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2. These provisions, which came into force quite recently, are the result of the passage of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) which is, by virtue of s7 of the Corporations (Northern Territory) Act 1990, part of the law of this Territory.
3. The facts are that the defendant posted the notice of demand and the affidavit required by s459E(3) on 28 July 1993 by certified mail addressed to the plaintiff's registered office in Adelaide, the home address of Mr Munn, a solicitor and co-director of the plaintiff company. Service by post is authorised vide s109Y, which provides that unless the contrary is proved, notice is taken to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post. The parties agreed that in the ordinary course of post, the notice would have been delivered within two or three days. Therefore, if the presumption in s109Y(b) applies, service would have been effected on either 30 or 31 July 1993.
4. On 30 July 1993 Mr Munn received a faxed copy of the notice of demand. There is dispute as to who sent the fax, but that does not matter. On 2 August Mr Munn received a notice from his post office box at Burnside, South Australia to collect a postal article at the Burnside Post Office. The Post Office habitually places postal articles addressed to his home in his post office box. As he was unable to attend at the Burnside Post Office during business hours, he telephoned the Burnside Post Office and arranged for the article to be redirected to the General Post Office, Adelaide. On 6 August 1993, he attended the General Post Office and received the article, which was in fact the notice of demand and supporting affidavit referred to above.
5. There is no evidence that Mr Munn knew what the article was that he had been asked to collect at the Burnside Post Office. Section 109Y does not require service by post to be by certified mail.
6. In my opinion, the plaintiff has satisfied me that service of the article did not take place until it was received by Mr Munn and this did not take place until 6 August 1993. I am not prepared to conclude that service was effected prior to then. There is no suggestion that Mr Munn was deliberately trying to avoid or to delay service.
7. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff's Summons is out of time. It was filed in this Court on 27 August 1993, i.e. within the twenty-one days limited by s459G(2) of the Act. The reason it was left so late is entirely the fault of the plaintiff's solicitors who were instructed well within time to take out this application. However, the Summons was not out of time, as it was filed on the last day. It is therefore not necessary to consider whether or not the court has power to extend time pursuant to s1322(4)(d) of the Corporations Law or s44(1) of the Limitation Act. However, s459G(3) also requires a copy of the application and supporting affidavit to be served within the twenty-one day period. Those documents were served on 27 August 1993 by facsimile on the defendant's solicitors; but that mode of service is not authorised by the Act or by the rules of this Court. It was therefore submitted that as s459G(3) was not complied with, I could not entertain this Summons.
8. The plaintiff has applied for an order pursuant to s1322(4)(d) extending the time for service of the Summons (which was served regularly at a later time); alternatively it has applied for an order pursuant to R6.10 of the Supreme Court Rules for an order confirming the informal service of the application and supporting affidavit. That Rule applies to these proceedings vide Rule 4 of the Supreme Court (Corporations Law) Interim Rules and Rule 7 of the Supreme Court (Companies) Rules.
9. Reliance was placed by the defendant upon the judgement of Hayne J in Texel Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (unreported, 14/9/93, Supreme Court of Victoria) which is to the effect that a Summons which is not filed within time cannot be extended by resort to s1322 of the Corporations Law. The reasoning of Hayne J was that, as the provisions of s459G(2) fell within Division 3 of Part 5.4 of the Corporations Law, which was intended to be a code for the setting aside of such notices, and as s459G(2) was expressed in mandatory terms, the special provisions of s459G had to be strictly complied with. The consequence of his Honours's reasoning is that a Summons not issued within the twenty-one day period fixed by the section is a nullity: cf. National Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 1 NSWLR 400 at 408. But the application was filed within time, and it would be a strange result that a proceeding validly issued should become a nullity if it were not later served within the time limits fixed by s459G(3). This point is averted to by Hayne J where he said (at 5): "In my view the language of the provisions of the Corporation Law shows a clear legislative intention that the special provisions made by s459G(2) and (3) are not to be extended by resort to s1322. Otherwise the limitations imposed in such clear and emphatic language by s459G92) and (3) would be rendered nugatory."
10. But in this case, there was service of the Summons and the supporting affidavit required by the section, within the time limited by the section, albeit irregular service. The mode of service to be used is not prescribed by the provisions of Part 5.4 of the Corporations Law. Nor do the provisions of the Corporations Law elsewhere to be found in that Act prescribe any exclusive mode of service. The mode of service of such an application, being a matter of practice and procedure, is left to the Rules of this Court. Accordingly it is my view that the method of service used in this case was a mere irregularity which could be waived by the defendant: see ATCO Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ancla Maritima SA and Ors (1984) 35 SASR 408 at 413-14. As, in my opinion, nothing in the Act precludes the court from prescribing the mode of service of an application, nothing in the Act prevents a court from making an order, pursuant to Rule 6, confirming irregular service of the application and the supporting affidavit on the defendant. It is clear that an order under R6.10 may be made at any time after informal service and I consider that I now have power to make such an order. As no prejudice could possibly flow to the defendant if such an order was now made, and the method of service was upon the defendant's solicitors (whose address was given in the statutory notice as the address for service on the defendant) I consider that it is just that such an order be now made, and accordingly I make orders (1) permitting the Summons to be amended to add thereto a further paragraph in the following terms: "1A. Insofar as it is necessary, the plaintiff seeks: (a) an order pursuant to Rule 6.10 of the Supreme Court Rules directing that this Summons and the affidavit of Thomas Peter Koltai sworn 27 August 1993 be taken to have been served upon Lanier (Australia) Pty Ltd on 27 August 1993." and (2) in terms of para 1A(a) of the Summons as amended.
11. I therefore consider that I do have jurisdiction to entertain the application to set aside the statutory notice.
12. The combined effect of s459H and s459J of the Corporations Law is that the court must set aside a notice if the "substantiated amount" is less than the statutory minimum and may set it aside if there is a defect in the demand which cannot be overlooked without causing substantial injustice to the defendant, or if there is some other reason.

The amount of the debt to which the demand relates, for the purposes of s459H, is the amount of $29,234.83. This is made up of two amounts as follows: (1) $9,114.83 for goods sold and delivered (2) $20,100 for a dealer's support fee. The plaintiff did not dispute that the first sum was due and owing, but claimed it has an offsetting claim in respect of that amount. As to the second sum, the plaintiff claims that that sum is not owing, and that in any event it has an offsetting claim which exceeds the admitted total. 14. The plaintiff claims that the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement on 26 March 1992 whereby the plaintiff was appointed a "key dealer" for the purpose of selling the defendant's products. The plaintiff alleges that not all of the terms of the agreement were reduced to writing, and that part of the agreement consisted of oral terms reached in November and December 1991. Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that the matters then discussed amounted to representations made by the defendant, and that the defendant engaged in deceptive and misleading conduct, contrary to s52 of the Trade Practices Act. In either event the plaintiff claims to have suffered loss and damage for certain of its claims totalling in excess of $60,000, plus unspecified general damages for other of its claims. 15. As to the claim for the dealer's support fee, the plaintiff contends that this sum is not yet due, as the defendant simply did not provide the support for the services for which the fee was paid. 16. In order to establish that the plaintiff has a genuine offsetting claim and genuinely disputes the existence of the alleged debt for the dealer's support fee, the plaintiff alleges that in June 1993, the defendant gave an improper notice terminating the plaintiff's key dealer status, contrary to the express terms of the written agreement. I consider that the plaintiff has an arguable case that this is so. Secondly, the plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff and the defendant settled their respective disputes by an agreement reached on 28 June 1993; that the defendant subsequently resiled from the settlement; that the plaintiff accepted the defendant's repudiation of the settlement; and that the plaintiff thereafter (a) gave written notice that it would resist threatened winding-up proceedings as an abuse of process, and that the dispute should be resolved by ordinary court process (b) gave notice to the defendant of its alleged breaches and some of the losses sustained by the plaintiff. I find that this is established on the evidence before me. Further the plaintiff says that on 15 July 1993, the defendant wrongly purported to terminate the contract between the parties by giving less than the notice required under the terms of the contract. There appears to be substance in this claim as well. I note as well that the plaintiff has now issued a Writ in this Court against the defendant in order to recover its alleged losses. 17. Having regard to the terms of the written agreement between the parties, I consider it likely that not all of the terms between the parties were in fact reduced to writing. The thrust of the plaintiff's complaint concerning the dealer's support fee is that the dealer did not provide the support for which the fee was to be paid. This support allegedly included "services support." Mr Black, on behalf of the defendant, submits that the written contract makes no provision for "services support", but I note that by the written agreement the defendant promised "support in all areas" and that the written agreement envisaged that the plaintiff would maintain adequate facilities to properly service customer's requirements. I consider, in short, that there is a genuine dispute as to the existence of the debt for the sum of $20,100. 18. Further, I consider that the plaintiff has genuine claims against the defendant for sums which I consider total not less than $10,000, and possibly considerably more. In particular, I consider that the following are genuine claims: the claims for advertising funding ($5,280); the loss of profit on a 6020 photocopier (at least $1,700); the claim for the loss of profits due to the wrongful termination of the key dealership and the contract generally which would probably amount to at least $4,000, if not more; and there are in addition, claims relating to preferences for national contracts being given to non-key dealers, which if made out, could result in considerable damages for which the plaintiff presently claims $45,900 in total. I would regard the plaintiff as having established a genuine offsetting claim in at least the sum of $10,000. 19. As the 'substantiated amount' therefore (admitted total $9,114.83, less offsetting total $10,000) is a negative figure, the plaintiff is entitled to an order pursuant to s459H(3) setting aside the demand. 20. Accordingly I order that the demand be set aside. The defendant is to pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to this application and order, and I certify fit for counsel.