1. Section 75 of the VCAT Act gives VCAT power to summarily dismiss or strike out all or any part of a proceeding that in its opinion (relevantly here) is misconceived or lacking in substance.
2. Rabel v State Electricity Commission [1998] 1 VR 12 describes how VCAT should decide s 75 applications. VCAT is to be cautious before it makes such an order, which deprives an applicant of the chance for the case to be heard. VCAT will only make such an order if it is satisfied the case is manifestly hopeless, untenable, doomed to fail, discloses no reasonable cause of action or on no reasonable ground can justify relief.
3. For the purposes of this application it should be assumed Mr Charles will be able to prove the alleged facts on which he bases his application.
4. The EO Act, which is remedial legislation, in that it gives benefits to persons and thereby remedies injustice, should be interpreted such that the interpretation is favourable to those who benefit from the legislation.[3]
5. I have also considered s 32 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 which requires, so far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, that all statutory provisions be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.

1. Section 4 of the EO Act defines "Services" to inclusively mean:
   • (a) Access to and use of any place that members of the public are permitted to enter;
   • (b) Banking services, the provision of loans or finance, financial accommodation, credit guarantees and insurance;
   • (c) Provision of entertainment, recreation or refreshment;
   • (d) Services connected with transportation or travel;
   • (e) Services of any profession, trade or business, including those of an employment agent;
   • (f) Services provided by a government department, public authority, State owned enterprise or municipal council-

but does not include education or training in an educational institution.

1. Section 44 of the EO Act is central to this application. It says a person must not discriminate against another person (because of an attribute of a person - here disability), whether or not the goods or services are provided for payment:
   • (a) By refusing to provide goods or services to the other person; or
   • (b) In the terms on which goods or services are provided to the other person; or
   • (c) By subjecting the other person to any other detriment in connection with the provision of goods or services to him or her.

The Corrections Act

1. The term "services" first appears in s 1 of the Corrections Act 1986, which says the purposes of the Corrections Act are to provide for
   • (a) The establishment, management and security of prisons and the welfare of prisoners; and
   • (b) The administration of services related to community-based corrections and for the welfare of offenders; and
   • (c) Other correctional services.
2. Section 1 does not use "services" with respect to prisoners. It only uses "services" (as distinct from "correctional services") with respect to "community based corrections and for the welfare of offenders". It appears the term, "welfare of offenders" relates largely, if not exclusively to people who are subject to correctional orders, being people not in prison.[4]

1. The Corrections Act does not define "services". Section 3 relevantly defines "correctional services":

correctional services means the following services -

(a) prisons and services related to prisons or prisoners; ...

1. The term "correctional services" appears to relate to the provision of correctional services by a contractor to the State of Victoria (see Part 2A of the Corrections Act). Similarly "custodial services" appears to relate to the provision of custodial services by a contractor to the State of Victoria.
2. To the extent that it refers to what is provided to prisoners, Parliament appears to have introduced a specific term to differentiate "correctional services" from the ordinary meaning of "services".
3. Section 20 addresses the duties of officers in charge of a prison concerning security and welfare. Section 21 addresses the Governor of a prison's responsibilities for the management, security and good order of the prison and the safe custody and welfare of the prisoners. The sections do not refer to providing "services".
4. Section 47 sets out the rights of prisoners, including to be provided with adequate food, including where needed for medical reasons, suitable clothing and reasonable medical care and treatment. The term "services" does not appear.
5. Section 84G deals with prison industries providing services from a prison to the community.
6. Part 9E concerns when a person may use or disclose personal or confidential information if the use or disclosure is reasonably necessary for the performance of the relevant person's official duties. Those "official duties" include, "the provision of training, education or health-related services to a prisoner" (s 104ZX).
7. Also at s 104ZX, the definition of "relevant person" includes providing "services", but only to the Department of Justice.
8. The Corrections Regulations 2009 do not use the term, "services". They address many aspects of prison life including management, security and prison discipline.

1. In submissions, Mr Charles drew my attention to the following publications:
   • (a) Commissioner's Requirements - Anti-Discrimination with Respect to Prisoners by Corrections dated August 2014. In its definitions it says:

Provision of certain benefits or services or facilities to prisoners (such as recreational facilities education) may attract the operation of anti-discrimination legislation. However, the definition of 'services' in anti-discrimination legislation does not automatically pertain to all prison "services" and must be considered in each case. Where there is doubt, prison operators should seek appropriate legal advice.

(b) The Prison and Information Booklet, Metropolitan Remand Centre, July 2014; a Department of Justice publication. It is littered with reference to services being provided to prisoners, primarily at the Remand Centre but with reference to services provided at prisons. It refers to legal services, programs and services, welfare services, health services, laundry services, Clinical and Drug and Alcohol Services, property services, pre-release services, library services, chaplaincy and faith services, education services, professional services to assist prisoners address their offending behaviour, personal development or release into the community. It refers to Corrections Victoria as a "service agency";[5]

(c) The Victorian Ombudsman's Investigation into the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners in Victoria - Discussion Paper - October 2014. The Ombudsman is examining the effectiveness of rehabilitation and transitional services for prisoners. Mr Charles specifically drew my attention to paragraph 3.10 of the Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia, "Programmes and services provided to address criminogenic needs". The Report speaks of Corrections developing prisoner education, training and employment services.

1. In IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1, the High Court of Australia considered "services" as defined in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA). Brennan CJ and McHugh J held [page 11]:

The term "services" has a wide meaning. The Macquarie Dictionary relevantly defines it to include "an act of helpful activity"; "the providing or a provider of some accommodation required by the public, as messengers, telegraphs, telephones, or conveyance"; "the organised system of apparatus, appliances, employees, etc, for supplying some accommodation required by the public"; "the supplying or the supplier of water, gas, or the like to the public"; and "the duty or work of public servants".

1. They decided a council in refusing a planning application did not provide a service.
2. Dawson and Gaudron JJ said [page 23] "services", "is a word of complete generality, should not be given a narrow construction unless that is clearly required by definition or by context." They also referred to the ordinary meaning of "services". I take them to accept dictionary definitions, such as quoted by Brennan CJ and McHugh J as expressing the ordinary meaning of "services".
3. Gummow J [page 4 1] spoke of the wide and varied meaning of the term. He characterised the council making town planning decisions as serving the community as it discharged its functions under the relevant legislation and conferring a personal benefit or advantage upon successful applicants for planning permission. He quoted [page 42] the Concise Oxford Dictionary which referred to service including providing assistance or benefit given to someone or the act of helping or doing work for another or for the community. He quoted [page 44] English Court of Appeal authority to the effect that police officers provide services in providing protection to the victims of crimes of violence.
4. Kirby J [page 68] also quoted the Macquarie Dictionary definition. After substantial discussion he decided [page 74] the town planning decision, "can undoubtedly be helpful and valuable to the recipients".
5. Toohey J decided the council in deciding the town planning application either provides or refuses a service. He cited the courts below but did not address the issue in detail.
6. In Rainsford v State of Victoria (2007), (Rainsford - Sundberg J), Sundberg J, held with respect to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cwlth), that transport and the accommodation of prisoners in cells were inherent parts of incarceration and were not helpful or beneficial to the prisoners concerned. Therefore, they could not be characterised as services provided to prisoners.
7. He said [73]:

The question must be whether the act is helpful or beneficial to the relevant class of persons to which the person alleging discrimination belongs.

... transport is an inherent part of incarceration. Prisoners on remand must attend court for their hearings. Prisoners in low-security prisons who are re-classified must be moved to higher-security prisons. The prison system simply could not function without prison transport. It is an artificial use of the word service to apply it to a fundamental integer of a system over which those affected have no or almost no control.

The accommodation of prisoners in cells within the prison system is similarly an inherent part of incarceration. Prisoners must be housed somewhere within the prison system and that this is so demonstrates that for a prisoner to have a cell is not a helpful or beneficial activity so far as the prisoner is concerned. In so far as there is choice in the allocation of prison cells, it is a purely administrative and prison management matter. It does not, of itself, provide prisoners with a benefit. Rather, it is better described as being "part and parcel of the exercise of a statutory duty and cannot be described as the provision of a service or services" ...

1. Sundberg J [79] accepted certain facilities provided to prisoners may constitute services for the purposes of the Disability Discrimination Act:

Attending to the welfare of prisoners is an important legal obligation placed on both respondents. This is all the more so given the vulnerabilities of prisoners who are unable to do much to control their circumstances within prisons. It is for this reason that I accept that certain facilities provided by the respondents to prisoners may constitute services for the purposes of the DDA.

To suggest that transport of prisoners or cell accommodation is a service to prisoners is to ignore the fact that they are functions performed in order to comply with the sometimes competing obligations of prison management to its prisoners, its staff and the public and the good governance of the prison.

1. On appeal, in Rainsford v State of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 31; (2008) 167 FCR 26 [9] (Rainsford - Full Court), the Full Court of the Federal Court briefly addressed the "services". It said:

In this case it is not necessary to consider whether his Honour erred in his interpretation of the expressions "service" or "facility". This is because, if, as we think, his Honour's conclusions on the other aspects of the claim are correct, this question does not arise. We observe that, although the meaning of "service" is not simple to resolve, and the matter was not argued in depth, we see some strength in the view that the provision of transport and accommodation, even in a prison, may amount to a service or facility.

1. Turning to VCAT decisions, in Alipek v GSL Custodial Services Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 845, McKenzie DP, while not expressing a concluded view, saw it as arguable that the provision of prison industry work for prisoners to perform is a service. She regarded it as beneficial in providing prisoners training and not an inherent part of incarceration, given the Secretary of the Department of Justice had discretion to decide whether to direct a prisoner to do such work.
2. In Geddes v Australian Labor Party (Victorian Branch) [2009] VCAT 409, VCAT dismissed a proceeding under s 75 of the VCAT Act on the basis that the Australian Labor Party does not provide a service in offering the facility of membership or in providing a disciplinary process under its rules. In reaching a conclusion, Harbison J said the disciplinary process was not a function which conferred any benefit, or advantage or welfare on Mr Geddes. It was not a facility offered to the public. The ALP was obliged under its rules to put the procedure in place.
3. In Egan v State of Victoria [2011] VCAT 1364, VCAT found Corrections Victoria did not provide a service in classifying a prisoner and in separating him from other prisoners. Coghlan DP dismissed the proceeding under s 75 of the VCAT Act. she said:

The scope of the word "services" used in similar contexts, has been given a wide meaning. There has been an emphasis on looking at whether the services are an "act of helpful activity" or there is some "action of supplying, helping or benefiting conduct tending to the welfare or advantage of another".

I agree with the respondent's submission that in classifying Mr Egan and in separating him from other prisoners, the respondent was not carrying out an activity of help or benefit to Mr Egan. Rather, its officers were carrying out their functions of maintaining the management, security and good order of Loddon prison and of administering Mr Egan's sentence of imprisonment. These activities were inherent parts of his incarceration, and were not services provided to him as contemplated by s 42 of the Act.

1. Turning to Queensland, in NC & Ors v Queensland Correctional Services Commission (1998) EOC 92-940, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal found the Correctional Services Commission treated HIV positive prisoners unfavourably by housing them in a medical segregation unit, not giving them the option to work in the kitchen prison, not being permitted to attend the oval at the same time as mainstream protection prisoners and the one prisoner being segregated after he was transferred to another prison. The transfer from prison to prison was apparently not complained of. The Tribunal noted the decision of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal, Western Australia in Hoddy v Executive Director Department of Corrective Services (1992) EOC 92-397. In that case, the Western Australian Tribunal found the respondent provided services to prisoners in its custody and care as defined by ss 66A and 66K of the then current Western Australian anti-discrimination legislation. However, these decisions predated the High Court in IWL.

1. The activities of which Mr Charles complains only fall within the EO Act's definition of "services" in s 4, if they can be characterised as "services" provided by government", in paragraph (f) of the definition.
2. The strong theme that runs through the above quote cases from IWL forward is the concept of "service" involves the element of helpful, beneficial, advantage aimed at welfare, not an inherent part of incarceration.
3. In Rainsford, the Full Court, as an aside, said transport and accommodation, in a prison, may amount to a service or facility. The Full Court did not decide the point.
4. In Egan, VCAT applied concepts of the element of helpful, beneficial, advantage aimed at welfare, not an inherent part of incarceration. In Alipek, VCAT saw the same elements as relevant.
5. The complaints considered in NC & Ors could be said to relate to the provision of benefit to the prisoners in question. However, given it was decided before IWL, it is of limited assistance. Likewise for Hoddy.
6. I have analysed Mr Charles' application as raising 60 issues.
7. I have noted the Commission's letter seeking to intervene. It said the proceeding raises questions about the meaning of "services" under the EO Act and whether Corrections provides services to prisoners. The Commission considers that the meaning of "services" in the prison environment in the existing case law is "unsettled".
8. While that has bolstered my view that some of Mr Charles' points of claim are arguable, it has largely not done so. It appears the Commission was content with such an outcome, given it did not seek to make submissions in the course of hearing Corrections' Application.

1. In IWL, while their Honours spoke of the broad meaning of "services", they also spoke of its ordinary meaning. Those who directly addressed the meaning of the term focused on concepts of helpfulness, etc.
2. I have rejected the submission that it is arguable that Corrections provides services to Mr Charles when it is predominantly making decisions as it seeks to provide management, security and good order of the prison and the safe custody and welfare of the prisoners. In my view, the ordinary meaning of "services", interpreted broadly, does not arguably stretch to encompass the above.
3. The required elements of helpful, beneficial, advantage aimed at welfare, not an inherent part of incarceration, are not present. The defining of "corrective services", apparently separate to "services" supports this approach.
4. Where I have rejected Mr Charles' submission that an activity falls within "services", I have dismissed that issue in his application. I have done so under s 75(1) of the VCAT Act on the basis that the application with respect to that issue is misconceived and lacking in substance.
5. I have accepted it is arguable Corrections provides some services to Mr Charles. In my opinion, there are issues where, arguably, the required benefit exists and there is not a sufficient inherent aspect of incarceration.
6. In summary I have decided to dismiss issues in the application as follows:
   • (a) Complaints about decisions made in relation to disciplinary and security issues - not service; dismissed.

Decisions in the context of disciplinary issues do not involve the provision of services as there is not the required element of benefit. Further, such decisions are an inherent part of incarceration. Decisions concerning security issues are primarily made with respect to the good governance of the prison. This is not changed by the fact that at times a prisoner may benefit to a varying degree, say if a security decision provides protection. See Geddes and Alipek.

(b) Complaints about a urine screen drug test and the way he was treated after a positive cannabinoids test - not service; dismissed.

There is no element of benefit and a strong element of being inherent to incarceration. It is part and parcel of the security/disciplinary regime within prisons. See Geddes.

(c) Complaints about his changed security rating - not service; dismissed.

Again, there is no element of benefit and a strong element of being inherent to incarceration. It is part and parcel of the security/disciplinary regime within prisons. See Egan.

(d) Complaints about different rules at different prisons with regard to hair clippers - not service; dismissed.

The making of rules cannot constitute a service. Corrections does not make or enforce rules concerning hair clippers in order to benefit particular prisoners. See Egan.

(e) Complaints about decisions made with respect to where Mr Charles was located within the prison system (i.e. which prison) - not service; dismissed.

Decisions concerning prisoner location between prisons are an inherent part of incarceration. Overall they address management security and good order of the prison. Those decisions cannot be regarded as not services one day (transfer due to misconduct - no element of benefit or help) and services on another day (to ensure prisoner safety or promote rehabilitation - element of benefit). See Egan.

(f) Complaints about decisions made with respect to where Mr Charles was accommodated within each of the prisons to which he refers in his application (i.e. which unit within a prison) - not service; dismissed.

Decisions concerning prisoner location within a prison are an inherent part of incarceration. They address management, security and good order of the prison as well as rehabilitation. Those decisions cannot be regarded as not services one day (transfer due to misconduct - no element of benefit or help) and services on another day (to ensure prisoner safety or promote rehabilitation - element of benefit). See Egan.

(g) Refusal to allow Mr Charles' application to perform volunteer work in the Prison Visit Centre Canteen - arguably service.

Similar to VCAT's observation in Alipek (concerning prison industry work), it is arguable this relates to a service.

(h) Complaints about conduct of the prison officers towards him - not service; dismissed.

In my view, the conduct of prison officers towards Mr Charles is not arguably a "service". That conduct is an inherent part of incarceration, not a service provided to the benefit of each individual prisoner.

While not relevant to my decision here, I note prisoners subject to alleged negative treatment have other avenues of complaint.

(i) Complaints about the conduct of other prisoners towards him - not service; dismissed.

I do not understand Mr Charles to be submitting the conduct of prisoners towards him is some form of service. Rather, he seems to submit that him being placed in the position where he was treated badly by prisoners constituted a failure by Corrections to provide a service to him, with respect to its obligations to provide him with a safe appropriate environment.

In my view, that is not arguably a "service". Corrections' broad responsibilities of that nature are an inherent part of incarceration, not a service provided to the benefit of each individual prisoner.

While not relevant to my decision here, I note prisoners subject to such alleged negative treatment have other avenues of complaint.

(j) Complaints about food provision - not service; dismissed (except special food based on medical advice arguably a service).

The provision of standard food to prisoners is an inherent part of incarceration. It is not an individualised service provided to each prisoner. Here, I see an arguable exception where special food is provided to an individual prisoner based on medical advice. This dovetails with my view with respect to medical services.

(k) Complaints about medical treatment - arguably service.

Medical treatment provided to a specific prisoner is arguably the service conferring a benefit on prisoner. I note Corrections' position that medical care provided to prisoners in prisons under its control is provided by a contracted medical services provider and is not provided by, or controlled by Corrections.

While that may well be so, the issue cannot be settled on that basis of the limited evidence in this s 75 application. Arguably, Corrections cannot avoid any responsibilities it has by subcontracting to another party. I note the vicarious liability provisions at ss 109 and 110 of the EO Act.

That said, I do not indicate any view that Corrections' actions are in any way motivated by any intention to avoid such responsibility.

(l) Complaints related to access to telephone, problems with lost property, managing money - arguably services.

Concerning these issues, there is arguably a sufficient element of benefit, where in the general operation of the prison system. There is arguably a more distinct element of benefit.

1. In making decisions in this proceeding I have considered the publications to which Mr Charles drew my attention. The Corrections publication concerning Anti-Discrimination with Respect to Prisoners is a commentary which adds nothing in this proceeding. The other two publications illustrate the point that it is arguable that services as broadly described can be provided to prisoners. However, I note the Remand Centre publication at no point describes the core functions in the prison system as "services".
2. Schedule 1 to these reasons is based on Appendix 1 to Corrections' points of defence discussed above, also drawing from Mr Charles' letters which constitute the particulars of his application in this proceeding and his submission concerning this s 75 application.
3. In Schedule 1, I recorded my decision with respect to each of 60 issues drawn from Mr Charles application. Where I record "not service", that element of the application is dismissed.
4. In my orders above, I set out the issues which remain the subject of this proceeding.
5. These decisions are made in the context of the law as it applies to s 75 applications. VCAT should be cautious in exercising the power. Here, I only decide:
   • (a) What is arguably a service; and
   • (b) Where the submission that something is a service is doomed to fail.
6. My decision that something is arguably a service does not predict VCAT's final decision on the point.
7. I have scheduled a directions hearing for VCAT to decide the future steps in this proceeding. It is likely that steps will include Mr Charles being required to redraft his application in light of these orders, Corrections being required to respond and the Equal Opportunity Commission making submissions, all leading to a hearing of Mr Charles' application as it now stands.

Analysis of claims - Decision as to whether arguably related to service - Based on Appendix 1 to Respondent's Particulars of Defence dated 15 December 2014 with reference to applicant's letters which constitute points of claim

For purposes of Corrections' Application, Mr Charles' allegations assumed to be true. No findings made as to the truth of the allegations.

Decision (including references to para 57 of above reasons)

Letter dated 22 October 2014 - Tribunal Book pages 1 to 34

February 2013 - transferred from Margoneet Correctional Centre to Langi Kal Kal (LKK) a minimum security prison

LKK refusal to allow application for volunteer work in the Prison Visit Centre Canteen during visit times due to HIV status.

In his submission, Mr Charles expanded on this saying despite completing and receive qualifications in food handling and workplace IT practices, he was denied the position due to complaints about a HIV/AIDS prisoner being in the position (paragraph 49(ix)). He also said he was employed as a "billet" in the centre and liked the job (paragraph 49(xv)).

LKK refusal to allow transfer to a smaller self-catering unit within prison due to HIV status.

Following complaints about Issues 1 & 2, unfavourable treatment including bullying, from Prison Officers and either VSU staff and some identified prisoners including abusive and derogatory comments regarding him, his sexuality, HIV status and complaints.

In 2013 or 2014 - As a result of complaints about Issues 1 & 2, he was threatened by prison officers on a number of occasions with transfer to alternative prison locations from LKK which exacerbated his severe anxiety.

15 February 2014 - transferred to Hopkins Correctional Centre (HCC)

Told by LKK operations manager and prison officers the transfer was due to a note from prisoner at LKK which was a threat to safety.

In his submission Mr Charles said he is of the view the note was written by a prisoner in collusion with prison officers and the transfer was an act of victimisation by Corrections (paragraph 49(xvii).

Told by senior prison officer the threat would be investigated by Police and would be returned to LKK within 7 days.

Request to see threatening note refused by operations manager.

In his submission Mr Charles said "identified the parties to the threat" in a statement to the police and IBAC (paragraph xviii).

Later told by two HCC prison officers that transfer due to complaints about Issues 1 & 2.

At HCC Medical Staff failed on five occasions to administer HIV medication.

Expected to speak to Police and requested to speak to Police, but this was refused by Prison Management.

Decision in context of police investigation not a service (57(a))

21 March 2014 - Issued with incorrect medication by GEO Care nursing staff. Serious side-effects for rest of day.

16 April 2014 - Transferred back to LKK - advised threat had abated

April 2014 - A piece of toilet paper with faeces on it was placed outside the door of his cell.

Corrections duty to provide safe environment not service (57(a) & 57(h))

The above (12 and 13) were reported to Police. Investigation commenced and not finalised. Mr Charles not kept informed.

Requested accommodation in small unit based on medical recommendations was after delay in June 2014 move to smaller self catering unit within the Redgum community where supportive prisoners were happy to live with a prisoner with HIV/AIDS (Mr Charles' submission, paragraph xvii) - other prisoners berated those living in units concerning them sharing accommodation with Charles who has AIDS.

Around 1 July 2014 - Made formal request to visit LKK Oak Street Community to visit specific prisoners Mr Charles identified as role models. Request granted, commenced visit but stopped by a supervisor.

3 July 2014 - Above supervisor was criticised (ostracised?) for refusing the visits and abused Charles for getting him into trouble.

3 July 2014 - Requested to undergo drug test via urinalysis

11 July 2014 - His telephone account was used by other prisoners and offensive telephone calls made; two calls to his partner and one call to a same sex couple. Same day requested change to telephone pin number.

14 July 2014 - Pin for telephone account was still not changed.

Corrections initially refused request by Mr Charles to contact his partner and the same sex couple to explain false telephone calls.

Misuse of phone was reported to Police and CV Intel, but no information given to him as to investigations.

Actions by Corrections relating to investigation not service. (57(a) & (h))

15 July 2014 - Transferred back to Hopkins due to positive urine test for cannabinoids.

Neither test nor transfer a service (57(b) & 57(e))

Charles claims "with a psychosis diagnosis I would not consume cannabis, nor have returned a positive diagnosis".

In his submission Mr Charles expressed his view that cannabis test had been tampered with or the charges had been fabricated (paragraph 49(ee)).

Protests test results/transfer via voluntary starvation, refusal to talk, refused medication and medical intervention, in part due to severe anxiety

Placed in an observation cell, 24 hour CCTV, unable to use a knife or fork and unable to wear normal prison clothes.

Corrections responding to Mr Charles' hunger/ medication / communication strike not a service (57(a))

Security rating increased and charged with a prison offence concerning cannabis use.

4 August 2014 - Adjournment of General Managers Disciplinary Hearing (GMDH) related to cannabis use granted due to Mr Charles' request for an independent visitor to be present due to diagnosis of cognitive impairment

Corrections advised by GEO Care that Mr Charles not diagnosed as suffering intellectual disability.

Supervisor and other staff told Mr Charles to "cop it sweet" regarding the charges.

Request for an investigation into positive urine test before GMDH reconvened not accepted or acknowledged by Corrections, denying natural justice.

Decisions in context of disciplinary proceeding not service (57(a))

10 October 2014 - secondary notification of charge of prison offence issued, prior to the initial VCAT directions hearing in this proceeding.

Supervisor said "you think you run the prison, but we do". Mr Charles swears at supervisor. Supervisor refuses Mr Charles' "official request" to put the supervisor's comment in writing.

Before cannabis test results, Charles had commenced an application to progress to the Judy Lazarus Transition Centre but progressing of application stopped by cannabis incident. This negatively impacts security rating, rehabilitation and parole prospects.

Not service (57(a) & 57 (e) or (f)) (do not know whether JLTC is another facility)

Due to the positive cannabis test result, lost contact visits with partner and friends for two months.

When visited by friends, contact visit was cancelled and Charles, describing his "huge emotional response" refused a non-contact (box) visit. Breakdown of one friendship for lengthy period followed.

Claims of lost property when transferred back from LKK to Hopkins due to positive cannabis test. These include sensitive documents. Corrections has not responded to formal claim related to missing items. Another prisoner in similar situation had claimed responded two months ago. Has caused financial difficulty resulting in discontinuing distance education.

11 September 2014 - Partner called 000 to arrange an ambulance due to Mr Charles' chest pains after staff victimised him for not being able to stand at the afternoon Muster due to chest pains "after intervention by the Health Services Commissioner and Victorian Ombudsman prior to the muster, but without response by the prison. He attended Ararat Hospital."

Services not being provided in context of a muster (57 (a) & (h))

Repeated incidents of non-delivery of mail sent by DX or Australia Post, which Corrections denies. Access to prisoner DX mail ceased for significant time.

Unable to access the daily medication for severe anxiety and the nurse admitted there were errors, but insisted the medication was not required.

GEO Care failed to arrange renewal of prescriptions.

Medical Officer and mental health specialists supported a requirement of accommodation in a smaller preferably self-catering unit to manage severe anxiety and improve diet due to HIV. Previous attempts to move to the smaller unit were hindered by prisoner objections and by Corrections due to HIV positive status

February 2014 - Purchase of own hair clippers, due to HIV status was encouraged at Marngoneet - Hopkins required the clippers to be stored in the property, but required the cord to be shortened for safety reasons - Prison clippers with short cord will not be useful at another prison if no extension cord available - A different prison may require Mr Charles to purchase a new set of hair clippers if cord too short. Other items in the prison had longer permanent cords - offered to store the hair clippers at the Officers Post or within the unit office - Barber service is available but costs money and does not have good cleaning procedure - risk of hepatitis C infection from other prisoners.

In making and enforcing rules, Corrections does not provide a service.

Managing prisoner's money arguably a service (57(l))

The food at Hopkins is unpalatable, not nutritious and too small serves. Mr Charles' diet is supplemented by nutritional drinks prescribed by the Doctor and a daily fruit bag.

Special food under medical advice arguably a service 57(k)

Has made request to move to self catering unit to meet nutritional needs consistent with HIV status. Previously in self-catering units, other prisoners have banned Mr Charles from using cutlery, washing dishes and sharing facilities. Prisoners remain scared of contracting HIV by a mosquito bite or sharing toilet. With the correctional system being program specific by offence specific category, Mr Charles is subjected to homophobic treatment by other prisoners. While he raised this with Corrections, it has not responded.

Dealing with complaint of attitudes re HIV/AIDS is in context of Corrections' duties (see s 20 Corrections Act). Not service. (57(h)

About 21 August 2014, in a meeting with a prison officer concerning privacy concerns related to this VCAT proceeding, The officer said Mr Charles "would never prove anything", which he later tried to tone down.

Operations Manager said if Mr Charles kept prison staff up to date on issues he would be looked after, but Charles said he is not a dog (informant).

He and other prisoners are reprimanded or "looked over for opportunities" if they complain to external agencies such as the Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission or the Victorian Ombudsman. Describes being subject to a barrage of discrimination, victimisation and bullying to try to resolve the simple issue of equality and an attempt not to be treated as a leper within the Victorian correctional community.

Mr Charles no longer participates in case management or the review and assessment meetings with Prison Officers, a report was produced for the assessment committee which he did not attend listing his calls the Victorian Ombudsman and Health Services Commissioner.

Activity related to case management or review and assessment not service. Report about him in this context not a service to Mr Charles (57(e) & (f))

Mail marked as exempt or classed as exempt has been opened, including mail from his lawyers, the Australian Human Rights Commission and VCAT.

Claims health has deteriorated while raising issues and GEO Care has advised him to discontinue the proceeding.

If this is meant as a complaint, arguable the advice by GEO Care was a service (57(k))

Opted for voluntary starvation and non-compliance and criticised by medical staff for not considering health.

If this is meant as a complaint, arguable the advice by GEO Care was a service (57(k))

Operations Manager asked other prisoner who supported his transfer to self-catering unit, why would you want to live with Mr Charles, but says Operations Manager denied comment, describing Mr Charles as delusional.

Pages 21 to 32 of the letter as contained in the tribunal book are submissions rather than points of claim

Letter dated 1 August 2014 - Tribunal Book, page 35 to 39, perhaps an attachment to above letter

Complaints about corrections requiring prisoners to purchase razor blades or pay a $6 fee the growing of a beard or facial hair.

Letter dated 23 October 2014 - Tribunal Book, page 40, 41

General complaint to VCAT of difficulties with using Hopkins' internal mail system to get mail documents from VCAT.

Letter dated 23 October 2014 - Tribunal Book, pages 42 to 45

Suffering from extensive diarrhoea due to positive HIV and complex care diagnosis together with being hairy or hirsute, obliged to shower regularly but limited to a few showers per day in prison unit.

Corrections does not in administering the functioning of accommodation provide a service. It is an inherent part of incarceration. (not in above summary)

The proposed ban on tobacco products and smoking tobacco products in prisons from 1 July 2015. Despite 13 to 14 attempts to stop smoking over the past 6 years, Mr Charles has been unable to stop. There is a provision for a prisoner who suffers from acute mental illness and nicotine withdrawal to be provided with a designated smoking cell and failure to do so will worsen mental state. Mr Charles states he suffers mental illness and should be exempt.

Refers to Corrections Amendment (Smoke-Free Prisons) Act

2014, which comes into effect on 1 July 2015. Therefore, no services relevant to it provided to date. Therefore no services (not in above summary).

Letter dated 3 November2014 - Tribunal Book, page 46

Letter dated 3 November 2014 (4 pages) - Tribunal Book, pages 47 to 50

Nonspecific claim that prisoners have questioned him about issues referred to in his claim, which the prisoners have somehow been informed about.

Operations Manager attended Mr Charles' unit, but Mr Charles refused to speak to him due to the allegations Mr Charles had made against him.

Letter dated 5 November 2014 (5 pages) - Tribunal Book, pages 51 to 56

One page letter to VCAT attaching letter addressed to the Acting General Manager, Hopkins and objecting to being told a Governors disciplinary hearing was to proceed on 7 November 2014.

Letter dated 5 November 2014 (5 pages) - Tribunal Book, page 57

One page letter to the Acting General Manager, Hopkins requesting unspecified witnesses from LKK and Hopkins for his Governors Disciplinary Hearing.

[1] Corrections does not concede Mr Charles' claims to also be disabled as a result of severe anxiety, cognitive disorder resulting from long-term HIV/AIDS diagnosis, depression, psychosis, allergies and complex drug interactions, chronic sinus congestion, chronic recurring infections. It is not necessary to address Mr Charles submissions concerning his identification as a gay man and regarding the attribute of age - see paragraph 49 of his written submissions in this proceeding concerning Corrections' application.

[2] He does so at paragraph 16 of his Amended Particulars of Claim and agreed this was so during the 13 March hearing.

[3] See Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 8th Ed, Pearce and Geddes, LexisNexis Butterworths 2014 at page 358.

[4] See definition of "offender" and "correctional order" at s 3.

[6] Mistake in numbering in handwritten letter.

[7] Mistake in numbering in handwritten letter.