CDK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451 SZVBB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1414

Aspects of the approach to Part 7 of the Act 71 The Tribunal, when conducting a review under Part 7 of the Act, is not concerned with the "correction of error" on the part of the Minister's delegate but is engaged in a de novo consideration of the merits of the decision referred to it. The task of the Tribunal is to consider the application for a protection visa "afresh" and to determine "for itself" whether or not it is satisfied that the criteria for the grant of the visa have been met. The precise character of the review to be undertaken by the Tribunal (or any authority or tribunal undertaking a review of an administrative decision) is ultimately always a function of the statutory context. For example, in ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34 ("ABT17"), the plurality, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ observe that the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Immigration Assessment Authority in conducting a review of a fast track reviewable decision is well settled (having regard to Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 at 226) and observed that when conducting a review, the IAA is not concerned with the correction of error but is engaged in a "de novo consideration of the merits of the decision that has been referred to it" imposing an obligation on the IAA to consider the matter afresh and determine the application for the grant of the visa for itself. However, as to the IAA, Nettle J expressed this observation in ABT17 at [59]: "… [F]or the purposes of assessing whether it was legally unreasonable for the IAA to depart from credibility findings made by the Minister's delegate pursuant to Subdivs AB and AC of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Act, the task of the IAA is more closely analogous to an appeal by way of rehearing". Gordon J and Edelman J, in separate reasons, in ABT17 emphasise that care needs to be taken with expressions like "hearing de novo" as the precise character of the review by the relevant body is ultimately always a function of the statutory context. 72 Taking account of all of those considerations and the statutory text of Part 7 described earlier, it is, in my view, correct to say, particularly having regard to the "overarching duty" on the part of the Tribunal to review the decision under s 414, that when the Tribunal conducts a review under Part 7 it is not concerned with the correction of error on the part of the Minister's delegate but is engaged in a true de novo consideration of the merits of the decision so as to form its own view about whether it can be satisfied that the applicant meets the criteria for a protection visa having regard to the powers, duties and obligations set out in Part 7 of the Act, taking into account the observations in SZMTA set out at [23] of these reasons. 73 That being so, it is not necessary to analyse the delegate's decision for the purpose, in effect, of seeking to find where the delegate may have "gone wrong". However, it may be useful to simply note an aspect of the delegate's decision that may be thought to have been influential in the reasoning of the Tribunal. 74 As to that, the delegate said this: While the evidence before me indicates that the Ethiopian government does not have direct control of the CASCAPE project, it is conducted in close co-operation with the government who contributes to its co-funding through university funding. Given the Ethiopian [government's] influence over all aspects of Ethiopian society, and aid programs in particular, I am not satisfied that the government would have no influence on employment in the project and endorsement of candidates for an overseas education opportunity such as an AusAID scholarship, and I find it implausible that somebody of the applicant's claimed political profile could be employed for three years by CASCAPE and nominated for training that involves foreign travel without demurral from the Ethiopian government at some level. When considered cumulatively with the other concerns regarding the credibility of the applicant's account I find that this contributes to undermining the credibility of his claims. … I found the applicant's account of his public outburst at his brother's funeral to be unconvincing and implausible in light of the available country information. I am not satisfied that even in a distressed state the applicant would make politically inflammatory remarks in a public forum in the knowledge that police were present, nor do I accept that the applicant would think his actions would provoke any trouble for him. When considered cumulatively with the other concerns regarding the credibility of the applicant's account I find that this contributes to undermining the credibility of his claims. 75 The appellant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 8 March 2016.

The findings and reasoning of the Tribunal 127 At 90 (all references to the Tribunal's observations are references to paragraphs of its reasons), the Tribunal notes aspects of the appellant's claims. It notes the appellant's claims of the imprisonment of TG, the appellant's visits to his brother, his brother's suffering and deterioration. It notes the appellant's view that suspicion came upon the family due to his maternal uncle's active support of the OLF. It notes the appellant's evidence of claims of countless searches of the family home by "government soldiers and local authorities". It notes the appellant's evidence of having seen such searches followed the arrest of his parents on four or five occasions. 128 As to TG, the Tribunal notes that the appellant "indicated" that TG was around 30 years old when he was detained in 2000. 129 At 91, the Tribunal notes aspects of the appellant's evidence concerning the speech he gave at TG's funeral. 130 The Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that GG was "suspected of being OLF" and suspected of having links with the secret representative of the OLF in the Amuru district. It notes the appellant's claims of harassment of his father and family due to GG's disappearance. 131 At 92, the Tribunal notes the appellant's claims of difficulties he experienced while working at Alage ATVET College, the OPDO meeting at the College and the threats made to him when the appellant refused to join the OPDO. It notes the appellant's claims of discrimination when it came to further study and wage reviews. The Tribunal notes the appellant's claims that if a person refuses to join the OPDO, the person is thought to be an OLF member or supporter. Many of the matters at [57] to [61] of these reasons are noted at 92. 132 At 93, the Tribunal notes the appellant's claims to have joined the OPC in 2008 and to have engaged in public activity for the OPC from around 2009, and his detention in 2010 at the time of the elections. 133 At 94, the Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence concerning his education: 94 is quoted at [9] of these reasons. 134 At 95, the Tribunal sets out its first short statement of its view or conclusions about the appellant's claims (for the reasons it then discusses) in these terms: [T]he Tribunal considers that the applicant's evidence about the difficulties he experienced in Ethiopia is lacking in credibility in a number of regards. It finds aspects of the evidence to be at odds with independent evidence about the treatment of people suspected of involvement in organisations such as the OLF. There are other aspects of his evidence which further undermine the credibility of his claims. [emphasis added] 135 As to the "independent information" said to be at odds with aspects of the appellant's evidence (and claims), the Tribunal notes that such information indicates that people associated with the OLF (or members) and especially those who have expressed dissent, are "harshly treated". Moreover, information in relation to people accused of being members of the OLF suggests to the Tribunal that such people (and their families) are intimidated "for considerable periods of time". 136 The Tribunal cites a 2005 Human Rights Watch report (Suppressing Dissent: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia's Oromia Region, May 2005, Vol 17, No. 7) which refers to "thousands of Oromo on charges of plotting armed insurrection on behalf of the OLF", and the use of arbitrary detention against those accused of supporting or being members of the OLF. The Tribunal observes that the report says that in many cases police officials "follow, harass and intimidate former detainees and their families for years after their release". 137 The Tribunal cites another report (US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 - Ethiopia, 31 March) which indicated to the Tribunal that the government of Ethiopia continues to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily, especially if persons are members, or thought to be sympathisers of, the OLF. 138 The Tribunal cites a further report (International Crisis Group 2009, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 153, 4 September 2009) (the "ICG 2009 Report") which indicates that the treatment of those associated with, or accused of being associated with, the OLF was "particularly harsh". 139 The Tribunal also refers to advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ("DFAT") dated 31 January 2003 which concerns Country Information Report No. 24/03 - Ethiopia: Oromo Ethnic Group, which indicated to the Tribunal that, "if a person is believed by the authorities to be associated with the OLF, that person's family members often also fall under suspicion of being associated with the OLF and that harassment of family members can continue after the death of the first family member suspected of association with the OLF". 140 The Tribunal also notes that information drawn from these reports is consistent with a United Kingdom Home Office Operational Guidance Notice: (Ethiopia), November 2013, which states that, "if it is accepted that a claimant has been involved in or is suspected of membership or sympathising with the OLF or the ONLF and has previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities, then they are likely to be at risk of persecution and a grant of asylum will be appropriate". 141 The Tribunal cites the ICG 2009 Report (and a document described as "Berteismann Stiftung's Transformation Index 2014, Ethiopia"), which "suggests that the civil service is highly politicised, that tertiary employment is closely linked with membership of the EPRDF, and that employment in a public sector job is associated with being a member of or close to the ruling party". 142 The Tribunal also cites another US Department of State Report (Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2012 - Ethiopia) (the "US 2012 Report"), which reports that teachers and other government workers have had their employment terminated if they belonged to opposition parties. 143 The Tribunal also notes, however, that the same report indicates that "at the University level, members of Medrek and its constituent parties were able to teach". 144 As to State-sponsored education, the Tribunal cites the ICG 2009 Report as indicating that selection for State-sponsored education also requires the person to be a member of, or close to, the ruling party. The Tribunal also cites the US 2012 Report as indicating that the ruling party gives preference to students loyal to the EPRDF in allocations to post-graduate programs. The Tribunal also cites a document (Haileselassie, A, 2009 Ethiopia: Writing its Own Obituary?, Daily Monitor, 25 August (2009)) which the Tribunal noted contains this information: One thing the [EPRDF] has said openly: not everyone can study for a master's degree at government universities without its goodwill. This is bolstered by the recruiters who go around telling students, "let alone a second degree, you will not even find a job unless you are a member". 145 The point of all these references, as the expression of the Tribunal's observation at 95 quoted earlier (at [134] of these reasons), is the further observation at 100 that the independent information available to the Tribunal: … does not appear to sit comfortably with the applicant's ability to obtain a higher degree and maintain public sector employment over a lengthy period in spite of his claimed difficulties, including suspicions of OLF links and difficulties associated with involvement in the OPC. 146 The Tribunal observes that it put its concerns on that issue to the appellant and "carefully considered all of the evidence and the submissions". 147 The Tribunal's concern was this: how could a person asserting the factual claims he makes as a basis for a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of significant harm, having regard particularly to suspected support for the OLF by reason of family association with the OLF through the appellant's maternal uncle, and actual engagement with the OPC from 2008, have overcome the attitude and conduct of government authorities towards a person exhibiting those features, reflected in independent country information, so as to have had the achievements reflected in the appellant's education and employment career in Ethiopia? 148 Plainly enough, the Tribunal was unable to reconcile the independent country information concerning the treatment by government authorities of persons suspected of association with the OLF and membership of the OPC on the one hand, and the appellant's achievements in education and employment in Ethiopia on the other hand, other than on the basis that the appellant's claims must be implausible and the appellant's evidence is "lacking in credibility". This was so notwithstanding the matter noted at [143] of these reasons. 149 Accordingly, the analytical approach adopted by the Tribunal was to test the evidence relating specifically to the appellant by testing the evidence of the appellant, other evidence provided to the Tribunal by the appellant and the submissions of the appellant by Mr Glass on matters of fact and law, against the background of the anomaly apparent to the Tribunal and of concern to it, of the appellant having achieved as he did in terms of his education and employment whilst having suffered at the hands of government authorities as claimed. 150 In other words, the benchmark or yardstick by which the actual evidence relevant to the appellant would be judged would be whether the Tribunal could reach a statutory state of satisfaction in discharging its "overarching duty" of review under s 414 of the Act, that the appellant's evidence overcomes the anomaly apparent to the Tribunal in the appellant's achievements in his education and employment on the one hand, and the treatment by government authorities of a person suffering the disabilities claimed by the appellant as the foundation for a well-founded fear of persecution, on the other hand. 151 How did the Tribunal deal with the actual evidence? 152 At 102, the Tribunal notes the appellant's claims concerning TG's death in 2003 and the appellant's detention and the accusation of having links with the OLF. It notes the appellant's evidence of GG fleeing to Kenya in October 2003 and the subsequent detention of family members. The Tribunal notes that it put to the appellant that it was "exactly around this time" that he himself obtained a job as an instructor at the College (October 2003), and that the College was established under the Ministry of Agricultural Technical Vocational Education. The Tribunal put to the appellant that it might have difficulty accepting that he was able to obtain such a job in 2003 around the time that he claimed the events described above were occurring. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant was able to sustain the job at the College until 2006. The Tribunal put to the appellant that people, who were suspected of membership of the OLF were harassed and intimidated by the police and so too were their family members for considerable periods of time. 153 The explanation given by the appellant was put this way at 102: The applicant stated that first of all he got the qualifications and graduated in July. In August he got this job. He said there were over 25 institutions. One of them was where he was given the job. He said at the time there were only 23 of them who graduated. The scope of the recruitment for people with his skills was high and they could not get enough staff. At the time he was not involved with any politics personally and he was not there when his family were arrested. 154 The Tribunal put to the appellant that the public sector in Ethiopia was highly politicised and that people might be appointed on the basis of their membership of the ruling party. Again, the Tribunal put to the appellant that it might have difficulty accepting that he was able to obtain that job in 2003 as claimed. The appellant gave this explanation to the Tribunal at 102: The applicant stated that what the Tribunal was saying was correct but not the way the Tribunal was putting it. If you were a university graduate and there was demand for the qualification, when it came to hiring[,] you would apply for it and go through the procedures and get a job. But after that time there was discrimination. People were separated into party supporters. That was where the discrimination came in. Regardless of what efforts you put in, someone doing less and who had the same qualification could be your boss because of links to the political party. When it came to professional development, the others might be sent and get paid but you would not get a lot of opportunity because you were not one of them. They would keep you because they needed you but the treatment and discrimination of the workplace would continue. You would never become a manager there but you would still work but with the prospect of not getting anywhere. If you were arrested, the employment would still continue. 155 At 103, the Tribunal put to the appellant that the Ministry of Education gave preference to students loyal to the EPRDF in allocating post-graduate programs and that not everyone could study in such programs at a government university without the goodwill of the EPRDF. The Tribunal put to the appellant that it might have some doubts about how he was able to enter the master's program if he was thought to be associated with the OLF and if he was a member of the OPC. The appellant's explanation was this at 103: The applicant stated that he left his other job and when he applied for this university in Haramaya there was no political requirement. He was hiding his membership. They did not know about it. As far as he knew, if you were able to pay for your studies and accommodation then you did not need to be a member of a political party to complete your studies there. If he had wanted financial support from the government, he would have been dependent on the government to pay for everything. That was when you would need to become a member. 156 At 104 and 105, the Tribunal addresses aspects of the appellant's submissions to the effect that a number of highly prominent Oromo political activists have had successful academic and professional careers and have been permitted to travel abroad before ultimately being arrested and subjected to torture. 157 One example concerned the case of Bekele Gerba who had been dismissed from employment with the Adama Teachers' College in 2005 due to being suspected of having participated in a student riot in 2004, but yet Mr Gerba had been able to return to Addis Ababa where he had taught at two private universities before becoming employed by Addis Ababa University as an English teacher. The Tribunal notes that Mr Gerba stood as a candidate for an opposition party in 2010, attended meetings with an Amnesty International delegation, and had later been arrested for suspected support for the OLF. He was released in May 2015 and although a prominent opponent of the regime, Mr Gerba had been permitted to travel abroad (after his release from prison), visit Washington DC in August 2015 and meet with State Department officials. Mr Gerba was re-arrested on his return to Ethiopia and taken to the "notorious Maekaiawi Prison". 158 The submissions also emphasise the case of "Merera Gudina". This is a reference to Dr Gudina, mentioned earlier. Dr Gudina was politically active at Addis Ababa University which "landed him in prison for seven years without charge". However, despite his leadership position in an organisation in opposition to the government, he held a position as an Associate Professor of Political Science at Addis Ababa University until December 2015 when he was removed from that role. 159 As to Mr Gerba, the Tribunal notes that Mr Gerba was arrested and subsequently convicted and imprisoned for association with the banned OLF. The Tribunal notes that when Mr Gerba was jailed, his wife lost her job as a high school teacher. He had earlier been dismissed from his post as a teacher at the Adama Teachers' College in 2005. The Tribunal notes that it may be that Mr Gerba was able to teach at two private universities and then be employed as a lecturer at the University of Addis Ababa from 2007 even though he had earlier been dismissed from the Adama Teachers' College in 2005. Nevertheless, suspected association with the OLF led to Mr Gerba's imprisonment and subsequent re-arrest in 2015. 160 The Tribunal considered at 105 that this background concerning Mr Gerba "is very much at odds with the applicant's employment and educational history in the wake of being suspected of involvement in the OLF in 2003". 161 The Tribunal also notes that the information concerning Mr Gerba and the circumstance that Dr Gudina was dismissed from his lecturing position in 2015 is "not inconsistent with information such as that from the US Department of State which indicates that, at university level, members of parties such as Medrek were able to teach", because in each case each man did lose their job and suffered imprisonment as a result of being associated with the OLF or because they took a stand in support of opposition parties against the ruling party. The Tribunal observed that notwithstanding the recognition in the US Department of State Report that at university level members of parties such as Medrek were able to teach, the report also refers to the dismissal of "other government workers, including teachers in other contexts, and indicates that both public sector employment and access to postgraduate opportunities are highly politicised". 162 At 106, the Tribunal notes that the appellant claimed that he and other members of his family had been suspected of involvement with the OLF as early as 2003 which ultimately led to the harassment of his family on four or five occasions, the detention of TG and the flight of GG from Ethiopia to Kenya resulting in continued harassment of the family including the events mentioned earlier in December 2003 after GG fled to Kenya. In that context, the Tribunal observes that the appellant's evidence was that at this time (October 2003 to December 2003) the appellant was able to obtain work at the College (a government college established by the Ministry earlier mentioned) working there until July 2006. The Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that he then went on to obtain employment at the Oromia Research Institute and to obtain a Master's degree from Haramaya University. 163 Again, at 106, the Tribunal returns to the matters mentioned at 95, 100 and 105, as earlier mentioned in these reasons, and makes this observation: The Tribunal finds that such a scenario is very much at odds with the independent information. In coming to this conclusion, it has had regard to all of the submissions, including the submissions about Mr Gerba and Mr Gudina. 164 At 107, the Tribunal notes the appellant's submissions that he obtained a job at the College in August 2003 which was at a time when TG had not died and GG had not fled Ethiopia. It notes the appellant's evidence that he was offered the job at the end of August and commenced at the College in October 2003. The Tribunal observes that the appellant had "consistently indicated" that his employment commenced in October 2003 and that it was after the Tribunal questioned him about how he was able to obtain the job in October 2003 that he claimed it was in August that he was offered the job, commencing in October. At 107, the Tribunal returns to the concerns reflected at 95, 100, 105 and 106 of its reasons, in these terms: However, even if it was the case that he was offered the job around the end of August, the Tribunal nevertheless finds very problematic the evidence that he was able to take up such employment in October and continued to be employed in that job until July 2006. As indicated in the country information set out above, independent information indicates that those suspected of involvement in the OLF have been particularly harshly treated and have suffered harm such as harassment and torture. [emphasis added] 165 At 107, the Tribunal also said this: The applicant's evidence suggests that his circumstances were in many senses analogous to those of his two brothers in the sense that he claims also to be related to the uncle who was involved in the OLF and to have been falsely accused and suspected of involvement with the OLF. He claims that one of those brothers died after imprisonment of three years and the other had to flee to Kenya where he remained in a refugee camp for around ten years. However, the applicant maintained public sector employment in Alage ATVET College and then Oromia Agricultural Research Institute for many years and then obtained a [Master's] degree from Addis Ababa University. 166 Having noted those matters, the Tribunal, at 107, returns to the concerns reflected at 95, 100, 105 and 106 and in the earlier part of 107, in these terms: His ability to do so does not sit at all comfortably with independent information about the treatment of those suspected of OLF involvement or with his evidence about how other members of his family were affected. Even if he was offered his job prior to the time of [TG's] claimed death, the Tribunal considers his ability to commence and maintain this employment to be very much at odds with his claims about the circumstances of himself and his family. This very much undermines the credibility of his claims and evidence. [emphasis added] 167 At 108, the Tribunal notes, and accepts, that the appellant's employment in "Zuway" was a considerable distance from his hometown of Amuru. The Tribunal notes country information (citing the UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note) which states that, in general, internal relocation to escape persecution associated with being a sympathiser of the OLF "will not be an option" and thus the "Tribunal does not accept that the applicant could avoid the interest of ["Ethiopian authorities"] simply by moving to another place in Oromia". Nor did the Tribunal accept that the relatively "recent" establishment of the College explained why the appellant could "assume employment there in October 2003 apparently with so little difficulty": 108. The Tribunal expressed this view at 108: The independent evidence indicates that Ethiopian authorities pursue, harass and intimidate those suspected of involvement in the OLF. The Tribunal considers that this in itself would be sufficient to cause the applicant to come to attention and does not accept that he could avoid such attention simply by relocating within Oromia. 168 At 109, the Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that his father, mother and sister were detained in December 2003 for two months following the departure of GG to Kenya. The Tribunal observes that "if this were true", the family would have been of "considerable interest" to the authorities at that time, causing the Tribunal to ask the appellant why he too had not been arrested. The appellant's evidence was that he was "teaching in Alage University" and thus "not in that area when these things happened". He said that he was at Alage University which was "very far" away. He said that it took "one day's journey to get there" and that the family members "were in the same house". 169 In response, the Tribunal at 109, emphasises its concern about the "employment" factor and says this (consistent with the Tribunal's concerns expressed at 95, 100, 105, 106 and 107 as mentioned earlier): However, the applicant's evidence suggests that he had been able to commence employment with Alage ATVET College and continued that employment while his other family members were detained. The Tribunal does not find at all convincing the applicant's explanation that he was not there when his family were arrested or when his brother [GG] left the country. He claimed to have brought himself to particular attention by giving a speech at the brother's funeral [TG] in September 2003. The evidence suggests that his brother [GG] did not go back home after seeing the applicant being taken by the police [which occurred at TG's house after the funeral service]. The applicant's evidence suggests that the applicant had recently come to attention as a person suspected of links with the OLF, his brother left the country soon after and his family came to the adverse attention of the authorities and was detained. The Tribunal does not accept that there is any satisfactory or credible explanation as to why the applicant would then be able to pursue his employment with the Alage ATVET College apparently without being pursued by the authorities in the same way as other family members. [emphasis added] 170 At 109, the Tribunal also said this: [I]t considers his circumstances in terms of his employment at Alage ATVET College to be very much at odds with his claims about what had happened to him and other members of his family. [emphasis added] 171 At 110, the Tribunal moves from an examination of its concern about the juxtaposition of the appellant's educational and employment achievements on the one hand and his claims of being suspected of being a member of, or associated with, the OLF (and his family's association with the OLF) on the other hand, to a consideration of internal inconsistencies in the appellant's own evidence. 172 The Tribunal observed at 110 that the appellant's evidence of a claimed connection with the OLF (and his family's connection with the OLF) "appears to have expanded greatly over time". 173 The inconsistency leading to that conclusion was said to be this. 174 At the hearing, the appellant claimed that ever since his maternal uncle joined the OLF, government soldiers intensified their suspicions about his family; "countless searches" of the family house occurred; he witnessed four or five such searches resulting in the arrest and detention of his parents for a while, yet "he had not made any mention of such incidents in his written statement of [11] March 2014 or in the claims in his protection visa application": 110. The Tribunal observed that in that statement, nor did the appellant mention that "his uncle was involved in the OLF": 110. Nor did he mention "the visits to his house and his parents being taken away". 175 To the extent that the Tribunal is referring to the four or five specific occasions when the appellant says he witnessed searches of the family house resulting in the arrest and detention of his parents, it is correct to say that that matter is not mentioned in the statement of 11 March 2014, nor in the boxes on the visa application form. However, it should be noted that at para 15 in the statement of 11 March 2014, as noted at [55] of these reasons, the appellant asserted that after the disappearance of his brother, GG, in fleeing to Kenya: [t]he Ethiopian security police continued to harass the rest of my family members. Even following my brother's death, the authorities continued to take my father to Amuru police station, and intimidated him several times. In December 2003, my father, mother and sister were arrested by security police in relation to the disappearance of my brother [GG] and detained them for about two months. 176 To the extent that the details noted by the Tribunal were not mentioned in the 11 March 2014 statement, the appellant gave evidence at the hearing that he had prepared the statement on his own without legal help and he did not know "how wide it should be", although he now knows that the comprehensiveness of his statement would be "relevant to his claim". The Tribunal advised the appellant at the hearing that the identified omissions from his statement and from the visa application form was "something that might cause it concern or doubt about his claims about this": 110. 177 As to these matters, the Tribunal said this at 112: If his uncle's membership of the OLF had led the authorities to harass his family, search the family home in which he lived and take his parents away on multiple occasions, this would have been of very obvious relevance to the applicant and his circumstances and claims. The Tribunal has considered the submissions in this regard but does not accept that there is a satisfactory explanation as to why, if the applicant's family had a connection to the OLF through an uncle and his family had been repeatedly harassed in the way that has been claimed, this was not raised in his written statements to the Department. 178 At 112, the Tribunal also said this: It may be that the applicant later raised the claim about his uncle with the Department and that this was then recorded in the delegate's decision. However, this does not explain the omission of these matters from the earlier written statements [the visa application form and the statement of 11 March 2014]. 179 At 113, the Tribunal identifies further aspects of the appellant's claims in relation to the events at TG's funeral which the Tribunal found "on their face difficult to accept". 180 As to that matter, the Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that soon after the death of TG in official custody after a period of detention of around three years, the appellant made a public speech (which is a reference to the appellant's claimed address at the funeral) "in which he referred to the [inhumane] treatment of his brother and other Oromos, and referred to dictators being judged for their human rights violations": the precise matters concerning the claims made at the funeral address are set out at [50] of these reasons. The Tribunal observes that it put to the appellant that it might have some difficulty accepting that he would say those sorts of things at such an event, particularly when there were three police officers there and that independent evidence suggested that people who had some association with the OLF had been harshly treated by the authorities and that people who expressed dissent had also been harshly treated. The Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that he had prepared his statement for the burial service and around 250 people attended. He gave evidence that he did not see the police officers before he began his statement but saw them in the later part of his statement, and by that time he had already said most of the important things. The Tribunal observes that it again put to the appellant that it might have difficulty accepting that he would say such things at a funeral service of a person accused of involvement with the OLF. The appellant's explanation in response was that he was saying the truth about the mistreatment of TG and the denial of medical support. The Tribunal notes the appellant's evidence that there were three police officers among a group of 250 people and he could not really see each and every person and, in any event, even after he saw them, he did not take them to be people who were spying on him. 181 At 114, the Tribunal observed that it has considered the applicant's evidence on this topic in combination with the post-hearing submissions, but did not find the appellant's evidence "at all convincing". 182 The Tribunal accepted that the death of a brother would be a source of trauma, anger and grief. The Tribunal considered that if TG had been detained by Ethiopian authorities for three years and had died in prison due to treatment by Ethiopian authorities, the extremely high level of risk associated with making a speech at a public funeral of the type described would be obvious even to a young man without political experience. The Tribunal observes that this topic or matter "is certainly not decisive in itself". 183 However, the Tribunal considered "aspects of the explanations provided by the applicant to be even more problematic". The Tribunal noted that in his supplementary statement of 28 February 2016, the appellant had claimed that at first he did not see any police but later, while speaking, he saw them. It notes that he claimed that he assumed they were there to mourn his brother and he did not turn his mind to the possibility that they were "police spies or to the possible consequences to him". The Tribunal then makes this observation at 114: However, the Tribunal considers that, if the applicant's brother had died as a result of mistreatment at the hands of Ethiopian authorities and there were three uniformed police officers at the funeral, this would have been something that would arouse the attention of those at the funeral. The Tribunal does not find at all convincing the suggestion that the applicant would not be aware of the presence of such people until he was part way through his speech. It also finds to be very much lacking in credibility the suggestion that people at such a funeral would regard uniformed police at such an occasion as being mourners or would not appreciate the possible consequences of making such a speech in front of police. … Considered in its entirety, the Tribunal finds the applicant's evidence about this event to be very much lacking in credibility. [emphasis added] 184 In the context of the Tribunal's concern about the perceived inconsistency between the appellant's education and employment achievements on the one hand and his claims as the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution on the other hand (at 95, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 109 of the Tribunal's reasons), together with the Tribunal's concerns about the difficulties in accepting the appellant's evidence on the matters described at [172] to [180] of these reasons, the Tribunal turned to the question of the witness statements put to the Tribunal by the appellant. 185 The Tribunal notes at 115 that the statements from "people such as Mr Diga, Mr Nono, Mr Oljira, [Ms] Akasa, Mr Jena, Mr Below and Mr Gudeta" are statements from witnesses who "claim to have some knowledge of these events". The Tribunal observes that it has had regard to the various witness statements that "purport to describe such events": 115. 186 The Tribunal observes that such evidence conflicts in some regards even with the appellant's own evidence. As to that, the Tribunal observes that with regard to the statement of Mr Nono, the Tribunal notes that he stated that he could not recall exactly when TG was imprisoned but that he believed that TG was aged, at most, in his early 20s when this occurred: 115. The Tribunal observes that this is "very much at odds with" the appellant's own evidence to the effect that his brother was around 30 years old when he was detained in 2000: 115. The Tribunal also noted that Mr Nono indicated in his evidence that he was born in 1978 and claimed to have been in the same year at school as TG. The Tribunal observed that there is a "fundamental inconsistency in the evidence": 115. The inconsistency as to the school year is that if TG was 30 years of age in 2000, he would have been born in 1970 and if Mr Nono was born eight years later, it was difficult for the Tribunal to see how they could have been in the same year at school. The Tribunal also observed that it had had regard to the "passage of time" but noted that Mr Nono claimed to be a person who knew TG. The Tribunal then repeated its finding that there is a fundamental inconsistency between Mr Nono's evidence about TG's age and the evidence given by the appellant in relation to the age of his brother at the time of his brother's detention in 2000: 115. 187 As to Mr Diga, the Tribunal noted that Mr Diga stated that he was born in 1981 and claimed that he and TG were one year apart in school. The Tribunal observed that it had "great difficulty" reconciling this evidence with the evidence of the appellant that his brother was about 30 years of age in 2000, which suggested that the age gap between Mr Diga and TG was 11 years: 115. 188 The Tribunal then observed that that circumstance cast "yet further doubt on the witness's evidence": 115. 189 The Tribunal also observed that "the applicant has been willing to provide witness evidence which does not accord even with his own claims about his brother [TG]": 115. 190 As to Mr Oljira, the Tribunal notes that he stated that in his experience, government forces target young people whom they suspect to be Oromo activists or supporters of Oromo activism and, in particular, suspected members and supporters of the OLF: 116. 191 As to Mr Gudeta, the Tribunal notes that he stated that once an Oromo family is suspected by police or security forces of being associated with the OLF, they are constantly harassed by the government: 116. The Tribunal notes that he stated that the appellant's family were known to him and were generally known in the community to be one of the families that faced constant harassment by the Ethiopian government: 116. 192 As to Mr Jena, the Tribunal notes that he stated that when he went to Ethiopia in 2008, the appellant's father told him that the police were constantly watching his house and family: 116. 193 As to the statements of Mr Oljira, Mr Gudeta and Mr Jena, the Tribunal observed that it was "unable to reconcile such statements with the appellant's circumstances in relation to matters such as his employment and subsequent education": 116. 194 As to Mr Diga and [Ms] Akasa, the Tribunal notes the submission of Mr Glass that those witnesses did not have access to a printer or a scanner but had authorised the provision of their unsigned statements to the Tribunal as a statement of their evidence. The Tribunal then observed that "no explanation has been provided as to why, if Mr Diga is living in the United States and was apparently able to organise for a statement to be e-mailed, he would be unable to arrange for [a] signed statement to be provided to the applicant or his representative". The Tribunal also observed that nor was there any explanation as to why [Ms] Akasa, who also claimed to be living in the US, "would be unable to arrange for a signed statement to be provided": 116. 195 At 117, the Tribunal seems to be addressing the question of the total number of witness statements when it says that it has considered the witness statements. It then says that it accepts that a number of parties have been willing to provide statements attesting to various matters, including the claimed events in 2003. It repeats its observation that there is some conflict between the witness's evidence and the appellant's own evidence, although the scope and content of that conflict is not explored beyond the matters already discussed. The Tribunal then observes that "[t]here are other difficulties with the witness evidence" and observes that "[i]n particular, the Tribunal is unable to reconcile the matters referred to in the witness evidence with the applicant's own subsequent experience in relation to matters such as education and employment": 117. 196 Accordingly, the Tribunal is expressing concern that the evidence of the witnesses is inconsistent with the educational and employment achievements of the appellant and gives rise to an "age" inconsistency. 197 Having expressed those views, the Tribunal then observes that it has considered the witness statements "but does not accept this material as being reliable": 117. 198 That conclusion must be referrable to the apparent inconsistency between the appellant's achievements in terms of his education and employment and the circumstance that the appellant and his family were thought to be supporters of the OLF, taken together with the identified inconsistency arising out of the appellant's evidence that TG was about 30 years of age in 2000 and the statements of the nominated witnesses that they were at school with TG. 199 The Tribunal observes that although the witnesses have indicated a willingness to discuss these matters with the Tribunal, "they have not provided any contact details on their statements" [emphasis added]: 117. 200 The Tribunal then notes that submissions have "suggested that the applicant's representative holds contact details". It observes that the appellant has provided evidence at length at the hearing and "brought with him to the hearing a witness from whom the Tribunal took evidence" (Mr Etana). It observes that subsequent to the hearing, the appellant's representative provided a number of witness statements to the Tribunal which the Tribunal "has weighed with all the other material": 117. The Tribunal then observes that "[i]n all the circumstances, the Tribunal does not consider it necessary to initiate enquiries to seek to contact the authors of such witness statements" [emphasis added]: 117. 201 The reference to "in all the circumstances" must be a reference to the circumstances identified by the Tribunal in these paragraphs, that is: the Tribunal has considered the written witness statements; it has considered the oral evidence of the appellant and the evidence of Mr Etana; it has taken into account the inconsistency in connection with the "age" of TG; and the apparent inconsistency between the appellant's educational and employment achievements and the circumstance that the appellant's family (and thus the appellant) faced constant harassment by the Ethiopian government as suggested sympathisers with the OLF. 202 In those circumstances, the Tribunal elected not to "initiate enquiries to seek to contact the authors of such witness statements". That statement must be understood as an election not to take up the opportunity to obtain evidence from the witnesses by calling upon Mr Glass to provide the contact details available for each witness held by him, as advised to the Tribunal, and to assist the Tribunal, as offered, in making arrangements for the relevant witnesses to give evidence. 203 There can be no serious doubt that Mr Glass held the contact details for the various witnesses and the circumstance that those contact details (especially the telephone numbers) were not recited in the statements themselves is not a matter which would rationally call into question the reliability of the statements. 204 At 118, the Tribunal addresses the statement provided by the appellant's brother, GG. It notes that GG, by his statement, purports to "corroborate the [appellant's] claims". It notes that GG refers to matters such as the uncle's connection with the OLF, harassment and questioning from the police, the appellant's speech at the funeral and the interrogation of the appellant. It notes that GG claimed that he feared that he might be the next member of his family "to be picked up" and that he decided not to go home after seeing the appellant taken away. The Tribunal then describes briefly aspects of GG's further evidence concerning his decision not to return to his parents' house; his decision to escape to Kenya; arriving at the refugee camp in Kakuma and spending about 10 years in that camp: 118. 205 The Tribunal then says this about GG's statement: However, the Tribunal does not accept that there is any satisfactory explanation as to why, if these were the circumstances for [GG] and other family members, the applicant was able to take up employment at Alage ATVET College, work there until 2006, obtain employment with Oromia Agricultural Research Institute (OARI) and complete a [Master's] degree at Haramaya University. The Tribunal has had regard to evidence such as that from [GG] but does not accept it as reliable. [emphasis added] 206 Again, the fundamental difficulty for the Tribunal was that it could not reconcile the evidence of GG, as a member of the appellant's family, and the circumstances confronting that family, with the educational and employment achievements of the appellant, other than on the footing that the answer to the reconciliation of those matters was that GG's evidence must also be unreliable. 207 At 119, the Tribunal turned to the oral evidence of Mr Etana and his written statement. The Tribunal notes that Mr Etana's sister is married to the appellant's half-brother. The Tribunal notes that Mr Etana's evidence was that his family members had told him "what was going on in the applicant's case and other cases". The Tribunal notes that Mr Etana did not provide "a lot of detail in his written statement" and that in relation to the third detention in 2013, Mr Etana seemed to say that he had been told about the appellant's arrest and that that was the last thing he had heard about the appellant until the appellant arrived in Australia. The Tribunal also notes that it questioned Mr Etana about how he could recall what happened around the time of the funeral. 208 As to the oral evidence of Mr Etana, the Tribunal notes that he gave evidence that he had heard that the appellant had been detained three times and was told of the first occasion by his mother in 2003. The Tribunal notes that Mr Etana said that in 2003 the appellant's older brother passed away, according to statements made to him by his mother, and he gave evidence that his mother attended the funeral and told him that the appellant was "reading some of the applicant's brother's life story and how he passed away". It notes that Mr Etana claimed to remember what his mother had told him about that matter even though he "would have been only about 12 years of age at that time". The Tribunal notes that Mr Etana said that he was about 14, but also notes that Mr Etana said that he was born on 17 September 1990, which suggested that he would have been just 13 at the time of the claimed death of TG in September 2003. The Tribunal observed that it asked Mr Etana how he was able to remember so clearly those matters. He said that he remembered "what his mother had told him". 209 At 120 and 121, the Tribunal examined aspects of Mr Etana's evidence, and especially the matter of Mr Etana's age at the date of TG's death in 2003. It seems that Mr Etana was 13 at that time. It noted that Mr Etana's evidence about claimed incidents in which the appellant was detained appeared to be quite vague. As to the age point, the appellant's lawyers submitted that Mr Etana was perfectly capable at age 13 of remembering the death of an acquaintance. 210 At 125, the Tribunal observed that it had considered the evidence of Mr Etana and the submissions made to it about that evidence. It observed, however, that it found Mr Etana to be "a most unimpressive and unconvincing witness" and although Mr Etana suggested that the appellant was of sufficient interest to him that he could recall what his mother had told him about the steps the appellant took at the funeral of TG, when Mr Etana was 13 years of age, he was able to provide "only the vaguest evidence about the applicant's claimed subsequent detentions". At 125, the Tribunal repeated his observation that Mr Etana was a most unconvincing witness and observed that it gave his evidence "little weight" and that his evidence "is far outweighed by other matters that cast doubt on the credibility of the claims" (which presumably is a reference to the appellant's claims). Although criticisms were made of the Tribunal's observations about the unlikelihood of Mr Etana remembering something his mother had said to him when he was 13 years of age, the Tribunal's assessment of Mr Etana and his evidence was well within the core function of the Tribunal's merits assessment of his evidence. Any criticism of that evidence is simply a matter of emphatic disagreement with the conclusion. 211 At 127, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has carefully considered all the evidence before it. However, the Tribunal ultimately finds the claims and evidence about the events in 2003 and the matters concerning the OLF to be lacking in credibility. 212 The Tribunal then synthesised, at 127, critical factual matters in these terms: The applicant has claimed, for instance, that his uncle had involvement in the OLF, that his family was repeatedly harassed, that his brother was detained in 2000 and died in 2003, that he gave a political speech at his brother's funeral, that he was arrested and detained in September 2003, that his brother subsequently fled Ethiopia, that his father continued to be detained, and that his father and sister were detained for two months from December 2003. 213 At 127, the Tribunal then set out its conclusion in relation to the evidence of the appellant. In simple terms, the Tribunal rejected every facet of the factual claims (addressed in 127) made by the appellant and it did so in these terms: The Tribunal finds the applicant's circumstances, including his employment at Alage ATVET and then the OARI and his completion of a [Master's] degree, to be very much at odds with such claims. This casts great doubt on his general credibility as a witness. The Tribunal finds the claims and evidence in this regard to be lacking in credibility. In this regard, it is also found to be lacking in credibility the applicant's evidence about matters to do with the funeral, including his explanations to the effect that he did not initially notice the police, that he thought they might be mourners when he did notice them and that he did not turn his mind to the possible consequences for him as he made his speech. The Tribunal finds the evidence about these matters to be lacking in credibility. It does not accept that the applicant's uncle was involved in the OLF, that members of his family were harassed or detained in relation to suspected involvement in the OLF, that his brother was detained in 2000 or died in prison, that the applicant gave a speech at his brother's funeral or was subsequently detained as claimed, that his brother [GG] left Ethiopia in the circumstances claimed or that members of the applicant's family were in any way harassed. It does not accept that the applicant was suspected to be associated with the OLF from around 2003 as claimed or that other members of his family were, or were suspected to be, members or supporters of the OLF. [emphasis added] 214 It can be seen that these factual findings start with the proposition that the appellant's circumstances including his employment and educational achievements are "very much at odds" with his claims. In other words, the two cannot sit together and because that is so, "great doubt" is cast on his "general credibility as a witness" with the result that the Tribunal rejects his evidence on all of the matters recited in the second half of that paragraph. The Tribunal did not accept any of the factual claims about the appellant's uncle's involvement in the OLF, harassment of the family, the detention of TG, the death of TG in prison, the giving of a speech by the appellant at TG's funeral, the appellant's subsequent detention, the departure of GG from Ethiopia in the circumstances claimed or indeed that members of the appellant's family were "in any way" harassed. Nor did it accept that the appellant was suspected of being associated with the OLF from 2003 or that members of his family were, or were suspected to be, members or supporters of the OLF. 215 The entire factual foundation of the appellant's claims addressed in 127 was rejected, very largely based upon the notion that the Tribunal was unable to reconcile the educational and employment achievements of the appellant with the claims he made forming the basis for his contended well-founded fear of persecution, together with the age discrepancy point mentioned earlier. 216 The Tribunal then turned to the problems the appellant claimed to have suffered at Alage ATVET College concerning the OPDO event and his employment generally and the second job obtained in August 2006. The Tribunal sets out the elements of those claims at 128 and further aspects of those matters at 129. The Tribunal notes that in relation to the second job in August 2006, the appellant said he was able to secure that position because he had never been found guilty of being a political member of any party or organisation and his first arrest was when he was speaking at the funeral about how TG died and that before that time no "problems or suspicions" had arisen. He emphasised that he had not become a political party member until 2008. 217 At 130, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant had not claimed to have become a political party member until 2008 and that he did not claim to have been found guilty of any offence. However, the Tribunal noted that the appellant claimed to have had problems at the Alage ATVET College and had faced demands and threats from the OPDO but had continued in employment at the College until July 2006. The Tribunal then observed that if the appellant had had problems at the College as claimed such that he was required to leave the College in fear of further persecution, it was not apparent to the Tribunal how he was able to maintain employment at the College until July 2006 when he obtained employment at another government college in August. At 130, the Tribunal returned to its fundamental concern in these terms: The Tribunal considers that the applicant's ability to teach at the Alage ATVET College until July 2006, gain further public sector employment and then undertake a [Master's] degree at Haramaya University is at odds with his claims about his history as someone suspected of involvement in the OLF and his claimed difficulties while at Alage ATVET College. 218 At 131, the Tribunal emphasises the independent information earlier mentioned by the Tribunal. At 131, the Tribunal sets out other aspects of the explanations given by the appellant for his ability to maintain employment and at 132, as to these matters, said this: In all the circumstances, the Tribunal does not accept as credible the applicant's claims about his difficulties while at Alage ATVET College. It does not accept that he refused demands to join the OPDO or was threatened or otherwise harmed as a result of such a refusal as claimed. It does not accept that he was discriminated against in relation to matters such as further studies, scholarships, promotions, salary increases or wages. It does not accept that he took part in a protest or demonstration in June 2005 or that he was arrested, detained or mistreated as a result. It does not accept that he was monitored or that people asked about his teaching. It does not accept that he was harmed by OPDO members, Ethiopian authorities or anyone else. 219 The Tribunal reached the conclusions at 127 having considered the statements of the appellant and related documents, the statement of Mr Etana and having heard oral evidence from the appellant and Mr Etana. It had also considered the statements of the witnesses put to it by the appellant but formed the view that those statements were not "reliable" and that, "in all the circumstances", the Tribunal did not consider it "necessary" to initiate steps to obtain evidence from any one of the witnesses. That seems to have followed for the Tribunal because the statements could not be reconciled with "the applicant's circumstances in relation to matters such as his employment and subsequent education": 116. It seems to have followed for the Tribunal that obtaining evidence from any one of the nominated witnesses could not have assisted the Tribunal in resolving the fundamental difficulty of reconciling the appellant's claims with the educational and employment achievements of the appellant. 220 However, as the paragraphs at [113] of these reasons reveal, Mr Nono, in his statement, had said that he knew TG and the appellant's family. He stated that many people in the community were speaking about TG's arrest and imprisonment. He stated that he had heard of it through family and friends and he thought that TG was in his early 20s when this happened. More particularly, he says that he visited TG in prison a couple of times and that he mainly recalls one of those visits to Shambu prison in around 2002. He says that TG looked like he had suffered a lot, was unhappy, had lost weight and appeared to be in poor health. He states that TG told him that he had been beaten by the police while they had interrogated him about whether he knew people working for the OLF and that TG had said that the police had tried to get information from him by beating him. Mr Nono says that TG passed away in 2003 and that he travelled to Amuru to attend TG's funeral. He stated that by the time he had arrived the funeral was nearly over. He stated that there were probably more than 200 people at the funeral. He also states that members of his family who were at the funeral told him that a member of the TG's family, he thinks the appellant, made a speech about TG's history, the fact that he was jailed and how he had suffered and died. He also says that he recalls that the family member told him that the appellant was crying during the speech. Mr Nono says that after the funeral he travelled home. 221 Mr Nono now lives in Alberta, Canada and had indicated a willingness to provide information to the Tribunal about the matters addressed in his statement. 222 The matters in Mr Nono's statement go directly to the findings at 127. 223 As to [Mr] Amenu Jena, the witness stated that he knew the appellant and his deceased brother, TG, because he was friends with their father. He stated that he returned to Ethiopia for a visit in 2008 and met briefly with the appellant's father. He says that the appellant's father told him that the government had arrested TG for political reasons and that TG had died in prison. He stated that the appellant's father told him that TG was mistreated and beaten in prison and that the police were constantly watching his house and family. 224 Mr Jena now lives in Toronto, Canada: see [119] of these reasons. He too was willing to speak to the Tribunal. 225 As to Mr Diga, he stated that he also knew the appellant and TG. He stated that in 2010 he returned to Ethiopia for a visit and met the appellant in Addis Ababa. The appellant told him that he was involved in organising students to support Oromo rights and freedoms in Ethiopia and he told him, in 2010, that he had been arrested and imprisoned and that he had no future in Ethiopia: see [115] of these reasons. 226 Mr Diga was willing to speak to the Tribunal about any aspect of his statement. 227 As to Ms Akasa, she says that she also knew the appellant and TG. She says that while she was still living in Ethiopia she remembers her mother telling her that TG had died in jail and that her mother had told her that he had been jailed for political activities and had suffered badly in jail: see [117] of these reasons. Ms Akasa now lives in Minneapolis in the United States. 228 She was willing to speak to the Tribunal about her recollection of what she had been told by her mother and any other matters in her statement. 229 The appellant's brother, GG, who now lives in the Netherlands also provided a statement: see [121]-[123] of these reasons. 230 In that statement, he addresses facts relevant to the matters the subject of the findings at 127. He talks about the role of his father in relation to the OLF, questioning by the police of his family, the death of TG in prison, attending TG's funeral, the appellant's funeral speech and the content of it, his return to the house where TG lived after the funeral and the arrival of the police and his fleeing to Kenya. GG was also willing to speak to the Tribunal about any aspects of his statement. 231 As to Mr Below, he also says that he knows the appellant and he knew TG and their family: see [124] of these reasons. He states that in around 1999 or 2000, TG was arrested by government security forces and imprisoned and he says that he knows this because he was in Ethiopia at the time of TG's arrest and had heard of the arrest from members of his family and from other people in the community. He says that he had heard that TG had been arrested because the government had accused him of supporting the OLF. Mr Below is not able to speak directly to these matters, but it is not irrelevant to understand that members of his family and people within the community were saying these things. Mr Below was also willing to talk to the Tribunal about any aspects of his statement. 232 As to Ms Gudeta, she says that she knows the appellant and knew TG: see [126] of these reasons. She says that in 2003 she was living away from her hometown but used to go back and visit her family from time to time. She says that on one of those visits her brother told her that TG had died in Shambu prison. She also states that her brother told her that her family had gone to TG's funeral and that members of TG's family had made speeches at the funeral about how TG was killed and that in the course of those speeches they had accused government security forces of torturing TG to death. She also says that during this visit she heard either from her family or from others within the community that the appellant had been accused of being hostile to the government and had been arrested because of what he had been saying about TG's death in jail. She also says that she had "heard" after the funeral that the appellant's family had been accused of provoking feelings against the government. Ms Gudeta lives in Canada but was willing to discuss any aspect of her statement with the Tribunal. 233 As to the evidence of Mr TA (see [92] and [93] of these reasons), he says that he and the appellant were both post-graduate students at Haramaya University at the same time and used to see each other every day. He says that he knew the appellant was involved in OPC activities on campus and knew that the appellant helped to organise political campaigns for the OPC. He then sets out his direct observations of the appellant in 2010 and discussions he had with the appellant's wife in relation to the 2013 event. Those matters are set out at [93] of these reasons. 234 As to these statements, the Tribunal reasoned that it recognised that the witnesses claimed "to have knowledge" of the relevant events going to the appellant's claims; that some of them purport to describe such events; and a number of them attest to the events of 2003: see [185] and [195] of these reasons. The Tribunal found the age discrepancy issue concerning TG in the evidence of Mr Nono and Mr Diga on the one hand, and the evidence of the appellant on that issue on the other hand, a "fundamental inconsistency" and a "great difficulty" casting "doubt" on the "witness evidence": see [186] - [188] of these reasons. It says that it has considered the witness statements and has weighed them "with all the other material", "but does not accept them as reliable" (see [197] and [200] of these reasons) for the reasons set out at [198], that is, the irreconcilable employment and educational factor and the age discrepancy point. The Tribunal seems to have further reservations about the statements because the contact details are not recited in the statements even though Gilbert+Tobin made it clear that it had the contact details for the witnesses and would assist in establishing arrangements to enable the Tribunal to engage with any of the witnesses should it wish or seek to do so. 235 It is not entirely clear what the phrase "but does not accept them as reliable" is intended to convey. 236 It presumably means that the Tribunal was not willing to act on, or rely upon, the witness statements as a basis for any corroboration of any of the factual claims of the appellant, that is, on any matter of fact as alleged by the appellant going to his asserted well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of significant harm. 237 However, the Tribunal does not say or find that any one, or some, or some in combination with others, or indeed all, of the witness statements are concocted or fraudulent. 238 The Tribunal expressed understandable reservations about the statement of Mr TA. He was described in the statement as "Mr T" and no broader details of his identity and address were provided to the Tribunal. However, those details were available to Gilbert+Tobin and there was concern about putting those details in the statement having regard to Mr TA's presence in Ethiopia and a concern about the confidentiality of those matters in the context of the difficulties he might face if disclosure were to occur. At 164, the Tribunal said this about Mr TA's statement: In making its findings, the Tribunal notes that the applicant has also provided a statement which purports to be from [TA]. In this statement, the author identifies himself as "T" and apparently refers to the applicant as "G". [The statement then sets out some factual matters drawn from Mr TA's statement and statements made to Mr TA by the appellant concerning the conduct of police officers detaining the appellant and accusing him of having been involved in anti-government activities while engaged in fieldwork with farmers. The Tribunal then continues at 164] … However, as discussed above, the Tribunal does not accept that there is any satisfactory explanation as to why, if the applicant had been targeted in the way he has claimed and accused of mobilising farmers, he would subsequently be able to return to work. It has repeatedly been suggested that the Tribunal should contact the author of this letter [the statement of TA], although the author of the letter has referred to monitoring of his calls by the Ethiopian authorities and claimed that he would need to be cautious about the level of detail he has provided. It is not at all apparent to the Tribunal how a person who could not in a written statement identify himself or the person about whom he was talking would be able to provide any useful detail in a telephone conversation. It is not apparent why, if these were the circumstances, he would, in oral evidence to a person previously unknown to him, provide basic details about matters such as the identities of relevant people. Notwithstanding the repeated submissions about this, the Tribunal does not consider it necessary or appropriate to contact the author of a statement (apparently using contact details to be provided by the applicant or his representative [Gilbert+Tobin]) to discuss matters about the applicant in circumstances where in a written statement provided for the applicant he identified neither himself nor the applicant. Ultimately, the Tribunal attaches little weight to this evidence. It considers that it is far outweighed by the difficulties with the evidence. It does not accept that the applicant was a member of the OPC or involved in OPC activities, that he disappeared in 2010 or in 2013, or that he suffered the difficulties referred to by the applicant and in the witness statements. [emphasis added] 239 The Tribunal says that it does not accept the witness statements as reliable and the reasoning suggests that the fundamental basis for that view is because the witness statements do not help the Tribunal to answer the irreconcilable difficulty, as it sees it, between the appellant's educational and employment achievements, on the one hand, and his claims, on the other, and the Tribunal considered that the statements gave rise to an age discrepancy issue so far as the evidence of Mr Nono and Mr Diga was concerned in light of the appellant's evidence on that issue. Mr TA can also speak directly to his extensive knowledge of the appellant, the appellant's political activities and his observations about the appellant going missing in 2010 and the appellant's condition in 2010 after the 2010 event, and his discussions with the appellant's wife at the time of the 2013 event. 240 Mr Nono and GG could speak directly to aspects of the underlying facts going to the appellant's claims. Mr Jena could speak to a conversation he had with the appellant's father in 2008 concerning TG and the appellant's father's understanding of the treatment TG received. Mr Below can give evidence of his parents having told him that they attended TG's funeral and that TG's family had taken TG's body from the jail to the funeral. 241 Some of these statements are, of course, second-hand. However, the Tribunal is not bound by the formal rules of evidence and it did not express the view that the statements were not "reliable" or of no assistance in addressing the factual claims of the appellant because some of the evidence concerned second-hand remarks made by witnesses recounting the statements of others (which, plainly enough, were not proffered as proof of the truth of those facts but reflections of family or community statements that were being made at the time by those engaged with the appellant's family). 242 It is entirely unsurprising that the Tribunal did not advance a rejection of the request to obtain oral evidence from the witnesses on the ground that some of the statements do not amount to probative evidence of the truth of the relevant fact in issue, as the Tribunal, in this area of its work, is entirely familiar with the international movement of peoples and the difficulty individuals have in obtaining strictly probative evidence on all aspects of the facts put to the Tribunal in support of a claim to hold a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of significant harm. 243 However, as to the age issue and other aspects of the proffered evidence concerning TG, his family and the apparent deterioration in TG's condition in Shambu prison, an election on the part of the Tribunal to take oral evidence from at least Mr Nono, GG, Mr TA and Mr Jena might have enabled the Tribunal to form a view about critical facts in issue decided adversely to the appellant (at 127; see [211] - [213] of these reasons) and assisted the Tribunal in deciding the credibility question concerning the appellant's evidence overall. Doing so might have assisted the Tribunal in deciding whether it could be satisfied that the appellant was a person who had, or whose family had (TG and the father), experienced the adverse attention of government authorities due to suspicions of having a connection, or a family association, with the OLF and who had, nevertheless, been able to secure education at the levels he achieved and secure employment as he did. 244 There was no suggestion in the reasoning of the Tribunal that the witness statements put to it by the appellant were to be rejected or found not to be reliable or of no assistance because the so-called "well" had been "poisoned beyond redemption" in the sense described by McHugh and Gummow JJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2005) 77 ALJR 1165 at 1174 [49]. 245 It is certainly true that in the context of adversarial litigation (which, of course, is not the character of the proceeding before the Tribunal which is "an inquisitorial merits-based review by an independent tribunal": see the plurality in Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 at 8 [22]), statements of a witness about what the witness has been told by third parties about a fact in issue are not admissible and not probative of the fact in issue. Sometimes, the very making of a statement by a person might itself be a material fact. However, in proceedings before the Tribunal, statements by witnesses about what they have been told by family members such as the father of the appellant about TG and his treatment might well aid the inquisitorial process. 246 Statements from people who can speak directly about having visited TG in prison and having attended the funeral (albeit towards the end of the funeral) would be likely to aid the inquisitorial process. 247 Statements from the brother of GG going to the heart of the appellant's claims would be likely to aid the inquisitorial process about those claims. 248 Statements by a person such as Mr TA with extensive knowledge of the appellant and who can give direct evidence, as described at [92] and [93], would be likely to aid the inquisitorial merits-based review. Statements from a person who spoke with the appellant as early as 2010 about his having organised students to support Oromo rights and having been arrested and imprisoned would be likely to aid the inquisitorial merits-based process: Mr Diga. 249 By using the phrase "aid the inquisitorial process", I mean aid in enabling the Tribunal to arrive at the "correct or preferable decision" in the case before it in respect of the individual applicant: Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 425, Brennan J; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 371 [93] ("Li"), Gageler J. 250 However, the Tribunal proceeded from the premise that a person who exhibited the educational and employment achievements of the appellant could not be a person who suffered exposure to ill treatment, harassment and discrimination by government authorities by reason of being a member or supporter of the OLF or who had, and whose family had, experienced treatment at the hands of government authorities as claimed. It followed for the Tribunal that none of the witnesses could assist it in reconciling that dilemma of great concern to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was also concerned about the "fundamental inconsistency" point concerning the age issue as earlier described: see [185] - [188] of these reasons. 251 As to each of the witness statements, it seems to be common ground that by reason of ss 424(1), 426(2), 427(1)(a) and 429A of the Act, the Tribunal has conferred upon it a discretion to take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purpose of obtaining, relevantly here, oral evidence in relation to the witness statements as part of a process of testing that evidence. The Tribunal must have regard to the appellant's wishes that the Tribunal seek evidence from the nominated witnesses although the Tribunal is not compelled to obtain oral evidence from any one of them. 252 That said, the discretion must be exercised reasonably and comply with all of the criteria of lawfulness, fairness and rationality that lie at the heart of administrative justice although the content of those concepts is to be found in the Act and Regulations and the common law: Li, French CJ at [14]. The purpose of these provisions of the Act is to ensure that the Tribunal is able to have access to all the relevant material which will assist it in discharging its statutory function of reviewing the decision so as to enable it to reach the correct or preferable decision as mentioned at [249] of these reasons. 253 Did the Tribunal act unreasonably in the legal sense in which that concept is understood, in exercising the discretion not to obtain oral evidence from the witnesses proffered by the appellant and by finding that it was not "necessary" to obtain oral evidence from any one of them (apart from Mr Etana)? 254 In CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023, Rangiah J made these observations at [58] and [59] subsequently approved by the Full Court in AYX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 FCR 317 at [80]: 58 A myriad of factors may influence a Tribunal's decision to obtain oral evidence or its decision not to do so. These factors include the relevance and importance of the proposed evidence, whether written evidence is sufficient for the Tribunal's purposes, whether taking the evidence would cause undue delay, the ease or difficulty of contacting the proposed witnesses and the availability of a suitable interpreter [where relevant]. In an appropriate case, the Tribunal might decide that the evidence of an applicant is so compromised that hearing the oral evidence of a corroborating witness could not affect the outcome. … 59 In the present case, there was no obvious practical difficulty for the Tribunal in obtaining oral evidence from the appellants' fathers. The appellants' solicitor had provided telephone numbers at which the fathers could be contacted and they were both immediately contactable. An interpreter was available. The oral evidence of the fathers was relevant and potentially important because acceptance of their evidence would have bolstered the appellants' credibility: cf W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 211; [124 FCR 449] at [2] per Lee and Finkelstein JJ; at [31] per Carr J. The Tribunal did not make any finding that obtaining oral evidence of the fathers could not have affected its view of the credibility of the appellants (instead reasoning that if the appellants' evidence was contrived, so too must have been the written statements from the fathers). 255 In the Full Court decision in AYX17, the Court also cited [40] and [41] of the observations of Rangiah J in SZVBB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1414. Paragraph 41 is in these terms: 41 [I]f evidence by a witness corroborating a part of the appellant's evidence is given and is believed, that might suggest that the appellant is also telling the truth about other parts of his evidence: see W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 211; (2002) 124 FCR 449 at [2], [30]. For this reason, in many cases it will not be open to the Tribunal to refuse to obtain oral corroborating evidence on the sole basis of an assertion that the evidence could not affect the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility. It is one thing to hear evidence and reject it or to find that it is of no assistance. It is another thing to refuse to hear what is said to be corroborating evidence on the basis of an assumption that it could not possibly be credible or could not possibly assist in assessing the credibility of the appellant. 256 The particular difficulty in this case concerning the witness statements and the request to obtain oral evidence from them and, in particular, the witnesses who could speak directly to important factual matters is that the Tribunal refused to attach any reliability to the witness statements for the reasons already indicated and was not willing to take any steps to make inquiries about the utility of being able to speak to any one of the witnesses, to test and determine whether it could usefully obtain evidence of matters which went to the critical factual matters relied upon by the appellant. It could have sought the precise contact details of one or more of the witnesses and investigated the possibility of obtaining evidence from them. It could have discussed these matters with Gilbert+Tobin who had the relevant details. It could have investigated whether evidence could have been obtained by telephone and whether it would have been necessary to undertake that process with the assistance of interpreters (although the witnesses are said to be able to speak English as a second language in any event). It could have informed itself about whether those processes were capable of being deployed. It might have formed a view that it was all just too difficult and unreliable. However, it treated the witness statements as unreliable for the reasons indicated and then decided that it was not necessary to even inquire about whether evidence could be obtained from any one of them on the factual matters. 257 In circumstances where the Tribunal was called upon to decide the range of factual matters reflected at 127, all of which were critical to the appellant's contended well-founded fear of persecution, the Tribunal had to form a view about the credibility of the appellant's evidence. The refusal to obtain oral evidence from any (apart from Mr Etana) of the witnesses (and, in particular, Mr Nono, GG, Mr TA (if that process had proved workable), Mr Diga and Mr Jena), for the reasons given and described extensively earlier in these reasons, lacked an evident and intelligible justification. Taking oral evidence from Mr Nono, GG, Mr TA and Mr Diga (and Mr Jena as to discussions with the appellant's father about the contended mistreatment of TG and the supervision of the family by police and security officers) might well have assisted the Tribunal in its inquisitorial role in coming to grips with the facts going to the credibility of the appellant's account, and asking questions of Mr Nono, Mr Diga and GG about their understanding of TG's age might have helped to resolve the "age" issue. The Tribunal could have asked Mr Nono about his and TG's schooling. Mr TA could have been asked about his direct knowledge of relevant matters and GG could have been asked about any or all of the matters in his statement. Questions could have been asked about the schooling anomaly of concern to the Tribunal; the contended visits to the Shambu prison; how often that occurred; how TG looked and what he may have said; the events at the funeral and any other matters touching upon any of the findings at 127. Testing those matters might have led to findings other than those at 127 and might have suggested to the Tribunal that the appellant was telling the truth about some or all of those matters and, as well, other aspects of his narrative influenced by a finding of lack of credibility as to this part of his evidence. It might have aided the Tribunal in resolving the dilemma it found difficult to resolve of how it could be that a person exhibiting the educational and employment achievements of the appellant could be a person of interest to government authorities on the grounds of suspected OLF support or membership. 258 Although there was a question concerning an age issue (which could have been explored in oral evidence with the corroborating witnesses), there is no doubt that the dominant postulate upon which the Tribunal rejected the evidence of the corroborating witnesses as unreliable and found it unnecessary to seek any oral evidence from any of them was that the Tribunal could not see how it could possibly be that a person exhibiting the educational and employment achievements of the appellant could be a person who had experienced, or whose family had experienced, the claims made by the appellant and thus the appellant must not be telling the truth. 259 At [84], the primary judge found that the course adopted by the Tribunal was not lacking an evident or intelligible justification. The primary judge said this at [84]: In my opinion it was not "plainly unjust", "arbitrary", "capricious", "irrational", "lacking [an] evident or intelligible justification", or "obviously disproportionate" for the Tribunal to rely on the combined effect of the applicant's educational and employment history and country information as a basis for not accepting the evidence of GG (or of the other persons who provided written statements) and, for that reason, deciding it would not be assisted in determining whether it would accept those persons' evidence by taking oral evidence from them. With the exception of the applicant's employment status from October 2009 to 2011 (which I discuss later in these reasons), there was no doubt that the applicant's education and employment history was that which the Tribunal found it was because the Tribunal's findings were based on what the applicant himself said; there is nothing to suggest GG or any of the other persons could have given any probative evidence about the applicant's education and employment history; and there is nothing that could reasonably have suggested to the Tribunal that GG or the other persons could have given evidence in relation to the country information on which the Tribunal relied in assessing the consistency between the applicant's employment and education history with the applicant's claims of detention and harassment. In those circumstances, there would have been no reason for the Tribunal to have reasonably expected, had GG or any of the other persons who had provided written statements been called to give oral evidence, that these persons could have said anything about the matters the Tribunal found to be inconsistent with their evidence, namely, the applicant's education and employment history, given the country information the Tribunal considered to be relevant. [emphasis added in bold] 260 The difficulty with these observations, in my respectful opinion, is this. 261 None of the witness statements were put to the Tribunal on the question of the appellant's employment and educational achievements. None of the statements were addressed to aspects, argumentatively or otherwise, of the country information ultimately relied upon by the Tribunal. 262 The statements were directed to foundation questions of fact relevant to the appellant's claim to hold a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of the conduct of Ethiopian government authorities in relation to his family and in respect of his own experiences. The contended fears (and thus the claims) were rooted in the claims concerning the conduct of government authorities towards the appellant's family including the appellant's father, mother and sister and TG, the facts in relation to TG, TG's incarceration in Shambu prison, his treatment in that facility, his deterioration and ultimate death in that facility, his funeral, the events at the funeral, the events at TG's family's house after the funeral and such matters all of which were the subject of the findings at 127. The point of the evidence of Mr Nono, GG, Mr Diga, Mr TA and Mr Jena was that they could speak to these foundation facts. Had the Tribunal heard evidence from Mr Nono, GG, Mr Diga, Mr TA and possibly Mr Jena it may have been informed about factual matters which may have caused it to be satisfied that at least some of the facts contended for by the appellant were true. Alternatively, it may have been satisfied that the evidence did not assist it in determining whether any of the appellant's allegations were true or that having taken steps to try and obtain the oral evidence of the corroborative witnesses, the Tribunal could not be assisted by the evidence so obtained. Findings by the Tribunal that the appellant's family was not harassed as claimed, that TG was not detained in 2000 and did not die in prison, that the applicant did not give a speech at his brother's funeral and that GG did not leave Ethiopia in the circumstances claimed, were made in circumstances where the Tribunal found the witness statements to be unreliable and thus it was unnecessary to take oral evidence from any of the witnesses who could speak directly to these matters (or witnesses who could talk about things said in the community and by family members having a connection to the appellant's family), because none of their evidence could overcome the postulate that a person who had the demonstrated educational and employment achievements of the appellant could be a person who was, or was thought to be, a person associated with, or sympathetic to, the OLF. 263 Thus, it necessarily followed that the appellant was lacking in credibility. 264 Evidence about the foundation facts from the corroborative witnesses may well have influenced a view about those factual matters. 265 Clearly enough, the Tribunal was not asked to obtain evidence from the corroborative witnesses on the topic of how they might address a resolution of the Tribunal's concerns as between information of a general nature contained in the country information reports and the uncontested circumstance that the appellant had been able to obtain education and employment as found by the Tribunal at 94 (as set out at [9] of these reasons). 266 The Tribunal's wholas bolas rejection of the witness statements on the footing that the Tribunal "does not accept this material as being reliable" (Tribunal at 117), and the election not to obtain oral evidence from any of those witnesses (other than Mr Etana) because it was not "necessary" (Tribunal at 117), when a number of those witnesses could speak to critical matters which became the subject of findings which, in turn, determined the Tribunal's attitude to the credibility of the appellant on those matters and overall, lacked an evident and intelligible justification. 267 Moreover, there is no assessment in the Tribunal's reasons of the possibility that it might be wrong about the appellant's credibility by reason of the dilemma caused by the juxtaposition of the appellant's educational and employment achievements and his claims, having regard to the country information. What if the evidence of the corroborating witnesses suggested to the Tribunal that the appellant's brother, TG, was in fact arrested and in fact deteriorated in Shambu prison in the way suggested and in fact died at the hands of government authorities (police and prison authorities) by reason of mistreatment and the denial of access to medical attention? What if Mr Nono's evidence about his conversation with TG in jail were to be accepted? What if Mr TA's and Mr Diga's evidence was thought to be persuasive on some material matters? What if the complaints and statements made by the appellant's father about the treatment of the family and TG were found to have gravitas? What would the position of the appellant be in those circumstances? 268 None of this is considered because the version of the facts given by the appellant must lack credibility because, in the Tribunal's view, a person having the educational and employment achievements of the appellant could not be a person who was, or whose family was, thought to be a member of, or sympathetic to, the OLF. 269 It should also be remembered that in relation to the employment and educational factor which was of particular concern to the Tribunal having regard to the achievements of the appellant in those areas against the background of the claims he made, the Tribunal had before it the evidence of Mr Arie van Kekem who from 1989 to 2015 was employed as a Project Leader for the CASCAPE Project: see [87], [95] and [96] of these reasons. The CASCAPE Project was an agricultural development and improvement project conducted within Ethiopia involving the Ministry of Agriculture, Haramaya University (and others): see [87]. As mentioned at [96], Mr van Kekem said this in his statement in relation to decisions about employment: In the interviews [in which] I participated, decisions about who to employ for the CASCAPE Project were taken together with the staff of the university. Our employment criteria were based solely on candidates' professional skills and experience, personal attitude to the job, and ability to speak or understand the local language. We did not ever have regard to political or ethnic considerations. Certainly, as far as I know, the government of Ethiopia did not have any influence in who we could employ for the CASCAPE Project. [emphasis added] 270 A large part of the Tribunal's reasoning which led it to conclude that the corroborating witness statements could not be accepted as "material as being reliable" (117) and the decision that it was not "necessary to initiate inquiries to seek to contact the authors of such witness statements" (117) was that the statements did not assist in reconciling the appellant's claimed circumstances and his employment and subsequent education. However, Mr van Kekem's statement seems to suggest that even though the Ministry of Agriculture and Haramaya University were involved in the CASCAPE Project, people were being employed independently of any question of political or ethnic considerations and that as far as Mr van Kekem knew, the government of Ethiopia did not have any influence in who would be employed in that Project. That evidence might have suggested to the Tribunal (sufficient to initiate inquiries about obtaining evidence from some of the key witnesses) that, at least in some circumstances, a person with anti-government views or suggested of having a history of political views unsympathetic to the ruling party, might nevertheless have been able to obtain employment in some areas of public sector activity, such as the CASCAPE Project. 271 The rational, reasonable course in exercising the discretion as an independent "inquisitorial, merits-based review … tribunal" (see [245] of these reasons) was to take up the opportunity of obtaining oral evidence from at least those witnesses who could speak directly to factual matters as indicated earlier. Having heard the evidence, the Tribunal might reject it and be entirely unpersuaded by the oral evidence. It might remain confirmed in its view taking into account the oral evidence it had heard. However, it has put out of its hands the possibility of evaluating the oral evidence and the possibility of the appellant convincing it that his evidence was credible in whatever respects the evidence might demonstrate. 272 The Minister supports the reasoning of the Tribunal and seeks to support, as a basis for the decision not to obtain oral evidence from any of the corroborating witnesses, the reasoning of the primary judge. The Minister says that any evidence that might have been obtained from any of the corroborating witnesses could not have assisted the Tribunal in resolving the dilemma it was seeking to resolve, and moreover much of the evidence was not probative of the relevant fact and simply amounted to hearsay upon hearsay. As already mentioned, the Tribunal did not exercise the discretion to refuse to obtain oral evidence from the corroborating witnesses on that ground. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437, the Full Court said this at [47] in the context of discussing the reasoning process by which the decision-maker arrived at the exercise of the relevant power: This question [that is to say, the relevance of matters not relied upon by the Tribunal in its reasons for exercising a statutory power conferred upon it] highlights the distinction made between reasonableness review which concentrates on the outcome of the exercise of power, and reasonableness review which concentrates on an examination of the reasoning process by which the decision-maker arrived at the exercise of power. Although it is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to resolve the question whether those should be seen as two different kinds of review and what might flow from that, we are inclined to the opinion that, where there are reasons for the exercise of a power, it is those reasons to which a supervising court should look in order to understand why the power was exercised as it was. The "intelligible justification" must lie within the reasons the decision-maker gave for the exercise of the power - at least, when a discretionary power is involved. That is because it is the decision-maker in whom Parliament has reposed the choice, and it is the explanation given by the decision-maker for why the choice was made as it was which should inform review by a supervising court. … If a supervising court goes outside the reasons given by a decision-maker for another justification for the exercise of power, that court might then be seen to be placing itself in the position of the repository of the power and therefore acting impermissibly. Where there are reasons, either the reasons given by the decision-maker demonstrate a justification or they do not. It would, we think, be a rare case where the reasons demonstrate a justification but the ultimate exercise of the power would be seen to be legally unreasonable. [emphasis added] 273 As earlier mentioned, s 420 of the Act provides that the Tribunal, in reviewing a Part 7 - reviewable decision is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence and must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case. The Tribunal rejected the corroborating witness statements as unreliable and decided not to exercise the discretion to obtain oral evidence from those witnesses for the reasons extensively identified already. It did not at any point decide that matter by reference to admissibility, or any aspect of the rules of evidence, as a reason for the decision. In those circumstances, I can see no basis upon which a supervisory court ought to stand outside the reasons adopted by the repository of the power for deciding to exercise the power in the way it was exercised, and begin a process of trying to identify other reasons why the exercise of the power might have fallen within the boundaries or limits of the conferral of the power, had they been the reasons. 274 To the extent that the primary judge made the findings described at [259] of these reasons, having regard to the matters at [260] to [271] of these reasons, I would respectfully depart from that view and find that the primary judge was in error. 275 Accordingly, Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal is upheld.

(1999) 197 CLR 510

(2004) 221 CLR 1

(2016) 250 FCR 109

(2018) 262 FCR 317

(1992) 175 CLR 408

(2018) 264 CLR 123

(2013) 249 CLR 332

(2014) 231 FCR 437

(2016) 237 FCR 1

(2010) 240 CLR 611

(2019) 264 CLR 421

(2013) 212 FCR 99

(2018) 264 CLR 541

(2018) 264 CLR 217

(2005) 77 ALJR 1165

(2015) 233 FCR 451

(2000) 204 CLR 82

(2000) 74 ALJR 405

(2002) 124 FCR 449

[2002] FCAFC 211