CCT23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1873

1. On 23 August 2023, the Applicant applied to this Court under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ('the Act'), for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), as it then was, made on 25 July 2023.
2. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a Delegate of the First Respondent ('the Delegate') not to grant the Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa ('the visa') under s 65 of the Act.

1. The Applicant was born in and is a citizen of Pakistan.
2. The Applicant first arrived in Australia on 30 April 2013 on a Higher Education Sector (subclass TU-573) visa. See Court Book ('CB') at page 285.
3. On 10 September 2016, the Applicant applied for a (subclass TU-500) Student visa ('the Student visa'). The Applicant was granted bridging visas pending a decision being made in respect of the Student visa application.
4. On 15 December 2016, the Applicant's Student visa was refused.
5. On 4 January 2017, the Applicant filed a review application in the Tribunal in respect of the refusal of the Student visa.
6. On 12 January 2018, the Applicant was granted a bridging visa. The Applicant then departed Australia from 22 January 2018 until 19 February 2018.
7. On 9 March 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate in respect of the Student visa.
8. On 5 April 2018, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in respect of the Student visa.
9. On 13 April 2018, the Applicant's bridging visa ceased, and he remained in Australia unlawfully.
10. On 18 June 2018, the Applicant was granted a bridging visa.
11. On 13 February 2019, the Applicant's judicial review application was dismissed.
12. On 24 February 2019, the Applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) visa, which is the visa that is the subject of this review.
13. On 5 September 2019, the Applicant was invited to attend an interview on 18 September 2019 to discuss his application and the Applicant's claims that he is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (CB195). The Applicant attended the interview.
14. On 31 October 2019, the Delegate refused to grant the Applicant the visa. The Applicant was notified via email of the Delegate's decision on that date (CB281).
15. On 15 November 2019, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision. The Applicant was assisted with the application by a registered migration agent who was nominated by the Applicant as his authorised recipient.
16. On 10 May 2023, the Tribunal sent an email to the Applicant's authorised recipient in which it requested that any additional evidence relevant to the application be sent to it and that the pre-hearing information form be completed and returned to it (CB318).
17. On 11 May 2023, the completed pre-hearing information form was returned to the Tribunal.
18. On 12 May 2023, the Tribunal sent a letter to the Applicant's agent inviting the Applicant to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 July 2023 to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in his case (CB328-332). In the invitation, the Tribunal stated that it had considered all the material before it, but it was not able to make a favourable decision on the basis of that information alone.
19. The Tribunal included a copy of the Delegate's decision with the invitation which it stated contained information the Tribunal would discuss with the Applicant at the hearing. The Tribunal pointed out that any adverse information contained in that decision, which the Tribunal may rely upon to form the reason, or part of the reason, to refuse the application would be put to the Applicant at the hearing and he would be given an opportunity to respond. The Tribunal also indicated it would consider any request for additional time to respond at the hearing.
20. Lastly, the Tribunal requested that the Applicant provide all documents on which he intended to rely and any written submission setting out his claims by 14 July 2023.
21. On 17 July 2023, the Applicant provided a written statement to the Tribunal (CB344-347). The statement was accompanied by various documents, including screenshots of news articles and a statement from the Applicant's sister (CB348-388).
22. The Applicant attended the hearing before the Tribunal on 21 July 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Applicant was represented at the hearing.
23. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the Applicant's sister via telephone from Pakistan. The Applicant was assisted by an Urdu interpreter (CB392).
24. On 25 July 2023, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant the Applicant the visa. The Applicant was notified of the decision on that date.

1. The legislative scheme in force at the time of the Application provided pursuant to s 36(1A) of the Act, that an Applicant for a protection visa must satisfy both of the criteria in subsections (1B) and (1C) and at least one of the criteria in s 36(2).
2. Section 36(2) provided:

36 Protection visas - criteria provided for by this Act

...

(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a) a non‑citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa) a non‑citizen in Australia (other than a non‑citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non‑citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

1. The meaning of significant harm and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B) of the Act as follows:

36 Protection visas - criteria provided for by this Act

...

(2A) A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B) However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a) it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b) the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(c) the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

...

1. Section 5H defined the term 'refugee'. The definition in s 5H(1) was as follows:

(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:

(a) in a case where the person has a nationality - is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality - is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

Note: For the meaning of well‑founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

1. Section 5J provided the definition for the phrase 'well-founded fear of persecution'. Pursuant to s 5J(1) of the Act, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if: they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons; and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. In ss 5J(2) to 5J(6) and ss 5K to 5LA additional requirements relating to a 'well-founded fear of persecution' and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are specified.

1. The Tribunal's decision at is at (CB402-410).
2. The Tribunal identified and accepted at [12] of its decision that the Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan.
3. The Tribunal correctly identified at [5] of its decision that the issue on review was whether the Applicant met one of the criteria in ss 36(2)(a), (aa), (b) or (c) of the Act and Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ('the Regulations'), in that he is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the 'refugee' criterion, or on other 'complementary protection' grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
4. At [6] to [8] of its decision, the Tribunal summarised the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act and the meaning of refugee and well-founded fear of persecution as defined in ss 5H and 5J of the Act. It also referred to the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear as set out in s 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA of the Act.
5. At [9] of its decision, the Tribunal summarised the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
6. The Tribunal identified at [10] that it had regard to the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines' prepared by the Department, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as required by Direction Number 84 under s 499 of the Act.
7. The Tribunal outlined at [14]-[18] of its decision, the information that was before the Delegate and the Applicant's claims for protection which were considered by the Delegate. This included the following:

(a) The Applicant is a Sunni Muslim and his family belong to a conservative Pashtun tribe;

(b) He met and fell in love with a woman in Canberra but his family did not approve;

(c) The Applicant's family persuaded him to return to Pakistan to marry a woman they had chosen for him;

(d) They became engaged on 4 February 2018;

(e) The Applicant returned to Australia on 19 February 2018;

(f) The woman he was engaged to became very possessive and he decided to end the relationship;

(g) The Applicant's family pressured him to continue the relationship so as not to negatively affect the family's honour and reputation;

(h) The Applicant ended the relationship and the woman's brother threatened to kill him for bringing dishonour on the family; and

(i) The woman's family are very influential in Pakistan and have threatened to kill him and would use their influence to trace him in any part of Pakistan.

1. At [19] to [23] of its decision, the Tribunal outlined the details of the review application and other information it had received from the Applicant about honour killings of men in Pakistan. It also referred to statements it had received from the Applicant and his sister in support of the application.
2. The Tribunal summarised the Applicant's additional claims contained in his statement as follows:

(a) The Applicant met a woman at the end of 2020 who was an Australian citizen;

(b) The woman converted to Islam prior to the marriage;

(c) They entered a Nikah on 15 February 2021;

(d) The Applicant is still viewed as having dishonoured his tribe and the community has turned against his mother and will kill him if he returns to Pakistan;

(e) The Applicant's father and other relatives believe that he married a Christian and would kill him if he returned to Pakistan because he has ruined the reputation of his family;

(f) The woman the Applicant was engaged to married and had a child but divorced because the husband believed she still loved the Applicant;

(g) The Applicant maintains that he will be a victim of an honour killing because of his failed relationship with the woman he was engaged to, and his father will kill him; and

(h) The Applicant's sister claims the Applicant will be blamed for the divorce and the woman's family will force him to marry the same woman if he returns to Pakistan.

1. The Tribunal summarised the evidence and arguments made by the Applicant at the hearing before it (CB405-406 at [24] to [36]). This included further evidence as to the Applicant's claims for protection as follows:

(a) The Applicant cannot relocate to any other part of Pakistan as it would be unreasonable;

(b) The Applicant would have to go to his hometown to apply for a new identity document and he would be killed if he returned;

(c) The Applicant's father, or the family of the woman he was engaged to, would kill him for refusing to marry her and bringing shame upon the family;

(d) The Applicant's father and the elders would kill him because he married a Christian woman; and

(e) The Applicant could not relocate to another part of Pakistan as Pashtuns are discriminated against.

1. At [37] to [44] of its decision, the Tribunal identified country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which it had regard to. It noted that certain types of threats such as honour killings are still persistent (CB408 at [38]).
2. The Tribunal considered the particular circumstances of the Pashtun ethnic group and noted at [44] that Pashtuns in conflict-affected areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, face a moderate risk of violence by state security forces, including enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings. However, elsewhere in Pakistan, Pashtuns generally face a low risk of official and/or societal discrimination and a similar risk of violence to other ethnic groups in the same locations, although the risk increases if they come to the attention of authorities for any reason.
3. The Tribunal set out its findings and reasons at [45] to [48] of its decision.
4. The Tribunal found that the Applicant's evidence was evasive and unconvincing, and his claims contrived for the purpose of supporting a protection visa application (CB408 at [45]).
5. The Tribunal did not accept the Applicant's claims of harm due to having ended the relationship with the woman he was engaged to and noted at [46] that she had not been harmed or threatened with harm.
6. The Tribunal also did not accept the Applicant's claim that he would be harmed by his father, the elders or anyone else for entering into a Nikah with an Australian woman (CB408 at [47]).
7. Additionally, as the Tribunal had found the Applicant's evidence to be untruthful, it also found the Applicant's sister's evidence to be untruthful (CB408 at [48]).
8. At [50] of its decision, the Tribunal noted that it had been clear with the Applicant about the aspects of his and his sister's evidence which lacked credibility or were implausible and gave him the opportunity to respond, which he did through his adviser.
9. The Tribunal concluded at [50] that:

...the lack of relevant detail and corroborating evidence, along with his responses to queries and concerns indicated to the Tribunal that the applicant was reciting a wholly contrived account of events rather than recalling memories from a lived experience.

1. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant will be subject to an honour killing, or serious harm, or any kind of harm or discrimination for the reasons claimed, or for any other Convention-based reason (CB409 at [51]).
2. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the Applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) for the reasons claimed, or for any other reason.
3. The Tribunal then went on to consider at [52] to [55] of its decision whether the Applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
4. The Tribunal did not accept the Applicant's claims in relation to his fear of returning to his hometown and therefore found that the Applicant would be able to safely return to his own home without fear of persecution, significant or other harm (CB409 at [53]).
5. The Tribunal also formed the view as recorded at [54] that the Applicant has the protection of his own family and can safely reside in his hometown or elsewhere without fear of persecution for a Convention-based reason or any other reason.
6. The Tribunal concluded at [55] of its decision that the Applicant's account of the harm that he fears was entirely contrived and lacking in credibility. As such, it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed to Pakistan, there is a real risk the Applicant will suffer significant harm and was not satisfied the Applicant had met the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
7. On 25 July 2023, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate and notified the Applicant of the decision on that date.

1. On 23 August 2023, the Applicant applied to this Court pursuant to s 476 of the Act for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. The Applicant also filed an affidavit annexing the decision of the Tribunal.
2. On 6 May 2024, a Registrar made procedural Orders in Chambers which included an Order permitting the Applicant to file any written submissions, amended application, and additional evidence upon which he sought to rely, 28 days prior to the hearing and listed the proceedings for a final hearing on a date to be advised.
3. On 30 May 2024, the Applicant filed a Notice of Address for Service, in which he updated his address.
4. On 18 July 2025, the parties appeared via telephone before a Registrar. The Registrar made an order listing the proceedings for a final hearing on a date to be advised.
5. Notations were made on that date that confirmed the Applicant had retained a copy of the Court Book, and that the Applicant was seeking legal representation.
6. The matter was listed for a final hearing on 5 November 2025.

1. At the hearing, the material set out below was before the Court.
2. The Applicant relied upon the following material:

(a) The Court Book which was tendered and marked as Exhibit 'C1';

(b) Application filed on 23 August 2023;

(c) Affidavit of CCT23 filed 23 August 2023; and

(d) Notice of Address for Service filed 30 May 2024.

1. The First Respondent relied upon the following material:

(a) The Court book which was tendered and marked as Exhibit 'C1';

(b) Response filed 31 August 2023;

(c) Outline of Submissions filed 21 October 2025;

(d) List of Authorities filed 29 October 2025;

(e) Affidavit of Service of Hannah Anderson filed 29 October 2025; and

(f) Notice of Address for Service filed 31 August 2023.

1. The Applicant was also given the opportunity to make oral submissions in support of his application and in reply to the submissions made by the First Respondent.

1. The Court may set aside the Tribunal's decision upon judicial review if it is affected by jurisdictional error: see Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474 and 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
2. The High Court explained jurisdictional error in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 ('LPDT') at [2] as:

...breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority which results in a decision made in the purported exercise of that authority lacking the legal force attributed to the exercise of that authority by statute. Though a decision affected by jurisdictional error is a decision in fact, it is "in law ... no decision at all" and is in that sense "void".

1. For the reasons that follow, I find that no jurisdictional error is established.

1. The Applicant's one ground of review with particulars is listed on page 4 of the application filed on 23 August 2023 and is as follows:

*** The tribunal's decision is legally unreasonable and against the law which constitute a jurisdictional error.**

1. Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, 2. the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines' prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and 3. country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

1. The Tribunal heavily relied on the inconsistencies in the applicant statement and failed to give benefit of doubt to the applicant. 2. It was unreasonable for the Tribunal to find that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion ins 36(2)(a) and will not be subject to an honour killing, or serious harm because the applicant has the protection of his family, including his father and can safely reside, without any fear of persecution from anyone in his hometown or anywhere else. 3. The Tribunal did not believe the evidence of the applicant's sister for the reason that it had found the applicant's evidence to be untruthful._**

1. By Ground One, the Applicant alleges the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable and against the law for the reasons outlined in the four particulars.
2. This appears to be an invitation to the Court to undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's factual findings.
3. To the extent the Applicant may be seeking a merits review by asking the Court to reconsider the facts, the Court does not have the power, and it is impermissible to undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.
4. As was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent, the Court's role is strictly supervisory and a reviewing court may not engage in a review of the merits of the decision, reconstruct a decision‑making process, rework the apparent basis upon which a decision has been made, or rewrite the reasons for decision. See LPDT at [29].
5. The particulars upon which the Applicant relies to support his claim that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable and wrong in law are addressed below.

1. The Applicant alleges the Tribunal's decision is against the Ministerial Direction Number 84, the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines' prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
2. The Applicant did not particularise which aspects of the Tribunal's decision he is referring to in this complaint. The Tribunal identified at [10] of its decision that it had taken these matters into account expressly for protection status purposes, to the extent they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
3. The central question is whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution. That requires a predictive examination of how a particular applicant may be treated if he or she returns to the country of nationality: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 ('SZMDS') at [67].
4. The Applicant acknowledged at the hearing in this Court that he had no strong evidence to support his case. However, he submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider that he is from a Pashtun family and that he had a strong fear he would be harmed either by his father, or the family of the woman he was engaged to if they found him. He submitted that the woman's family might not have forgotten.
5. It is evident from its decision that the Tribunal took into account the mandatory considerations it was required to in accordance with Ministerial Direction Number 84, made under s 499 of the Act to the extent they were relevant to the decision under review.
6. The Tribunal referenced specific details of relevant country information assessments at [37] to [44] of its decision when considering the Applicant's protection claims.
7. It noted that certain types of threats such as honour killings are still persistent and that Pashtuns in conflict-affected areas, such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, face a moderate risk of violence by state security forces, including enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings (CB408 at [44]). However, the Tribunal also took into account that Pashtuns generally face a low risk of official and/or societal discrimination and a similar risk of violence to other ethnic groups in the same locations, although the risk increases if they come to the attention of authorities for any reason.
8. The Tribunal was required to make a predictive assessment of whether there was a real chance the Applicant would be harmed by his own family, members of his ethnic tribe or by the family of the woman he was engaged to.
9. The Tribunal considered the Applicant's claims in this regard and provided a cogent explanation as to why it did not accept the claims. It considered the Applicant's claims lacked relevant detail and corroborating evidence and that the Applicant's responses to questions were contrived and did not present as lived experiences.
10. The Tribunal was unable to find that the Applicant's subjective fear of harm was well-founded and that he would be able to safely return to his own home without fear of persecution, significant or other harm and that the Applicant would have the protection of his own family.

1. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that although the Tribunal made findings in respect of which a different decision-maker might have come to a different conclusion (and with which the Applicant evidently disagrees), no jurisdictional error is made out because the Tribunal's findings were open to it on the material before it. I agree with this submission.
2. Accordingly, I do not consider any jurisdictional error arises from the matters raised in this particular.

1. The Applicant alleges the Tribunal relied upon inconsistencies in his statement and failed to give him the benefit of the doubt.
2. In respect of the issues of credibility, the Tribunal accepted that inconsistencies in evidence can occur, particularly in circumstances of high stress and when applicants are being asked to recount events which may have occurred several years prior. Further, the Tribunal noted it was mindful that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible, but unable to substantiate their claims (CB409 at [50]).
3. The Tribunal provided the Applicant with the opportunity to respond to the aspects of his evidence which it considered lacked credibility or were implausible however, the Applicant was unable to allay the Tribunal's concerns to its satisfaction. The Tribunal found at [50] of its decision that:

...the lack of relevant detail and corroborating evidence, along with his responses to queries and concerns indicated to the Tribunal that the applicant was reciting a wholly contrived account of events rather than recalling memories from a lived experience. The Tribunal is not in any doubt that the applicant has not been truthful.

1. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that it is at the core of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to make findings of credibility. As was stated by the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67], a finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision-maker par excellence.
2. It was further submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that considerable caution must be exercised before concluding that adverse findings of credibility give rise to jurisdictional error.
3. The basis upon which the Tribunal has made adverse findings, including adverse findings as to credit, must be adequately explained: see SZSRV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 220; (2014) 142 ALD 219 at [23], and a failure to do so may expose jurisdictional error: see SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) FCA 1089 at [23].
4. In this instance, the Tribunal clearly outlined at [50] of its decision why it found the Applicant had not been truthful and what led to its adverse credibility finding.
5. To the extent the Applicant is seeking to challenge the Tribunal's findings of fact, the Applicant would need to demonstrate that the findings were such that no rational or logical decision maker could have arrived at on the evidence that was before the Tribunal: see SZMDS at [130].
6. The Tribunal's findings of fact were at [45] to [48] of its decision. The Tribunal clearly outlined that it was not satisfied the Applicant would suffer serious harm for the reasons stated by him relating to the two relationships he had been involved in or that his subjective fear of harm was well-founded.
7. The Tribunal also found the Applicant to be untruthful and that his evidence was evasive and unconvincing (CB408 at [45]). Ultimately, it formed the view that the Applicant's claims were contrived solely for the purpose of supporting a protection visa application.
8. The Court is satisfied that the findings above were reasonably open to the Tribunal based on the information and evidence before it and no jurisdictional error arises from the matters raised in this particular.

1. By this complaint the Applicant appears to be alleging unreasonableness and illogicality in the Tribunal's conclusion that the Applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
2. In conducting its review of the Delegate's decision, the Tribunal was required to:

(a) Consider whether the Applicant satisfied the refugee protection criteria in s 36(2)(a) or the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act; or

(b) Consider whether the Applicant satisfied the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act; and

(c) Consider each of the claims advanced by the Applicant.

1. The Tribunal's Decision Record demonstrates that the Tribunal:

(a) Identified the claims that the Applicant made before the Department and before the Tribunal;

(b) Correctly identified the law; and

(c) Considered the Applicant's claims in the context of the information before the Tribunal and the evidence given at the hearing.

1. As stated above, the Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant would suffer serious harm for the reasons stated by him relating to the relationships he had been in, or that his subjective fear of harm was well-founded.
2. As already referred to above, the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant had been truthful and found his evidence was evasive and unconvincing.
3. The Tribunal undertook an assessment of all the evidence before it and gave detailed reasons for its findings that the Applicant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) or the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal reached this state of satisfaction in the context of the anterior factual and credibility findings it made.
4. In this regard, The Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically, protection claims made by an applicant, nor seek out evidence to support an applicant's claim: see ABT16 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 166 ALD 79.
5. For a decision to be legally unreasonable, it must be "lacking in a rational foundation"; "plainly unjust"; "arbitrary"; "capricious"; or "lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of power": see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 ('Stretton'), at [11] per Allsop CJ.
6. In this case, I find the Tribunal's reasons provided a logical and evident foundation for its findings and demonstrate that the Tribunal's conclusions fell within the area of "decisional freedom" or "genuinely free discretion" within which "reasonable minds might differ". See Stretton at [7], [56] and [92].
7. Accordingly, no jurisdictional error arises from the matters raised in this particular.

1. The Applicant's complaint relates to the Tribunal not accepting the evidence of the Applicant's sister because it had found the Applicant's evidence to be untruthful.
2. The Tribunal noted at [48] that the Applicant's sister had confirmed his account that their father would kill the Applicant for marrying a Christian woman and that is how the rest of the village would consider this.
3. The Tribunal took into account the written statement of the Applicant's sister and also took further evidence from her by telephone at the hearing. When asked why she believed the Applicant would suffer serious harm should he return to Pakistan, she said that the pressure comes from their caste, and he has to comply with their decisions including to marry the woman they had determined he should marry (CB407 at [35]).
4. The Tribunal was very clear with the Applicant about the aspects of both his and his sister's evidence which it found lacked credibility or were implausible. It gave the Applicant the opportunity to respond but he was unable to allay the Tribunal's concerns to its satisfaction.
5. The Tribunal ultimately concluded "that the Applicant is not a witness of truth and that all his claims are contrived solely for the purpose of supporting a protection application" (CB409 at [51]).
6. It is well established that the Tribunal is entitled to accept, reject or give such weight to the evidence submitted as it deems appropriate in the circumstances: see Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]. Further, the degree of weight to be given to the evidence is a factual question for the decision maker alone: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48 at [33] and Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14 at [197] per Gummow and Hayne JJ.
7. The Court is satisfied that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal as to the evidence of the Applicant's sister was reasonably open to it based on the information and evidence before it and its doubts about the Applicant's credibility. Accordingly, no jurisdictional error arises from the matters raised in this particular.

1. For the reasons given above, I find that no jurisdictional error is established and the application for judicial review will, accordingly, be dismissed.

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, I invited submissions from the parties as to costs.
2. The First Respondent sought costs in the applicable scale amount prescribed by Sch 2, Pt 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) for a proceeding concluded at final hearing, being $9,097.93.
3. The Applicant stated he could not afford to pay costs.
4. As the application has been dismissed and the First Respondent has been put to the expense of preparation for and attendance at the hearing, I consider it appropriate that an order for costs be made and will order that the Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs in the amount of $9,097.93.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-one (121) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Leishman.