Cawley & Morvell [2026] FedCFamC2F 64 (27 January 2026)

Amended pursuant to rule 10.13(1)(g) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 on 27 January 2026

1. On or before the expiration of 60 days from the date of these Orders ("the date"), the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant the sum of $207,019.80 ("the payment").
2. Within 30 days of the date of these Orders, the Respondent provide written confirmation that she is able to comply with her obligations under Order 1 hereof.
3. In the event such payment is not made by the date or the Respondent provides notice prior notice that such payment cannot be made, then within 14 days from the date of such notice or default of payment, the Respondent do all things necessary to engage Mr B from C Real Estate ("the selling agent") at Suburb D as the selling agent for the sale of the property at E Street, Suburb F in the State of Victoria being the whole of the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume ... Folio ... ("the E Street property") with such sale to be on the following basis:

(a) The Respondent arrange for the selling agents to have any works recommended by them for the preparation of the E Street property for sale to be completed ("the works") as soon as practicable, using the option of paying for those works from the proceeds of sale;

(b) The Respondent do all things and sign all documents necessary to list the E Street property for sale within 14 days of the completion of the works;

(c) In the absence of written agreement between the parties, the method of sale, the terms of the sale and the asking or reserve price be as recommended by the selling agent

(d) The Respondent appoint Wightons Lawyers as conveyancers for the sale of the E Street property;

(e) The Respondent authorise the selling agent to liaise with the Applicant as to the progress of the sale, including any offers made; and

(f) pending the settlement of the sale of the E Street property, the Respondent shall have sole use and occupation of the E Street property and maintain same to ensure the property is available for inspection as requested by the selling agent and neither party shall further encumber the E Street property.

1. On or before the settlement of the sale of the E Street property or contemporaneous with the payment referred to in Order 1 the Applicant, at his expense (which expense shall include all PEXA fees, workspace and lodgement fees), withdraw any caveat lodged over the real property by himself or on his behalf including but not limited to Caveat Registration No. ... and pay any monies due in respect of any such Caveats where appropriate.
2. Upon the settlement of the sale of the E Street property the proceeds be applied as follows:

(a) First, to pay the costs and commissions of the sale including the deferred cost of the works and any rate adjustments;

(b) Second, to discharge the mortgage ... to Commonwealth Bank of Australia;

(c) Finally, the balance be divided so as to effect an overall division of the assets as set out in annexure "A" herein of:

(i) 80 percent to the Applicant Respondent; and

(ii) 20 percent to the Respondent Applicant.

1. The Respondent shall retain for her sole use and benefit to the exclusion of the Applicant absolutely the business known as H Pty Ltd and indemnify and keep indemnified the Applicant in respect of any liabilities, claims or demands including but not limited to taxation liabilities.
2. The Applicant shall retain for his sole use and benefit to the exclusion of the Respondent absolutely the business known as K Pty Ltd and indemnify and keep indemnified the Respondent in respect of any liabilities, claims or demands including but not limited to taxation liabilities.
3. Save as otherwise provided for in these Orders, each party shall be solely liable for and indemnify the other and keep them so indemnified in respect of any liabilities including but not limited to any personal taxation or other ATO debts, credit card, personal loans or other debts, owing by them to any financial institution or third party.
4. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purposes of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:

(a) each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders (the furniture, personal possessions and like chattels in the real property being deemed to be in the possession of the Respondent);

(b) each party shall retain such bank and investment accounts held in their sole names;

(c) each party forego any claims they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other. The parties each specifically retain all their right title and interest in relation to any superannuation benefits to which they are each entitled as at the date of these Orders;

(d) Insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named thereon.

(e) Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.

1. The Applicant and Respondent execute all documents and instruments necessary to give effect to these Orders.
2. All extant applications otherwise be dismissed.

1. Pursuant to section 90ST of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the parties intend these orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial (and other) relationships between them and avoid further proceedings between them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is a property matter concerning a 16-year de facto relationship which produced one child, X ("X") aged 14 years.
2. The parties are the applicant de facto husband, Mr Cawley, and the respondent de facto wife, Ms Morvell. For ease of reference, although the parties were not married, I shall refer to them as the husband and wife respectively.
3. The parties largely agree as to the value of the asset pool, although there is a dispute as to whether two liabilities of the husband should be attributable to the relationship.
4. The husband concedes a division of the asset pool in the wife's favour of 40 per cent. This is based on 57.5 per cent for contributions with a further 2.5 per cent adjustment for the wife's current and future circumstances.
5. The wife seeks the assets be divided such that she receive 85 per cent of the pool. Her case is that she should receive 80 percent of the pool based on an assessment of her contributions, and a further 5 per cent adjustment due to her current and future circumstances.
6. It was common ground that the asset pool be approached by way of a two-pool approach, such that the parties' superannuation remains where it is and that the percentage they each assert be applied solely to the non-superannuation pool.

1. The parties were both born in Australia.
2. The husband completed his qualifications before moving to London in 2002 to work.
3. The wife also moved to London for work in about 2003.
4. The parties met in London in early 2006. At that time the wife was working for J Company in the United Kingdom.
5. In mid-2006, the husband was unemployed for a period due to issues with his work permit. He returned to work in late 2006/early 2007.
6. The parties commenced cohabitation in about October/November 2006. At that time the wife was living in London in accommodation provided by her employer, J Company. The husband moved in with her at that property.
7. In April 2010, the wife took a voluntary redundancy. The husband does not appear to dispute she received the net amount of $132,190.46.[1] Thereafter the wife completed a twelve-month diploma course through L Company, followed by a three-month internship at M Venue in London. During this period the parties lived in a rental property in London.
8. In late 2010, the wife inherited a property at E Street, Suburb F, ("the E Street property") valued at that time at $500,000.
9. Upon the wife becoming pregnant, the parties decided to return to live in Australia, arriving back in 2011. The parties moved into a home owned by the wife at N Street, Suburb F ("the N Street property").
10. In 2011, the wife was involved in an accident and suffered serious injuries, including a broken leg.
11. In late 2011, the husband commenced working for J Company in City O where he worked for the next four years.
12. The parties' son, X, was born in 2011.
13. In 2012, the wife commenced a masters degree which she completed in 2015.
14. Between September 2013 and August 2014, the parties undertook internal renovations to the E Street property. It seems that around this time the parties obtained a viridian line of credit over that property to pay for the renovations and to manage other shared expenses ("the viridian line of credit").
15. In August 2014, the parties moved into the E Street property.
16. The N Street property was rented out from September 2014 until January 2016.
17. In November 2014, the husband was made redundant from J Company. He says he received a redundancy payment of $70,000. The wife says she was not aware of this despite attaching a termination payment document to her affidavit.[2]
18. Following his redundancy, the husband worked as an educator for between three to six months.
19. In about May 2015, the husband commenced working for P Company.
20. In or about 2015, the wife received a scholarship to complete her studies. She also undertook part-time lecturing.
21. In August 2016, the husband established a business, Q Company, undertaking consultancy work.
22. In August 2016, the parties sold the N Street property for $625,000. $336,000 was applied to pay down the viridian line of credit and about $213,984 thereafter applied to external renovations of the E Street property.
23. The husband was made redundant in March 2017. The wife says she returned to part-time lecturing to support the family.
24. Between March 2017 and June 2018, the husband completed further studies.
25. In March 2019, the husband incorporated his company K Pty Ltd.
26. In October 2019, the wife commenced her own business, H Pty Ltd ("H Pty Ltd"). She is a professional.
27. The parties separated in March 2023 under the one roof. The husband moved out of the E Street property in early July 2023. The wife remained living in the E Street property with X.
28. In January 2024, the wife initiated the first set of proceedings in this court as the parties were in dispute about X's secondary education.
29. The wife and X moved out of the E Street property in late 2023/early 2024 and into the wife's mother's property at R Street, Suburb S ("the R Street property"). At that time the wife's mother went into aged care. The wife negotiated with her other siblings to live in that property rent free.
30. Between early 2024 and January 2025, the E Street property was rented out. The E Street property has been empty since January 2025. The wife gave evidence that she did not want to put tenants in the property in case the house had to be sold.
31. Final parenting orders were made by consent on 17 April 2024, which provided for the husband to spend time with X on alternate weekends with a progressive increase in time to 5 nights per fortnight by 2026.
32. In June 2024, X was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder ("ASD") level 2, a communication disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, and attention deficit defiance disorder ("ADHD"). He has since been placed on a NDIS plan.
33. On 16 December 2024, the husband commenced these proceedings.
34. In April 2025, X began expressing a desire to self-harm. He spent no time with the husband between April and September 2025. Since September 2025, he has spent only occasional and ad hoc time, mainly doing activities such as attending the gym or the movies with his father.

1. The husband relied on the following documents:
   • his further amended initiating application filed 2 December 2025;
   • his trial affidavit filed 21 October 2025;
   • his affidavit in reply filed 5 November 2025; and
   • his financial statement filed 21 October 2025.
2. The wife relied on the following documents:
   • her amended response filed 28 July 2025;
   • her trial affidavit filed 20 October 2025;
   • her affidavit in reply filed 5 November 2025; and
   • her financial statement filed 20 October 2025.
3. There were also a number of exhibits tendered in this matter, as follows:
   • R1 - Section 50 certificate schedule
   • A1- Bank statement
   • A2 -HELP/HECS statement dated 7.12.2025
   • A3 -SFSS scheme (Student Financial Service Scheme)
   • R2 -Westpac Flexi loan bundle
   • R3 - SFSS student study loans dated 1.11.2013 to 8.11.2025
   • R4 - Westpac account in name of K Pty Ltd
   • R5 - Westpac choice account in Applicant's name
   • A4 - Child support payments made by the Applicant
   • A5 - Wotif booking confirmation re: London
   • A6 - Series of photographs of renovations
   • J1 - Joint balance sheet
   • R7- Respondent's proposed final property orders
   • A7 - Applicant's amended proposed final property orders
4. The valuation report of the single expert Mr T went into evidence by consent. The valuer was not required for cross-examination.

1. The only witnesses in this matter were the parties themselves.

1. The husband was a problematic witness from the beginning presenting as belligerent, evasive, and argumentative. His evidence was also inconsistent. A key example of this concerned the husband's use of the wife's credit card. The husband said in his affidavit in reply that he "never" used the wife's credit card.[3] However, the wife's credit card showed transactions occurring in City G, Queensland and Suburb D, City O in the same period. The husband conceded he visited his mother in City G around the time of the transactions but would not concede he was using the credit card. In his oral evidence, the husband said that "Suburb D" in the bank statements could be one of a number of Suburb Ds as there are "multiple Suburb Ds". Furthermore, he said that the wife may have been using the card in City G and that the other card may have been used by one of the wife's relatives in the City O area. Although, the husband also said he did not know if it was possible to get a second credit card for the same account. When presented with an application for such a card, seemingly signed by him, the husband denied it was his signature and said he could not confirm or deny it was his handwriting as he was not a handwriting expert. His evidence was not only inconsistent but inherently unbelievable, as the wife would have had no reason in 2013 to forge the husband's signature on an application so that he could have a secondary credit card.
2. The husband was also asked about a number of transactions in City O, which the wife said occurred while she was in London. The husband said he could not recall if the wife was in London and he would have to search his flight records. When he was subsequently presented with an itinerary and air ticket showing the wife had travelled to London at that time, he then said this did not prove she got on the plane.
3. Another example of problematic evidence related to the husband's financial statement, in which he asserted that he was paying $1050 per week off his flexi loan. When confronted with evidence that he did not pay any amounts off the one known flexi loan with Westpac, the husband suggested that perhaps the National Australia Bank ("NAB") may have called their credit card a flexi loan. However, the NAB credit card was referred to separately in that document. In any event, it was evident the husband was not paying $1050 per week off any of his debts.
4. Furthermore, at least in one key respect the husband lied to the court and that was in regard to providing disclosure to his solicitor. Under cross-examination the husband said, when asked about failure to provide disclosure, that he had provided all of his documents to his solicitor and that it was "on him" (his solicitor) if they were not sent to the wife. I asked the husband directly that if his solicitor was called to give evidence whether he would confirm this, and the husband told the court that he would. After the husband's cross-examination, the matter was stood down so that counsel for the husband could get instructions. When the husband was re-examined, the husband stated he had lied to the court when he said he had provided all the documents to his solicitor.
5. For all of these reasons, I cannot rely on the evidence of the husband where it is not otherwise corroborated by reliable material.

1. Although the wife's evidence was not nearly as problematic as that of the husband, it was clear she was reluctant to concede the husband had made any meaningful contribution to the relationship, either financially or non-financially. Nonetheless, she conceded that she was able to operate her business during the relationship, despite X's school refusal, because they were an intact family. The clear implication was that this was possible because the husband was available to assist with X's care at those times.
2. Overall, it was apparent the wife remains very bitter about the husband due to possible affairs that he had during the relationship and what she genuinely believes was his lack of commitment to the relationship. She feels taken advantage of and used for the financial resources she brought in and inherited during the relationship. However, I do not accept the wife's case that the husband entered the relationship with the sole intention of seeking a financial advantage. As put by counsel for the husband, this was playing a very long game, one in which he fathered a child which necessarily impacted significantly on the parties' financial situation. It seems that the wife now seeks to rewrite the entire history of the relationship. The wife also conceded that she had applied for spousal maintenance for strategic reasons when she was more than capable of supporting herself.
3. For these reasons, I am also cautious about relying upon the wife's evidence where it is not otherwise corroborated by other reliable evidence.

1. The relevant legal principles governing any application for de facto property settlement are set out in Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). Section 90SM(1) of the Act authorises the court to make such orders between the parties as it considers appropriate. Section 90SM(2) makes it clear that the court cannot make an order for a property settlement unless it is just and equitable to do so.
2. There is no presumption that the parties' entitlements in the existing asset pool should be altered, or that one party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them. In addition, although both of the parties may urge the court to make orders altering their interests in property, the existence of such an agreement is not sufficient. The court must be satisfied that such orders are indeed just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
3. Earlier Full Court authorities have identified a four-step process that can assist the court in reaching a just and equitable decision: see Lee Steere & Lee Steere [1985] FamCA 57; (1985) FLC 91-626; Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395; (2003) FLC 93-143; and In the Marriage of Omacini [2005] FamCAFC 104; (2005) 33 Fam LR 134. These steps have been codified in section 90SM of the Act as follows:

Orders in property settlement proceedings

(1) In property settlement proceedings after the breakdown of a de facto relationship, the court may, subject to subsection (6), make such order as it considers appropriate:

(a) in the case of proceedings with respect to the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them - altering the interests of the parties to the de facto relationship in the property; or

(b) in the case of proceedings with respect to the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party to the de facto relationship - altering the interests of the bankruptcy trustee in the vested bankruptcy property;

(c) an order for a settlement of property in substitution for any interest in the property; and

(d) an order requiring:

(i) either or both of the parties to the de facto relationship; or

(ii) the relevant bankruptcy trustee (if any);

to make, for the benefit of either or both of the parties to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship, such settlement or transfer of property as the court determines.

Note 1: The geographical requirement in section 90SK must be satisfied.

Note 2: The court must be satisfied of at least one of the matters in section 90SB.

Note 3: For child of a de facto relationship, see section 90RB.

Note 4: Subsection (6) relates to property that is a companion animal.

(2) The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

(3) In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the court:

(i) the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(ii) the existing liabilities of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(b) is to take into account (except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal):

(i) the considerations set out in subsection (4) (considerations relating to contributions); and

(ii) the considerations set out in subsection (5) (considerations relating to current and future circumstances).

Note: See subsections (6) and (7) in relation to orders with respect to property that is a companion animal.

Considerations relating to contributions

(4) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(i), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the de facto relationship to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the de facto relationship;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the de facto relationship has provided for a child of the de facto relationship.

Considerations relating to current and future circumstances

(5) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(ii), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship (the subject de facto relationship) has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection;

(b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship;

(c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

(d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the subject de facto relationship, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

(f) the extent to which either party to the subject de facto relationship has the care of a child of the de facto relationship who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child;

(g) commitments of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain;

(h) the responsibilities of either party to the subject de facto relationship to support any other person;

(i) the eligibility of either party to the subject de facto relationship for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i) - the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the subject de facto relationship in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the subject de facto relationship to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the subject de facto relationship has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the subject de facto relationship and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the subject de facto relationship;

(p) the need to protect a party to the de facto relationship who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

(q) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

(r) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under this Part in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship (in relation to another de facto relationship); or

(ii) a person who is a party to another de facto relationship with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(s) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIII in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(ii) a person who is party to a marriage with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(t) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the subject de facto relationship is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the subject de facto relationship;

(u) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on either or both of the parties to the subject de facto relationship;

(v) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on a party to the subject de facto relationship;

(w) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

1. In Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52, the court considered the expression "just and equitable" at [36] and noted that it:

... is a qualitative description of a conclusion reached after examination of a range of potentially competing considerations. It does not admit of exhaustive definition. It is not possible to chart its metes and bounds.

1. The Full Court in Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at [86], made it clear that the just and equitable requirement is not a threshold issue, "but rather one permeating the entire process". Accordingly, I shall return to this at the conclusion of the judgment.

1. The parties were largely in agreement about the assets and their values save that the wife did not agree that the husband's Australian Taxation Office ("ATO") debt, Higher Education Contribution Scheme ("HECS") liability and Student Financial Supplement Scheme ("SFSS") debt should be included in the pool (although she accepted the quantum of the debts).
2. The agreed assets were as follows:

Property interests, superannuation and financial resources

1. In determining whether the court should include liabilities in an asset pool, the court must firstly consider whether the debts are referrable to the relationship.[4] As was stated by the Honourable Evatt CJ In The Marriage of Prince [1984] FamCA 7; (1984) 9 Fam LR 481 at [486]:

Of course, the court cannot ignore the fact that there is or may be a liability; the effect is simply that it does not consider that the other spouse should be called upon to in effect "contribute" to the liability by having that spouse's fair share in the parties' property reduced by virtue of its existence.

1. In this case, the taxation debt was accrued largely during the relationship. The debt is referable to the 2023 financial year and although the parties separated in March 2023, the husband did not move out of the home until about June/July of that year.[5]
2. The Full Court discussed taxation debts in Shamon & Shamon [2025] FedCFamC1A 150 at [64] and [67]:

64. .... merely because a taxation debt accrued prior to separation does not mandate it being brought to account as a joint matrimonial liability (Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633; (2004) FLC 93-204). To create such a principle would leave open between separation and trial the opportunity for a party to organise or manipulate finances to maximise liabilities in the hands of one party and not to give justice between the parties (Trustee of the Property of G Lemnos, a Bankrupt & Lemnos & Anor [2009] FamCAFC 20; (2009) FLC 93-394). Consequently here, by neither statute nor authority was the primary judge mandated to treat the appellant's taxation liability as a liability of the marriage. Rather the exercise was one of discretion.

...

67 The primary judge makes findings of fact to the effect that the appellant had the ability to meet the taxation debt between separation and the trial date and chose not to use monies available to him to do so. This was during a period when the first respondent also made contributions by continuing to meet her child rearing obligation following separation. The appellant did not himself give any justification for not meeting the debt earlier. Her Honour did not ignore the debt, rather, she was not satisfied that it should be deducted from the assets of the parties in the circumstances of the case. As liabilities are not "property" of a debtor their inclusion in the balance sheet must rely upon s 75(2)(o) and thus it was for the appellant to persuade the primary judge that the liability should be included in the balance sheet or otherwise taken into account. It was open to the primary judge to conclude that in the circumstances of this case it was not appropriate to take this debt into account. We are not persuaded that the primary judge has given insufficient reasons for her decision. (Emphasis added, Citations omitted)

1. The wife argues that the husband had about $62,000 in the business bank account and that he should have put those funds aside to pay his tax debt for that year. The husband says that he needed those funds for living expenses and legal fees. The husband argues that he was required to rehouse himself, pay bond and rent in advance, as well as purchase furniture and white goods for his new residence. The wife says she offered him her mother's white goods and household items but he did not accept that offer. I do not accept that the husband was obliged to accept the second-hand belongings of the wife's mother in lieu of purchasing his own items and it does not appear that his spending in that regard was unreasonable.
2. In regard to the funds spent on legal fees, I note the wife conceded she also spent a similar amount, about $62,000 on her fees. She said this was made up of a combination of her business income, a tax return and an investment account. However, it is unclear when she earned this income, where the funds in the investment account came from, and what period was covered by her tax return.
3. In all of the circumstances, it is appropriate that the husband's ATO debt be included in the pool.

1. The husband completed his qualifications prior to the commencement of the relationship, which resulted in a HECS debt (now referred to as a HELP debt). During the relationship he also completed an MBA which added to that debt. Some of the total debt was paid down during the relationship.[6]
2. On the other hand, the wife completed her qualifications during the relationship, at a total cost of about $22,000, which was fully paid for from funds otherwise available to the parties for their day-to-day expenses.
3. In such circumstances, it would not be just and equitable to exclude the husband's HECS debt from the pool, particularly given the parties benefited from his subsequent employment at P Company which he acquired as a result of this prior education.

1. This appears to have been obtained by the husband to assist him with living expenses as a student prior to the relationship. In such circumstances, I do not propose to include this debt in the pool.
2. Accordingly, I find the parties current assets and liabilities to consist of the following:

Property interests, superannuation and financial resources

1. It is not in dispute that at the commencement of the relationship the wife owned the N Street property, which she had purchased five years prior for about $150,000. This property was unencumbered by the start of the relationship. The husband does not dispute the wife also had $50,000 in savings and a car worth about $18,000.[7]
2. The husband had no assets of significance other than Motor Vehicle 3.
3. I note that both parties were content for the court to ignore any superannuation they may have had at the commencement of the relationship or contributions made to it thereafter.

1. The wife argues that at the commencement of the relationship she was earning $257,225 per year plus a package including accommodation and airfares she could elect to cash in,[8] whilst the husband was earning a modest income of between $76,800 and $94,000 per annum. She points out that because the costs of the accommodation were paid, he did not have to pay rent for about three years. The wife says she also funded the parties' holidays each year, their flights to Australia and the husband's legal costs to review his visa decision of about £6,000.[9]
2. Notwithstanding this initial inequity, the wife says that during the relationship the parties kept their finances separate and that their intention was to meet the costs of the household equally. It seems common ground that in or about 2013 the viridian line of credit was set up to pay for their day-to-day expenses and that the wife would advise the husband of the amounts he was required to pay into that account. Later, when the parties conducted an internal renovation on the E Street property, they also used the viridian line of credit to meet those expenses. When the husband made purchases for the renovation from his own accounts, he would give the wife the receipts and be reimbursed from the line of credit.
3. At trial, the wife relied on a table prepared pursuant to section 50 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("the section 50 table") which it was agreed reflected the parties' various contributions to the viridian line of credit.[10] The wife relied upon it as proof of her superior contributions to the asset pool overall. However, the Full Court has made it clear that the assessment of contributions is not a mathematical exercise but should be approached holistically.[11]
4. In addition, even if I were minded to accept that it was appropriate in the circumstances of this case to take a mathematical approach to the parties' financial contributions, the wife's argument is problematic for a number of other reasons:
   • The section 50 table does not cover the period prior to 2013;
   • The section 50 table only covers the viridian line of credit;
   • Between 2012 and 2016, the wife was not earning sufficient income to meet the requirement for a tax return so was likely making her contributions from savings or rental income which could lead to double counting of her contributions; and
   • The section 50 table includes the sale proceeds of the N Street property which would be double counting.
5. It is also evident that for significant periods during the relationship the primary income earner was the husband and that although he had several periods of unemployment, he also received a number of redundancies. Whilst the wife asserted that the husband kept his income for himself or otherwise spent it on eating out and entertainment, she did not produce any like reconciliation of his bank accounts to support this assertion. If the wife sought to convince the court to take such a precise mathematical approach, in my view the onus was on her, not the husband, to perform a similar reconciliation of all of the parties' various bank accounts. The wife argues that she had insufficient time to collate the husband's documents due to late disclosure; however, whilst she could have sought an adjournment, she did not.
6. In any event, as submitted for the husband, even if the wife is correct the difference in contribution to the viridian line of credit over a ten year period was a matter of about $15,000 per year, and this must be assessed in the context of a myriad of other contributions made by the parties during the relationship (and up until trial).
7. In this regard, and as already discussed, the wife was reluctant to concede the husband made any significant contributions, either financially, non-financially, or by way of homemaker or carer of X. Her case, and to a large degree the husband's, is that the husband worked long hours each day. However, she says when he was home, he spent his time otherwise gaming and did little to help out. Notwithstanding the wife was seriously injured when she was pregnant, and that it took two years to rehabilitate, she says the husband did not provide additional support.[12] The wife gave oral evidence that the husband "did the dishes sometimes" and did "make the occasional meal". However, for reasons already provided neither party's evidence was reliable in this regard.
8. The wife was similarly reluctant to admit that the husband made any meaningful contributions to the renovations of the E Street property. She conceded limited renovations were conducted by the husband in her reply affidavit, but asserted that most of the renovations were done by paid tradesman. She says she project managed and designed the landscaping of the outdoor areas.[13] However, as with the wife's evidence generally, there is reason to believe she was also minimising the husband's contributions in this regard. For example, the wife concedes the husband helped "dig a hole under the house",[14] or what she otherwise referred to as "limited digging out of the basement".[15] However photos of that project,[16] along with the plans showing the size of the space, indicate it was much more than a hole. The wife also concedes the husband was reimbursed about $42,000, which he spent on items for the property. This in itself is indicative of a greater involvement in the project.
9. Nonetheless, it is not in dispute that the wife inherited the E Street property in 2010 and that at that time it was worth $500,000 and was unencumbered. It is also common ground that in 2016, the wife sold the N Street property for $625,000, and that $335,400 was used to pay down the viridian line of credit and $213,984 applied towards further renovations of the E Street property. Given the total non-superannuation pool is only 950,669.80, these are very substantial contributions. The parties also had the benefit of rental income from the N Street property prior to its sale.
10. In addition, the wife makes various allegations about family violence, which she says have made her day-to-day contributions more onerous. Whilst the husband denies these allegations the wife particularised a number of incidents including an incident in May 2012, in which she alleges the father smashed a kettle on her leg and provided corroboration by way of photos of a broken kettle and a large bruise on her leg.[17] She also particularised another incident which occurred in April 2014 in which she alleges the husband tried to push a refrigerator over on her and started throwing glass jars from the fridge at her feet, hitting her. She also says he ripped the phone out of the wall to stop her making a call. The wife's evidence was quite detailed and was quite compelling. She also reported the matter at the time to the police who applied for an intervention order ("IVO") on her behalf.[18] The wife did not proceed with the final IVO order, as she says that the husband convinced her the acts would not occur again. Aside from these particular events the wife says the husband would engage in behaviour such as throwing objects, pushing her, hitting walls in anger and swearing at her.
11. The husband argued that the wife also engaged in family violence, including recording him without his permission. However, this occurred post-separation in circumstances where the wife had installed security cameras for her own protection. I do not find this to be family violence.
12. I find that, on the evidence, the husband subjected the wife to multiple incidents of family violence throughout the relationship and that this would have made the mother's contributions as a homemaker and parent more arduous.

1. It is also common ground that the wife has been primarily responsible for X's care since separation. The husband does not dispute the wife's assertion that:

...Since separation, I am not aware that [Mr Cawley] has attended any paediatric appointments, GP appointments, psychological sessions or appointments, OT sessions, counselling or speech therapists. He does not engage with the school in relation to the supports [X] has there.[19]

1. In addition, the wife argues that she has paid all of the rates and outgoings on the E Street property post-separation. However, the wife also had the sole benefit of the rental from that property for a year, of $1,020 per week. This is not a matter I take into account when assessing contributions.
2. Finally, the husband asks that funds provided to him from his mother, in the amount of $26,680 be taken into account under section 90SM(4) of the Act in circumstances where he concedes it is "possibly unenforceable" as a loan.[20] Under circumstances in which these funds have been acquired post-separation and were used by the husband to meet his own post-separation needs, this is not a contribution to the asset pool of the relationship.

1. It is evident the wife's initial contribution of the N Street property followed by her inheritance, is not only a significant contribution but has provided a springboard to the parties' current asset pool. However, I must assess these contributions in the context of the myriad of other contributions I have identified in this decision. Having done so I am of the view that the wife's contribution to the asset pool should be assessed as 75 per cent.

1. The parties are of similar age, the husband is 53 years of age and the wife 55 years of age. There is no medical evidence that they have current health issues. The wife says she has been hospitalised twice from late 2024 to early 2025 but provides no supporting evidence.
2. The husband continues to work at P Company as a professional. He earns about $130,000 with the possibility of bonuses. The wife says the husband receives additional income from a boarder. The husband's evidence about this was unconvincing, and I find on the balance of probabilities it is likely to be true.
3. The wife gave evidence she has not operated her business H Pty Ltd for about twelve months due to ill health and her obligations to X, to her mother, and these proceedings. However, the business has historically earned a reasonable income, and the wife hopes to resurrect the business when these proceedings are over. The wife's evidence was that:

Since its incorporation, the taxable income generated by the company each financial year is as follows:

(a) 30 June 2020 - $73,254.

(b) 30 June 2021 - $12,647.

(c) 30 June 2022 - $94,690.

(d) 30 June 2023 - $114,756

(e) 30 June 2024 - $40,870

(f) 30 June 2025 - $37,273[21]

1. However, the wife will continue to be X's primary carer and on the evidence is currently responsible for the lion's share of X's care. Furthermore, X requires additional support due to his special needs. The husband does not deny the wife's assertion in her trial affidavit as follows:

As a result of [X]'s neurodivergence, he requires additional support. I regularly cook him meals which are limited to specific foods as he has a sensory processing issue relating to foods textures etc. He struggles to eat a large range of food. I take him to all his medical appointments with his GP as well as counsellors. He is attending occupational therapy which has enabled him to develop better skills to engage with other people and practical self care skills. He has engaged with a speech therapist, psychologists, counsellors and two paediatricians and I attend those appointments with him.[22]

1. I note that X had been seeing a psychologist weekly and this has since transitioned to fortnightly with an occupational therapist. I understand he is now being supported by a school psychologist and/or counsellor. He also sees a paediatrician. The wife said during her oral evidence that the primary issue was getting X to school, which was "a big effort every single day" and she would invariably get a call from the school, and on occasion have to pick him up. The wife consequently says that attending to X's special needs impacts on her ability to run her business. Although I accept the submission for the husband that the wife's business is not a nine to five operation and that the wife has a certain degree of flexibility, she is likely to be required in certain locations at specific times which may be problematic if she is required to pick X up at short notice.
2. However, I also take into account that on my assessment the wife would have the benefit of 75 per cent of the pool. Having determined the net non-superannuation pool to be $950,669, this would amount to $713,001.75. The wife also has the use of her mother's home, which enables her to house X regardless of whether she is able to keep the E Street property or has to sell it to pay out the husband. In addition, she will retain $322,804 by way of superannuation.
3. Whilst the husband is in arrears of child support, I accept that a portion of the child support arrears arose following reviews conducted by the child support agency and because of a lag in payments resulting from a takeover of the company employing the husband. In any event, the husband is an employee and there are mechanisms to recover any outstanding arrears.

1. The husband concedes that the wife ought to receive 2.5 per cent of the pool for her current and future circumstances. The wife seeks 5 per cent of the pool. I find that in all of the circumstances a further five per cent adjustment is appropriate. This would bring the wife's division to 80 per cent. However pursuant to Clauson & Clausen [1995] FamCA 10; (1995) FLC 92-595, I must stand back and assess what 80 per cent looks like in real terms.
2. Having determined that the net non-superannuation pool amounts to $950,669, 80 per cent of that total is $760,535.20 If the wife retains the E Street property (with the viridian line of credit) and her vehicle, she will have assets of $967,555 which would require her to make a payment to the husband of $207,019.80.
3. I find that in circumstances where each of the parties has made contributions to the asset pool, that it is just and equitable to make an order for property division. Furthermore, I find that taking into account all of the matters addressed in this judgment that the aforementioned payment would also be just and equitable.

1. The last controversy is that in the event there is a default sale of the E Street property, whether the husband ought to share the responsibility for the capital gains tax ("the CGT") and/or the vacant land tax. The husband argues that the reason there would be any CGT is because the wife chose to rent out the E Street property after separation, and that he neither had a say in this decision nor received any benefit from same. I accept that on this basis the wife should be solely responsible for the CGT. In regard to the vacant land tax, this again flows from decisions made by the wife and likewise should be paid by her.
2. Otherwise, I was not addressed as to why I should prefer one set of orders over the other in terms of the default sale. I made it clear to the parties that where there was no evidence, for example with respect to whether the property should be sold by public auction or by private sale, that I would make orders as agreed and I shall do so.
3. The parties agreed that in accordance with authorities such as Noetel & Quealey (2005) FLC 93, that the proceeds of any default sale should be divided in the same percentages determined by the court.
4. For all the aforementioned reasons, I make the order as set out at the commencement of this judgment.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and four (104) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Dorrat.

[1] Wife's trial affidavit filed 20 October 2025 ("wife's trial affidavit") at [39].

[2] See wife's trial affidavit, annexure "MSM-15" at [112].

[3] Husband's affidavit in reply filed 5 November 2025 ("husband's reply affidavit") at [10].

[4] See Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633;

[5] Husband's trial affidavit filed 21 October 2025 ("husband's trial affidavit") at [22]; Wife's affidavit in reply filed 5 November 2025 ("wife's reply affidavit") at [174].

[6] See Exhibit R3 - SFSS student study loans dated 1.11.2013 to 8.11.2025.

[8] Wife's case outline filed 14 November 2025 at [8].

[10] See Exhibit R1 - Section 50 certificate schedule.

[11] See for example Horrigan & Horrigan [2020] FamCAFC 25.

[13] Wife's trial affidavit at [69] and [73].

[14] Wife's reply affidavit at [171(h)].

[16] See Exhibit A6 - Series of photographs of renovations.

[17] See wife's trial affidavit, annexure "MSM-26" at [160]-[161].

[18] See wife's rial affidavit, annexure "MSM-25" at [158].

[19] Wife's trial affidavit at [129].

[20] Husband's case outline filed 2 December 2025 at [5].

[22] Wife's trial affidavit at [130].