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Charles v Davies (No 2) [2026] ACTSC 178 | Case summary | Zoe

ACTACTSC

Charles v Davies (No 2)

[2026] ACTSC 178

Supreme Court of the ACT|2026-05-29|Before: Kelly AJ

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Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of the ACT

Decision date

2026-05-29

Before

Kelly AJ

Catchwords

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Appeal – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – Sentence appeal – Whether sentence was manifestly excessive – Family violence offences – Driving offences

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Appeal – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – Sentence appeal – Whether sentence was manifestly excessive – Family violence offences – Driving offences

Judgment

Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title: Charles v Davies (No 2) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 178 Hearing Date: 21 May 2026 Decision Date: 29 May 2026 Before: Kelly AJ Decision: (1) The appeal is dismissed. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Appeal – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – Sentence appeal – Whether sentence was manifestly excessive – Family violence offences – Driving offences Legislation Cited: Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), ss 207, 218, Pt 3.10 Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Parties: Carney Damien Charles (Appellant) Benjamin Davies (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Appellant) E Roff (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Appellant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) File Number: SCA 6 of 2026 Decision Under Appeal: Court: ACT Magistrates Court Before: Magistrate Campbell Date of Decision: 13 February 2026 Case Title: McDonnel v Charles Court File Numbers: CAN 9475/2025 CAN 10857/2025 CAN 10856/2025 CAN 10769/2025 CAN 10768/2025 CAN 10767/2025 CAN 10766/2025 KELLY AJ: Introduction

This is an appeal from the decision of Magistrate Campbell on 13 February 2026. Magistrate Campbell convicted and sentenced the appellant for multiple family violence offences, as well as for a series of driving offences. The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of eight months’ imprisonment, backdated to commence on 13 December 2025 and expiring on 12 August 2026.
On 4 March 2026, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in which he sought to put further evidence before the court in the form of a copy of the signed agreement between the appellant and the DPP. The appellant’s grounds of appeal were expressed to be: (a) that the agreement made between the accused and the DPP was not honoured; and (b) that the accused was wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously sentenced by the magistrate.

As this is an appeal against sentence, Pt 3.10 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) (‘Magistrates Court Act’) applies. Section 207 of the Magistrates Court Act confers this court with appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal. The powers of this court on appeal are set out in s 218 of the Magistrates Court Act.
I accept that the principles applicable to this appeal were accurately stated in the respondent’s written submissions on appeal. In short, a sentence is not to be set aside simply because an appellate court, on hearing the appeal, might have imposed a different sentence. The appeal may only be upheld and a different sentence imposed if the appellate court is satisfied that the sentencing discretion miscarried by reason of legal, factual or discretionary error. Even if a specific error is identified, an appellate court is not required to intervene if satisfied that the sentence is, nevertheless, appropriate. Background
The procedural history in this matter was recorded in a chronology marked Annexure A in the respondent’s outline of submissions. It is convenient to reproduce that material as an annexure to this judgment.
As the appellant’s complaint on appeal segued from the complaint concerning the alleged breach of the agreement with the DPP to a general complaint that the sentence was manifestly excessive, it is important to set out the facts which gave rise to Magistrate Campbell’s decision.
The appellant was served with a family violence order on 9 October 2024. The conditions of the family violence order relevantly included conditions that he was not to approach the victim, or contact her in any way except through a lawyer and he was not to go within 100 m of where the victim lived or worked.
On 26 August 2025, the victim called 000 and police were dispatched to her home. The victim disclosed that the appellant had been living at her home for some time, notwithstanding the existence of the FVO and other bail conditions.
On the morning of 26 August 2025, the victim and the appellant had engaged in an argument which culminated in the victim asking the appellant to leave. The appellant then became physically aggressive and picked up a stone bowl from the victim’s bedroom table and threw it against the wall, causing the bowl to shatter.
The appellant then pinned the victim down by pushing his fist against the right side of her face, leaving slight swelling and red marks on her face.
The appellant left the victim’s bedroom and the victim locked the door to prevent him from returning. The appellant then struck the bedroom door with such force that it caused a crack which was visible from inside the bedroom.
By the time the police arrived, the appellant had left and he was not arrested until 27 September 2025. By that stage, the appellant had committed a number of driving offences.
On 1 October 2025, the appellant pleaded guilty to the driving offences and pleaded not guilty to the family violence charges arising out of the events of 26 August 2025. The family violence offences were listed for hearing on 16 January 2026.
On 16 January 2026, the parties appeared before Magistrate Temby and advised the court that the matter had resolved. Importantly for this appeal, the prosecutor indicated that there would be a plea to the charge of contravening the family violence order on 26 August 2025 and that the prosecution would accept a plea to the statutory alternative of common assault in satisfaction of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm charge. The prosecutor also advised that the damage property charges would be rolled up, with a plea being entered to one count only to reflect damage to both the stone bowl and the door, while the second count was withdrawn.
During this hearing, the prosecutor handed up a statement of facts for the series of driving offences and a copy of the appellant’s criminal history. The prosecutor indicated that some redactions were required to be made to the statement of facts for the family violence offences prior to it being filed. The redacted statement of facts was eventually filed on 19 January 2026, with the appropriate redactions to reflect the resolution reached between the parties.

At the hearing of the appeal on 21 May 2026, the appellant appeared unrepresented. When shown the affidavit of Liam Taylor, the prosecutor in the Magistrates Court proceeding, affirmed on 14 May 2026, Mr Charles did not oppose the respondent’s application to adduce that evidence on appeal. Accordingly, I received the affidavit of Mr Taylor as evidence on the appeal.
In the affidavit of Mr Taylor, he explained how the parties reached an agreement on the morning of 16 January 2026 and how the statement of facts was amended and filed on 19 January 2026 to reflect the agreement that had been made. The appellant’s legal representative at the time confirmed that there were no issues with those statements of facts.
The evidence of Mr Taylor is consistent with the Magistrates Court’s record of the facts filed on 19 January 2026.
Upon oral argument at the appeal hearing, it became obvious that Mr Charles was under a misunderstanding that he had been convicted and sentenced for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, when in fact the record and transcript of proceedings in the Magistrates Court show that he was actually sentenced, among the other offences, for a common assault, being the statutory alternative to assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
As I stated at the appeal hearing, I can see how the confusion arose, as the Warrant of Imprisonment and the Official Notice of Sentence both record the offence of ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’. I am sympathetic to Mr Charles’ misunderstanding. However, I am satisfied that the transcript of proceedings demonstrates that Mr Charles was convicted and sentenced for a common assault offence, and not assault occasioning actual bodily.
During further oral argument, it also became apparent that there may have been some misunderstanding between Mr Charles and his legal representative at the time of the Magistrates Court hearing. When offered the opportunity to adjourn the matter, waive privilege, and ask his previous legal representative to prepare an affidavit, Mr Charles sensibly conceded that, if the matter was adjourned again, the appeal would become futile as he is due for release in July or August this year in any event.
Mr Charles elected not to press this ground of appeal further and, on the evidence before me, I find that this ground has not been made out.

Mr Charles elected to proceed on the basis of his second complaint, being that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The magistrate correctly noted that the appellant’s offending with regard to the breaches of the family violence order were serious examples of those offences. The appellant’s contravention of the family violence order struck at the heart of the condition that the appellant not contact the victim nor be within 100 m of her. Furthermore, his conduct extended to the use of physical violence and property damage.
The magistrate correctly noted and afforded the appellant an appropriate discount for the guilty plea. Though the plea was entered late, it still attracted some discount. In fact, the magistrate made an error when sentencing for the family violence offences, erroneously recording that the appellant had pleaded guilty at an early opportunity and was entitled to a full discount of 25%. To the extent that this minor error was made, it clearly favoured the appellant and could not have had the effect of increasing the sentence.
The magistrate correctly recounted the appellant’s unfortunate and profoundly disadvantaged background and indicated that she would give full weight to the Bugmy principles, being the principles found in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571.
Given the appellant’s lengthy criminal history and his guarded prospects of rehabilitation, the magistrate considered that a period of full-time imprisonment was warranted, having regard to the objective seriousness of the family violence offending and the need for specific and general deterrence.
In making the sentences wholly concurrent with each other, it seems to me that, in fact, the magistrate afforded the appellant a significant degree of leniency. Accordingly, the sentence was well within the proper exercise of the magistrate’s sentencing discretion.
In his oral submissions, the appellant outlined that he has been seeing therapists since becoming incarcerated and has housing and employment secured for when he leaves custody. He submitted that he was seeing a counsellor at Relationships Australia now and showed the court skilful paintings he had created whilst in custody. Though I am finding against him today, I do want to commend the appellant on the positive steps that he has taken during his current period of incarceration.
The appeal must be dismissed. Orders
The orders of the Court are: (1) The appeal is dismissed.