Chen & Quen [2026] FedCFamC1A 27 (2 March 2026)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Chen & Quen has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons explain the refusal of leave for the husband to appeal from interlocutory orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 8 October 2025 in long-running financial proceedings, contested by two spouses and many other parties.

1. The spouses were married between 1982 and 2016, though the husband concurrently carried on a de facto relationship with another person ("the respondent") between 1998 and 2015.
2. The underlying financial cause was commenced in June 2016 by the wife against both the husband and the respondent, but many other respondents have since been joined to the proceedings, including liquidators of corporations and receivers of trusts. The liquidators have initiated separate litigation in the Supreme Court of Victoria ("the Supreme Court") relating to the insolvency of the corporations under their administrative control.
3. The husband voluntarily transferred substantial assets to the respondent, which he alleges she has since put beyond the reach of he and the wife.
4. Since the litigation was commenced, there have been a multitude of interlocutory disputes and appellate proceedings, but the financial cause has still not yet been tried.
5. On 2 September 2025, the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking interlocutory relief in the form of, primarily, the Court's grant of permission to him to make allegations of criminal conduct against unnamed persons, but certainly including the respondent, to the Australian Federal Police ("the AFP") or, alternatively, permission to furnish the AFP with certain documents generated in the litigation.
6. His application was entertained and dismissed by the primary judge on 8 October 2025, with this order made:
   1. The [husband's] Application in a Proceeding filed 2 September 2025 be dismissed.

1. By an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 23 January 2026, the husband seeks leave to appeal from the dismissal order.

1. The husband joined two respondents to this appellate proceeding: the respondent and another person ("Mr Q"). The husband describes Mr Q as the "external accountant" of one or more of the liquidated corporations joined to the underlying substantive proceedings.
2. Mr Q is not a party to the underlying financial proceedings but was joined by the husband as a respondent to the interlocutory application dismissed by the primary judge. It remains quite unclear why Mr Q was joined because the husband sought no order directly against him. As it transpired, Mr Q neither appeared at the hearing before the primary judge on 8 October 2025 nor participated in this appellate proceeding.
3. Only the respondent appeared and resisted the application for leave to appeal.

Proposed appeal brought despite breach of orders

1. The respondent contended, without the husband's repudiation, that he remains indebted to her for about $170,000 under various costs orders formerly made at first instance and in earlier appellate proceedings.
2. The respondent contended there is an anterior question about whether the husband's application for leave to appeal ought even be entertained while he is in such egregious default of existing orders, which decision lies within the Court's discretion (Moorcroft & Moorcroft [2018] FamCAFC 253; (2018) FLC 93-881 at [17]-[22]). Since the issue was not raised by the respondent until her Summary of Argument was filed less than a week before the hearing, the husband's application for leave to appeal will be heard on its merit, though he should not expect such latitude again.

1. The dismissal order was interlocutory in nature and so the husband requires leave to appeal from it, which he correctly acknowledged. While discretion is unfettered, the grant of leave to appeal ordinarily requires the applicant to show the decision at first instance is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant appellate scrutiny and, additionally, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision at first instance to be wrong (Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [44]-[57]).
2. As the following reasons reveal, the husband fails to discharge both limbs of that test. He cannot prove error by the primary judge. Nor can he demonstrate his experience of substantial injustice by the deprivation of leave to appeal.

Futility of the subject interlocutory application

1. The first-instance application filed by husband in September 2025 sought this relief:
   1. This proceeding be referred to Australian Federal Police (AFP) for unexplained wealth investigation. Or in the [alternative];
   2. The [husband] be granted leave to provide document listed at FC1(770) to Australian Federal Police (AFP) to request unexplained wealth restraining investigation and crime proceeds recovery.
2. Proposed Order 1 was entirely unnecessary because the husband was free to report any alleged financial crime to the AFP for investigation at any time he pleased without the need for the Court's imprimatur.
3. Proposed Order 2, which was sought in the alternative, was the subject of only this evidence within the husband's accompanying affidavit:
   1. In the alternative, as a victim of this financial crime, I seek leave to be granted for me to provide Australian Federal Police (AFP) relevant documents listed at "FC1(770)" to request an unexplained wealth restraining order investigation and crime proceeds recovery.

1. The exhibit referred to as "FCI(770)" in both proposed Order 2 and the husband's affidavit comprised multiple documents, being:

(a) five affidavits filed by the husband in the proceedings between March 2021 and August 2025;

(b) an affidavit filed by the respondent in June 2021;

(c) any "affidavits or submissions" filed by other parties in response to the husband's affidavit filed in August 2025;

(d) an application filed by the husband in August 2025;

(e) submissions filed by the husband in December 2023; and

(f) all "bank transaction records" produced under subpoena and released to the parties in the proceedings.

1. Proposed Order 2 was also unnecessary.
2. The husband did not need the Court's permission to furnish the AFP with his own affidavits, applications and submissions, to the extent such documents comprised his allegations of criminal conduct by the respondent (and perhaps other parties) and his unverified claims for relief in respect thereof. He could legitimately provide such documents to the AFP for criminal investigation pursuant to the provisions of s 114S(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). The husband should have known that from the reasons for judgment delivered by the Full Court in an earlier appellate proceeding concluded in March 2025 (Quen & Chen [2025] FedCFamC1A 39; (2025) FLC 94-242 at [30]-[40]).
3. The only documents for which the husband potentially required the Court's permission to furnish to the AFP, either pursuant to s 114Q(2) of the Act or by release from his common law undertaking (Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125), were:

(a) the respondent's affidavit filed in June 2021;

(b) any affidavits or submissions filed by other parties in the proceedings; and

(c) the "bank transaction records" produced under subpoena and released to the parties in the proceedings.

1. But in respect of those three classes of documents, several points can be uncontroversially made.
2. First, the respondent denies all the husband's allegations of criminal conduct so neither her affidavit filed in June 2021 nor any other affidavit or submissions she filed in the proceedings contain an admission against her interests which could assist the carriage of any criminal investigation against her. The husband did not point to any aspect of her affidavit which would aid an investigation.
3. Second, the husband did not make any submission directed to establishing that an allegation made against the respondent by any other party to the litigation in a filed affidavit could assist an AFP investigation and/or was in any way materially different from, stronger, or wider than those already made by him.
4. The liquidators supposedly contend within the Supreme Court litigation that the respondent made "voidable transactions" with corporate funds (Pt 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)), but that contention could not have helped sustain the husband's interlocutory application brought before the primary judge. The respondent's alleged misuse of corporate funds at times proximate to the corporations' insolvency in the pending commercial litigation before the Supreme Court is a quite different concept from both the respondent's commission of a criminal offence rendering her liable to prosecution by the AFP and Commonwealth DPP and any allied civil proceedings brought by those entities for the confiscation of money from her due to it being the product of a criminal offence. No money can be confiscated from the respondent as being the proceeds of crime if the money which is the subject of the alleged "voidable transactions" is recovered from the respondent by the liquidators. If the husband is seeking the confiscation of other money from the respondent, then the voidable transactions alleged by the liquidators are not relevant to the husband's additional allegations.
5. Third, on the other hand, if the liquidators' reports would help advance the husband's claims of criminal conduct by the respondent, then he was also free to produce such reports to the AFP pursuant to s 114S(1)(a) of the Act without the need for the Court's permission.
6. Fourth, the "bank transaction records" produced to the Court under subpoena issued in the litigation could easily be procured by the AFP by other methods if the AFP is satisfied by the husband's allegations that further investigation into the respondent's conduct over and above the liquidator's investigation is warranted.
7. Fifth, the husband submitted to the primary judge that the evidence within his affidavits was more than enough to satisfy the AFP of the need for official action against the respondent without needing to supply "bank transaction records" or any other documents, as he submitted this to the primary judge in his written submissions filed on 7 October 2025:
   1. The legal basis of my application filed 2 September 2025 is set out at Section 36K of Confiscation Act 1997 (VIC) "Application for Civil forfeiture restraining order". Unexplained wealth laws permit state and territory governments across Australia to seize tainted assets of individuals who cannot account for their wealth. By 2014, all states introduced such laws except ACT introduced in 2019. The laws have been put into place seeking to target the business model of serious criminal activity such as money laundering or massive tax evasion. The laws are designed to prevent or deter those who contemplate criminal activity by reducing the possibility of keeping a profit from that activity.
   2. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or Federal Police (AFP) may apply to the court for an unexplained wealth restraining order if a police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has engaged in serious criminal activity and obtained profit worth $50,000 or more.

...

1. The evidence provided in my affidavit is clear and sufficient to support an unexplained wealth restraining order application by Federal Police. Section 179B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) allows the Court to make a preliminary unexplained wealth order requiring a person to appear before it to prove the money was lawfully acquired. If [the respondent] chooses not to give evidence for fear of possible criminal consequence, it should not prevent the application of unexplained wealth restraining order to proceed.

(Emphasis added)

1. Consequently, the application seeking the Court's leave to furnish those additional classes of documents to the AFP was unnecessary and its dismissal was inevitable.
2. Aside from the futility of the first instance application rendering the appeal unnecessary, the proposed grounds of the appeal evince no merit.

1. These two grounds are irreconcilable and are rejected.
2. Ground 1 asserts the husband was denied procedural fairness by the primary judge's advertence to reports compiled by the liquidators for use in the allied Supreme Court litigation, whereas Ground 6 asserts the primary judge erred by failing to heed "crucial evidence" given by the liquidators. The husband cannot have it both ways. He cannot complain on the one hand of the primary judge's reliance on the liquidator's evidence and, on the other, complain about his Honour's failure to rely upon the same evidence.
3. Ground 1 contends it was unfair for his Honour to have relied upon the liquidators' reports when such evidence had not been "submitted" or "argued" by the respondent and the evidence had not been put to him for any "response".
4. The complaint is nonsense. The husband relied upon the liquidators' reports and sent them to his Honour by email, as these exchanges in the transcript reveal:

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Yes. Now, the [respondent] says, "Well, look" - so what is said is - the [respondent's] allegations - that is, your allegations in this 2 September 2025 application - are already the subject of the liquidator's investigations and two proceedings within the Supreme Court of Victoria. Now, where's the record of those proceedings?

[The husband]: It's in liquidator's report affidavit, and [the respondent's] submission I have provided a response.

HIS HONOUR: Where do I find that? Where do I find that?

[The husband]: I - actually, should be - should be in the file, because I - I filed them. The submission has been sealed.

HIS HONOUR: Today?

[The husband]: Yes, today. Yesterday. Yesterday.

HIS HONOUR: But where is the liquidator's report?

[The husband]: Liquidator report is actually in file - is over three years, long period.

HIS HONOUR: Listen, my friend - just answer the question, old chap. Where is the - where is the liquidator's report? Where do I find it?

[The husband]: They scanned into at least the seven affidavit.

HIS HONOUR: Well, just send it through to me now on your email.

...

HIS HONOUR: All I want is the liquidator's report.

[The husband]: Report. Okay. That is, altogether, 11 of them.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Good.

[The husband]: Okay.

HIS HONOUR: And if it's in an affidavit, you can tell me where it is.

[The husband]: Okay. Let me send the link - send the affidavit itself. I'm sending the most recent one, going backwards. And liquidator number their affidavits. Altogether - - -

HIS HONOUR: Right. I will stand the matter down. You can attend to this, please, because - - -

[The husband]: Yes, yes. I'm doing it now.

HIS HONOUR: Because if these companies are all wound up in liquidation and the liquidator has provided a report and their work is done, well, that's - I don't know what else this court is meant to do. If there are no assets, there are no assets.

(Transcript 8 October 2025, p.9 line 37 to p.10 line 17; p.11 lines 3-24)

1. Ground 6 contends the primary judge failed to consider the "crucial evidence" given by the liquidators to the effect the second respondent "admitted cash laundering offences in excess of $5 million dollars". The complaint is nonsense.
2. According to the evidence adduced before the primary judge, the respondent made no admission, nor did the liquidators depose she did. The husband knows the respondent has made no admission of criminal conduct because he stated this in his Summary of Argument:
   1. ... The real wrongdoings of [the respondent] and Mr. Q committed are the unexplained mass transfers in breach of relevant money- laundering laws.

1. If the cash transfers allegedly made by the respondent are still "unexplained", then it must follow she has not given any inculpatory explanation for them.

1. This ground alleges the primary judge erred by dismissing the husband's application in so far as it related to Mr Q by failing to provide any reasons.
2. The ground is rejected for two reasons: first, the husband's application related only to the grant of his permission to report criminal conduct and provide certain documents to the AFP, which application did not ostensibly concern Mr Q, particularly when not a party to the underlying proceedings; and secondly, the primary judge did give reasons for the dismissal order.
3. True enough, the primary judge did not publish written reasons to explain the dismissal order, but it is not true to assert the judgment is unexplained. The explanation is plain from the transcript of the hearing. In summary, the primary judge found the dismissal order was justified because the proposed orders should not be made when no definitive factual findings about the respondent's alleged perfidy could be made on untested evidence and, in addition, there were already parallel proceedings pending before the Supreme Court concerning the movement of funds in which the parties are interested, commenced by the liquidators of the corporations joined as parties to the underlying proceedings under the Act.
4. As to the first point, these exchanges in the transcript are evident:

[The husband]: The orders I'm seeking is actually seeking Federal Police investigation.

HIS HONOUR: Well, that's - but how can we order that? What's my power to order that?

[The husband]: That's pursuant to the Victorian Confiscation Act.

HIS HONOUR: But that would require me to make a finding that there's a prima facie ground. But what - I can release you from - I can make orders releasing you from your obligation of confidentiality in relation to the documents, and that was the subject of the appeal decision. Right?

[The husband]: Yes.

...

HIS HONOUR: But what's my - what's the court's power to require them to undertake an investigation?

[The husband]: The court has a power to make finding on reasonable ground that property has been received and retained through unlawful activities. And in my application, it's relying on those large amounts, money laundering activity identified in this proceeding and also tax evasion identified for that - on that basis, the Victoria - the Victoria Confiscation Act 1997 applies. The section 36K allow the court to make a finding, on reasonable ground, that the defendant is subject to - I will explain - with restraining order - under that order, the defendant has obligation to demonstrate to court the money may - may - obtained, unlawfully acquired. And if not, then those - those property or money is subject to - - -

HIS HONOUR: What you need - what you need is independent expert - an independent expert to look at this material and provide an opinion as to what has gone on here. Because the court is not in a position to go through all this material and then to make a - even a prima facie finding that there has been fraud or money laundering or tax avoidance.

...

HIS HONOUR: - - - how is that going to impact - how is that going to affect any case that I've got to decide? And what case do I have to decide? If you say the money is all gone, why don't you just bring it - bring an - deal with this by about way of criminal proceedings?

[The husband]: Look, I can't bring criminal proceedings because criminal proceeding require higher level of evidence ...

...

HIS HONOUR: But if you're - but you can refer to this - the - you can get orders for the documents to be provided and I can make that order, but as to whether the Federal Police investigate it or not, well, that's a matter for you - - -

...

HIS HONOUR: Well, I am not minded to make the orders that you seek. I'm not in a position to make - to make findings that you seek me to make - that there's some prima facie case. I think there's a danger of the court making orders which involve the Federal Police and in significant investigation of all these documents, when in fact the matter is before the Supreme Court and the matters - the question of the control of the companies is being dealt with by the liquidator at the moment.

...

HIS HONOUR: Well, I - on the basis of the application before me, I'm not prepared to make the orders at this point. What I will do is - it's - you haven't explained why this is going to bring this family law proceeding any closer to finality.

(Emphasis added)

(Transcript 8 October 2025 p.3 lines 35-47; p.4 lines 29-46; p.6 lines 37-43; p.7 lines 20-22; p.15 lines 11-16 and lines 30-32)

1. As to the second point, these exchanges in the transcript are evident:

HIS HONOUR: Look, if the matter is before [another named judge] on 17 October, I think I need to know what is going on with the liquidation and get some idea of what's happening with the liquidator. The point is that these claims that you're making - wishing to make and send all these documents to the Federal Police, they're claims that have already being raised by the liquidator. The liquidator has told the court that they have made - they have raised issues with AUSTRAC, for instance, but have had very little response from AUSTRAC. So that's what the liquidator has told the court in its affidavits. Now, one thing the liquidator has said in its correspondence, and in the - in the reports is that your correspondence with them is costing them - costing a lot of money. There are proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria - this is in his affidavit of 4 June. It says:

Following from examinations, I instructed my solicitors to commence the following proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

And proceedings have been issued against [the respondent] in respect of voidable transactions and breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties, and proceedings have been issued against [the respondent and a third party]. And they're seeking relief for breaches of her statutory and fiduciary duties as a director of [corporations]. Now, I'm told this is coming before the court on 17 October. There's going to be an updating affidavit in December 2025. Now, what you're asking me to do now is to not only authorise you to send a whole lot of documents to the Federal Police but actually say that they ought to investigate it - the matter for criminal conduct. Correct?

[The husband]: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I'm not sure I've got the power to do that. It's one thing to refer documents, but I - at this point, I'm not in a position to make a finding about the conduct, particularly where those matters are before another court. They're before the Supreme Court. So effectively, you're wanting two courts to start adjudicating or becoming involved in the same issues.

...

HIS HONOUR: I'm not prepared to make the order at this stage, when the matters that you are seeking to investigate are being - are the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court, and I - and it would be - - -

(Emphasis added)

(Transcript 8 October 2025 p.14 lines 13-43; p.16 lines 1-3)

1. This ground alleges the primary judge erred by determining the parallel Supreme Court litigation covered the same issues as the husband's application pending before his Honour.
2. Of course, it is true the two separate proceedings are not the same, but the primary judge did not say they were. The Supreme Court proceedings concern the past use of funds owned by the insolvent corporations which are now under the liquidators' control. The liquidators are investigating the use or misuse of the insolvent corporations' money and so, to the extent the husband claims the respondent misused such corporate funds, the issues in the Supreme Court proceedings overlap issues in the underlying financial proceedings. His Honour was conscious of how it was not necessary, when determining the husband's interlocutory application, to embark upon any factual enquiry about contentious issues already the subject of the liquidators' investigation and progressive reports.
3. The judge said this during the hearing:

HIS HONOUR: ... There are proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria - this is in his affidavit of 4 June. It says:

Following from examinations, I instructed my solicitors to commence the following proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

And proceedings have been issued against [the respondent] in respect of voidable transactions and breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties, and proceedings have been issued against [the respondent and a third party]. And they're seeking relief for breaches of her statutory 30 and fiduciary duties as a director of [corporate] entities. Now, I'm told this is coming before the court on 17 October ...

...

HIS HONOUR: ... but I - at this point, I'm not in a position to make a finding about the conduct, particularly where those matters are before another court. They're before the Supreme Court. So effectively, you're wanting two courts to start adjudicating or becoming involved in the same issues.

(Emphasis added)

(Transcript 8 October 2025, p.14 lines 22-32 and lines 40-43)

1. The husband said the liquidators were only interested in cash transactions extending back to late 2017 or early 2018, though he wanted to explore transactions even before that time. However, it ought to be noticed that the documents the husband wanted to furnish to the AFP only extended back to 2021. Regardless, the husband was free to report all his allegations against the respondent, Mr Q, or anyone else to the AFP whenever he liked.

1. This ground alleges the primary judge "failed to consider" evidence of the respondent's financial misconduct, which impropriety is alleged to comprise fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion.
2. As pleaded, this is a complaint of discretionary error in the primary judge's decision to dismiss the husband's interlocutory application by failing to consider certain evidence.
3. There are obvious obstacles to the prosecution of this ground. Most significantly, the primary judge did discuss with the husband the allegations he made in his affidavit against the respondent, so there was certainly no failure to consider his evidence. However, the husband's allegations of the respondent's criminal or otherwise improper conduct are just that - bare allegations. They will remain bare allegations unless and until they are proven in either criminal or civil proceedings, which is presumably why the husband perceives the need for the involvement of the AFP.
4. Given the vexed state of the evidence, which was not tested in the interlocutory hearing conducted in September 2025, the primary judge was neither able nor permitted to make findings vindicating the husband's bare allegations. His Honour knew the respondent denied the husband's allegations and so could not summarily reject her rebuttal.

1. This ground alleges the primary judge failed to consider Mr Q's financial misconduct, which impropriety is also alleged to comprise fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion.
2. It is rejected for the same reasons the husband's allegations against the respondent are rejected under the rubric of Ground 4. Moreover, as Mr Q is not a party to the underlying financial proceedings and no relief is sought against him, allegations of his misconduct lead nowhere.

1. This ground is pleaded as follows:
   1. ... The primary judge erred in finding restraining order or Federal Police investigation applications are criminal proceedings and reluctant to make a finding.
2. The submissions made by the husband in support of this ground in his Summary of Argument comprise these:
   1. Proceeding against [the respondent] in Supreme court is a narrow, single issue of unreasonable director's related transactions from companies for a short 4 years periods between end 2017 and May 2022. Legal basis against her is breach of Section 180,181,182,183 and 184 of the Corporations Act. Total repayment amount demanded to laundry entities in liquidation is around $5.6 million dollars. This is disclosed in liquidator's initial letter of demand dated 5 December 2022. (see Appeal Book 703 to 724) Liquidator is required to file investigation progress report affidavit every 6 months to Family Court. Liquidator made 7 affidavits after initial letter of demand issued. (see Appeal Book 24 transcript P13L40) He did not make any additional allegations against [the respondent]. Liquidator did not make any substantial investigation report relating to the excessive ATM cash withdrawals identified in subpoena released bank records.
   2. Allegations against [the respondent] in this proceeding is money laundering activities amounted to financial crime. Most of the ATM cash withdrawals are made from her personal bank accounts. The legal basis against her is Section 40F of the Confiscation Act 1997 (VIC) offence. It is a civil proceeding but require reasonable grounds that the offender has engaged in serious criminal activity.

1. Several propositions are uncontroversial. The Supreme Court proceedings brought by the liquidators are only civil in nature. While the husband alleges the respondent's criminal misconduct and he might be gratified by her ultimate prosecution in relation to it, for the time being, he is satisfied by civil proceedings being brought against her by an authorised official entity to recover funds said to be the proceeds of criminal conduct under the provisions of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) ("the State Act") or the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ("the federal Act"), which is the counterpart federal statute.
2. However, the complaint within this ground proceeds from a mistaken premise.
3. In his written submissions to the primary judge, the husband said this:
   1. The evidence provided in my affidavit is clear and sufficient to support an unexplained wealth restraining order application by Federal Police. Section 179B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) allows the Court to make a preliminary unexplained wealth order requiring a person to appear before it to prove the money was lawfully acquired. If [the respondent] chooses not to give evidence for fear of possible criminal consequence, it should not prevent the application of unexplained wealth restraining order to proceed.

1. In these proceedings, the husband submitted this in his Summary of Argument:
   1. The restraining order application and Federal police investigation application is not a criminal proceeding application. SEC315 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 confirmed clearly that the application is civil. Rules in criminal proceedings do not apply to this application. Restraining order can be enforced without criminal conviction against the offenders. The Federal Police or DPP (Director of Public Prosecutions) investigation for restraining order application can be made to any Australian court including Family Court. The disclosed bank records and offenders' own admissions are sufficient evidence to make such an application.

1. Contrary to the husband's belief, the primary judge had no jurisdiction or power to make an interlocutory injunction under the State and federal statutes cited. The purpose of the State Act is to enable orders compelling the forfeiture of the proceeds of certain criminal offences. The jurisdiction to make forfeiture orders and injunctions under the State Act is vested in State courts. Similarly, the federal Act only confers jurisdiction and power on courts which have "jurisdiction to deal with criminal matters on indictment in [a] State or Territory" (ss 314, 324 and 335), which did not include the primary judge.
2. His Honour was only exercising the federal jurisdiction and power conferred under the Act and had no business enquiring into legal and factual issues relevant to the operation of the State and federal statutes. It will be remembered the only application entertained by his Honour was for the grant of permission to the husband to report criminal conduct and to provide certain documents to the AFP to assist in an investigation.

1. On 6 February 2026, the husband filed an Application in an Appeal seeking leave to adduce further evidence in the appeal, being his affidavit filed in support on 6 February 2026, containing his narrative about the importance of the annexed documents.
2. The application was listed for hearing in conjunction with the appeal (r 13.39(4) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules").
3. Neither the documents nor the husband's narrative about them are relevant to the disposition of his application for leave to appeal.
4. Of the 10 annexed documents, four are historical and were not tendered to the primary judge when they could have been, for which the husband provides no explanation and which failure is fatal (CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [55], [111], [114], [116] and [186.9]; r 13.39(2)(d) of the Rules).
5. Another five documents were created after the hearing in October 2025 and comprise, first, correspondence between the husband and the liquidators in November and December 2025, and secondly, an excerpt of written submissions made by him to the primary judge at another procedural hearing held in January 2026 for the underlying proceedings. The husband does not explain how those documents advance the proposed grounds of appeal (r 13.39(2)(b) of the Rules) and the connection is not so obvious as to justify him not giving any explanation. Unless the evidence would likely have produced a different result, and it would probably not, it should not be received (CDJ v VAJ at [109], [111], [140]-[151] and [169]).
6. The last document is the curriculum vitae of Mr Q, which could not conceivably have any bearing on this appellate proceeding.
7. The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed.

1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The two active parties in the appeal were self-represented so no question of costs arises.

I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Austin, Gill & Christie.