1. Although the applicant's ground of appeal does not depend on the identification of discrete error, it is nonetheless informative to examine the judge's reasons for sentence.
2. After introductory remarks and setting out the factual circumstances of the offending and subsequent investigation, the judge turned to the issue of victim impact, noting that the feelings of loss experienced by Mr McKimmie's wife, daughter and granddaughters as a result of his death 'are no doubt amplified by the utterly pointless and unnecessary circumstances surrounding it'. The applicant's driving 'was outrageous, and caused others incalculable loss'.
3. The judge then described the features of the applicant's driving which rendered it culpable. With respect to the applicant's moral culpability, the judge noted that the applicant: was unlicensed; had been suspended from driving by reason of being found to have been driving under the influence of drugs; had failed to do a drug education course that he had been required to do; drove in an unregistered car with false plates; and had sped away from police to avoid the possibility of detection for minor drug and road traffic offences. The judge found the applicant's moral culpability to be 'extremely high', observing:

It was sensibly conceded by your counsel that your offending was above the mid-range of similar offences and I agree. Your driving is well above the mid-range of objective culpability in its category. Your case involves a suite of objective features that sometimes make up culpable driving only in smaller constellations. But here, you are drug affected, ignoring the road rules, speeding to evade police and driving wildly.

1. As to the applicant's personal circumstances, the judge noted that he was aged 40. He has a child born in December 2022, whom he has seen a 'handful of times' since he has been in custody. The applicant's childhood 'was not a happy one'. His mother re-partnered with violent and abusive men and the applicant was physically assaulted by two of them. At a young age, he also fell victim to sexual abuse by an older male teenager. He attended school until year 10, and worked in various warehouse jobs until aged approximately 34. The applicant has been a consistent drug user since the age of 15, when he started using cannabis on a daily basis. He commenced using methylamphetamine at the age of 25, and prior to the offending was smoking methylamphetamine daily. On the day of the offending, the applicant consumed both cannabis and methylamphetamine.
2. So far as mitigating features were concerned, the judge took into account the applicant's 'early' pleas of guilty, which was 'a very important feature in the reduction of [his] sentence'. The judge noted that the applicant had written a letter of apology to his victims, noting that it was 'untested evidence of [his] remorse' and she gave it 'the limited weight it earns in that context'.
3. With respect to the applicant's mental health, the judge made the following observations:

A report authored by Jeffrey Cummins [psychologist] was tendered on your plea. I have taken its contents into account in a general way. I find his reference to pre-collision PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] vague, imprecise, and without any reference to the diagnostic criteria for that condition.

I accept that as a result of the collision you have experienced, and will continue to experience, symptoms of depression and anxiety, infused with self-blame and shock at what you have done, such that the burden of your imprisonment will be very substantial. In this state, you isolate yourself as a coping mechanism. I take these matters into account in mitigation of your sentence.

I do not accept that there is sufficient cogent evidence that imprisonment will, on Verdins[8] principles, cause your mental health to deteriorate.

1. The judge noted that the applicant does not have any prior convictions (albeit VicRoads records revealed that the applicant's licence was suspended for six months from 14 June 2009 for exceeding the speed limit by more than 35 kph; and was further suspended for six months from 27 March 2022 for driving a motor vehicle with a prescribed concentration of drugs present in his oral fluid). Although he had no prior convictions, however, the applicant had recently been sentenced for breaching an intervention order made in favour of his mother and for recklessly causing injury to her. The applicant's prospects of rehabilitation, the judge said, will much depend upon the determination he brings to addressing his drug problem.
2. With respect to the purposes of sentencing, the judge said the 'need for just punishment and for general deterrence is central to this sentence'. There was also a role for the protection of the community. The immediate history of the applicant's driving record required the judge 'to impose a sentence that will speak to [him] personally and deter [him] from driving in this way ever again'. Further, the judge said that the community 'expects that courts will respond to driving like [his] with stern sentences and with denunciation'. It is 'unacceptable for anyone to use drugs and drive wildly with little or no regard for human life'. The judge observed that the 'cost to the community is too high and demands the imposition of a lengthy sentence'.
3. The judge concluded her sentencing remarks with reference to the standard sentence; current sentencing practices; and principles of totality and proportionality.

1. As we have said, the applicant's proposed ground of appeal was concerned solely with the sentence imposed for culpable driving, charge 1.
2. The applicant's counsel submitted that while the applicant was to be sentenced in relation to objectively serious offending, the applicant received a sentence that is manifestly excessive when the matters in mitigation and current sentencing practices are considered. A review of sentences for this offence places the applicant's sentence towards the top of the range, with there being only one other case, Hennessey, in which an offender received a lengthier sentence of 12 years' imprisonment (which the Court of Appeal described as being at the 'very top of the permissible range').[9] In that case, the applicant was drug affected and engaged in driving that involved excessive speed and extremely negligent conduct by driving on the wrong side of the road for periods while placing other road users at risk. Counsel for the applicant also referred to Rakatau[10] and Laz.[11]
3. Acknowledging that the range indicated by past sentences does not establish the boundaries for future sentence, counsel submitted that current sentencing practice is an important mechanism for ensuring consistency in sentencing. Counsel submitted that the sentencing judge did not have due regard to current sentencing practice when imposing the sentence on charge 1. Conceding that the applicant's moral culpability was 'high', and that the offending was 'above the middle of the range of seriousness', counsel nevertheless submitted that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge 'failed to give adequate weight to the matters in mitigation relied upon by the applicant'.
4. Counsel for the applicant also drew attention to the following mitigating factors: the early plea of guilty; the utilitarian benefit of the plea; the presence of some remorse; the impact of a term of imprisonment on the applicant's mental health; family support; and the applicant's 'fair' prospects for rehabilitation.

1. The respondent's counsel submitted that the plea hearing proceeded on the conceded basis that the offending the subject of charge 1 was an above mid-range example of the offence of culpable driving causing death. It was further conceded that the moral culpability of the applicant was high, and that general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment were very serious considerations in the sentencing exercise.
2. Counsel submitted that there was a 'suite' of aggravating features present of the kind commonly described in the authorities, the fact that the applicant had lost his licence due to drug driving featuring significantly among them. The applicant had been required to complete a drug driving education program to regain his licence, but had failed to do so, instead driving again whilst unlicensed and under the influence of the same drug to such an extent that he was incapable of having proper control of the motor vehicle. He then sped away from police, to avoid being detected again for drug driving, leading to catastrophic consequences for the victims moments later. So much gave a particular and grave context to his offending.
3. The respondent's counsel submitted that the 'primary victim', Colin McKimmie, had suffered life-threatening injuries. He and his family endured a protracted seven weeks of surgeries and treatment, cycling between a state of hope, and pain and despair, before he finally succumbed to his injuries. The suffering endured by the victims was described by the judge as 'immeasurable'.
4. Counsel submitted that the applicant had limited factors to rely upon in mitigation: an early plea of guilty and the associated utilitarian benefit; the application of limb 5 of Verdins to some extent; some remorse; ongoing family support; and a finding that his prospects of rehabilitation were 'fair' (but not powerful). Based on all relevant factors, the judge was correct to conclude that the offending was well-above the mid-range of seriousness, and that the applicant's moral culpability was extremely high.

1. The sentence imposed on charge 1 might be considered to be stern. That is not sufficient, however, to warrant appellate intervention. This Court's intervention would only be warranted if the Court were persuaded that the sentence imposed is wholly outside the range of those open in the sound exercise of discretion.[12] We are not persuaded that it is.
2. As we have mentioned, the sentencing judge described the applicant's driving as 'outrageous'. That is an apt description. In order to evade police, the applicant drove away from them at high speed - far in excess of the speed limit - and performed a dangerous manoeuvre at an intersection by driving the wrong way around the controlling roundabout, all the while under the influence of methylamphetamine and amphetamine to such an extent that he was incapable of having proper control over a motor vehicle. Additionally, he was on bail at the time, which is an aggravating feature of his offending.[13]
3. It cannot be gainsaid that, in those circumstances, general deterrence assumed a deal of prominence in the sentencing exercise. In these days when the use (and abuse) of methylamphetamine is such a ubiquitous and enduring problem - its use by drivers creating significant danger to life, limb and property - those who cause death or injury whilst driving when impaired by that drug must realise that upon apprehension they will receive stern punishment. So, too, those who try to evade police in the manner that the applicant did must know that, if their resulting grossly negligent or reckless driving causes death or injury, they also will receive appropriately severe punishment.
4. In the applicant's case, specific deterrence was also of importance to the imposition of sentence. An earlier experience of being detected driving with illicit drugs in his system had not deterred him from driving on the day of the fatal collision whilst under the influence of methylamphetamine. As to that, the applicant had been detected on 26 February 2022 with drugs present in his oral fluid. His licence was suspended for six months from 27 March 2022, then cancelled on 5 July 2022 when he failed to complete a required drug program. Despite that fact, the applicant drove his vehicle in the lead-up the collision having consumed methylamphetamine to an extent that he was incapable of having proper control of it.
5. Moreover, immediately prior to the fatal collision, the applicant sought to evade police because he knew he would have methylamphetamine ('ice' or 'meth') in his system. So much appears from what he told the reporting psychologist. Mr Cummins recorded the applicant as saying the following:

Well the day before this collision I was celebrating my birthday with a mate in Lake Eppalock and yes, I had some ice and some dope to celebrate my birthday. Well then I saw that I was being chased by the police and I panicked because I knew I'd have meth in my blood. I can't even remember how it was I sort of skidded over the roundabout and my memory of the collision is all sort of confused ...

1. Furthermore, in addition to general and specific deterrence, denunciation and community protection all needed to be reflected in the sentence imposed. And as we have said, the judge assessed the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation as 'fair'. Self-evidently, those prospects revolve to a large extent on his capacity to cease the use of illicit drugs.
2. Balanced against the objective seriousness of the applicant's offending, there were limited features in mitigation. Prominent among those features were the applicant's early plea of guilty, accompanied by its utilitarian benefit. Like the sentencing judge, we would afford the applicant's letter of apology little weight. And also like the sentencing judge, whilst we would accept that the applicant will continue to experience symptoms of depression and anxiety, such that the burden of imprisonment will be substantial, we do not accept that Mr Cummins' report provides a sufficient basis for concluding, according to Verdins principles, that those symptoms will cause the applicant's mental health to deteriorate.
3. When distilled, the applicant's contention that the sentence is manifestly excessive largely rests upon the proposition that it is towards the 'top of the range'. But while it is true that the sentence in the present case is one of the highest imposed for this offence, the sentencing range - as informed by current sentencing practices - is not 'capped and collared' by sentences previously imposed.[14] Depending on the facts of a particular case, the full spectrum of permissible sentences may extend as far as the maximum penalty.
4. Synthesising all relevant features, including the circumstances of the applicant and the offending, and paying due regard to the factors going in aggravation and those in mitigation, we are not persuaded that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive.

1. Leave to appeal against sentence should be refused.

[1] Crimes Act 1958, s 318(1). The maximum sentence is 20 years' imprisonment, and the standard sentence is 8 years.

[2] Crimes Act 1958, s 18. The maximum sentence is 5 years' imprisonment.

[3] Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981, s 73(1). The maximum penalty is imprisonment for one year or 30 penalty units.

[4] Road Safety Act 1986, s 7(1)(a). The penalty for a first offence is 25 penalty units.

[5] Bail Act 1977, s 30B. The maximum penalty is 3 months' imprisonment or 30 penalty units.

[6] Road Safety Act 1986, s 49(1)(bb). The penalty for a first offence is 12 penalty units.

[7] Road Safety Act 1986, s 18(1)(a). The penalty is 6 months' imprisonment or 60 penalty units.

[8] R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269.

[9] See Hennessey v The King (2024) 106 MVR 220, 235 [86] (Emerton P and Whelan JA) ('Hennessey').

[10] Rakatau v The Queen (2021) 95 MVR 347 ('Rakatau').

[11] Laz v The Queen (2022) 101 MVR 177 ('Laz').

[12] See, e.g., Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA, Weinberg JA agreeing).

[13] See DPP v Milson [2019] VSCA 55, [66] (Priest and Weinberg JJA).

[14] See, e.g., DPP v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 445 [51] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), citing DPP v OJA [2007] VSCA 129; (2007) 172 A Crim R 181, 196 [30]-[31] (Nettle JA, with whom Ashley and Redlich JJA agreed).