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Series Charge and approximate offence date Maximum Penalty and Sentence Imposed CAN 7048 of 2023: Common assault, as Maximum Penalty: 2 years a statutory alternative to assault Imprisonment Offences occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of against the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) daughter Sentence Imposed: Convicted and Between 1 January 2015 and 31 released on a 12 Month GBO (Core December 2016 Conditions Only)

CAN 7049 of 2023: Common assault, as Maximum Penalty: 2 years a statutory alternative to assault Imprisonment occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Sentence Imposed: Convicted and Between 1 January 2015 and 31 released on a 12 Month GBO (Core December 2019 Conditions Only) 4. CAN 7050 of 2023: Assault occasioning Maximum Penalty: 5 years actual bodily harm: s 24 of the Crimes Imprisonment Act 1900 (ACT) Between 1 January 2017 and 31 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and December 2019 sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only) Series Charge and approximate offence date Maximum Penalty and Sentence Imposed CAN 7051 of 2023: Common assault, as Maximum Penalty: 2 years a statutory alternative to assault Imprisonment occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Sentence Imposed: Convicted and Between 1 January 2021 and 31 released on a 12 Month GBO (Core December 2021 Conditions Only)

CAN 7052 of 2023: Aggravated common Maximum Penalty: 3 years assault, as a statutory alternative to Imprisonment aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and (ACT) released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Between 1 May 2023 and 30 May 2023 Conditions Only) CAN 7053 of 2023: Aggravated assault Maximum Penalty: 7 years occasioning actual bodily harm: s 24 of Imprisonment the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Between 1 June 2023 and 30 June 2023 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only)

CAN 3015 of 2024: Common assault, as Maximum Penalty: 2 years a statutory alternative to assault Imprisonment occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Sentence Imposed: Convicted and Between 1 January 2015 and 31 released on a 12 Month GBO (Core December 2019 Conditions Only) CAN 3016 of 2024: Common assault: s Maximum Penalty: 2 years 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Imprisonment Series Charge and approximate offence date Maximum Penalty and Sentence Imposed Between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2020 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only) CAN 3017 of 2024: Common assault: s Maximum Penalty: 2 years 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Imprisonment Between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2021 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only)

CAN 3021 of 2024: Aggravated common Maximum Penalty: 3 years assault, as a statutory alternative to Imprisonment aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm: s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and (ACT) released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Between 1 May 2023 and 30 June 2023 Conditions Only) CAN 3019 of 2024: Common assault: s Maximum Penalty: 2 years 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 Imprisonment Offences Between 1 January 2021 and 31 against December 2022 son Sentence Imposed: Convicted and released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only) CAN 3020 of 2024: Common assault: s Maximum Penalty: 2 years 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Imprisonment Between 1 January 2022 and 11 July 2023 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and released on a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only) Series Charge and approximate offence date Maximum Penalty and Sentence Imposed CAN 7055 of 2023: Threat to kill: s 30 of Maximum Penalty: 10 years the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Imprisonment Offences Between 1 January 2015 and 31 against December 2015 ex-wife Sentence Imposed: Convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only)

CAN: 3022 of 2024: Assault occasioning Maximum Penalty: 5 years actual bodily harm: s 24 of the Crimes Imprisonment Act 1900 (ACT) Between 1 January 2014 and 31 Sentence Imposed: Convicted and December 2014 sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering a 12 Month GBO (Core Conditions Only)

5. The sentencing hearing occurred on 30 May 2025. After receiving sentencing material and hearing submissions, the magistrate proceeded to sentence on the same day. The overall sentence imposed was for six months imprisonment, to be fully suspended upon the respondent entering into several good behaviour orders for 12 months, with each good behaviour order to be served concurrently.

6. A notice of appeal against the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was filed on 27 June 2025. The notice of appeal was subsequently amended, with leave, at the hearing before me to include an additional ground of appeal. The grounds of appeal, as amended, are: (a) The sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate. (b) His Honour erred in making the factual finding that the offending occurred in circumstances of excessive force while [the respondent was] disciplining his children for what he perceived to be wrongdoing. (c) His Honour failed to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of each of the offences.

7. The following particulars were given in support of ground (a): (a) The individual sentences imposed for each offence were manifestly inadequate. (b) The total effective sentence is manifestly inadequate. (c) There was inappropriate concurrency in the sentences.

8. The appellant seeks orders setting aside the sentence imposed by the magistrate, and asks this court to impose a new sentence on the respondent.

Jurisdiction on appeals from sentence

9. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals against sentences imposed by the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 219B(1)(f) of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT). Under s 219D(e), this may be on the ground that “the sentence or penalty was manifestly inadequate or otherwise in error”.

10. The powers available to the Court, including where error on the part of the Magistrates Court is established, are set out at s 219F of the Magistrates Court Act, as follows: 219F Powers of Supreme Court (1) On a review appeal, the Supreme Court may, after considering the evidence before the Magistrates Court and any further evidence called by leave of the Supreme Court— (a) dismiss the appeal if satisfied that the decision of the Magistrates Court should be confirmed; or (b) set aside or quash, in whole or part, or otherwise vary or amend, the decision of the Magistrates Court. (2) If, under subsection (1) (b), the Supreme Court sets aside, quashes or otherwise varies or amends a decision of the Magistrates Court, the Supreme Court may— … (c) for a decision mentioned in section 219B (1) (f)— (i) impose the sentence or penalty the Supreme Court considers appropriate; or (ii) by order, exercise any power that the Magistrates Court might have exercised; or … (5) The Supreme Court may, despite the ground or any of the grounds for review mentioned in section 219D being established, dismiss the appeal if the court considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has happened.

11. Additionally, when dealing with a prosecution appeal on sentence, even where error has been established, the court retains a residual discretion to dismiss an appeal: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462 at [1], [24]; Harlovich v Sebbens [2023] ACTSCFC 3; 20 ACTLR 237 at [94]-[95]. The onus is on the prosecution to demonstrate why the residual discretion not to interfere with the sentence should not be exercised in the event error is established. The principles relating to the exercise of that discretion are discussed later.

Summary of offending

12. The facts relating to the offending were summarised in the appellant’s submissions as extracted, and the appellant’s summation was not a matter of dispute. The names of the victims of the offending have been anonymised. On one occasion in 2014 while [the ex-wife] was about six or seven months’ pregnant with [the son], the respondent grabbed [the wife] by her hair and threw her to the ground. He then placed his knee on her neck. [The daughter] saw this and began to cry. The appellant had his knee on [the wife’s] neck for about five or 10 minutes, and she found it hard to breathe. [The wife] begged the respondent to stop. This incident caused bruises to [the wife’s] arms and neck. This incident was subject of CC2024/3022 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which the respondent was found guilty. In 2015, [the wife] had decided to leave the relationship. At some point, [the wife] confronted the respondent and told him that he needed to stop assaulting her or she would report the abuse to police and that she was ending their relationship. The respondent went to the kitchen and obtained a kitchen knife. He held the knife towards [the wife] and said: “Before police come, you’ll be dead”. [The wife] was scared. This incident was subject of charge CC2023/7055 – threat to kill for which the respondent was found guilty. Following this, [the wife] decided to leave. She wanted to take her children but did not know how she would be able to care for them. She decided to leave them with the respondent. [The wife] fled to Melbourne. She returned to Canberra several months later. The respondent had maintained custody of both [the daughter] and [the son]. Around 29 June 2023, [the wife] received a phone call from [the daughter] who was upset and asking her for help. [The wife] eventually met with [the daughter], and she asked her what was wrong. [The daughter] told [the wife] that she needed some money because the respondent had given her money, and she needed to repay him. [The wife] asked why she needed to repay the money to her father and [the daughter] told her that if she did not give the money back, the respondent would hit her. During this conversation, [the daughter] told [the wife] that the respondent “smacked and hit her all the time” and this included any time she said she wished to visit [the wife]. [The daughter] told [the wife] that she did not want to go back and live with the respondent and told [the wife] that the respondent had hit her with a cord. On 2 July 2023, [the daughter] was interviewed by police and disclosed several assaults committed by the respondent. [The son] and [the wife] were also interviewed on 11 July 2023. During her interview with police, [the daughter] disclosed that the respondent forced her to study the Khmer language excessively and would get angry if she got words incorrect, including punishing her by hitting her with white cords. [The daughter] said that on one occasion when she was about 5 or 6 years old, she was studying. She had a book in front of her and the respondent kept yelling at her to study. She began to cry, and he located the iPhone cable. [The daughter] asked the respondent if she could go and visit her mother. In response, the respondent struck her repeatedly with an iPhone cable and called her names. He also told her that [the wife] was a “bad influence” and that [the wife] did not want her. [The daughter] recalled she was struck around 6 – 11 times. During this incident, [the daughter] described receiving purple marks all over her face and body. [The daughter] said this made her feel sad. This incident gave rise to CC2023/7048 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative of common assault, for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] described having a shower and she spilt water on the bathroom floor whilst doing so. The respondent retrieved a cord and began striking her repeatedly with it. [The daughter] said she was naked, in the corner of the shower crouched down whilst the respondent whacked her. [The daughter] said she had marks on her body as a result. This incident gave rise to charge CC2024/3015 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative offence of common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] and [the son] were having a bath and they were splashing around. The respondent retrieved a cord and whacked them both on their shoulders and heads, yelling at them [to] not mess up the bathroom. [The daughter] said she could feel bumps on the top of her head and had white and red marks on her shoulders. This incident gave rise to charge CC2023/7049 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative offence of common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] said the respondent was angry with her and she ran out of the house because she knew the respondent would not hit her in public. The respondent convinced her to come back inside the house and told her “I promise I won’t hit you. I promise.” She then came back inside the house. The respondent then grabbed her hair and threw her to the ground. The respondent stomped on her and banged her head. [The daughter] had injuries from the assault, and she took pictures and sent them to [the wife] and to her aunt … This incident gave rise to charge CC2023/7050 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] described staying up late and was playing. She said the respondent became angry that she was not studying. He retrieved a white cable and struck her multiple times. This incident gave rise to charge CC2024/3016 – common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] said that she was studying Khmer with [the son], and she pronounced a word incorrectly. The respondent retrieved the white cable he had previously used to hit her and began striking her until she said the word correctly. This incident gave rise to charge CC2024/3017 – common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] said she was sleeping in the respondent’s bed because the respondent told her to. [The daughter] said it was late, and she was still awake. The respondent became angry with her and retrieved a thick metal microphone stand and hit her with it on the head and hands. The respondent then told her to go and study. This incident gave rise to charge CC2023/7051 - assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative offence of common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On another occasion, [the daughter] described that she arrived home late. She had been out shopping with her friends. One of her friends was having difficulties and [the daughter] stayed to comfort her. The respondent called her and asked where she was and that he was waiting for her to come home. [The daughter] apologised and asked if the respondent would hit her. The respondent said, “you’ll find out when you come home”. Once [the daughter] came home, the respondent told her to “bring out your hands” and he began to whack them with a cord. [The daughter] said if she did not bring out her hands, she knew she would be hit elsewhere. This was witnessed by [the son]. This incident gave rise to CC2023/7052 - assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative offence of common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. On the same day, [the daughter] said the respondent told her to go and clean her room and vacuum the house. The respondent gave [the daughter] 10 minutes to clean her room and when it was not clean in that time, he struck her with a cable. This incident gave rise to CC2024/3021 - assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The prosecution relied upon the statutory alternative offence of common assault for which the respondent was found guilty. Finally, [the daughter] described a further incident where the respondent assaulted her causing injury to her eye. [The daughter] said she asked the respondent if she could swap phones with her brother and he agreed. [The daughter] said she had forgotten to change over some photos and when the respondent was going through her brother’s phone, he came angry and began yelling at her. [The daughter] began to cry, and he used his hand to whack her in the eye. [The daughter] said it was “numbing” and “it was bright white when I got straight hit”. She said it left a red dot on her eye which was also puffy. … This incident gave rise to charge CC2024/3019 - assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which the respondent was found guilty. [The son] was interviewed by police on 11 July 2023 and 13 August 2023. [The son] described an incident where the respondent caught him playing instead of doing his homework. He said the respondent retrieved a blue lightsabre toy [and] hit him on his head. [The son] said this hurt and he cried. This incident gave rise to charge CC2024/3019 – common assault. [The son] described a further incident where the respondent told [the son] to show him his hands. When [the son] placed his hands in front of him, the respondent struck them with a cut power cord. This incident gave rise to charge CC204/3020 – common assault. The respondent was found guilty of both offences committed against [the son].

The evidence

13. The trial proceeded over seven days (from 3 March 2025 to 6 March 2025 and from 8 April 2025 to 10 April 2025) and was complicated by the involvement of an interpreter as a consequence of the respondent’s limited English language skills. The prosecution case was based almost entirely on the evidence of the three victims of the offending conduct. The respondent and his ex-wife separated in 2015, and thereafter, he had custody of the two children of the marriage, who were at the time of the separation approximately five and two years old.

14. Relevantly for the purpose of understanding the submissions made by each of the parties on appeal, the respondent denied the offending conduct in its entirety. He denied striking his children or his ex-wife. In relation to the children, he said correction was undertaken without recourse to any form of violence or physical contact. The magistrate’s reasons

15. On 26 May 2025, the magistrate gave reasons for his decision and on 30 May 2025 delivered reasons for sentence. It is helpful to summarise those reasons as they relate to each of the grounds of appeal and in the order in which they were addressed in the hearing before me. The magistrate noted the desirability of keeping his reasons as short as possible as they were being translated for the respondent.

Assessing objective seriousness

16. The magistrate noted most acts of violence occur in the privacy of the family home away from the eyes of third parties. He accepted the continuing violence of the respondent towards his ex-wife. There was also acceptance of the evidence of the children concerning the use of weapons in the form of cords and cables in the assaults upon them. The magistrate noted the photographic evidence of injury to the respondent’s daughter as being consistent with the larger hand of an adult.

17. In his reasons for decision, the magistrate addressed each of the individual charges and made findings concerning the degree of harm to the victim in each case, relevant to the nature of the charge. On sentence, the magistrate noted the respondent was found guilty of several offences occurring over a period of roughly 8 years including assault occasioning actual bodily harm and a reckless threat to kill another person. While some of the offending was in a category he described as “excessive discipline”, the magistrate noted the more serious offences, including the threat made to the respondent’s ex-wife while she was concerned about the safety of their children, and the assault upon her while she was pregnant with the younger child. He noted some of the charges called for a period of imprisonment and in sentencing regard must be had to s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) together with the preamble to the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT). The magistrate noted the intolerance of family violence generally and the importance of sending a message to the general community.

Factual error - excessive chastisement

18. The observations of the magistrate in terms of excessive discipline or chastisement were not drawn from the evidence of the respondent, who denied the offending conduct altogether. The magistrate first used the expression in the course of his reasons for decision in the analysis of charge 7048 of 2023: For completeness, I say that it appears the defendant was chastising [the daughter] and indeed chastising all of the children for what he perceived in [sic] misbehaviour in respect to the charges involving the children. It seems to me that his method of punishing them was beyond what would be considered lawful chastisement.

19. In the course of the sentence, his Honour again referred to the offences against the children as being directed to administering discipline, “but in excess of what I would consider lawful chastisement”. He elsewhere described some of the conduct as excessive discipline or using excessive force while disciplining the children. It was acknowledged during defence submissions at the sentencing hearing that had a defence of chastisement been raised the conduct of the respondent was excessive.

Manifest inadequacy

20. In sentencing, in addition to the matters already identified his Honour noted the respondent’s particular subjective circumstances. He was raised in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime, and suffered the imprisonment, torture and execution of his father. The magistrate acknowledged the respondent’s own imprisonment in that country where he was also tortured and beaten. The respondent was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of his past trauma. On the basis of his background, the magistrate concluded the respondent was “not necessarily a suitable vehicle for general deterrence”. He accepted the need for a term of imprisonment for some of the charges. He noted the absence of a plea of guilty and the need to have regard to relevant family violence principles in sentencing. The expressed basis for suspending the sentences of imprisonment imposed was the respondent’s good behaviour prior to the subject offending. As to the concurrency applied in the sentencing process the magistrate did not further elucidate his reasoning.

21. I address each of the grounds of the appeal, in the order adopted by the appellant in their submissions.

Ground (c): Failure to assess the objective seriousness of the offences

22. The importance of addressing objective seriousness through the sentencing process is in setting the parameters of an appropriate sentence, ensuring the sentence imposed is proportionate to the offence committed: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472.

Appellant’s submissions

23. Counsel for the appellant submits that on a fair reading of his reasons, the magistrate failed to make any assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences, either expressly or by implication. She says the only relevant observation his Honour made was some of the offending involved excessive force (a finding which is the subject of the complaint under, ground (b)), and his Honour otherwise did not refer to any facts or features of the offending. Relevant factual matters to which the magistrate failed to refer include the ages of the child victims, the use of cords or cables as weapons, and the fact some of the assaults involved multiple strikes or assaults to vulnerable parts of the body.

24. The appellant says even upon a reading of the sentencing reasons together with the decision finding the respondent guilty there is a failure to deal with the factual substance of the charges other than in very general terms. In short, the magistrate’s reasons reflect a bare summation of the facts, which falls short of the obligation imposed upon him in demonstrating an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending as a critical component of the sentencing task.

Respondent’s submissions

25. The respondent notes the caution required of an appellate court in conducting a review of an ex-tempore judgment to avoid the application of unfair and unrealistic standards “that does not accord with the realities of busy lower courts”. In the particular circumstances of this matter, there was a lengthy hearing, translation difficulties and evidence that was largely unequivocal. The respondent submits, upon reading the verdict and sentence reasoning together, it is clear the magistrate recognised the seriousness of family violence offences, their repugnance to the community, and in respect of the respondent’s ex-wife, the greater seriousness of the offences committed against her, including the assault while she was pregnant.

26. The respondent submits the magistrate’s assessment of the offences as objectively serious, involving conduct intolerable to the community and harm to his victims, was clear and unambiguous.

Was there a failure to assess objective seriousness?

27. In Baydoun v The King [2024] NSWCCA 65, the NSW Court of Appeal had cause to consider the scope of the obligation upon the trier of fact in assessing objective seriousness. As Chen J stated at [42]-[43]. Whilst it is undoubtedly “preferable” for there to be an express finding dealing with the objective gravity of the offending, an absence of such a finding is not necessarily erroneous, if it is apparent that the sentencing judge did so implicitly by referring to, and making findings about, the facts that bear upon the objective seriousness of the offending: Delaney v R (2013) 230 A Crim R 581; [2013] NSWCCA 150 at [56] . Here, however, aside from setting out the agreed facts, and noting the maximum penalty available, the reasons of the sentencing judge did not make any intermediate findings that would be relevant to any finding about, or assessment of, the objective seriousness of the offending. It is well settled that a “bare recitation of the facts constituting the offences and a reference to the ‘objective features of the offences’ does not satisfy the requirements of sentencing”: R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304 at [17] (‘Cage’).

28. The approach in this Court to the responsibility of a magistrate in assessing objective seriousness was helpfully summarised by Baker J in Barrett (a pseudonym) v Pemberton [2025] ACTSC 152 at [19]: The principles relating to a Magistrate’s duty to make an assessment of objective seriousness in this jurisdiction are well established. It is necessary for the sentencing court to make an assessment of the objective gravity, or objective seriousness of the offending: Forster-Jones v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 31 at [29] – [30]. However, it is not necessary to reach a conclusion in the form of ‘labels’ such as ‘low-range’, ‘mid-range’ or ‘high range’ offending. Indeed, it has been held that: … references to low-range, mid-range and high-range objective seriousness are unlikely to be helpful in this jurisdiction. It is preferable for a sentencing judge to confine themselves to identifying the particular features of the case that inform the objective seriousness of that case. R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at [24]; R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 at [18] – [25]

29. An implicit reference to objective seriousness will be more readily discerned in circumstances where there is a degree of consensus between the parties as to the seriousness of the offending evident from the manner in which the hearing was conducted before the trial judge.

30. In this case it is apparent from the transcript the magistrate was mindful of the language difficulties for the respondent in keeping his decision brief. At the commencement of his verdict reasons, he said: “I will keep my reasons as short as possible, noting that they are being translated for the defendant”.

31. In closing submissions, counsel for the respondent recognised the family violence constituting the offending was a serious set of charges involving young children. The respondent accepted in some instances there was evidence of bodily harm suffered as a consequence of the respondent’s actions. The primary point of difference between the parties in the submissions at trial related to the threat to kill offence and the assault occasioning actual bodily harm upon the respondent’s daughter when she was only five or six years old. In respect of those matters, the appellant submitted to the magistrate that a period of full-time imprisonment was warranted to reflect the seriousness of the offending. For the balance of the matters, no particular submission as to sentence was made, although the facts of each of the offences were addressed in some detail. The magistrate’s reasons must therefore be viewed against a background where there was clearly significant consensus between the parties as to the seriousness of the offending.

32. The question for my determination is whether in the circumstances I have described the magistrate did enough, either expressly or by implication, to deal with the objective seriousness of the offending. I am satisfied he did. The magistrate was clearly aware of the nature of the offending occurring, as it did, in family violence circumstances, in the home of the victims, involving a pregnant woman and children of highly vulnerable ages. I accept more could have been said about the particular features of the offending as they related to the sentence imposed, however, what was conveyed by the magistrate was in my view sufficient in circumstances where the submissions before him reflected some consensus between the parties and set out in clear terms those features and the seriousness of the offending.

33. This ground is not made out.

Ground (b): Factual error - finding of excessive chastisement

34. The nub of the appellant’s complaint is the language used by the magistrate characterising the offending conduct in relation to the children as “excessive discipline”.

35. The appellant contends the magistrate’s finding was not open on the evidence.

Appellant’s submissions

36. The appellant acknowledges some uncertainty as to the standard required to establish factual error warranting appellate interference with the sentencing decision: DPP v Liu [2024] ACTCA 23 at [18]. Accepting the higher standard requires the appellant to establish it was not open to the primary judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a fact in issue was proved, the appellant says the higher standard is satisfied in this instance. The appellant contends the finding that the respondent was “chastising all of the children” and his method of punishment “was beyond what would be considered lawful chastisement” was not only a finding not open on the evidence, but was a hypothesis specifically excluded by the respondent’s case at trial. The appellant notes there is no statutory defence of lawful chastisement in the Territory, but acknowledges the concept, where established, has been recognised at common law as a reasonable excuse for assault (see Lumb v Police [2008] SASC 198 at [40]; R v Kinloch (1996) 187 LSJS 124): The common law permits a parent to chastise his or her child. A parent may chastise his or her child “in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education” (Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1825 reprint of the 1783 Ed. At 452-453). The circumstances in which that chastisement might take place were said to arise “for the purpose of correcting what is evil in the child” (R v Hopley (1860) 2 F & F 202; 175 ER 1024); and for “wrong behaviour” (R v Terry (1995) VLR 114). … If the punishment is immoderate or excessive, or if it is administered for reasons unconnected with the purposes mentioned above, then the punishment is unlawful. …

37. The appellant submits the excuse of lawful chastisement may be established where the purpose of the conduct is the correction of wrong behaviour, and the chastisement or correction is moderate and reasonable with reference to the age and situation of the child. In circumstances where the respondent flatly denied the physical contact comprising the relevant offences there was no suggestion from the defence case that the events occurred in the course of the respondent chastising his children. The only factual finding available to his Honour based on the evidence of the children was the respondent engaged in “repeated acts of extreme violence over many years against two young children out of anger”. The appellant says the error was material and significant because a finding of that nature has the effect, generally, of mitigating the offender’s moral culpability for the offence and the overall seriousness of the offending. The error was thus prospectively relevant to the sentencing task, even though the magistrate did not explicitly make a finding that the respondent’s moral culpability was reduced on account of the finding.

Respondent’s submissions

38. The respondent submits the reference to “excessive chastisement”, was merely an observation with little bearing on the objective seriousness of the actual charged offences. No such defence was ever canvassed. Instead, the respondent submits the reference to the respondent chastising his child, arose in the context of the magistrate’s search for the subjective state of mind of the respondent. In that regard, he submits, “as someone who demonstrably suffered from PTSD, it is relevant to the respondent's moral culpability that he was acting in response to perceived infractions by his children, regardless of how objectively baseless such perceptions were”.

39. The respondent submits the finding was relevant in the sentencing exercise, but did not constitute an imputed finding of an excessive positive defence.

40. As to whether such a finding was open on the evidence, the respondent says it was an available inference on the appellant’s own case. In that regard, he highlights the circumstances of a number of the particular instances of offending such as, in relation to the completion of studies, in response to a proposed visit from the respondent’s ex-wife who was perceived by him to be a bad influence, and in response to spilling water on the floor. It is not suggested any of these behaviours from the children warranted the respondent’s actions. Accepting the conduct was without objective justification, it was in the respondent’s mind a form of discipline rather than seeking gratuitous enjoyment from engaging in violence against his children. Having rejected the respondent’s version of events entirely it was open to the magistrate to make the finding he did based on the accepted evidence of the children themselves.

Was there error in the chastisement finding?

41. The magistrate’s comments as to lawful chastisement, as they relate to the ultimate fact finding exercise, are no more and no less than a positive exclusion of the concept of lawful chastisement as a relevant factor in the determination of the charges. The magistrate found the interactions were contrary to lawful chastisement and in the nature of unlawful assaults upon the children. In circumstances where the respondent raised no defence to the charges other than a blanket denial, the ultimate fact required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt to establish guilt in respect of the offences was a finding about whether or not the offending conduct occurred. A finding of lawful chastisement was certainly not open on the evidence. However, a finding the assaults were proven beyond reasonable doubt was open, and the magistrate also finding the conduct of the respondent as in excess of, or contrary to, lawful chastisement was not commentary material to a fact in issue in determining guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

42. I accept the magistrate’s musings about chastisement and discipline were in the context of his search for the subjective state of mind of the respondent at the time of the offending. A finding that, although unlawful and entirely without a proper basis, the respondent’s conduct occurred largely in circumstances where he perceived he was disciplining the children, was open given the context provided for the offending conduct from the evidence of the children themselves.

43. This ground is not made out.

Ground (a): Manifest inadequacy

44. The appellant contends the individual sentences imposed by the magistrate are sufficiently inadequate to bespeak error. That inadequacy is compounded by the total sentence imposed. To succeed on this ground, the appellant must demonstrate the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust, even though there is no single correct sentence, and flexibility must be accommodated in the sentencing process. As to the circumstances in which an appellate court may overturn a sentence for manifest inadequacy, the High Court stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505: It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.

Appellant’s submissions

45. The appellant submits the assessment of manifest inadequacy is a conclusive process, not dependent upon the attribution of specific error in sentencing. As to the specific offences, the appellant submits: (a) Each of the offences against the respondent’s daughter were committed in the family home where she was entitled to feel safe and in circumstances where the respondent was in a position of trust. A number of the offences involved repeated striking with a cord resulting in bruising to the face and body. In one instance, the child was struck repeatedly while she was huddled naked in the shower recess. A circumstance that would have been especially degrading for a young girl. A further incident involved a particular breach of trust when the child was lured back into the house on a promise she would not be struck, only to be immediately assaulted by the respondent. Several offences involved blows to the head: in one instance causing facial numbness, disturbed vision and an injury to the eye. (b) Each of the offences against the respondent’s son were aggravated as they involved the use of a weapon. The child's age and consequent vulnerability were matters of significance. (c) The offences against the respondent’s ex-wife constituted serious acts of domestic violence. In one instance occurring when she was heavily pregnant with her son and involving her being thrown to the ground and held in that position with the respondent’s knee on her neck, impeding her breathing for five to ten minutes. The incident inevitably involved the victim fearing for her own safety and that of her unborn son. The threat to kill made against her included the brandishing of a knife by the respondent in circumstances where she feared the respondent was capable of carrying out the threat.

46. The appellant highlights the significant impact on the victims as disclosed in the victim impact statements.

47. As to the subjective case for the respondent, the appellant acknowledges his traumatic upbringing in Cambodia, but notes his failure to show any remorse or to accept responsibility for the offending. In terms of the counselling undertaken by the respondent, the appellant submits: Indeed, the respondent’s lack of insight into his own offending is demonstrated by the fact that the respondent could engage in counselling seeking to deal with his own traumatic childhood whilst simultaneously causing physical and emotional trauma to his own children.

48. The appellant submits the magistrate’s finding the respondent was, given his background, not a vehicle for general deterrence, was erroneous, with due regard given to the preamble to the Family Violence Act and the prevalence of family violence in the community. The respondent’s failure to accept responsibility for the offending and lack of insight into the gravity of his conduct also requires greater weight to be given to specific deterrence.

49. Given the nature of the offending and the applicable maximum penalties for each of the individual sentences, the appellant submits the imposition of short periods of good behaviour cannot be said to be proportionate to the offences, nor reflect the relevant purposes of sentencing. The appellant submits each of the offences called for a term of imprisonment, and in respect of the serious offences against the respondent's ex-wife, a term of full-time imprisonment. The absence of anything other than core conditions in the good behaviour orders is, the appellant submits, further evidence of inadequacy in sentencing.

50. As to the total sentence imposed, the appellant acknowledges there are a variety of acceptable ways in which to implement the totality principle. The primary submission of the appellant is the total sentence imposed cannot be said to reflect the total criminality of the offending, noting it involved three separate victims over an extended period of time. The appellant submits: The effect of the magistrate’s sentence in this regard was to effectively signal that there was no difference between the respondent having committed one or multiple assaults upon his child, and no difference between committing offences against one or more children.

Respondent’s submissions

51. The respondent describes the sentence as “undoubtedly lenient”. He submits however where the principles of both Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 and R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 are enlivened, the respondent ceases to be a vehicle for general deterrence. With reference to the trauma to which he was subject in Cambodia, resulting in the development of a complex post-traumatic stress disorder, it was open to the magistrate to conclude the respondent was not a suitable vehicle for general deterrence. The respondent points to the failure of the appellant, either at sentence or on appeal, to provide any assistance by way of comparative sentences or appellate authority to support the manifest inadequacy alleged.

Is the sentence manifestly inadequate?

52. As the Court of Appeal stated in R v Nicholas; R v Palmer [2019] ACTCA 36 at [66], “an appellate court must respect the wide discretion of the sentencing judge concerning an appropriate sentence”. The Court went on in that case to cite with approval the following passage concerning Crown appeals alleging manifest inadequacy, from R v Rappel [2019] ACTCA 11 at [10]: As this Court said in R v Lee [2017] ACTCA 30 at [53], a Crown appeal against sentence is a “unique species of appeal” … Such appeals “constitute an anomaly in the criminal justice system and so should be instituted sparingly”: R v TW [2011] ACTCA 25; 6 ACTLR 18 at [3]. Appropriate occasions that might arise for the bringing of a Crown appeal, include, as stated in R v Clarke (1996) 2 VR 520 at 522: (a) to correct a sentence that reveals such manifest inadequacy or inconsistency in sentencing standards as to constitute an error in principle; (b) to enable the Court to establish and maintain adequate standards of punishment; (c) to ensure uniformity in sentencing, so far as the subject matter permits.

53. Having dismissed the other grounds of appeal, the residual question is whether the sentence itself reveals either a level of inadequacy, or degree of inconsistency with sentencing standards, amounting to an error in principle. In DPP v Hojlund [2025] ACTCA 52, the Court of Appeal stated at [22]: The requirement that the inadequacy be “manifest” reflects that the ground is only made out where the result is inappropriately lenient to such a degree that it supports an inference that there was a latent error of principle committed by the sentencing judge, even though no error can be identified on the face of the reasons given.

54. The appellant did not in this instance provide any guidance in the nature of comparative sentences as a means of demonstrating the manifest inadequacy asserted. In essence the appellant submits the individual sentences imposed were so insubstantial relative to what was obviously appropriate, having regard to the seriousness of the offending, as to meet the description of manifestly inadequate on the face of the sentences. Further, the totality of the sentence imposed, fell into the same category in circumstances where the offending comprised “14 separate violent offences against three victims over a nearly eight-year period.”

55. I am satisfied that the imposition of a good behaviour bond of 12 months duration in respect of each of 12 separate counts of violent offending in the family violence context, applied concurrently, was inappropriately lenient and on its face an inadequate sentence with due regard to the seriousness of the offending. In reaching that view, I note each of the 12 offences carried a maximum penalty of a term of imprisonment, with the most serious of them carrying a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment. The offending occurred in the family home where each of the victims was entitled to feel they were in a safe haven. In relation to the offending against the children, they were both very young and vulnerable. The offending involved repeated instances of the use of a weapon resulting in actual bodily harm; in one instance causing an injury to the eye, disturbed vision and associated facial numbness. A number of the offences included blows to the head. The offending extended over a period of approximately eight years. The offending against the respondent’s ex-wife was serious, with one attack occurring while she was heavily pregnant giving rise to concerns not only for herself but for her unborn son. She was thrown to the ground and held with the respondent’s knee placed on her neck leading to an extended period of impeded breathing. The incident must have been terrifying for the victim.

56. In relation to each offence against the respondent's ex-wife, a term of three months imprisonment was imposed, to be served cumulatively and suspended immediately on the entry of a good behaviour bond over a period of 12 months. Accepting there is no single correct approach to the structuring of multiple sentences, the total sentence imposed fails to reflect the totality of the criminality of the respondent. The offending involved a course of unlawful conduct comprising several distinct offences against three different victims over many years. As the Court of Appeal observed in DPP v Liu [2024] ACTCA 23 at [42]: This is a matter where the criminality of one offence cannot encompass the criminality of the other offences. Accordingly, the structure of the sentence must properly reflect the additional criminality involved.

57. This ground of appeal is made out.

58. On 31 March 2026, having given notice in advance to parties that I had reached a stage where I needed to hear further from them as to the exercise of the residual discretion and the resentencing question, further written and oral submissions were received together with additional evidence tendered on behalf of the respondent.

Should the residual discretion be exercised?

Appellant’s submissions

59. The appellant submits where manifest inadequacy is established the sentence should not be allowed to stand. In Liu at [22], referring with approval to Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462, McCallum CJ and Taylor J noted the purpose of Crown appeals as laying down principles for the guidance of courts charged with sentencing convicted persons: The Court described that as “a limiting purpose” which “does not extend to the general correction of errors made by sentencing judges” but instead “provides a framework within which to assess the significance of factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion”.

60. The appellant has the task of demonstrating why, in light of the residual discretion not to intervene on a Crown appeal, the Court should do so in this case. The appellant says there is no evidence an increase to the sentence, including the minimum term, will impact negatively upon the respondent’s rehabilitation. Importantly, an appeal of this type assists in “maintaining confidence in the administration of justice by promoting uniformity of sentencing”. With particular regard to a finding of manifest inadequacy the finding would be deprived of meaningful effect if the residual discretion were exercised: see R v Carey [2024] NSWCCA 90 at [5].

61. The appellant relies upon the summary of factors bearing upon the exercise of the residual discretion in the reasons of Bell CJ in R v White [2025] NSWCCA 111 at [44], and the observations of N Adams J in R v Sabbagh [2025] NSWCCA 203 at [204].

62. As to delay, the appellant acknowledges that no application for expedition of the appeal was made but submits delay in the matter being listed for hearing was also occasioned by a number of adjournments sought by the respondent. In those circumstances delay should not be a consideration against the appellant in this case. The appellant acknowledges the respondent is in the community, however, submits that is only as a consequence of a grossly inadequate sentence.

63. Although accepting the relevance of the potential hardship arising from any time in custody for the respondent, the appellant submits it would not be enough to warrant the exercise of the residual discretion when balanced against the other relevant factors.

64. As to the medical evidence, the appellant accepts the respondent continues to engage with his psychologist but points to the lack of engagement in any relevant treatment or programs “in the context of intimate partner and familial violence”.

Respondent’s submissions

65. The respondent submits to belatedly re-sentence a 50-year-old respondent diagnosed with PTSD, having no English language skills, and previously a victim of torture in prison, at a time which is now about 85% through his existing sentence, would constitute a failure to have regard to substantively relevant factors in the exercise of the residual discretion.

66. He highlights the failure of the appellant to seek expedition of the appeal having due regard to the length of the initial sentence imposed. Other factors relied upon by the respondent are: (a) in the context of the imposition of a non-custodial sentence there has been substantial compliance with its terms; (b) the respondent has been undergoing significant and informed counselling through Companion House; (c) there is importance in achieving finality; (d) any re-sentencing is likely to impact negatively on the respondent’s rehabilitation, particularly with reference to his linguistic challenges and his prior custodial experience overseas; and (e) for reasons stated previously the respondent ought not be considered a suitable vehicle for general deterrence.

Should the residual discretion be exercised?

67. I am satisfied the residual discretion to not intervene should not be exercised in this matter. The final orders made at first instance remain in place until 30 May 2026. I do not accept any relevant delay on the part of the appellant in the timing of the appeal hearing and I am not satisfied any conduct on the part of the appellant led to the manifestly inadequate sentence.

68. I accept there are particular personal factors relevant to the respondent in terms of his background, his mental health issues and his prior experience in custody that may bear significantly on any resentencing exercise. But those factors are not such that I should decline to intervene to re-sentence the respondent.

69. Although the respondent has served most of the term of his present good behaviour order without incident, the order remains in place at this time, as does the suspended sentence attached to that order.

Resentencing

Appellant Submissions on Resentencing

70. The appellant primarily submits the respondent should be subject to a term of full-time imprisonment. Specifically, the appellant makes that submission in relation to the assaults against the respondent’s ex-wife and the assault occasioning actual bodily harm against his daughter. As for the other offences, although those warrant terms of imprisonment given their gravity, the appellant submits they need not be full-time custodial terms.

71. Whilst accepting the respondent may experience potential hardship in custody, the appellant submits the hardship should be carefully considered against the nature and circumstances of the offence and purposes of sentencing.

72. Regarding the question of any suspension of terms of imprisonment and the imposition of a good behaviour order, the appellant proposes direct engagement with Corrective Services as an additional condition of any behaviour or correction order due to the nature of the family violence offending.

Respondent Submissions on Resentencing

73. The respondent’s primary submission is that his complex PTSD requires specialised treatment, and, in the community, he is able to undergo counselling tailored to his specific needs. As for specific deterrence, the respondent suffers the ongoing loss of relationship with his children. The respondent submits there is a “particular cruel unfairness” in subjecting a person who has served almost his entire sentence to re-sentencing, particularly re-sentencing involving a term of full-time imprisonment.

74. Noting the purpose in Crown appeals of establishing governance in sentencing, the respondent submits his unsuitability as a subject for general deterrence weighs against an increased sentence.

75. In relation to the imposition of a full-time custodial sentence, the respondent relies upon the report of Mary Pekin, psychologist, dated 20 March 2026, together with a number of character references. Relevantly, to any resentencing exercise, Ms Pekin expresses the opinion that a term of incarceration would have “a severe and potentially destabilising effect” on the respondent’s mental health. She notes in particular: (a) the likelihood of a custodial environment acting as a trigger for past trauma including imprisonment and torture; (b) the risk of re-traumatisation, heightened anxiety and loss of emotional regulation; (c) the risk of acute psychological deterioration including the possibility of self-harm; and (d) the increased risk as a consequence of the respondent’s limited English and lack of support networks.

76. The respondent’s character references emphasise his heavy reliance upon the strong support network afforded to him by his local community and his close friends. One of his referees notes the respondent’s poor coping skills in circumstances where he is placed under significant stress on his own.

Relevant Considerations

77. Section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act sets out, relevantly for the resentencing exercise: 33 Sentencing—relevant considerations (1) In deciding how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence, a court must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant and known to the court: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offence; (b) any other offences required or allowed to be taken into account; (c) if the offence forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of criminal acts of the same or a similar character—the course of conduct; (d) if the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence were known to the offender when the offence was committed—the circumstances; (e) any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence; (f) the effect of the offence on the victims of the offence, the victims’ families and anyone else who may make a victim impact statement; … (g) if a victim of the offence was pregnant— (i) whether the offender knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the victim was pregnant; and (ii) whether the offender intended to cause, or was reckless about causing, loss of or harm to the pregnancy; and (iii) the loss of or harm to the pregnancy; and (iv) whether the offender intended to cause, or was reckless about causing, the death of or harm to a child born alive as a result of the pregnancy; and (v) the death of or harm to a child born alive as a result of the pregnancy; (gb) if the victim of the offence was a vulnerable person— (i) whether the offender knew, or ought reasonably to have known— (A) that the victim was a vulnerable person; or (B) that the victim was a vulnerable person and the extent of the person’s vulnerability; and (ii) the loss or harm to the vulnerable person; (h) any action the offender may have taken to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence; (i) the degree of responsibility of the offender for the commission of the offence; … (k) any assistance by the defence in the administration of justice (see section 35A); (l) any assistance by the offender to law enforcement authorities (see section 36); (m) the cultural background, character, antecedents, age and physical or mental condition of the offender; (n) the financial circumstances of the offender; (o) the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the offender’s family or dependants; (p) whether the offender was affected by alcohol or a controlled drug when the offence was committed and the circumstances in which the offender became affected; (q) the degree to which the offence was the result of provocation, duress or entrapment; (r) whether the recording of a conviction or the imposition of a particular penalty would be likely to cause particular hardship to the offender; … (t) whether the offender is voluntarily seeking treatment for any physical or mental condition that may have contributed to the commission of the offence; (u) whether the offender was in a position of trust or authority when the offence was committed; (v) the reason or reasons why the offender committed the offence; (w) whether the offender has demonstrated remorse; … (za) current sentencing practice. … (2) Without limiting subsection (1), in deciding whether a good behaviour order is an appropriate penalty for an offence, the court must consider the nature and severity of the conditions that may apply to the offender under the order. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not limit the matters a court may consider in deciding how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence. (4) The fact that any relevant factor is known to the court does not require the court to increase or reduce the severity of the sentence for the offence.

Resentence

78. I have had regard to s 34A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requiring the respondent to be sentenced in accordance with current sentencing practice and patterns.

79. The issue of totality looms large in the resentencing exercise. The magistrate’s sentence both in the approach to concurrency and in the sentences imposed fails to reflect the reality that the offending involved three separate victims, all of whom were in states of some vulnerability at the time of the offending and the offending involved numerous offences occurring over several years.

80. In the absence of any evidence being placed before me as to rehabilitation programs that may have been suitable to meet the particular needs of the respondent with regard to his underlying psychological condition and his English language skills, I am not prepared to make any orders requiring his participation in such a program. In particular, I do not have the benefit of a pre-sentence report concerning the respondent’s suitability to take part in a rehabilitation program and I am thus precluded from making such an order as part of a good behaviour order pursuant to s 97 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act.

81. I proceed to resentence on the basis of the findings made by the magistrate, together with the additional evidence placed before me including evidence concerning the respondent’s post sentence conduct.

82. In relation to the offences against the respondent’s daughter, being charge numbers 7048 of 2023, 7049 of 2023, 7051 of 2023 and 7052 of 2023, and 3015 of 2024, 3016 of 2024, 3017 of 2024 and 3021 of 2024, the respondent is convicted and released on a good behaviour order for a period of 12 months with core conditions only.

83. In relation to each of the offences against the respondent’s daughter being charge numbers 7050 of 2023 and 7053 of 2023, carrying maximum penalties of five years imprisonment and seven years imprisonment respectively, the respondent is convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering into a good behaviour order with core conditions only for 24 months.

84. In relation to each of the offences against the respondent’s son, being charge numbers 3019 of 2024 and 3020 of 2024, the respondent is convicted and released on a good behaviour order for a period of 12 months with core conditions only.

85. In relation to each of the offences against the respondent’s ex-wife, being charge numbers 3022 of 2024 and 7055 of 2023, carrying maximum penalties of five years and 10 years respectively, the respondent is convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment fully suspended upon entering into a good behaviour order with core conditions only for 24 months.

86. As to concurrency of sentencing, I have had regard to the absence of common elements (other than victim identity) in each of the offences for which a term of imprisonment has been imposed. The separate nature of each of the offences and the extended time period over which they occurred leads me to conclude that concurrent sentences would not adequately address the criminality of the respondent’s behaviour.

87. The respondent’s subjective circumstances are such that, notwithstanding the relative seriousness of the offending, a full-time custodial sentence is inappropriate. I am primarily influenced by three matters: (a) The respondent’s prior record of good behaviour; (b) The respondent was sentenced almost 12 months ago and has remained in the community since then with continued participation in counselling and no adverse behavioural indications. On the contrary, his community involvement appears to be a positive rehabilitative factor; and (c) The strong evidentiary basis supporting the likelihood of significant psychological decompensation in the event of a period of incarceration.

88. The respondent must come to terms with the fact that his use of violence to address his unhappiness with members of his family is not acceptable. The risk of the respondent suffering acute psychological deterioration as a direct consequence of full-time custody is high, in the opinion of Ms Pekin. That risk has influenced me particularly in concluding a fully suspended sentence is appropriate.

89. The total sentence imposed is two years imprisonment fully suspended upon the respondent entering a good behaviour order. I have increased the term of the good behaviour orders for the four offences attracting terms of imprisonment to accommodate the seriousness of the offending and to allow a further 12-month period of oversight while the respondent continues his counselling and rehabilitation through Companion House. Reflecting totality principles, each of the good behaviour orders will apply concurrently. I set out the sentence in the table below. Orders

90. I make the following orders: (1) The appeal is allowed. (2) I resentence the respondent as per paragraphs [81]-[89] of my judgment. (3) In accordance with s 149 of the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT), I place the pseudonym of ‘TD’ on the name of the respondent.

I certify that the ninety [90] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Muller. Associate: MG Malouf Date: 16 April 2026