apartment number he would be able to find her car parking space which displayed the same number.
2. In my view neither the OCs nor Mr Delves had any obligation to Ms Cheung not to permit the process server to enter the building or to gain access to the ninth floor. There is no reason why they should deny to anyone who had a lawful purpose in seeking entry - a member of the police force, or a tradesperson, or a process server - the ability to enter and endeavour to contact Ms Cheung. Obvious though it is, I need to state the fact that successful service of process upon her on 2 February 2011, although a step in the sequence that led to her being made bankrupt, was not a cause of her suffering any financial loss from the bankruptcy; earlier steps in the sequence would have been the failure to defend the court case brought against her - which concerned a guarantee upon a lease of a motor vehicle - or a failure to defend the proceeding successfully.
3. I conclude that the claim that Ms Cheung has made in relation to Mr Delves's conduct, such as it was, that led to the service of court process, fails.
4. On 10 December 2015 a finance company repossessed a car which Ms Cheung had been hiring and parking in her space in the building's car park. Ms Cheung has complained about the OCs' and Mr Delves's conduct in allowing that to happen. She gave evidence that there were goods to the value of $2,100.00 in the boot of the car when it was repossessed. Mr Delves gave evidence, which I accept, that his only involvement in the repossession was

his receiving a visit from the police who alleged that there was a "stolen" car in the building's car park. Again, I do not see how an owners corporation has any duty to an occupier of a lot not to permit entry to a person who has a lawful purpose of repossessing a car, even from the lot owner's car space. Any claim that Ms Cheung may have for the loss of the goods in the boot of the car might be brought against the finance company or the repossession agent, not against the OCs.

1. By the middle of 2017 Mr Delves, having experienced a barrage of emails from Ms Cheung complaining about him, applied to the Magistrates' Court for an intervention order against Ms Cheung. She responded with a counter-application for an intervention order against him. Ms Cheung gave evidence to me that during the hearing of those cross-applications Mr Delves had admitted to the Magistrate that he had slashed the tyres of her car while it was parked in her space. Mr Delves told me that although he had told the Magistrate that he was aware that the tyre-slashing had occurred he had denied having had anything to do with it, and the fact was that he had had nothing to do with it. I accept Mr Delves's evidence on that matter rather than Ms Cheung's improbable version. It is most unlikely that Mr Delves would have jeopardised his employment by performing a criminal act and then admitting to the Magistrate that he had performed it. The fact (which I accept) that the tyre-slashing had occurred lends colour and credibility to Ms Cheung's evidence about the trespassing into her apartment, because it suggests that a person who may or may not have been resident of the Watergate building has held a grudge against her. That fact does not mean, however, that Ms Cheung has any tenable claim against the OCs in connection with. She has not.
2. There was an occasion when Ms Cheung was issued with a parking ticket while her car was in its correct space in the car park. She was not alone. Other residents had had the same experience. It occurred because a company which the OCs had engaged to oversee residents' parking turned out to be incompetent. From Ms Francis's evidence I am satisfied that the OCs terminated that company's contract, and had the parking tickets withdrawn, as soon as was practicable.
3. Ms Cheung has not made out any of the claims made against the OCs that arose out of the events, described above, that had happened at or near her car parking space in the building.

1. Since 2012, according to Ms Cheung, she has been denied access to the fifth floor of the building because the OCs, through Mr Delves de-activated the swipe card that she had been using to give her access to that floor and have refused to re-activate it. The OCs maintain that they were entitled under their rules to do that because Ms Cheung was in arrears in payment of owners corporation fees and still owes many thousands of dollars in unpaid fees.
2. The OCs have registered at the Land Titles Office special rules, headed "Additional Rules"[3]. They were made and registered before the Owners Corporations Act 2006 ("the OC Act") came into force, but they are deemed to be rules under that Act to the extent that they are not inconsistent with that Act or with regulations made under it.[4]
3. The rule upon which the OCs rely is rule 12.1(e). Rule 12.1 is as follows:

12.1 The Body Corporate may take measures to ensure the security and to preserve the safety of the Common Property and the Lots affected by the Body Corporate from fire or other hazards and without limitation may:

(a) Close off any part of the Common Property not required for access to a Lot on either a temporary or permanent basis or otherwise restrict the access to or use by Proprietors or occupiers of any part of the Common Property.

(b) Permit, to the exclusion of Proprietors and Occupiers any designated part of Common Property to be used by any security person as a means of monitoring security and general safety of the Lots, either solely or in conjunction with other Lots;

(c) Restrict by means of key or other security device the access of Proprietors or Occupiers;

(d) Restrict by means of key or other security device the access of the Proprietors or Occupiers of one level of the Lots to any other level of the Lots; and

(e) Cancel any security card or key issued where a Proprietor is in arrears in payment of Body Corporate Levies in excess of 2 quarters.

An un-numbered paragraph at the beginning of the rules includes the following sub-paragraph:

(m) If any Rule or part thereof is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, unlawful, unenforceable or void, then that Rule or part thereof shall be struck down and shall have no further force and effect. HOWEVER all remaining Rules or part thereof capable of separate enforcement and effect shall continue to be value and enforceable in accordance with their terms.

The rules bind the OCs, Ms Cheung, and all other lot owners or occupiers of a lot.[5] The "Body Corporate" is each of the OCs.[6]

Ms Cheung became aware of the de-activation of her swipe card after an incident that she says occurred on 3 October 2012. Her daughter and her dog were in the gymnasium area, part of an area of common property on the fifth floor, where children and dogs are not supposed to be. Mr Delves observed that on the CCTV monitor in his office. Mr Appleton was with him. He then observed Ms Cheung on the monitor too. He and Mr Appleton went into the pool and gymnasium area. He remonstrated with Ms Cheung and asked her to leash the dog and leave the area with her daughter. There was loud and heated argument. The police were called, twice. From that date onwards Ms Cheung has not been able to gain access to the fifth floor, because her swipe card was and is de-activated.

1. Mr Delves told me that he had de-activated Ms Cheung's swipe card earlier, on the instructions of the committee, because she owed owners corporations fees for more than two quarter years. Rule 12.1(c) permits that, the OCs say. I think that Mr Delves is mistaken about the time of de-activation. His version does not explain how Ms Cheung came to be on the fifth floor near the pool and gymnasium on 3 October 2012.
2. During the hearing I raised the issue of the validity of the Additional Rule 12.1(e). Mr Rudd of Counsel for the OCs responded to my invitation to file and serve a written submission on the issue.
3. A decision of the Supreme Court in 2016, Owners Corporation PS 501391P v Balcombe ("the Balcombe case")[7] has expressed the law on how to determine whether an owners corporation rule has been made validly. The Balcombe case concerned the Watergate building and another of the Additional Rules. It decided that the validity of that rule had to be determined in the light of the applicable legislation which was in force in 2004 (when the Additional Rules were made and registered), namely, the Subdivision Act 1988 and the Subdivision (Body Corporate) Regulations 2001 ("the 2001 Regulations"), and then in the light of the applicable legislation now, which is the OC Act, because if the rule was validly made in 2004 it would nevertheless be invalid if inconsistent with the OC Act or with the regulations made under it.[8]
4. I agree with the following steps in the very well-presented argument developed in Mr Rudd's written submission:
   • (1) As was set out in the decision in the Balcombe case, the issue of whether a rule is a valid rule within the rule-making power of an owners corporation is determined with reference to the following considerations:

1. What is the statutory purpose of the relevant provisions in the empowering legislation (determined by reference to the scope, object and subject matter of the empowering Act)? 2. What is the character of rule 12.1(e) (determined by reference to the circumstances in which it applies, in particular its operation and effect)?

1. Is there a sufficiently direct and substantial connection between the statutory purpose and the likely operation of rule 12.1(e)?
   • (2) The statutory purpose of the 2001 Regulations and of the OC Act is similar. It is the purpose of providing for the management, powers and functions of owners corporations, especially by requiring an owners corporation to manage and administer the common property and keep it properly repaired and maintained.
   • (3) The scheme of both the 2001 Regulations and the OC Act includes the empowering of an owners corporation to levy fees, based upon lot liability, and the imposing of an obligation upon a lot owner to pay the fees properly levied.
   • (4) To determine the character of rule 12.1(e), rule 12.1 should be read as a whole.
   • (5) The chapeau of rule 12.1 expresses it to be one for ensuring the safety of the common property, and for the lots affected by the owners corporations, "from fire or other hazards", by closing off or restricting lot owners' or occupiers' access to parts of the common property.
   • (6) Ensuring safety of the common property and lots from fire or other hazards is something which had a direct and substantial connection between the statutory purpose and the likely operation of the rule to that extent.
2. If Additional Rule 12.1 had stopped at the end of paragraph (b), or even if it had stopped at the end of paragraph (d), I would have regarded it as valid in accordance with the law as set out in the Balcombe case.
3. Additional Rule 1.2 does not stop there, however. It goes on in paragraph (e) to purport to empower the OCs to cancel a security card or key for a lot owner is in arrears of payment of levies for more than two quarters.
4. The lot owners who are members of the OCs are the beneficial owners, as tenants in common, of the common property in the Watergate subdivision in shares proportionate to the lot entitlement of their respective lots.[9] One begins with the legal position that each lot owner has just as much right as any other to enter upon common property. Any rule that limits a lot owner's right of entry to common property is a limitation to a property right than the lot owner has. To the extent that the limitation operates to make the common property more safe and secure from fire and other hazards, the limitation is consistent with the statutory purpose of managing and maintaining the common property and the rule creating the limitation is valid.
5. Whether a lot owner is or is not in arrears of payment of levies has nothing to do with making the common property safer or more secure from fire or from other hazards. Additional Rule 12.1(e) does not operate to achieve that end. Its effect is to enable the OCs to punish a lot owner who is in arrears of payment of more than two quarters' levies.
6. Mr Rudd argued that because the OCs were empowered by statute to require lot owners to pay levies, and needed to recover the levies in order to meet the expenses involved in carrying out that statutory function of maintaining and repairing common property, there was a sufficiently direct and substantial connection between the statutory purpose and the likely operation of rule 12.1(e). I do not accept that argument. Punishment of a lot owner by depriving the lot owner with a means of process to common property of which the lot owner is a part owner in equity goes well beyond the limits of the statutory purpose of administration and management of common property.
7. So I conclude that Additional Rule 12.1(e) is invalid. As the un-numbered paragraph (m) at the beginning of the Additional Rules provided for, that paragraph of the rule can and should be severed from the rest of the rule so that the rest of the rule remains valid.
8. Ms Cheung has not asked me to declare that Additional Rule 12.1(e) is invalid, so I shall not. She has asked to be compensated for her swipe card being de-activated so that she has been denied access to the fifth floor.
9. General meetings of the OCs are held in a meeting room on the fifth floor. One consequence of the de-activation of Ms Cheung's card has been that she cannot gain automatic access to the place where the general meetings are held. Ms Francis gave evidence that there is always an OC representative available to escort to the general meetings those lot owners whose cards do not allow them access to the fifth floor. Ms Cheung could have availed herself of the escorting service if she chose to attend a meeting. She gave no evidence of ever having wanted to attend a general meeting since her card was de-activated. She has not made out any claim for compensation for the inability to attend general meetings.
10. The de-activation of her card took place in humiliating circumstances. Mr Delves confronted her in the presence of her daughter and Mr Appleton - there was no evidence that any other person was present - and there was a heated argument: so heated that the police were called. She ought to be compensated for the humiliation. Moreover, she and her daughter have been unable to use the pool or the gymnasium. She ought to be compensated for that too. In each case the compensation should be nominal. I shall order the OCs to pay her compensation of $1,000.00 for having denied her access to part of the common property by de-activating her card when the OCs had no legal entitlement to do that.

1. This decision does not mean that all other lot owners who have had swipe cards de-activated because they have not paid their fees can rush to claim compensation. I am awarding nominal compensation to Ms Cheung because of the unusual and humiliating circumstances in which the de-activation of her card occurred.

1. Ms Cheung has alleged that the OCs have entered into contracts without first having gone through a tender process, have conferred financial benefits on the chairperson Ms Francis and others, and have been paying contractors who have submitted false and inflated invoices. Those are serious allegations.
2. The contracts in question appear to be those with the Kingston Management Group (the management contract), Brenda Wright and her cleaning company WWW Cleaning Services Pty Ltd and the building manager (first Mr Delves then his company Woodward and Bernstein until Mr Delves's retirement in mid-2018).
3. The OCs led evidence that satisfied me that there had been a proper tender process followed in the engagement of the owners corporation manager and of the cleaning contractor, Ms Francis gave evidence that Kingston Management Group had been one of six companies that had submitted tenders for the management contract and that Ms Wright's company had been one of three companies that submitted tenders for the cleaning contract. The management contract is reviewed every 3 or 4 years and the cleaning contract was originally for 3 years. There was no evidence of there having been tenders for the appointment of the building manager, but as Mr Delves had been a satisfactory assistant manager for six months it was reasonable for the OCs to appoint him as manager without putting the position out to tender.
4. As for the allegation of improperly conferred financial benefits to individuals, the only evidence that had any logical connection at all to such an allegation was evidence that the OCs had made a one-off sponsorship payment to a residents' action group calling itself "Watergate We Live Here" in which Ms Francis is active. Apparently the purpose of the group is to look after the interests of owner-occupiers in high rise apartment buildings like the Watergate Apartments by making the group's views known to the state government and to local government. If the members of the OCs disapproved of the payment they had the opportunity to express their disapproval at general meetings of the members. There was no evidence of any disapproval.
5. I was satisfied also that there was nothing in the allegation of payment of false and inflated invoices. Ms Darray gave evidence, which I accept, of her own scrutiny of tradesmans' invoices and of her checking with Mr Delves that they had attended for the times claimed, and of the OCs' accounts officer Mr Krygger auditing the payments every three months.

1. Ms Cheung criticised the committee for having incurred considerable legal costs in the Balcombe case where the OCs had failed at VCAT and had failed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Balcombe case concerned one of the Additional Rules that purported to prohibit lot owners from entering into short-term letting of their apartments. I would not be surprised if there were other members of the OCs who experienced litigator's remorse and were unhappy about the size of the legal costs. There was no evidence, however, of a groundswell of dissatisfaction about the matter. Ms Cheung has not persuaded me that for that reason or for any other reason the appointment of any committee member or of the owners corporation manager should be revoked.
2. When Mr Appleton occupied the car parking space next to Ms Cheung's he fitted a storage cabinet at the front of his space. One side of the cabinet covers the painted line that separated his space from hers. The cabinet has remained even though Mr Appleton no longer owns a lot or that parking space. No common property is involved. Action by Ms Cheung concerning the encroachment, minor though it is, upon her car parking space should be brought, if at all, against the present owner of the adjacent car parking space; not against the OCs.
3. Ms Cheung has alleged that Ms Francis, Mr Delves, and Mr Appleton have been stalking her. The allegation gives rise to private disputes between her and those persons, not to an owners corporation dispute, as defined by the OC Act.[10] The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the private disputes. The only comments I make are, first, that it is not surprising that Ms Francis as chairperson of the OCs has shown an interest in Ms Cheung's various court appearances by being present as them, and, secondly, that it would be difficult to imagine a person less likely to fit the stalker's typical profile than Ms Francis.
4. Ms Cheung is unhappy about the state of cleanliness of the building. The committee is not. Ms Francis told me that the committee considers that the cleaning contract is being performed satisfactorily. There has been no evidence of any other occupier's dissatisfaction with the cleaning. There the complaint should, and does, rest.
5. Ms Cheung complains that her door is painted a different colour from other doors: brown instead of black. Ms Darray told me that she would readily arrange for the door to be painted black if Ms Cheung would be prepared to allow the door to be open for 8 hours so that the painting could be done. Given Ms Cheung's evidence about trespassing into her apartment, I doubt that she would agree to leave her door open for that length of time, but that is a matter for her to decide.

Television reception is achieved by there being antennas on the common property roof. During the proceeding Ms Cheung complained that she could get reception on her television set for only two of the free-to-air channels and that the reception for one of them was poor. Ms Darray told me that other residents had complained of poor reception and she had had the problem fixed. I was left with the impression that until the hearing Ms Cheung had not efficiently communicated her complaint to the OCs or, if she had, that they had not dealt with it efficiently. I propose to give her leave to begin a fresh proceeding, limited to her complaint about television reception: a complaint that was almost lost amongst all the other complaints aired during the hearing.

1. Wherever I have not mentioned any complaint that Ms Chung aired during the hearing, it is because I regarded the complaint as not deserving any remedy against the OCs or against anyone else.

1. I shall order the OCs to pay to Ms Cheung compensation of $1,000.00 for the damage done to her by the de-activation of her swipe card so that she could not enter the fifth floor. I shall give leave to her to begin a fresh proceeding on the matter of the television reception if she sees fit to begin one. Otherwise the proceeding is dismissed.

[1] There was a period of about 12 months when Ms Darray was not involved in managing the OCs.

[4] Owners Corporations Act 2006 ("the OC Act") s 205, Schedule 2, item 5.

[6] What is now called an owners corporation in the OC Act was called a "body corporate" under earlier legislation.

[7] [2016] VSC 384.

[9] Subdivision Act 1988 s 30.