Charles v Northern New South Wales Local Health District

The decision at first instance

As we noted above, Murphy C dismissed the first instance application brought pursuant to s 84 of the Act. In so doing Murphy C held (at [23] of the impugned decision): "In this case the evidence discloses that the termination of the applicant's casual employment, even if it be regarded as a dismissal, was neither harsh, unreasonable nor unjust".
It is apparent that the question of whether or not there was a dismissal within the meaning of the Act was a live issue in the proceedings before Murphy C.
In the catchwords to the impugned decision, Murphy C noted as follows: "separation from casual pool - administrative process - no dismissal". It may appear from this that Murphy C proceeded on the basis that there was not in fact or law a dismissal.
However, headnotes and catchwords do not form part of a decision. Nowhere in the body of the impugned decision is it possible to identify a point at which Murphy C determined there was or was not a dismissal, nor his reasons for so determining.
The jurisprudential gateway to the Commission hearing and determining an application brought pursuant to Ch 2 of Pt 6 of the Act is that there has been a dismissal of an employee. The words of ss 83 and 84 make that abundantly clear.
As the Commission cannot exercise any of its relevant powers unless there has been a dismissal, and must not exercise those powers if there has not been a dismissal, it is fundamental to the Commission's jurisprudence that in any proceedings pursuant to Ch 2 of Pt 6 of the Act the Commission identify whether there has or has not been a dismissal. In many cases, a resolution of that question will be readily reached because there is common ground. This is not such a case.
We cannot see, on the face of the impugned decision, that the necessary determination of whether or not a dismissal occurred was made. In this matter, such a finding is not to be discovered by inference. A failure to determine in terms whether a dismissal has occurred in proceedings pursuant to Ch 2 of Pt 6 of the Act, when that determination is necessary to establish whether jurisdiction lies, constitutes, on its face, an error of law.
We accept that first instance decision making under the Act, particularly given the obligations placed on the Commission under s 162(2)(a) read together with ss 56 to 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, is properly exercised quickly. That is arguably more so in relation to applications under s 84 where delay in determining a matter may well act to restrict the exercise of the Commission's discretion in relation to remedy.
As a general approach, first instance decisions which are rendered promptly and provide adequate reasons, even if every single aspect of the matter to be determined is not canvassed in detail, are preferable to lengthy decisions that take a considerable time to produce. And it is not conducive to quick and effective first instance decision making and the satisfaction of the Commission's obligations under the Act to conduct an examination of decisions on appeal which requires from a first instance decision maker an exhaustive attention to every argument raised in the proceedings.
It is also to be remembered that, in the context of an appeal, significant weight must be given to the decision of the trier of first instance when approaching both findings of fact and the exercise of a discretion: Port Macquarie Golf Club Limited v Stead (1996) 64 IR 53 at 59; Westfield Holdings v Adams [2001] NSWIRComm 293; (2001) 114 IR 241 at [73]; Master Education Services Pty Ltd v Ferfolia [2009] NSWIRComm 132 at [26]. As was observed by the Full Bench in Antonakopoulos v State Bank of NSW (1999) 91 IR 385 at 392: "The provisions of the Act as to appeals give primacy to first instance decision making in a manner not earlier found in industrial legislation in this State."
However, the identification, and then resolution, of jurisdictional issues, including matters of jurisdictional fact, are necessary parts of any first instance decision. They are obligations which cannot be overlooked.
Here, there has been, in our view, a failure to determine a fundamental jurisdictional issue, that is, whether there was or was not a dismissal. Such a failure constitutes an error of law. Accordingly, the appeal can properly be said to raise a substantial issue of law, warranting the grant of leave to appeal: Knowles v Anglican Church Property Trust (No 2) (1999) 95 IR 380. We have determined to grant leave to appeal.
Determination of the appeal
We turn first to the jurisdictional question we identify above: was there a dismissal? If there was not in fact a dismissal, there is patently no power to make any order under s 89.
The event said to constitute the dismissal was the removal of the appellant's name by the respondent from a list of employees who were eligible to be offered casual work. The existence of the list, and the appearance of an individual person's name on the list did not create or guarantee any offer of work by the respondent, nor impose any obligation to work on the persons whose names were on the list. A person on the list might or might not be offered casual work. They might or might not accept that work if it were offered.
The appellant's name was taken off the list at a time when he had not worked for the respondent for 11 months and at a time when he was not ready, willing and able to perform work for the respondent and it was not known when, if ever, he would be. The appellant could not at that point have been offered nor could he have accepted any casual shifts at Lismore Base Hospital.
The employer was wrong to state in its letter of 5 March 2015 that the appellant "was no longer an employee" as a consequence of his name having been taken off the list. In fact, that administrative action had no effect upon the employment relationship at all. The appellant remained, as he remains now, a person who has formerly undertaken casual employment for the respondent and might be offered further casual employment if he is fit, and wishes, to perform it. There was nothing in the nature or continuity of his employment to suggest otherwise.
On the documentary material before Murphy C (which the Full Bench received in lieu of an appeal book proper) the appellant remains unfit to return to his former employment at Lismore Base Hospital even now. He may or may not wish to work casual shifts for the respondent at a place other than at Lismore Base Hospital. That is a matter for him, as it always was. The respondent may or may not consider him for other casual work at other locations. That is a matter for the respondent, just as it was before the removal of the appellant's name from the list in 2014. If the appellant advises the respondent that he is now fit to work at other locations and wishes to be considered for work at other locations, we assume that the respondent would restore his name to the list of employees eligible to be offered casual work at those locations. That does not, as it did not before, guarantee any work being offered or accepted.
But the removal of his name from the list had no effect on the appellant's employment status. There has been no dismissal of the appellant within the meaning of that expression in the Act.
The finding by the WCC that the appellant suffered an injury and that he was entitled to payments has, of course, no bearing on whether or not a contract of employment was or remained on foot.
The respondent advanced an argument that the removal of the appellant's name from the list was not its doing, but that of Healthshare, and that the respondent could not be accountable for Healthshare's actions. The way in which this matter has fallen to be determined means that we do not have to rule on this point, but we observe that this argument cannot be sustained.
If an employer contracts with a third party to provide, for example, payroll services in relation to its employees, that does not affect the identity of the parties to the employment relationship into which the employer has entered. So far as the third party may act to carry out functions an employer has designated to it in relation to any employee, it is taken to be acting as agent for the employer: Bonette v Woolworths Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 142 at 150. Any action taken by Healthshare within the scope of functions the employer had delegated or contracted it to undertake remained the action of the employer. Even more importantly for the purposes of the Act, the employer was required to be cognisant of the circumstances affecting its employees. An active disregard of unfair treatment offered by a third party contracted by an employer to perform services with respect to the employer's employees merely aggravates any unfairness for the purposes of the Act. For example, in this case, in the case of dismissal the respondent would have needed to be particularly concerned about the status of the appellant under the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994.
Summary and disposition of the appeal
As we have found that the decision under appeal contained an error of law we are bound, in our view, to grant leave to appeal.
Given our finding as to there being no dismissal for the purposes of the Act, however, the determination of the appeal could lead to no other order than that made by Murphy C in the disposition of the first instance proceedings. We have decided, therefore, to not uphold the appeal and dismiss the proceedings.
Orders
The Full Bench makes the following orders:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
1. The appeal is dismissed.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (7 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (13)

Cited By (4)