s.604 - Appeal of decisions

Appeal against decision [2025] FWC 1219 of Deputy President Butler at Brisbane on 7 May 2025 in matter number U2024/11923 - Stay application - Stay sought against order for reinstatement and payment of lost remuneration - Stay granted on conditions.

• [1] David Weule was employed by Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd until 20 September 2024. Most recently, he was deployed to perform work at the Caval Ridge Mine near Moranbah in Central Queensland. The mine is operated by BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd. Mr Weule was dismissed following his involvement in an altercation with an employee of a labour hire provider who was also working at the mine, Mr Torcello.

• [2] On 4 October 2024, Mr Weule applied to the Commission for an unfair dismissal remedy under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). The application was heard by Deputy President Butler on 30 and 31 January 2025. The Deputy President handed down her decision on 7 May 2025. The Deputy President concluded that there was no valid reason for Mr Weule's dismissal and was satisfied that his dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable.[1] Central to the findings of the Deputy President was her conclusion that Mr Torcello had attacked Mr Weule and Mr Weule defended himself in a manner that was proportionate and reasonable.[2] The Deputy President was not satisfied that reinstatement was inappropriate and decided to order Mr Weule's reinstatement.[3] The Deputy President also indicated she considered it was appropriate to make an order to maintain the continuity of Mr Weule's employment and that she would hear the parties further on Mr Weule's loss since dismissal.[4] The Deputy President made directions for the parties to the heard as to the form and content of the orders to be made.

• [3] On 28 May 2025, Central Queensland Services filed a notice of appeal seeking permission to appeal from, and to appeal, the decision of the Deputy President. The notice of appeal indicated that Central Queensland Services sought a stay of the whole of the decision. At the time the notice of appeal was filed, the Deputy President had not made any orders. The stay application was allocated to me, and directions were issued to facilitate a hearing of the stay application on 25 June 2025 on the expectation that, by that time, the Deputy President would have made orders consequent on the findings she had made.

• [4] On 24 June 2025, the Deputy President issues a further decision in relation to the form and content of the orders to be made to resolve the proceedings at first instance.[5] The time taken in resolving the orders to be made is explained by the parties having filed a number of rounds of further submissions and evidence in relation to the form and content of the orders that should be made. The Deputy President made the following orders:[6]

A. Pursuant to the decisions in David Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1219 and David Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1760, the Fair Work Commission orders that:

1. Pursuant to section 391(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 ("the Fair Work Act"), Mr David Weule is to be reinstated to his employment with Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd and reappointed to the position in which he was employed immediately before his dismissal.

2. Mr Weule's reinstatement, provided for in paragraph A(1), is to be effective on and from 15 July 2025.

3. Pursuant to s.391(2) of the Fair Work Act, Mr Weule is taken to have been continuously employed by Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd from the date of his dismissal until the date of his reinstatement.

4. Pursuant to s.391(2) of the Fair Work Act, the period from the date of Mr Weule's dismissal to the date of his reinstatement counts towards Mr Weule's continuous service with Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd.

5. Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd shall pay to Mr Weule $29,318.27 gross on or before 15 July 2025.

• [5] In short, Central Queensland Services is required to reinstate Mr Weule and pay him a gross sum of $29,318.27 on or before 15 July 2025.

• [6] A hearing was conducted in relation to the stay application by Central Queensland Services on the morning of 25 June 2025. Holly Blattman KC and Megan Brooks of counsel appeared for Central Queensland Services and Jack Patrick, National Legal Officer of the Mining and Energy Union, appeared for Mr Weule. Shortly prior to the commencement of the hearing of the stay application, both parties provided draft orders which they contended should be made in relation to the stay application.

• [7] The form of order suggested by Mr Weule was as follows:

Pursuant to s.606 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Fair Work Commission orders:

1. the Decisions and Orders made by Deputy President Butler in matter U2024/11923 on 7 May and 24 June 2025, respectively, are stayed upon the basis of the following undertakings:

(a) The Appellant will pay to the Respondent an amount equal to:

(i) the wages and other payments to which the Respondent would have been entitled, had this Order not been made, in the period from 15 July 2025 to the date C2025/5395 (Appeal) is determined;

(ii) less any income earned by the Respondent in the same period.

(b) The Respondent will take reasonable steps to mitigate the difference between the amounts referred to at Item A(a)(i) and Item A(a)(ii) of this Order.

1. Any amount payable to the Respondent in accordance with Item A of this Order must be made within 14 days of the Respondent, following determination of the Appeal, providing evidence of the amount referred to at Item A(a)(ii) of this Order.

• [8] Mr Patrick confirmed that the provision of the draft order is to be understood as representing consent to a stay being granted with respect to the decision and orders of the Deputy President subject to the condition that Central Queensland Services pay Mr Weule the wages and other payments he would have received if he had been reinstated from 15 July 2025 (less income earned in other employment).

• [9] Central Queensland Services proposed a stay order be made in similar terms. There were two differences. First, Central Queensland Services contends that the conditions upon which a stay should be granted should be that the amounts calculated in order (A)(a) should only be payable to Mr Weule if its appeal does not succeed. That is, it contends that Mr Weule should not be paid any monies as condition of the granting of a stay in the event that the appeal is successful. Second, the draft order put forward by Central Queensland Services provides in order (A)(b) that Mr Weule take "all reasonable steps" to mitigate the difference between the ordinary earnings and the income he is receiving from other sources. The issue having been raised, Ms Blattman indicated that Central Queensland Services did not press the inclusion of the word "all" in order (A)(b).

• [10] The remaining issue as between the parties is whether a stay should be granted on condition that Central Queensland Services pay Mr Weule the monies he would have earned had the reinstatement gone into effect (less monies earned in other employment) irrespective of the outcome of the appeal or, alternatively, only if the appeal is unsuccessful. Mr Weule contends that, unless a condition is imposed which requires Central Queensland Services to pay Mr Weule the monies he would have earned if he had been reinstated from 15 July 2025, then he would be prejudiced by a stay order and a stay should not be granted.

• [11] The power to grant a stay pending the hearing and determination of an appeal lodged under s 604 is contained in s 606(1) of the Act, which provides:

(1) If, under section 604 or 605, the FWC hears an appeal from, or conducts a review of, a decision, the FWC may (except as provided by subsection (3)) order that the operation of the whole or part of the decision be stayed, on any terms and conditions that the FWC considers appropriate, until a decision in relation to the appeal or review is made or the FWC makes a further order.

• [12] A commonly cited formulation of the principles applicable to the grant of a stay is found in Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Edghill [2000] AIRC 758 in which Ross VP (as his Honour then was) said:[7]

In determining whether to grant a stay application the Commission must be satisfied that there is an arguable case, with some reasonable prospects of success, in respect of both the question of leave to appeal and the substantive merits of the appeal. In addition, the balance of convenience must weigh in favour of the order subject to appeal being stayed. Each of the two elements referred to must be established before a stay order will be granted.

• [13] The usual principle applied by the courts, when considering an application for a stay pending appeal, is that "a successful party is entitled to the fruits of his judgment" and there must be "sound reasons" to justify a suspension of that right.[8] The approach of the courts was usefully summarised in Philip Morris (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1821:[9]

The general principles governing an application for a stay pending the determination of an appeal or application for leave to appeal are not in doubt. The party seeking a stay must demonstrate a reason, or an appropriate case, to warrant the exercise of a discretion in his or her favour. This requirement is not satisfied by the mere filing of an appeal or an application for leave to appeal: ...The Court has a discretion whether or not to grant the stay, and if so, as to the terms that will be fair. In the exercise of the Court's discretion, it weighs consideration such as the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties, in particular whether prejudice will be caused by reason of the grant or withholding of a stay: ..... Within this framework, the Court exercises a broad discretion, and the party seeking a stay does not have to establish "special" circumstances: ....In general, a party which has succeeded at the trial is entitled to the benefit of a judgment and thus to commence with the presumption that the judgment is correct.

• [14] No different principles are applicable where a stay is sought of a reinstatement order. There are potential consequences of reestablishing an employment relationship in circumstances in which it may be interrupted again if the appeal is successful. Although those consequences may be relevant to an assessment of the balance of convenience in such a case, it is not correct to say that the grant of a stay in an appeal against a reinstatement order is the "normal" or "usual" course.[10]

• [15] Section 606(1) of the Act permits the Commission to order that the operation of the whole or part of a decision be stayed "on any terms and conditions that the FWC considers appropriate". The precise scope of the "terms and conditions" that may be imposed does not appear to have been examined by the Commission. The extent of the discretion conferred to impose conditions on a stay order in other contexts also appears to be little considered in the authorities.[11] It is readily apparent that the discretion conferred by s 606(1) to stay a decision of the Commission subject to terms and conditions is intended to be broad. A stay may be granted subject to "any terms and conditions" that the Commission considers appropriate. Language conferring a more expansive discretion is difficult to imagine.

• [16] It is not necessary to explore, in this matter, the full extent of the "terms and conditions" which may be imposed on a stay pending appeal under s 606(1) of the Act. It appears to me that to constitute a term or condition of a stay order, the term or condition must at least have some logical connection to staying the operation or effect of the decision or order subject to the appeal and not seek to achieve some ulterior or distinct purpose. In PHI (International) Australia Pty Ltd T/A HNZ Australia Pty Ltd v Nash [2024] FWC 1735, I said in a different context:[12]

In my opinion, the intention of the section is that the Commission have the capacity to impose terms and conditions such that the stay will operate only if the condition imposed were met. For example, a condition might be imposed requiring steps to be taken to ameliorate or reduce any prejudice caused by the stay order. A common example is that a reinstatement order may be stayed on condition that the employer pay the dismissed employee his or her usual wages pending determination of an appeal. I do not believe that the 'terms or conditions' contemplated by s 606(1) could convert an order staying a decision to something else or cause it to have an effect beyond staying the decision subject of the appeal. That is the effect of the condition sought by the appellant. It seeks to convert a stay of a decision to a stay of proceedings.

• [17] In that passage, reference was made to Department of Health (NSW) v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 47; (2010) 77 NSWLR 159 in which the NSW Court of Appeal considered the s 89(8) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). That subsection permits a reinstatement, re-employment or compensation order to be made by the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW "on such terms and conditions as the Commission determines". Spigelman CJ said of that section:[13]

Pursuant to s 89(8) of the Act, the Commission can impose "terms and conditions" on "an order under this section". The conditions able to be imposed pursuant to this power must be attached to something capable of constituting an "order" within s 89(1)-(5). There was no such order. Section 89(8) is not a power enabling the Commission to do whatever it thinks is fair and/or reasonable. The "conditions" identified as 4(i) and (ii) are not conditions within s 89(8).

• [18] The reference to "terms and conditions" in s 606(1) of the Act does not permit the Commission to simply do whatever it considers fair or reasonable. It can only impose terms or conditions on an order which is, in substance, a stay of a decision of the Commission. However, if it stays the operation of the whole or part of a decision, the Commission has a broad power to determine what, if any, terms and conditions ought to apply to the stay. The power at least extends to terms or conditions intended to ameliorate or remove any prejudice which would otherwise be caused by the grant of a stay or to protect the interests of the parties taking into account the likely eventualities if the appeal is successful or unsuccessful.

• [19] The first matter to be considered is whether Central Queensland Services has an arguable case, with some prospects of success, in relation to both the question of permission to appeal and the substantive merits of the appeal. In circumstances in which there is consent to a stay being granted, at least on conditions, it is unnecessary to reflect on the grounds of appeal in great detail. It is sufficient that I satisfy myself that Central Queensland Services has a sufficiently arguable case to warrant a stay being granted.

• [20] The grounds set out in the notice of appeal are, to say the least, extensive. There are eight grounds of appeal with many sub-grounds. The grounds are elaborated upon in the written submissions with respect to the substantive appeal which have been filed by Central Queensland Services. A number of grounds of appeal contend that the Deputy President erred in the approach she adopted with respect to the question of self-defence, whether there was a valid reason for dismissal, whether Mr Weule had received a reasonable opportunity to respond to the reason for his dismissal and with respect to reinstatement. It also alleges the Deputy President failed to take into account various matters, including Central Queensland Services' policies and its health and safety obligations.

• [21] It appears to me that the appeal is primarily directed at challenging the factual findings made by the Deputy President, in particular, the finding that Mr Weule was defending himself in the encounter with Mr Torcello and that his actions were proportionate and reasonable having regard to the events and the conditions at the time. There may be a question as to whether it is in the public interest to grant permission to appeal for the purposes of ss 400(1) and 604(2) of the Act if an appeal is primarily directed at factual findings made by the Deputy President in the particular case. However, that is not necessarily a barrier to permission to appeal being granted. Without having had the opportunity to review the evidence at first instance in any detail, it is not possible to assess with certainty the merits of Central Queensland Services' case on appeal. On the information available to me, I am satisfied that it has a sufficiently arguable case in relation to both permission to appeal and the merits of the appeal to justify the Commission staying the operation of the orders of the Deputy President.

• [22] Turning to consider the balance of convenience, I also accept that the balance of convenience favours the granting of a stay at least if the prejudice occasioned to Mr Weule by granting a stay can be appropriately addressed. The capacity to actually perform work in a job has an intrinsic value which is separate and distinct from the benefit of the remuneration received for the performance of such work.[14] That is a matter that will frequently be relevant to the assessment of the balance of convenience in circumstances in which a stay is sought in relation to a reinstatement order.

• [23] In this matter, Mr Weule is willing to consent to a stay. Furthermore, the order for reinstatement is not to take effect until 15 July 2025 which is shortly before the hearing of the appeal. If the appeal does not succeed, the delay in reinstatement is likely to be relatively short. This consideration weighs in favour of a finding that the balance of convenience supports the granting of a stay. I do not accept everything Central Queensland Services has said in relation to the difficulties it says may be caused by Mr Weule being reinstated. Based on the findings made by the Deputy President, it is difficult to accept that Mr Weule returning to the workplace would, in itself, present a risk to health and safety or disrupt relationships with other employees or managers. However, given that the gap between reinstatement and a decision in relation to the appeal is likely to be short, some inconvenience is likely to be caused to all parties by recommencing the employment relationship in circumstances in which it may again be interrupted shortly thereafter if the appeal succeeds.

• [24] The issue that remains is whether a stay should be granted on condition that Central Queensland Services pay Mr Weule his usual wages and other payments from 15 July 2025. Although there is some lack of clarity in the form of order provided on behalf of Mr Weule, it was clear from the hearing of the stay application that he seeks an outcome such that Central Queensland Services is required to pay him the remuneration he would receive if reinstated (less earning derived from other employment) irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. The position of Central Queensland Services is that no such condition should be attached to a stay and that the only condition should be that it pay Mr Weule the wages and other payments he would have received if reinstated only if the appeal does not succeed.

• [25] Ms Blattman referred to the decision of the Full Bench in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409. That case concerned an appeal from orders that eleven mine workers be re-employed. Vice President Ross (as his Honour then was) had made orders partially staying the re-employment orders on condition that, among other things, the employer pay most of the employees an amount equal to their net fortnightly remuneration pending the determination of the appeal.[15] In the course of the hearing before Ross VP, the employees initially sought that provision be made in the stay order that monies paid to the employees pending determination of the appeal not be recoverable.[16] The employees did not ultimately press for that provision and the matter was conducted on the basis that the employees would need to repay any amounts paid to them pursuant to the stay order if the employer's appeal was successful.[17]

• [26] The Full Bench dismissed the appeal, but added some additional observations upon which Ms Blattman relies. The Full Bench recorded that the employees' counsel was asked during the appeal hearing whether the employees were going to repay any monies payable under orders of Ross VP if the appeal was fully successful. Counsel indicated that the employees needed to survive and live on the payments in the meantime and would not undertake to repay the money.[18] The Full Bench made the following comment:[19]

We find the views expressed by the respondents through their counsel to be most unusual. If we were considering the matter for ourselves we would ensure that the appellant was not exposed to the possibility of being successful on the appeal and then being forced to institute civil action to recover sums paid pursuant to Deputy President Leary's orders. We agree, with respect, with the following passage from the judgment of the High Court in Commonwealth v McCormack [1984] HCA 57; (1984) 155 CLR 273 at 276:

'''Restitutio in integrum is the right of every successful appellant': per Lord Field in Cox v Hakes [(1890) 15 App Cas 506]. An appellant who has satisfied a judgment for the payment of money is entitled, on the reversal of the judgment, to repayment of the money paid by him with interest: Rodger v The Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris [(1871) LR 3 PC 465]; Merchant Banking Co v Maud [(1874) [1874] UKLawRpEq 145; LR 18 Eq 659]. In the former case, Lord Cairns said [(1871) LR 3 PC at 475]: '. . . one of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case.'''

We think that in cases before the Commission, which is not a Court, where doubt exists as to the ability to repay money paid pursuant to the order under appeal, the appropriate course is to require that money only be paid if some procedure is adopted to protect the appellant in the event that the appeal succeeds. The procedure may be an undertaking to repay or a requirement that the money be preserved in an interest-bearing account, or some other appropriate course. We add that in many cases the use of an interest-bearing account is adopted by consent.

• [27] A number of observations may be made about this passage. First, it is obviously obiter dicta. The Full Bench had earlier observed that what it had already said was "sufficient to dispose of the appeal". Second, the remarks assume that amounts paid pursuant to the conditions imposed as part of the stay were "sums paid pursuant to Deputy President Leary's orders" being the orders at first instance. It is not clear that is correct. Third, the Full Bench assumed, but was not called upon to decide, that the monies paid to the employees pending determination of the appeal were liable to be repaid in the event that the appeal was successful. If monies paid pursuant to a condition of a stay order are not required to be repaid, the observations of the Full Bench in relation to protecting the capacity of an appellant to recover amounts from an unsuccessful respondent are of no present significance.

• [28] The Full Bench in Coal and Allied did not suggest the Commission cannot impose, as a condition of staying a reinstatement order, a requirement that an employer pay its former employee the remuneration that would have been earned had the order gone into effect and not recover those sums irrespective of the outcome of appeal. It is not uncommon for reinstatement orders to be stayed subject to a condition in those terms.[20] This has frequently occured in circumstances in which the employer has consented to such a condition. It is nonetheless evidence that the Commission has generally assumed a stay can be granted with such a condition. I am not aware of any authority that the Commission cannot grant a stay on condition that the employer pay an employee the remuneration that would have been earned but for the stay and not recover those monies. Central Queensland Services did not refer to any such authority. Section 606(1) permits the Commission to stay a decision subject of an appeal on any terms and conditions it considers appropriate. It provides ample authorisation for a condition of that type to be imposed.

• [29] The primary submission advanced by Central Queensland Services is that it is not appropriate for a stay to be granted on the condition sought by Mr Weule because it would permit him to retain monies that he would have earned had he been reinstated even if the reinstatement order is subsequently quashed on appeal. It submits that no prejudice is caused to Mr Weule if a stay is granted on the condition it proposes. Ms Blattman submits that this is because, if Central Queensland Services succeeds in the appeal, Mr Weule should never have been reinstated, and he has not lost anything. Mr Patrick, on behalf of Mr Weule, submits that Mr Weule will be prejudiced if the condition he seeks is not attached to the order. Mr Patrick says that is because, if no stay is granted, Mr Weule will be reinstated from 15 July 2025 and have the opportunity to earn his usual remuneration from his employment.

• [30] In my opinion, the submissions of Central Queensland Services assess prejudice from the incorrect standpoint. The prejudice occasioned by the granting of a stay is to be assessed by comparing what would occur if a stay is now granted or if it is not rather than on the assumption the appeal will be successful. If a stay is not granted, Mr Weule is entitled to be reinstated from 15 July 2025. He would then be able to earn the remuneration associated with his employment. As Ms Blattman accepted during the stay hearing, if Mr Weule earns wages by the performance of work, he would not be liable to repay his income even if the appeal is successful. The effect of a stay is to deny Mr Weule the opportunity to earn the remuneration associated with his employment pending determination of the appeal and retain the sum earned irrespective of the outcome. That prejudice is not ameliorated by the order proposed by Central Queensland Services. That order would mean Mr Weule would only receive monies equivalent to the earnings he would have received had the reinstatement order come into effect if the appeal is unsuccessful.

• [31] The Commission may conclude in a particular case that a stay of a reinstatement order should be granted without the condition sought by Mr Weule. That may be because the case of appeal is extremely strong, the dismissed employee has obtained alternative employment from which they derive greater remuneration, or the dismissed employee may have engaged in some disentitling conduct. I am not satisfied there is any basis upon which Mr Weule should be prejudiced as a result of a stay being granted in this matter. In my opinion, the balance of convenience does not favour a stay being granted unless a condition attaches to the stay order to ensure Mr Weule is not disadvantaged financially as a result. If Central Queensland Services wishes to avoid the reinstatement order coming into effect, it is appropriate it pay Mr Weule the remuneration he would have earned had he returned to the employment.

• [32] For these reasons, I propose to stay the decision and orders of Deputy President Butler on condition that Central Queensland Services pay Mr Weule an amount equal to the wages and other payments to which he would have been entitled had he been reinstated for the period from 15 July 2025 to the date the appeal is determined less any income earned in other employment. The conditions will include that Mr Weule is not required to repay those amounts irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. An order will issue separately to that effect. As the form of the order differs somewhat from that proposed by the parties, the parties will have leave to apply to vary the order prior to 15 July 2025 if there is any concern in relation to its terms.

H Blattman KC with M Brooks, of counsel, instructed by S Chapman of Landers and Rogers for the appellant.

J Patrick, National Legal Officer of the Mining and Energy Union, for the respondent.

[1] Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1219 at [168].

[2] Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1219 at [136].

[3] Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1219 at [171].

[4] Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1219 at [177] and [181].

[5] Weule v Central Queensland Services Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1760.

[6] Print PR788461.

[7] Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Edghill [2000] AIRC 758 at [5].

[8] McBride v Sandland (No 2) [1918] HCA 59; (1918) 25 CLR 369 at 374 (Barton J).

[9] Philip Morris (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1821 at [17] (Sackville, Hely and Gyles JJ).

[10] See, for example, Supreme Caravans Pty Ltd v Pham [2013] FWC 4766 at [11]; Virgin Airlines Australia Pty Ltd v Macnish [2024] FWC 2333 at [16]- [17].

[11] See, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 29(1).

[12] PHI (International) Australia Pty Ltd T/A HNZ Australia Pty Ltd v Nash [2024] FWC 1735 at [17].

[13] Department of Health (NSW) v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 47; (2010) 77 NSWLR 159 at [23] (Spigelman CJ).

[14] Blackadder v Ramsay Butchering Services Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 22; (2005) 221 CLR 539 at [32] (Kirby J) and [80] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); Quinn v Overland [2010] FCA 799; (2010) 199 IR 40 at [101] (Bromberg J); Transport Workers Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 4) [2021] FCA 1602; (2010) 312 IR 133 at [139] (Lee J); Elisha v Vision Australia Limited [2024] HCA 50; (2024) 99 ALRJ 171 at [67] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ).

[15] Ultimately in the form set out at Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409 at [6].

[16] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409 at [23].

[17] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409 at [24]-[26].

[18] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409 at [30].

[19] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Crawford (2001) 109 IR 409 at [31].

[20] See, for example, Department of Human Services v Starr (Print PR578994); Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd t/as Rio Tinto Iron Ore v Ballam [2017] FWC 6630 at [34] and [38]; Sydney Trains v Bobrenitsky (Print PR732014); Sydney Trains v Elali (Print PR747782); Metcash Trading Limited v Hudson (Print PR733245); Queensland Rail v Rainbow (Print PR739820); DP World Sydney Limited t/as DP World v Montana [2023] FWC 918 at [3] and [10]-[11]; Illawarra Coal Holdings Pty Ltd T/A South32 v Sleiman (Print PR74911); Australian International Islamic College Ltd T/A Australian International Islamic v Brownson (Print PR776641).

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