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The first matter was a mismatch in the Registry's document recording the 24 May order. The order itself dismissed the plaintiff's application, but the document stated, under “Appearances”, that the application was “Determined pursuant to Rule 13.03.1”. Beech-Jones J said the reasons for the earlier dismissal made clear that the application had been dismissed pursuant to r 25.09.1. The reference to r 13.03.1 was “clearly an error” and was corrected under r 3.01.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) [1].

The second matter was costs. In their earlier substantive submissions, the second to fourth defendants had said, in accordance with Form 12A, that they “do not seek any special costs order”. They later argued that they had implicitly sought the usual costs order and asked the Court to address costs. The plaintiff opposed a costs order, arguing that the omission in the earlier reasons was deliberate [2].

The Court agreed with the plaintiff on the point about what the earlier submission meant. It said the absence of any reference to costs in its earlier reasons was deliberate, and that a statement that a party does not seek special costs is not an application for ordinary costs. The Court stated: “If a party seeks an order for costs, it should do so expressly” [3]. However, the defendants subsequently sought an order for costs. The Court made one, ordering the plaintiff to pay their costs up to and including 24 May 2024 [4].

The parties were described as follows: the plaintiff and first defendant were unrepresented, while the second to fourth defendants were represented by Clayton Utz. The reasons do not set out the underlying facts or merits of the plaintiff's original application. For that context, the judgment refers to Chen v A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2024] HCASJ 20, but does not reproduce the full reasons in that matter.

Why the court decided this way

The correction addressed a record that did not match the Court's reasons. Beech-Jones J distinguished the operative dismissal from the inaccurate rule reference appearing in the Registry document. The earlier order had dismissed the application without a hearing, and the reasons indicated that r 25.09.1 was the applicable rule. The Court therefore treated the reference to r 13.03.1 as a correctable error and amended the record to use r 25.09.1 [1], [4]. The judgment does not set out the text of either rule, so it supports the conclusion that the reference was erroneous, but not a wider account of the rules' operation.

On costs, the Court drew a precise distinction between not seeking a special costs order and seeking ordinary costs. The defendants' earlier Form 12A submission used the former wording. The Court said that, however the phrase “do not seek any special costs order” might be parsed, it was not a request that costs be paid on the usual basis. It treated the omission of costs from the earlier reasons as deliberate, rather than as an oversight to be corrected [2]-[3].

That did not end the issue. The defendants later made an express request for costs. The Court considered that request and stated that there was “no reason” why the defendants should not receive their costs in light of the findings made previously. It referred to the earlier assessment that the plaintiff's application was “completely untenable” [3]. The order was limited by its terms to costs “up to and including 24 May 2024” [4]. The reasons do not explain the basis for any costs after that date.

The Court also addressed s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Its reasoning was conditional: it did not decide whether s 570 applied to the plaintiff's application. Instead, it said that even if the section applied, it would not preclude a costs order because the proceedings had been initiated “without reasonable cause” [3]. The footnote identifies the earlier decision, [2024] HCASJ 20 at [10], as the source for that finding. The present judgment therefore applies the earlier finding to answer the costs objection; it does not give a general exposition of s 570.

Before and after state of the law

This judgment does not announce a new general rule about correction of court orders or costs. It applies the High Court Rules to a particular discrepancy and explains how the Court understood the defendants' specific earlier costs submission.

Before this decision, the 24 May 2024 dismissal had been recorded in a Registry document with a reference to r 13.03.1, although the reasons identified r 25.09.1 as the basis for dismissal. After this decision, the document was to state “Determined pursuant to Rule 25.09.1” instead [1], [4]. The ruling is thus a procedural correction to the record, not a reversal or reconsideration of the dismissal.

For costs, the decision makes clear how the Court read the phrase used in this case: “do not seek any special costs order” did not amount to a request for ordinary costs [2]-[3]. The Court's express statement that a costs application should be made expressly is the clearest general procedural proposition in the reasons [3]. It should be read in context: the Court was deciding whether this particular submission had sought costs, not setting out a comprehensive code for costs applications.

The eventual costs order followed the defendants' later request and the Court's reliance on its previous findings. The decision therefore illustrates that a court may distinguish between an earlier non-request and a later express application. It does not say that the later request was merely a correction of an earlier costs application; to the contrary, the Court said the earlier reasons had omitted costs deliberately because the defendants had not asked for them expressly [3].

The judgment's treatment of s 570 is similarly narrow. It records no decision on whether that provision applied. Its stated alternative reasoning is that, if the provision applied, the proceedings were initiated without reasonable cause, as found in the earlier decision [3]. Nothing in the reasons supports extending that conclusion to other proceedings or circumstances.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [1], Beech-Jones J said the reference to r 13.03.1 “is clearly an error” and would be corrected. In plain English, the Court considered the reasons for the earlier dismissal and the rule number in the Registry document, found they did not match, and corrected the document. The judgment says this was done under r 3.01.2. It does not suggest the underlying dismissal was itself changed.

At [2], the defendants' earlier submission was that they “do not seek any special costs order”. The defendants later argued this implicitly meant they sought ordinary costs. The plaintiff contended the omission of costs had been deliberate. At [3], the Court accepted that the earlier words did not expressly seek ordinary costs and confirmed that the omission was deliberate. The distinction is important: a statement about not seeking a special order was not treated as a request for a usual order.

The Court's statement at [3], “If a party seeks an order for costs, it should do so expressly”, translates the Court's view into a practical procedural point: the request should be made clearly rather than inferred from wording about special costs. The judgment does not prescribe a particular form of words beyond referring to the express request requirement.

Also at [3], the Court described the application as “completely untenable”. In this judgment, that description is linked to its earlier findings and supports its decision to award costs. The reasons refer to [2024] HCASJ 20 at [10]-[13] for those findings. The detailed underlying reasoning is not reproduced here, so this passage should not be treated as a standalone account of why the original application was dismissed.

Finally, the Court said that even if s 570 applied, the proceedings were initiated “without reasonable cause” [3]. In plain English, the Court did not need to decide whether s 570 governed the application to address the objection: on the alternative assumption that it did, the Court considered the earlier finding about reasonable cause sufficient to permit the costs order.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The most directly relevant factual pattern is a court order whose recorded description contains a rule number that conflicts with the reasons explaining the order. In this case, the mismatch was between r 13.03.1 in the Registry document and r 25.09.1 in the reasons. Beech-Jones J treated the mismatch as a clear error and corrected the record under r 3.01.2 [1], [4]. Whether a different discrepancy can be corrected would depend on its own record and procedural context; this judgment does not establish that every inconsistency is correctable.

The costs discussion is most relevant where a party's earlier submission refers only to not seeking a special costs order, but that party later seeks ordinary costs. The decision treats the initial wording as insufficient to request ordinary costs, and emphasises the need for an express request [2]-[3]. It also shows the Court distinguishing that earlier position from a later, express application.

A further feature was the Court's reliance on findings already made in the earlier proceeding. The costs order was not based solely on the phrasing of the costs submission. The Court referred to its earlier findings, including that the application was completely untenable, and stated that the proceedings had been initiated without reasonable cause [3]. The judgment therefore provides limited assistance where a costs question arises without comparable findings or where the relevant statutory provision and factual circumstances differ.

The decision records that the plaintiff opposed both the correction and the costs order. The fact that the correction was made despite the plaintiff's opposition illustrates the Court's treatment of the record as erroneous; it does not establish a general rule that objections to correction or costs have no effect.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later cases treating [2024] HCASJ 24, and the material provided does not establish any subsequent judicial treatment. It would therefore be unsupported to say that later courts have followed, distinguished, applied, or criticised this decision.

The judgment itself refers to Chen v A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia & Ors [2024] HCASJ 20. It relies on that earlier decision for the reasons for the dismissal and for the findings relevant to costs, including the characterisation of the original application and the conclusion about reasonable cause [1], [3]. This is the relationship between the two judgments shown in the supplied text: HCASJ 24 refers back to HCASJ 20. It is not evidence of how later courts treated HCASJ 24.

For research purposes, the holding should accordingly be described at the level supported by the reasons: a short procedural decision correcting a rule reference and making a costs order following an express later request. The text supplied does not permit a broader account of its subsequent precedential status.

Still-open questions

Several matters are left unresolved by the judgment. First, it does not reproduce the text of rr 3.01.2, 13.03.1 or 25.09.1. It records the Court's conclusion that the rule reference was wrong and that r 3.01.2 was the basis for correction, but does not explain the full scope or limits of that rule.

Second, the judgment does not set out a comprehensive procedure or timing requirement for costs requests. It says a party seeking costs should do so expressly and determines that the defendants' earlier wording did not do so. It does not address every possible formulation, the effect of different court forms, or whether any particular procedural rule prescribes how or when an express request must be made.

Third, the ruling does not decide whether s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 applied to the plaintiff's application. It states only that, even if it did, the proceedings were initiated without reasonable cause [3]. The earlier decision is cited as support for that finding, but its full reasoning is not included in the present judgment.

Fourth, the decision does not explain the calculation or amount of costs, nor does it address costs after 24 May 2024. The operative order extends only to costs up to and including that date [4]. It also does not discuss any other potential limitation or exception affecting costs.

These limits matter when stating the decision's significance. The clearest propositions are the correction of the specific erroneous reference and the requirement, in the circumstances considered, that a party seek costs expressly. The costs outcome additionally depended on findings in the earlier proceeding, which are referred to but not fully set out here.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.