The applicant told the tribunal that he had completed a course of his prescribed medication for depression and anxiety which was the drug Venalafaxine. The report from the psychologist, which set out a treatment plan, noted that he was using that prescription drug for those purposes but no report from her or any other medical practitioner identified that he had, in fact completed that drug therapy.
I accept his evidence that he is ceased using the prescribed medication notwithstanding that there is no medical advice to confirm this. That matter is, however, factually neutral, because that medication obviously provided a function in managing his mental health issues. If his completing that course of medication is a positive thing for him, that is something that should be clear on medical evidence.
The Respondent also made the point, in my view quite legitimately, that the Applicant has not presented evidence from a psychologist that specifically dealt with his present condition and in particular, any that gave any opinion as to whether there was any prospect that he would relapse into the use of alcohol or drugs. It submitted that he had a long history of alcohol abuse, drug use, and violence and that there was no evidence that he had reformed. It also submitted that he could have, but did not present evidence from the psychologist that he had not had any time and would not in the future go back to his former ways.
The Applicant explained these gaps in the evidence as being because of his inexperience at conducting cases such as this. It can also be partly explained by the fact that prior to the hearing, the Applicant had not read the Respondent's extensive submissions concerning why the decision should not be overturned, and why he was shown not to be a fit and proper person or alternatively that it was not in the public interest that he be provided with the relevant licence. Those submissions made the very point I am discussing, the absence of contemporaneous expert opinion.
Had such evidence and presented to the tribunal it may will have led to a significantly different result. Sadly, he did not obtain it.
For the Respondent, it was conceded that the Applicant had certainly shown that he was "on the right course" and that its attitude may be different if he had presented a psychologist's report showing that the various risks that concerned it had been dealt with.
The Respondent also conceded that the Applicant could make an application for a new at any time if this decision went against him and that the position was not however, static. I was told that with the passage of time, the Commissioner could be persuaded to grant a licence in response to a further application in that regard and that the Commissioner and the Directory would also have regard to the reasons handed down by this tribunal on this application in deciding what to do with any such application.
The Applicant has provided character references that show he is held in high regard in his community. I have had regard to those.
In my view the applicant has not shown at this time that he is a fit and proper person to hold a licence of the classes for which he previously held a licence. His failure to present current medical opinion and up to date information that shows insight into his behaviour in the past was vital to his application but was absent. In my view, were such material in a credible form obtained, the decision may well have been different.
Even if he had succeeded in this application, it would be a somewhat short-lived victory since the licence would have expired in five months in April 2026 and he would then need to justify the grant of a new or renewed licence in any event. He may still be able to do so.
Having regard to those matters the decision under review is affirmed.
[2]
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Catlin
Respondent/Defendant:
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATOD 163;
Legislation Cited (5)
(Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007
Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020
Industry Act 1997
Decisions Review Act 1997
Industry Regulation 2016
Cases Cited (7)
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review an administratively reviewable decision: s 55 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (the ADR Act). Section 83B of the HB Act provides that applications may be made to the Tribunal for administrative review under the ADR Act of decisions to refuse authorities under the HB Act. I am satisfied the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine this application for review.
When considering an application for review the Tribunal is to decide what is the correct and preferable decision having regard to the material before it (s 63(1) of the ADR Act). In doing so the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision (s 63(2) of the ADR Act).
The time at which the correct and preferable decision is determined is when Tribunal makes its decision: YG and GG v Minister for Community Services[2002] NSWCA 247 at [25]. In conducting a review, the Tribunal is not restricted to consideration of the material that was before the Commissioner but may have regard to any relevant material before the Tribunal at the time of the review: Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority[2008] HCA 31.
The Tribunal may decide to affirm or vary the administratively reviewable decision, or set it aside and either substitute a different decision or remit the matter to the administrator for reconsideration: see s 63(3) of the ADR Act.
The Applicant's personal interest in retaining his licence cannot outweigh the public interest in having full confidence in the professionalism of people involved in the security industry: Blissett v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police; Web Protection Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 114 at (32).
Public interest in the context of section 26(1)(d) of the Act and clause 25(1) of the Regulations requires paramount consideration be given to public safety. I would find it difficult to convince the public that you hold the necessary attributes consistent with the standards of behaviour required to hold a licence. I consider that you have clearly demonstrated a lack of self-control, integrity, and general disregard for the law. I have weighed these factors against your need to hold a security licence and having considered the aforementioned, and with a focus on public safety, I am satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for you to hold a security licence at this time.
In conclusion, after giving due consideration to your application I am satisfied that the grounds under which your security licence was revoked clearly fall within the provisions of section 26(1A), section 15(1)(f)(i), section 26(1)(d) of the Act and clause 25(1) of the Regulation. If you were applying for a new licence, the application would be required by this legislation to be refused. Consequently, I affirm the decision of the delegate of the Commissioner to revoke your security licence. The SLED assesses each application received on its merits so that the public of NSW can form the view that the applicant can be trusted to hold a security licence.
While the Applicant claims to only operate a business specialising in the installation and servicing of CCTV, alarm, access control and security gate systems, the scope of activities permitted under his licence are much more extensive. It is within this context that questions of fitness and propriety must be considered.
The conduct which gave rise to the revocation of the Applicant's licence is of particular concern to the Respondent. This is made clear by the fact that the stalking/ intimidation offence is a prescribed offence under the Act and Regulation, and when the Applicant was convicted of that offence, and found guilty, his licence was required to be revoked. He had applied under Section 14 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) for an order which would have avoided a criminal conviction and a record of guilt. Section 14 is a mechanism to divert individuals with a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment from the traditional criminal justice system. That order was refused. He appealed that refusal.
The District Court made orders that allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and dismissed the charge. The Applicant was ordered to comply with all reasonable treatment directions of Ms Ingleton, including in respect of therapeutic interventions such as Psychoeducation, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, Mindfulness. He was ordered to abstain from illicit drugs and alcohol and take all medications prescribed by his treating doctors.
Notwithstanding the operation of these provisions, the Tribunal is to take into account matters indicating criminal conduct even though the particular offences charged have not been proven or have been dismissed_: Joseph v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force_ [2017] NSWCA 31 (Joseph), [62] - [64]. It is the conduct rather than the conviction that is of concern to the tribunal: Esterman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force[2014] NSWCATOD 70, [30].
In Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police v Mercer at , it was held that;
In GXC v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force[2025] NSWCATOD 37 at [41] Senior Member Naida Isenberg held in the context of the Act under consideration here that;
"..even where a person has a criminal record this of itself may not be sufficient for the Tribunal to be satisfied that a person is not a fit and proper person to work in the security industry. As pointed out by the Tribunal in Toleafoa (No 2) v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2000] NSWADT 48 at [34] in the decision of the High Court of Ziems -v- The Prothonotary of The Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 302, Taylor J said that the vital question in determining a person's fitness and propriety for a particular licensed activity was not whether the licence holder (in that case a registered legal practitioner) had been convicted of an offence against the criminal law, but whether the conduct of the licence holder was such to show that he was unfit to remain a member of his profession."
In Forbes v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service[2005] NSWADT 151, several factors were identified to determine a person's fitness to hold a security licence, including: