[2026] FWC 434
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-02-10
Original judgment source is linked above.
s 394 - Unfair dismissal
Unfair dismissal - valid reason - reinstatement - evidential onus that reinstatement not appropriate not met
[1] Ms Cassandra Cooke (the Applicant) has made an unfair dismissal application under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) regarding her dismissal as a First Officer (E190 Pilot) with National Jet Express Pty Ltd (the Respondent).
[2] At the time of her dismissal, the Applicant had worked for the Respondent for 27 years, and, according to the Applicant in her first witness statement, she had no previous disciplinary or performance issues. However, in her witness statement in reply, the Applicant provided detail of the disciplinary issues that had arisen over her long tenure.
[3] The Applicant's dismissal arose after a conversation with a work colleague on 21 March 2025. It is alleged that on that day, the Applicant was dropping off pilot attendance paperwork to the Resource Planning team at the Perth Airport Head Office. Whilst doing this, the Applicant is said to have engaged in a conversation with Victoria Portelli (Portelli), Crew Training Coordinator. It is Portelli's evidence that the Applicant made certain comments to her about Wayne Ovens (Ovens), Head of Flying Operations. Those comments were said to be about Ovens' work and personal life. This conversation, particularly the Applicant's alleged comments about Ovens, were reported to Ovens, presumedly by a member of the Resource Planning team. Ovens subsequently made a written complaint on 1 April 2025 to the Respondent about the Applicant's purported conduct after having asked Portelli to write a statement. The disparaging comments were said to include the following:
(a) 'he hates women';
(b) 'he is clearly having marital problems';
(c) 'he is obviously fighting with his wife'; and
(d) 'even the Union Member agreed with these statements'.
[4] After receipt of Ovens complaint, the Respondent instructed the Applicant not to attend work on 16 April 2025. An investigation ensued and the allegation was ultimately found to have been substantiated by the Respondent notwithstanding the Applicant's denial that the conduct occurred. The Applicant was dismissed for 'serious misconduct' on 26 May 2025. However, whilst the Applicant's conduct was characterised by the Respondent as 'serious misconduct', she was provided payment in lieu of notice.
[5] Before deciding the merits of the application, s 396 of the Act requires that I decide four matters. First, whether the application was made within the 21-day period required by s 394(2) of the Act. Second, whether the Applicant was a person protected from unfair dismissal, because she had served the minimum employment period and earned less than the high income threshold or was covered by an industrial instrument. Third, whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. Fourth, whether the Respondent is a small business employer, rendering the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code relevant to this matter. The Applicant made her application in the requisite timeframe and was protected from unfair dismissal. The Respondent was not a small business employer at the relevant time and there is no claim that the Applicant's position was made redundant, hence rendering these preliminary considerations of no further relevance.
[6] Having considered the evidence before me, I am of the view that the Applicant's dismissal was unfair notwithstanding that there was a valid reason for her dismissal based on her misconduct of 21 March 2025. The censure of dismissal was, however, harsh in all the circumstances and having weighed the factors favouring reinstatement against the factors which do not favour reinstatement, and noting that I am limited to the evidence adduced, I have concluded that I cannot be satisfied that reinstatement is not appropriate.
[7] However, I do not consider it appropriate, in the circumstances of the present matter, to put the Applicant into a position where she has suffered nothing out of this exercise. By not making an order for the restoration of lost pay, a very clear message is given to the Applicant as to the consequences that flow from her own conduct.
[9] Before turning to the consideration of s 387 of the Act, it is necessary to describe the factual background and to make findings in relation to contested matters. In respect of findings, it is trite to observe that when an employer alleges misconduct, it must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the misconduct occurred.
[10] The background to the matter is structured in accordance with the some of the circumstances that ultimately led to the Applicant's dismissal.
[11] It is observed that, in support of her case, the Applicant gave evidence.
[12] The Respondent relied upon the evidence of:
(a) Portelli, Crew Training Coordinator and, prior to April 2025, Resource Planner;
(b) Mark Heal (Heal), Fleet Manager for the Embraer E190 - the aircraft operated by the Applicant, and the Applicant's manager for the 12 months prior to her dismissal;
(c) Robin Furber (Furber), Chief Operating Officer; and
(d) Shannyn Van Heerden (Van Heerden), Resource Planner.
[13] Before broaching the circumstances that gave rise to the Applicant's dismissal, it is timely to outline the responsibilities and duties of the Applicant within her former workplace. In addition, further context is provided about the work environment and some of the purported issues with the Applicant's behaviour that the Respondent drew upon to support its contention that there was a valid reason for the Applicant's dismissal.
All Employees must behave in a professional manner at all times and not engage in any behaviour which brings the Group into disrepute, whether at work premises, in public or on social media.
[16] As to 'relevant' policies and procedures, the Respondent referred to its HDB Policy. Insofar as the Applicant was alleged to have breached certain requirements of that policy, the Respondent relied upon clauses 6.1 and 6.3. Whilst the Respondent relied upon clause 6.3 without more, it is unclear how the clause proved relevant. The Respondent referred to the requirement in clause 6.3 that an employee must not discriminate against someone on the grounds of their association with someone who has, or is assumed to have, a 'Protected Attribute'. The passage in question states:
It is also unlawful to discriminate against someone on the grounds of their association with someone who has, or is assumed to have, a Protected Attribute.
[17] Clause 6.1, which perhaps was more on point given that which was alleged against the Applicant, was titled 'Harassment' and set out, amongst other matters, the following:
Harassment is any form of behaviour that is not wanted, not welcome, unreciprocated and that is likely to create a hostile or uncomfortable work environment by seriously offending, humiliating or intimidating a person for any reason.
Harassment does not require intent for the behaviour to be deemed as harassment.
Examples of behaviour that can constitute harassment include, but are not limited to:
[18] The Respondent specifically relies upon that part of clause 6.1 of the HDB Policy that is in bold font.
[20] Regarding the context in which the Applicant performed her duties, Heal gave a detailed account of crew resource management. He explained that there is a working relationship between all parties involved in the operation of an aircraft. This involves interactions between flight crew members, cabin crew, ground crew and air traffic control. According to Heal operating in a dynamic environment and with many operational challenges, makes operating an aircraft a very high stress environment.
2.1 The Applicant's purported allegation that a colleague had cheated
[23] Included in the Respondent's evidence was an email dated 3 July 2022 titled 'Record of conversation with FO Cass Cooke'. Ovens was copied to the email. The sender and recipient of the email were not called to give evidence, but it appeared to be accepted that the email constituted a business record. An abridged version of the email follows:
The following is a short dot point recall of a conversation with FO Cass Cooke, regarding allegations of Capt XXXX XXXXXX cheating during a systems exam.
Cass stated that "XXXX XXXXXX has cheated on that morning's systems exam, as he knew the answers, which she perceived were ready prior to the start of the exam"
I stated that "how could he, as no one has any idea what questions were in the exam"
Cass stated "that he got them from Wayne Ovens HTD, as they wanted Ryan to pass.
Cass stated that "he never opened his IPad, and the only time he did he had the fifty answers ready to go"...[9]
[24] A further email chain dated 6 July 2022, commencing with an email from the pilot at the centre of the purported cheating allegation to Gavin Healy (Healy), Head of Flying Operations, Ovens and two further recipients, was included in the Respondent's evidence. The email was titled 'Training concerns' and outlined that the pilot was unsure of the best way to tackle the issue, that he understood that HR had briefed Healy about what had happened, and that the pilot's concerns had not been appreciated to the extent warranted. The responsive email to the pilot from Healy of that same date stated that he needed to have a group conversation so all knew that 'these behaviours will not be supported' and that Healy was 'aware of [the pilot's] concerns re the type of rating and am working through this at the moment'.
... the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses' recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts.
[27] Lee J went on, at paragraph 17, to set out that the approach is one premised on the assumption that contemporaneous notes and documents are the extemporaneous and unvarnished product of the conduct of internal dealings or communications between the contesting parties, and that confidence can be placed on the contemporaneous record, particularly where that record is unfiltered and sufficiently complete.
[29] The limited documentary evidence is sufficient to draw doubt about the accuracy of the Applicant's recollection that her assertion that her colleague cheated was said as a joke. Nevertheless, there is no evidence before me indicative that the Applicant was subject to disciplinary action or that the Respondent investigated the pilot's complaint with the exception of what is disclosed in the Respondent's email from Healy to the pilot dated 6 July 2022. It follows that there is no evidence of a disciplinary record that evinces a record of counselling, a warning or the like. To thereafter submit the Respondent's loss of trust in the Applicant arose, in part, due to her unsubstantiated assertion that her colleague had cheated, is unreasonable in this context.
2.2 Injury and its impact on the Applicant's work prior to 21 March 2025
Ms Cassandra Cooke has a medical condition and I have recommended a postponement of her simulator assessment for another four weeks from now.
Ms Cook remains fit for active flying duties.[18]
So you're actually placing the aircraft - you're actually placing the airline, safety, everything else, at major risk, because if you're deemed not to be able to fit a simulator because it may do damage to your toe, then if you're in an incident where you're operating an aircraft and you have a very - I don't know, some adverse situation, and all of a sudden now, because of her injury, her toe is affected, and as a result the detriment of the aircraft and the crew is put at severe risk so that's why I made the decision to stand Ms Cooke down. That was the communication to me from Wayne Ovens, because he received the medical certificate for me himself and the management committee to review, and I took it - and I took it further to CASA, which when I spoke to Avmed - which, sorry, it's Aviation Medical - they agreed:
Yes, you're right to - within your rights to stand Ms Cooke down...[35]
[39] An email between Furber and 'Matt' of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) dated 4 April 2025, copying in Ovens was located at page 82 of the Digital Hearing Book. That email set out Furber's concerns relating to the DAME's medical certificate for the Applicant dated 10 March 2025. In the email, Furber referred to the DAME's recommendation to postpone the Applicant's recurrent simulator sessions rostered concurrently for 24 and 25 March for 30 days whilst also advising that the Applicant remains fit for active flying duties. Furber further described the similarities in requirements between flying and simulator sessions and outlined that he considered there had been a serious dereliction in the DAME's responsibilities.
[40] An email between Furber, Kim Hai and the Management Committee was also included at page 82 of the Digital Hearing Book. The email dated 11 April 2025, detailed that Furber had a call with Mr Hockberg from CASA Aviation Medicine and that 'the agree we [sic] our assessment and have started an investigation into this matter and will contact me to advise on their findings...'.
[41] As at 21 March 2025, the Applicant was not permitted to fly the Respondent's planes despite the Applicant stating that the DAME had requested she return to work fit for flying duties. According to the Applicant's evidence she was trying to return to flying and had provided the medical certificate dated 10 March 2025 to the Respondent to demonstrate her fitness to fly.
[42] The Respondent takes issue with the Applicant having not taken accountability in respect to the approach she took regarding the DAME's medical certificate. It is difficult to conceive why the Respondent frames its concept of 'accountability' insofar as the Applicant's behaviour is concerned, as comprising of the Applicant conducting a self-assessment of her fitness to the extent that her assessment would result in her deeming herself unfit to fly. Where the Respondent disagrees with the medical assessment of the DAME, it is open to the Respondent to provide further instruction to the DAME in respect of the duties and responsibilities of the Applicant's role and request a further medical examination based on that additional information. Alternatively, the Respondent may seek a further medical examination from the DAME (a second opinion) and where conflicting reports arise, a further medical opinion may be warranted, or, as was the case here, the Respondent may challenge the veracity of the medical certificate with the relevant regulator who oversees the practice of the DAME.
[44] It is important to caution as an aside, that this did not in turn mean that the Applicant had no recourse in respect of a medical report with which she disagreed. As was the case for the Respondent, had the Applicant disagreed with the DAME's assessment then similarly it was open to her to request a further medical assessment or to agitate her consternation with the relevant regulatory body.
[45] However, returning to the issue at hand, there is no basis for finding that the Applicant demonstrated a lack of accountability when she persisted in trying to return to fly or failed to consider herself unfit to fly.
It caught my attention when they talked about the Medical Certificate stating that she was fit to fly but not to attend the simulator training. And the conversation further went into Wayne Ovens.[44]
I knew it was about Wayne Ovens because I heard her say his name.
The incident in question (the conversation pertaining to Wayne Ovens) is what stands out about this whole conversation. I sit about 1 meter away from Victoria. We have adjoining desks. The incident where Case Cooke mentioned Wayne Ovens started with the applicant stating, "he was in such poor form" and being "rude to everyone is because of conflict going on at home between him and his wife".
I sit quite low in my chair; I face Victoria from a directional point of view. Caz Cooke was standing no more than half a metre from me. I can't remember the wording specifically. I just know that Wayne Ovens was the top of conversation.
I peered through my screens and to see if Victoria was ok. She looked uncomfortable. I remember Victoria standing up after the conversation and she said that was uncomfortable and the conversation was weird...[45]
[52] The interview notes scribed by Panchal (Van Heerden interview notes) recorded, amongst other things, the following:
SV - Yes, In the afternoon she came in to our room, dropped some paperwork and she was then updating Vic on the same
SV-I believe she was instructing a course , HF course and and then came to drop of the paperwork
AW - Where were you at time of the conversation between Caz Cooke and Victoria
SV - I was at my workstation opposite to Victoria.
AW -can I confirm if you were you in a position to overhear the conversation between them**?**
SV -Yes but I wasn't listening to the whole conversation. Cass was talking about her kids, maybe a birthday party.
AW - At any point during the conversation, did you hear any rumours, gossip, or personal remarks made about anyone?
SV - Yes towards the end, I know Cass brought something up. She was upset about something, that she has a medical certificate clearing her fit to fly or something but wayne is not letting her. She was talking about how he was having issues with his wife and said something like, "he's such a dick, that's why he is being rude to everyone."
AW - So confirming you heard her say she was upset, and that wayne and his wife were fighting, and
SV - Yes. She said, "I know he is having problems with his wife at home". I couldn't believe that she said it about the head of flying operations and it was only my second or third week. It wasn't my place to get involved in the conversation.
SV - I don't remember her saying anything otherwise
SV - After Cass left the room, Vic stood up and said, "That was weird"
AW - Is there anything else that could help with this investigation?
Wayne, he's such a dick, that's why he's being rude to everyone. He's having issues with his wife. I know he's having problems with his wife at home'.[51]
[55] When asked whether there was mention of 'Wayne's' surname, Van Heerden was unable to remember whether there was or not but accepted that she had inferred that it was 'Wayne Ovens' and that she could not rule out that the Applicant was talking about a different 'Wayne'.
[57] The Applicant was taken to page 127 of the Digital Hearing Book where the Van Heerden interview notes set out the following:
SV - I don't remember her saying anything otherwise.
V - I remember the conversation happening, and not long after that, Cass left the room.
SV - After Cass left the room, Vic stood up and said, "That was weird"
AW - Is there anything else that could help with this investigation?
...Ms Cooke and Victoria were discussing the medical certificate and her return to work, or whatever was going on. I didn't hear or - I didn't hear the conversation stay [sic] to anything else so when the conversation switched to Wayne, I didn't believe there could be anyone else they were talking about...[61]
[66] At the coffee catch-up, the group of mothers were discussing circumstances surrounding a teacher at the school where the Applicant's daughter previously attended. According to the Applicant, the mothers were discussing this same teacher to the extent that they referred to the following:
a) he was having marital problems;
b) he had a bad temper which was affecting students at the school;
c) the students had witnessed him and his wife bickering (the wife taught at the same school);
d) there was a proposal to move him to the school where the Applicant's child attends, to separate the teacher and his wife;
e) students had complained of him raising his voice in the playground towards his wife; and
[68] The Applicant recalled that the conversation between her and Portelli unfolded as follows:
Applicant: I've got clearance from the doctor - so when the company and the union agrees, I'll go back to flying
Applicant: how's the little one going at school?[76]
[70] The Applicant recalled that she said to Portelli words to the effect of:
Look, I heard a bit of a rumour from the school mums yesterday, that Wayne from [my daughter's previous school] maybe [sic] heading your way. He's having issues with his wife. He's going through a messy divorce. I think this is their way of shifting him sideways to let things cool down and give them a bit of space. Some of the girls are complaining that he hates women.[79]
...she was I think sick - had been put - her flying duties had been turned to sick leave, I believe, on the live roster which is dealt with by ops after we in resource planning publish it. And she wanted to know what was happening with the roster because the medical certificate that she had provided was, I guess - had said that she was medically still cleared to fly. And I said, "[I]t's out of my hands. It's sitting in the live roster and I don't have anything to do with that".[86]
[81] It was Portelli's evidence that after the Applicant left the room, she stood up and asked her colleagues in the room if anyone had heard the conversation and 'why didn't anyone butt in and "save me"?'. Portelli said that Coslani asked what was said and she repeated the Applicant's comments that the Applicant had made about Ovens.
[84] Counsel for the Applicant drew to Portelli's attention that things were said in her witness statement that were not in the 'interview notes' of 14 April 2025 that were located in the Digital Hearing Book at page 131 (Portelli interview notes). The 'interview notes' disclosed, in part, the following:
Victoria: I couldn't recall word for word, but it was along the lines of:
Victoria: I tried to change the topic. I picked up my phone and showed her a photo of my son in uniform. The conversation went that way, but then circled back to Wayne again, and she made more
She was probably there for about 20 minutes.[99]
I would like a full review of Ms Cooke's HR record to establish their suitability to remain an employee of NJE [sic] This is not the first time that I have heard that Ms Cooke has made false accusations about myself and other NJE management, however this time there were several witnesses.[107]
[87] The Applicant said that she received a call from Joyce on 16 April 2025, in which Joyce informed her that an allegation had been made about her and that she would be immediately stood down subject to a formal investigation about a conversation said to have occurred in March 2025.
[88] On that same date, the Applicant was provided with a letter which confirmed that a formal complaint had been made against her by Ovens about the alleged comments the Applicant made to Portelli about Ovens.
[89] A meeting was scheduled for 17 April 2025 for the Applicant to respond to the allegations, but that meeting was rescheduled to 23 April 2025, to enable the Applicant time to obtain representation, understand the allegations, and recall any related conversations with Portelli.
2.5 The Applicant's past interactions with Ovens
[99] Ovens had been the Applicant's superior since she started with the Respondent. On a number of occasions, they disagreed with one another, according to the Applicant. In this respect the Applicant referred to the following:
a) soon after commencing with the Respondent, Ovens took issue with the Applicant's height and therefore suitability for flying an aircraft, so she took the matter to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Deputy President O'Callaghan ordered her reinstatement;
The concept used in subsection (1), being the "balance of probabilities", is often misunderstood. It does not mean a simple estimate of probabilities; it requires a subjective belief in a state of facts on the part of the tribunal of fact. A party bearing the onus will not succeed unless the whole of the evidence establishes a "reasonable satisfaction" on the preponderance of probabilities such as to sustain the relevant issue: Axon v Axon [1937] HCA 80; (1937) 59 CLR 395 (at 403 per Dixon J). The "facts proved must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may reasonably be satisfied": Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 (at 305 per Dixon CJ). Put another way, as Sir Owen Dixon explained in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 (at 361), when the law requires proof of any fact, the tribunal of fact must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found.
Justice Hodgson put it differently, but to the same effect, by observing that when deciding facts, a civil tribunal of fact is dealing with two questions: "not just what are the probabilities on the limited material which the court has, but also whether that limited material is an appropriate basis on which to reach a reasonable decision": see D H Hodgson, 'The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-finding' (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 731; Ho v Powell [2001] NSWCA 168; (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 (at 576 [14]-[16] per Hodgson JA, Beazley JA agreeing).
Whatever way it is put, a "[m]ere mechanical comparison of probabilities independent of a reasonable satisfaction will not justify a finding of fact": NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198; (2012) 38 VR 618 (at 655 [124] per Redlich and Harper JJA and Curtain AJA); Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWCA 431; (2012) 10 ASTLR 164 (at 176 [51] per Campbell JA, Bergin CJ in Eq and Sackville AJA agreeing).[138]
...In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings the High Court explained the approach as follows:
'The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary "where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found". Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct'.
[106] To further explain, it is first necessary to consider the evidence of Van Heerden. Van Heerden had been employed by the Respondent for less three weeks when the conversation was held between the Applicant and Portelli on 21 March 2025. There is therefore no reason to assume, nor evidence to suggest, that Van Heerden was motivated by some agenda or held a level of animus toward the Applicant, such that she would provide evidence unsupportive of the Applicant's account.
[114] As was the case for Van Heerden, there is therefore no reason to assume, nor evidence to suggest, that Portelli was motivated by some agenda or held a level of animus toward the Applicant, such that she would provide evidence unsupportive of the Applicant's account.
[119] The Applicant's evidence is no stranger to the phrase, 'he hates women'. The Applicant, of course, conceded the utterance of these words but did so in the context of the deputy principal that may have been heading to the school of Portelli's child. Whilst on balance I find that the Applicant said this phrase, I do not believe the Applicant's account that it was said in reference to the deputy principal.
[120] It is perhaps relevant to note at this juncture that the Applicant's evidence as set out in her first witness statement concerning the conversation with Portelli was not challenged through the process of cross examination. It should be stated that I am not persuaded that the Respondent, who was self-represented, simply accepted the Applicant's evidence in this respect, but rather was not familiar with practice of placing a witness on notice of contradictory evidence to allow the witness to address the contradiction.
[121] I return to Portelli's evidence that after the Applicant left the room, she stood up and asked her colleagues in the room if anyone had heard the conversation and 'why didn't anyone butt in and "save me"?'. That Portelli stood up after the Applicant left the room, accords with the evidence of Van Heerden and whilst Van Heerden said that Portelli stated, '[t]hat was weird' and Portelli's recollection differed to the extent that she reports she said, essentially, 'why didn't anyone butt in and save me?', that the recollections differ slightly in this respect does not, in my view, detract from the truthfulness of their accounts as to what the Applicant said about Ovens.
...Ms Cooke and Victoria were discussing the medical certificate and her return to work, or whatever was going on. I didn't hear or I didn't hear the conversation stay [sic] to anything else so when the conversation switched to Wayne, I didn't believe there could be anyone else they were talking about...[180]
[127] I find that the Applicant informed Portelli that in respect to Ovens - not 'Wayne' the deputy principal - that:
(a) 'he hates women';
(b) 'he is clearly having marital problems';
(c) 'he is obviously fighting with his wife'; and
(d) 'even the Union Member agreed with these statements'.
[128] For a dismissal to be unfair, the Commission must be satisfied that the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable (s 385(b) of the Act). The conduct which may fall within the phrase 'harsh, unjust or unreasonable' was explained in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd; Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd by McHugh and Gummow JJ as follows:
.... It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted.[182]
[129] Section 387 of the Act, which address the factors to be considered when determining whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, contemplates that an overall assessment as to the nature of the dismissal will be undertaken and in so doing, the aforementioned factors must, where relevant, be weighed in totality.
[130] When considering whether a dismissal is unfair, the Commission must consider whether there was a valid reason for dismissal.
It is well established that in cases where an employee has been dismissed for a reason relating to conduct, the Commission must, in considering whether there is a valid reason for dismissal, be satisfied that the conduct occurred. This obligation, articulated by the Federal Court in Edwards v Giudice, flows from the plain wording of s.387(a), which requires the Commission to consider whether there is a valid reason for the dismissal. The question of whether the alleged conduct took place and what it involved is to be determined by the Commission on the basis of the evidence in the proceeding before it, to the Briginshaw standard. The test is not simply whether the employer believed on reasonable grounds that the employee engaged in the conduct.[186] (references omitted)
[133] The Applicant first submitted that the conversation between the Applicant and Portelli did not constitute a breach of the HDB Policy. The Applicant pressed that the subject of the offending part of the conversation concerned a person named 'Wayne' and that there was no evidence of Wayne's surname; only that Portelli thought it to be Ovens. The Applicant further submitted that the comments were not about Ovens but instead they were throwaway comments made in passing between two mums having a chat about their kids' school.
[134] Contrary to the Applicant's argument, I have found against her in this respect and note that her comments as detailed at paragraph [127] were said in respect of Ovens. The question then is whether those comments are such that her conduct fell foul of the obligations she had under the HDB Policy, assuming that the obligations or directions within that policy were lawful and reasonable.
[137] Clause 6.1 of the HDB Policy sets out what 'harassment' means for the purpose of the policy; it is noted that the 'H' in 'HDB' refers to 'harassment' as defined in the policy, as set out at paragraph [17] of this decision. The HDB Policy provides examples of behaviour that can constitute harassment, which includes destructively criticising or undermining staff publicly or privately.
[138] It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that the Commission must assess conduct in its proper context. The Applicant referred to a passing comment in a sprawling conversation spanning work and non-work topics being qualitatively different from a deliberate comment designed to undermine a colleague, and that Respondent's characterisation (of the Applicant's conduct) ignores this crucial context.
[139] The conversation the Applicant held with Portelli referred to Ovens and constituted a policy breach. The conversation was held in the Resource Planning office where others could hear - Van Heerden did to the extent detailed. It concerned the Head of Flying Operations, and both the Applicant and the Portelli were his subordinates. The content was disparaging, drawing upon negative observations of Ovens within his work environment and casting an aspersion about his personal life. It was not simply indiscrete. It was destructively critical and undermining and, to that extent, constituted misconduct justifying termination of employment given it breached the HDB Policy.
4.2 Notification of the reason and an opportunity to respond
[141] Turning to whether the Applicant was afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegation and to 'show cause' as to why she should not be dismissed, first, the Applicant was informed of the following allegation on 16 April 2025:
1. In conversation with Victoria Portelli (Resource Planner), it is alleged that you made the below remarks in relation to Wayne Ovens (Head of Flying Operations);[sic]
"Even the Union Member agreed with these statements."
[143] Third, a meeting was held with the Applicant on 9 May 2025, again the Applicant was supported by an official of the TWU. The Applicant stated she was informed that the investigation had concluded and that the allegation had been substantiated on the balance of probabilities. The Applicant reports that Joyce informed her that the allegation had been substantiated upon the four witness statements taken by the Respondent, and that the Respondent would be sending a show cause letter with a view to terminating her employment, and that previous performance issues had been considered in deciding to terminate the Applicant's employment.
[144] Fourth, on 16 May 2025, the Applicant received a letter stating that the Respondent was satisfied that the allegation had been substantiated and that its preliminary view was that the behaviour (Applicant's behaviour) constituted serious misconduct. The Applicant provided a written response to the 16 May letter on 21 May 2025.
[145] In all the circumstances, I have found that the Applicant was notified of the valid reason and provided with a meaningful opportunity to respond.
[147] These issues were raised by Counsel when addressing s 387(b) and (c) of the Act, which Counsel addressed together with 'procedural unfairness'. Whilst I will further address procedural issues at paragraphs [157] to [189], the Applicant's contention that the Respondent relied upon the historical conduct of the Applicant that is said to have spanned years and upon commencement of the investigation was suddenly resurrected, warrants addressing. The Applicant's Counsel submitted that the Applicant was given no opportunity to respond to these historical allegations, either in the investigation or the show cause process, and she was given no particulars that would have enabled her to properly answer (or respond to) them. In respect to the Respondent's reliance on historical conduct, the Applicant observes what was set out in Furber's written evidence and canvassed in his cross examination at hearing.
[13] As was made clear in Bista, assessing whether a particular instance of misconduct is of sufficient gravity to constitute a valid reason for dismissal is not the same thing as considering whether dismissal was a disproportionate penalty for the misconduct. The former is "concerned with whether the conduct in question, considered in isolation, was intrinsically capable of constituting a valid reason for dismissal".15 The latter involves taking into account a range of potential mitigating factors, which may include matters such as the employee's length of service and disciplinary record, and weighing them against the gravity of the misconduct in order to determine whether dismissal was too harsh a penalty.
[14] In respect of the former task, it is not correct, as Mr Diaz submits, that the specific acts or omissions which constitute the relevant misconduct can be divorced from contextual matters relevant to the seriousness of that conduct. In Sayers v CUB Pty Ltd, the Full Bench made it clear that the "conventional position" in considering the valid reason issue is to take into account contextual matters bearing upon the degree of culpability on the part of the employee.16 The majority judgment in B, C and D v Australia Post17 might be read as standing for the proposition that contextual matters which operate to diminish the culpability of the employee should be taken into account under s.387(h) rather than s.387(a). However that does not assist Mr Diaz, because the majority also made it clear that the following matters, which concern the employee's misconduct assessed from the employer's perspective, arise for consideration in relation to the valid reason issue under s.387(a) (emphasis added):
"The acts or omissions that constitute the alleged misconduct on which the employer relied (together with the employee's disciplinary history and any warnings, if relied upon by the employer at the time of dismissal) but otherwise considered in isolation from the broader context in which those acts or omissions occurred."
[15] It is clearly the case that the gravity of an employee's misconduct is increased in circumstances where the employee has previously engaged in conduct of the same or a similar conduct and has been warned not to repeat it. To put this another way, the employee's defiance of the earlier warning(s) is an intrinsic aspect of his or her misconduct, and necessarily forms part of the assessment of the gravity of the misconduct. We do not consider that it is in any way controversial for such circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether there is a valid reason for dismissal under s.387(a). We therefore do not consider that Mr Diaz has demonstrated any arguable case of error in respect of the approach taken by the Senior Deputy President under s.387(a). Nor do we consider that Mr Diaz has identified any question of general application or any disconformity in the authorities in this respect.
[150] The Full Bench considered that an employee's defiance of an earlier warning(s) formed an intrinsic aspect of her or his misconduct, which necessarily formed part of the assessment of the gravity of the misconduct, and that it was uncontroversial for such circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether there is a valid reason for dismissal under s 387(a) of the Act.
[152] By re-litigated, I simply mean that the allegations or particulars that gave rise to the first written warning in 2013, the final written warning in 2014 and the written warning in 2020, were not something that the Respondent was necessarily obliged to put to the Applicant to again respond. A disciplinary process had arguably been embarked upon by the Respondent on each occasion, when it broached the misconduct with the Applicant at the relevant time. To that point, whilst the Applicant provides further context in respect of each of those occasions of disciplinary outcome, she makes no suggestion that allegations were not provided to her or that she did not have the opportunity to address the allegations prior to the issuance of those historical warnings.
[153] As was the case in Diaz, it was open to Furber to assess the gravity of the Applicant's misconduct by reference to previous conduct of the same or similar type. This did not in turn mean that the Applicant had been denied procedural fairness to the extent of the consideration under s 387(b) of the Act. As to the Applicant's assertion that the timing of the decision to dismiss her and the dismissal itself were designed to 'get rid' of the Applicant, those points will be traversed shortly.
[154] It is evident from what has been traversed at paragraphs [92] and [93] that the Applicant was not denied the opportunity to have a support person present at the investigative and disciplinary meetings.
[155] As will be evident from the background material, it was not the case that the Respondent sought to rely upon unsatisfactory performance to justify dismissing the Applicant.
4.5 Size of the Respondent's enterprise and dedicated human resource specialists
[156] The Respondent business is of a reasonable size, employing or engaging more than a couple of hundred workers. It appears to have its own internal human resources expertise. In all circumstances, I do not consider that the size of the Respondent business or its internal human resources capability impacted upon the process followed.
[157] Several further issues require attention under s 387(h) of the Act. These include, amongst others, the Respondent's compliance with the Agreement; the differential application of the HDB Policy between Ovens and the Applicant; the Respondent's compliance with the HDB Policy; what to make of witnesses who were not called to give evidence; the relationship between the decision-maker, Furber, and the complainant Ovens; the weight to be attributed to warnings, and the personal impact the dismissal had upon the Applicant.
[158] As detailed, the Applicant attended a meeting with Joyce accompanied by her support person, an official from the TWU, on 9 May 2025. Joyce is said to have informed the Applicant that the investigation had been concluded and that the allegations were, on balance, substantiated on the basis of four witness statements taken by the Respondent.
[159] In a letter of 21 May 2025 from the TWU, on behalf of the Applicant, to Furber, the TWU highlighted that clause 14 of the Agreement sets out the requirements that the Respondent must comply with when conducting investigations. At paragraph 8 and 9 of the letter, the following is stated:
On 9 May 2025, an Outcome Meeting was attended by Ms Cooke, Mr Joyce and I. During the meeting Mr Joyce stated that the investigation had been concluded and the allegations against the First Officer Cook had been substantiated. This was based on the further interviews during the investigation conducted by NJE and included reliance on four (4) witness statements.
During the outcome meeting I asked Mr Joyce if he could confirm if any or all of the four (4) witness statements did the witness confirm that they heard Ms Cooke include "Ovens" in any of the alleged references contained in the allegation letter. Mr Joyce said he would not go into specifics but on the balance of probabilities NJE had substantiate the allegations. Mr Joyce refused the request to provide a copy of these statements to First Officer Cooke and/or the TWU.[200]
[160] I accept that the Respondent communicated to the Applicant that it had relied upon four witness statements to substantiate the allegation against the Applicant in respect of her conversation of Portelli. It is not apparent that the Respondent disputes that this was the case.
[161] Clause 14 of the Agreement sets out, amongst other matters, the following at clause 14.4:
The Pilot shall be given access to all relevant materials relied upon in the investigation required to enable the pilot to provide a response to an allegation.
[162] The issue as to whether the four witness statements were required to enable the Applicant to respond to the allegation against her warrants the adoption of a conservative approach. I consider it safe to assume that those witness statements included the evidence garnered by the Respondent from Portelli and Van Heerden. Those records of interview were therefore, in my view, relevant materials relied upon in the investigation by the Respondent, that would likely have enabled the Applicant to respond to the allegation against her, and it follows, I am satisfied that this was a procedural flaw in the investigative process.
[163] However, I am similarly of the view that the allegation as set out in the Respondent's letter of 16 April 2025 provided sufficient particulars to enable the Applicant to meaningfully respond to it. Therefore, whilst finding that there was a procedural flaw in the investigative process, I do not consider that the flaw fundamentally prejudiced the Applicant's ability to respond to the allegation regarding her conversation with Portelli about Ovens.
[164] The Applicant further called into question whether the Respondent had been compliant with its HDB Policy. Clause 9 of the HDB Policy sets out the 'Complaint Handling Procedures' of the HDB Policy. The introductory passages of clause 9 state the following:
NJE endeavours to deal with any breaches of this policy in a prompt, confidential and fair way and to ensure that all staff are provided with a safe environment from the moment the complaint is raised.
NJE recognises the gravity of such matters and, in circumstances where NJE considers it necessary, complaints will be investigated and reported to the relevant Management Committee or to the Group Chairman if a member of the Management Committee is implicated. All complaints should only be discussed with those who are involved in the resolution of the matter, irrespective of what process is followed to resolve the matter.
All staff could avail themselves of external channels of complaints such as the Australian Human Rights Commission or the relevant discrimination authority in each State. However, it is a requirement for all staff to first lodge a complaint with the Company prior to seeking external intervention.[201]
[168] The Applicant submitted that when Furber gave his evidence, Furber spoke of a complaint that the Applicant had made against Ovens that was of the same nature, but which did not make it to the Management Committee in 2023. The Applicant further submitted that this was because, as her unchallenged evidence indicated, there was a meeting in which the Applicant was encouraged to resolve her complaint against Ovens.
[21] The issue of differential treatment of employees in respect of termination of employment was considered by Vice President Lawler in Sexton v Pacific National (ACT) Pty Ltd. In Sexton's case, his Honour said:
"[33] It is settled that the differential treatment of comparable cases can be a relevant matter under s.170CG(3)(e) to consider in determining whether a termination has been harsh, unjust or unreasonable ...
[36] In my opinion the Commission should approach with caution claims of differential treatment in other cases advanced as a basis for supporting a finding that a termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable within the meaning of s.170CE(1) or in determining whether there has been a 'fair go all round' within the meaning of s.170CA(2). In particular, it is important that the Commission be satisfied that cases which are advanced as comparable cases in which there was no termination are in truth properly comparable: the Commission must ensure that it is comparing 'apples with apples'. There must be sufficient evidence of the circumstances of the allegedly comparable cases to enable a proper comparison to be made."
[22] Subsection 170CG(3)(e) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) was relevantly similar to ss.387(h) of the FW Act.
[23] Similarly, in Daly v Bendigo Health Care Group, Senior Deputy President Kaufman said:
"[62] I am troubled by the apparent disparity in the treatment of Mrs Daly and the other nurses concerned. However, on balance I have concluded that this factor does not render the otherwise justified termination of her employment into one which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. There was no evidence led as to why the other three nurses were treated differently to Mrs Daly. The fact that none of them was sacked does not of itself render the treatment of Mrs Daly unjust. Although differential treatment of employees can render a termination of employment, harsh, unjust or unreasonable, that is not necessarily the case. I agree with Lawler VP's observation in Sexton that 'there must be sufficient evidence of the circumstances of the allegedly comparable cases to enable a proper comparison to be made.' There is not, in this case, sufficient evidence to enable a proper comparison to be made. Having regard to Mrs Daly's years of experience, her direct involvement with the patient to a greater extent than that of the other nurses and her refusal to acknowledge that she had acted inappropriately, I am not prepared to find that because the employment of the other nurses involved was not terminated, Mrs Daly's termination of employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable." [Footnotes omitted]
[173] As observed in Darvell, matters that may be taken into account when determining whether an applicant has been afforded differential treatment in respect of their dismissal include whether the cases are truly comparable and whether there is the absence of a proper basis for distinguishing between the employees concerned.
[175] However, that the Respondent exercised discretion to adopt one approach for Ovens and another for the Applicant, warrants further examination. At paragraph [36(b)] of the Applicant's witness statement, the Applicant refers to her complaint about Ovens in October 2023 and identifies the following:
I complained to management about Mr Ovens in October 2023. One complaint was that he was swearing and yelling one day when my colleagues and I were in the simulator. I reported him at the time for saying "shut that fucking barking bitch up now" about the simulator female computer voice that advises when the autothrottle is disconnected. I responded to him at the time "that's really inappropriate" and he replied, "what the fuck would you know?".
[179] A Jones v Dunkel inference can be drawn where there is a conflict in the evidence on particular issues and there is an unexplained failure to call someone to explain that conflict. In this case I consider that Ovens' evidence on this issue would not have assisted the Respondent. The evidence did not support a finding that Ovens' conduct, as alleged by the Applicant, did not occur. Preceding on the basis that Ovens engaged in the conduct as alleged by the Applicant, the resolution of his misconduct significantly differed to the process and outcome afforded to the Applicant, notwithstanding that the conduct complained of against Ovens was egregious and clearly in breach of the HDB Policy. On that point, the conduct of Ovens and the Applicant was not identical and the circumstances of each case are materially different. It is to be appreciated that Ovens held a higher level of responsibility within the organisation than that of the Applicant. Ovens spoke directly to the Applicant in a condescending and disrespectful manner and made a comment, referencing the gendered simulator voice, that denigrated women. Whilst not minimising the conduct of the Applicant, Ovens' conduct was evidently reprehensible and does not strike me as conduct lending itself to resolution through an informal means. The difference in application of the complaints procedure under the HDB Policy to the Applicant when compared to Ovens some two years prior, demonstrates an inconsistency of approach. Ovens was offered an unjustified level of generosity by the Respondent when it adopted an 'informal' resolution approach when addressing the Applicant's complaint about him. Still, that is not to say that an 'informal' approach under the HDB Policy was warranted in the Applicant's circumstance simply because that approach had been afforded to Ovens. The inculcation of error in this respect was to be avoided and whilst appreciative of the unsavoury optics arising from the inconsistency, it was both open and entirely proper that the Applicant's misconduct was addressed via a 'formal' approach.
[181] One of the many focuses of the Applicant in pressing that her dismissal had been unfair was the timing of events. Counsel on behalf of the Applicant submitted that the Applicant had provided a medical certificate on 10 March 2025 and a subsequent one on 26 March 2025, in similar terms. Counsel remarked that this presumably, should have put the matter to bed (in respect of the Applicant's fitness to fly) but, Counsel continued, it was this very same day that Ovens said he was advised of the comments by the Applicant. The Applicant again submitted that the Commission should infer that Ovens' evidence would not have supported the Respondent's case.
[182] That the Applicant held a conversation with Portelli when she did and chose to disparage Ovens in that conversation, temporally relates to her provision of the medical certificate to the Respondent on 10 March 2025. The Applicant's conversation with Portelli touched on the Applicant's fitness, flying duties having been turned to sick leave, the provision of that medical certificate, and what was occurring with the roster. That Ovens made a complaint about the Applicant when he did, bears temporally with having heard about the conversation between the Applicant and Portelli, having asked Portelli to make a statement and then making a formal complaint about the Applicant (presumedly with Portelli's statement attached). In this respect only, I do not consider that there is a significant evidentiary gap arising from Ovens' absence from the hearing. To draw connection between Ovens' complaint and the provision of medical certificates, if such a connection is drawn, is at best unconvincing.
[185] In my view the warnings that predate 2020 should be attributed far less weight than the warning of 2020. I have already observed that the Respondent's reliance on irrelevant conduct which included that the Applicant had not assumed accountability for the DAME's medical certificate, and for her cheating allegation against a colleague, was misplaced. The warnings form an important aspect of the factual matrix, and it was reasonable for Furber to have considered them; it was, however, unreasonable for the warnings predating 2020 to have been afforded significant weight. There is a point in time, not an arbitrary point, where an employee may have a level of confidence that they and their employer have moved well past a disciplinary signpost that almost caused the employment relationship to come to an immediate halt. To be judged by conduct that unfolded 15 years ago, or 12 years ago or for that matter 11 years ago, as is the case here, is unreasonable. However, in my view, the Respondent had a valid reason for dismissing the Applicant based on her conduct on 21 March 2025 irrespective of those past warnings or the conduct issues identified by Furber and by Heal. The decision to dismiss, was not made unreasonable or unfair because warnings predating 2020 were considered significant by Furber or because he took into consideration the irrelevant conduct of the cheating allegation or the Applicant's failure to take accountability in respect of her fitness to fly.
[186] It is timely at this juncture to remark briefly on Heal's evidence. I have placed limited weight on certain aspects of his evidence given his work relationship with Ovens extended to personal interactions through playing golf (albeit only once) and that it appeared that Ovens played some role in Heal assuming the position that he held in the business. Furthermore, it is apparent that Heal had limited knowledge about the Applicant's misconduct and the investigation into the same and had no input into the decision to take disciplinary action against the Applicant. This is notwithstanding that Heal was the Applicant's manager. However, paragraphs [4] and [7] of Heal's witness statement provide useful insight into the requirements of the Applicant's role, which, in my view, Heal was appropriately placed to talk about.
[187] Returning to the Commission's role regarding an unfair dismissal application, it is not to consider what it would have done had it been in the position of the employer, rather, it must consider whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, taking into account all of the circumstances. The decision to dismiss the Applicant was a significant sanction and as noted, I do not consider that it was unjust or unfair, but in my view, it was harsh.
[188] The formulation of 'harsh, unjust or unreasonable' calls for an assessment of the gravity of the conduct alleged as the valid reason and assessment of the proportionality of the sanction of dismissal against that conduct, having regard to the fairness of the process leading to dismissal and the consequences for the employee.
[189] Having heard from the witnesses, I simply find the Applicant's account of what was said in the conversation with Portelli to be implausible. In my view, the Applicant's misconduct warranted censure. Although there were several procedural deficits in the process engaged in by the Respondent as identified, and the Respondent had afforded differential treatment towards Ovens when the Applicant complained about his conduct, the Applicant's failure to comply with the HDB Policy, as identified, was a valid reason for her dismissal.
[190] However, the Applicant had been employed by the Respondent for some 27 years. She is approximately 54 years old and had spent most of her working life working for the Respondent. Based on the evidence provided, the impact of dismissal upon the Applicant had been significant. As the sole provider within her household, the Applicant referred to the profound emotional and financial impact upon her and her child. On balance and having regard to all the relevant factors referred in respect of s 387 of the Act, I have come to the conclusion that the termination of the Applicant's employment was harsh.
[191] The Applicant stated that she sought reinstatement and an order to maintain the continuity of her service and restoration of lost pay.
[10] Subsection 390(3) underscores the primacy of reinstatement as a remedy for an unfair dismissal as the discretion to order a remedy of compensation may only be exercised if the Commission is satisfied that reinstatement is 'inappropriate'. Further, one of the objects of Part 3-2 of Chapter 3, in which the unfair dismissal provisions appear, is "to provide remedies if a dismissal is found to be unfair, with an emphasis on reinstatement". We would observe that to describe reinstatement as the 'primary remedy', is to simply recognise that reinstatement is the first, perhaps even the foremost, remedy under the Act. The relevant question in determining whether to grant the remedy of reinstatement of an employee in relation to a dismissal that is found to have been 'unfair' is whether reinstatement is appropriate in the particular case."
[194] On the question of reinstatement, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant occupied the position of First Officer, a role integral to passenger operations, where the highest degree of professionalism, judgment and trust is non-negotiable. The Respondent pressed that the Applicant's history of misconduct, including dishonesty and a safety breach, compounded by the final incident, provided a clear and rational basis for the conclusion that the employment relationship was irreparably damaged.
[195] The Respondent clarified that it was not really questioning the Applicant's ability to fly the aircraft if she were on her own. But it drew attention to its operations involving a multi‑crew, safety-critical environment and that in her role, the Applicant must respect the chain of command, take instructions from the Captain and any directions from the head of line operations, namely Ovens. The Respondent pressed that Ovens is the Head of Flying Operations, a CASA‑approved role. It followed that he was in charge of all flight operations, pilots, cabin crew, rostering and operations control; all of these areas report to him. The Respondent stated that Ovens' authority had to be respected for the safety of work. It continued that it could not have someone in the cockpit who it was not confident would respect and follow the hierarchy.
[196] According to the Respondent, the Applicant's disparaging comments about Ovens, combined with the strained relationship between the Applicant and Ovens rendered that relationship irrecoverable, and it had caused the Respondent to doubt whether the Applicant would follow instructions and whether it was realistic for them to work in the same team.
[198] The Applicant pressed that she sought reinstatement primarily for three reasons. First, her case was an appropriate one for reinstatement because her conduct, even on the Respondent's case, did not reflect a fundamental incompatibility with continued employment. If the conversation occurred as alleged, it was a single incident that could have been addressed through counselling or a warning. Second, the evidence showed that her dismissal was orchestrated by a small number of individuals and that the Applicant had positive working relationships with both her colleagues and her clients. The Applicant submitted that she is known for her professionalism and her friendliness and has received compliments from clients about these qualities. Therefore, there was no evidence of any broader breakdown in the employment relationship. Third, at her age and in her circumstances, compensation was an inadequate remedy for the loss of her employment. The Applicant submitted that she wished to return to work and is capable of performing her role. The Applicant further asserted that the Respondent has actively precluded her from gaining other employment in the industry. The Applicant's view was that reinstatement was both appropriate and practical.
[199] I turn first to the Applicant's latter assertion that the Respondent had actively precluded her from gaining other employment in the industry. The Applicant gave evidence in her second witness statement that whilst she had found herself part-time work following the termination of her employment, she had been informed on 22 September 2025 by the Chief Executive Officer and director of the company for whom she was working, that they had received a call from the Respondent and, because she was subject to an allegation of serious misconduct, they could not continue to employ her. Consequently, the Applicant was now unemployed and earning no income.
[200] Whilst the Respondent did not appear to challenge the Applicant's evidence in this respect, the evidence was uncorroborated and the Applicant did not offer direct evidence to support her assertion that her employment with the new employer had been terminated, and she had not required the Chief Executive Officer of the relevant company to give evidence whether voluntarily or by applying for an order requiring his attendance at the hearing. I therefore have placed little to no weight on this assertion when considering whether reinstatement is not appropriate.
[201] As observed by the Applicant's Counsel, much had been said about a broader breakdown in the relationship (presumedly between Applicant and Respondent). The Applicant drew upon Furber's evidence, that the Respondent liked having the Applicant around. This evidence, however, did little to assist the Applicant. The submission failed to acknowledge the nuance of Furber's response:
Does the company like having her around?‑‑‑We like all employees being around.
I understand that, but Ms Cooke specifically, does the company like having her around?‑‑‑There's no - I can't - basically, there's no comments to be made that we don't want Ms Cooke, except when we've got an investigation of this saying that she's been - serious misconduct...[236]
[202] Whilst the email correspondence between Portelli and the Applicant evinced positivity in the relationship, the evidence did not permit a broader extrapolation that the Respondent liked having the Applicant around. The question of whether there has been a loss of trust and confidence on the part of the employer such as to render reinstatement unviable does not simply involve an assessment of the subjective views of the employer's management personnel. Nevertheless, whilst not irrelevant, I am not tasked with simply determining whether the Applicant was liked or not, the question to be answered is whether there is a loss of trust and confidence that is soundly based.
[203] The Applicant further submitted that Heal had given evidence about how critical the Applicant's role as Human Factors instructor was to the safety infrastructure of the organisation, and that the Respondent recently trained the Applicant for a safety training role requiring precisely the qualities of judgment, professionalism and trustworthiness. The Applicant pointed out that when in the office on 21 March 2025, she had been congratulated for her having passed that exam and having been appointed to that position. Counsel submitted, on behalf of the Applicant, that one cannot credibly say someone lacks judgment while entrusting them to train others on safety and questioned why, if the Respondent genuinely held these concerns about the Applicant's character, she was in such a crucial safety role.
[204] There is an alternative view regarding the Applicant's training in human factors. That the Respondent facilitated the Applicant's training as a Human Factors instructor indicates that at the time when the decision was made to allow for such training and completion of the same, the Respondent did not hold the concerns it now expresses to the extent that training of the Applicant in this field would be precluded. The decision was taken, and the training completed, prior to 21 March 2025. It was therefore entirely reasonable for the Respondent to recalibrate its assessment of the Applicant's suitability for ongoing employment in the face of a valid reason for her dismissal. Clearly, the Applicant failed to demonstrate professionalism and judgment when she decided to engage in conduct that undermined Ovens in front of others.
[205] The context of the Applicant's employment is relevant. As Head of Flying Operations, it appeared uncontroversial that Ovens assumed full responsibility for flight operations, pilots, cabin crew, rostering and operational control. I accept the Respondent's submission that its operations involve a multi‑crew, safety-critical environment and that, in the Applicant's role, the chain of command must be respected.
[206] Respect is not engendered between an employer and its employee, when an employee openly disparages the Head of Flying Operations with colleagues - undermining his position by calling into question his emotional stability and essentially characterising him as irascible.
[207] The working relationship between Ovens and the Applicant may appear fundamental to the ongoing viability of the working relationship between Applicant and Respondent. In fact, the Respondent draws upon the breakdown in the relationship between Ovens and the Applicant, submitting that Ovens had stated in his complaint that the Applicant's action undermined his authority and was not acceptable behaviour for an employee of the Respondent. However, for reasons which, as noted, were only explained, to the extent they were explained, late in the day at hearing, the Respondent chose not to call Ovens to give evidence. As was said in Nguyen, and as I have already repeated, an argument of lost trust and confidence must be soundly and rationally based, and it is important to carefully scrutinise a claim that reinstatement is inappropriate because of a loss of confidence in the employee. The onus of establishing a loss of trust and confidence rests on the party making the assertion and in this case, that sits with the Respondent.
[209] Ultimately, the Respondent has pushed against reinstatement premised not only on the Applicant's conduct on 21 March 2025, but her conduct over an extended period. However, reliance on that conduct proves problematic for the Respondent for the reasons detailed in this decision at paragraphs [184] and [185]. With the exception of the warning provided to the Applicant in 2020, to which I have given weight, the remaining warnings relied upon carry little weight because of the time that has lapsed since they were provided. Whilst an indubitable fact that the Applicant has not been promoted to First Officer during the course of her lengthy employment, the evidence presented shows no detail of performance improvement plans nor sustained failures to meet key performance metrics.
[210] Heal gave evidence that the Applicant had demonstrated a lack of accountability premised on her unsubstantiated claim that her colleague cheated in an exam and her failure to self-assess that she was unfit to fly if unfit to undertake simulator training. As observed, Heal, whilst the line manager for the Applicant, had little to no involvement in the investigation into her misconduct or the disciplinary process. Further, he had, essentially, been placed into the position he held by Ovens, and in my view, lacked the requisite independence to be forming views as to the whether trust and confidence was irreparably eroded. His examples of the Applicant's conduct which were said to have demonstrated loss and confidence, and a lack of accountability, were fatally flawed and did little to persuade me that reinstatement was not appropriate.
[211] The Applicant's misconduct warranted censure but censure in the form of dismissal was harsh. The evidence before me was not sufficient to demonstrate clearly that there had been a complete breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence. In this case, I am persuaded that the employment relationship is capable of withstanding the friction and doubts that have arisen. It had been five years since the Applicant's last warning, and whilst I am of the firm view that the Applicant had, through her actions on 21 March 2026, demonstrated a lack of respect for Ovens and more broadly exercised poor judgment and a lack of professionalism, I am not persuaded that the Applicant's misconduct and her reinstatement pose an imminent safety risk to the Respondent's operations. However, the Order to be issued nonetheless sends a clear message to the Applicant as to the consequence that flows from her own conduct.
[212] It should not be read from this decision that an employee is prohibited from ever expressing dissatisfaction with their employer or a leader within that same business. However, there will likely be appropriate avenues for expressing such views, and those views should focus on offending behaviours that are premised upon objectivity, rather than targeting a colleague or leader on personal level.
[3] Digital Hearing Book Pt 2 (DHB), 15.
[5] National Jet Express Pty Ltd Pilot Enterprise Agreement 2022-2026 [2023] FWCA 3875, AE522364, 20 November 2023.
[7] Transcript of Proceedings, Cooke v National Jet Express Pty Ltd (Fair Work Commission, U2025/10141, Beaumont DP, 30 September - 1 October 2025) (Transcript), [PN751].
[8] Witness Statement of Mark Heal dated 23 September 2025 (Heal Statement), [6].
[10] Second Witness Statement of Cassandra Cooke dated 25 September 2025 (Second Cooke Statement), [41].
[13] Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2021] FCA 873 ('Qantas Airways'), [16]-[17].
[43] Witness Statement of Shannyn Andrea Van Heerden dated 23 September 2025 (Van Heerden Statement), [4].
[65] Witness Statement of Cassandra Cooke dated 5 September 2025 (Cooke Statement), [26].
[68] Second Cooke Statement (n 10) [33].
[83] Witness Statement of Victoria Portelli dated 23 September 2025 (Portelli Statement), [3].
[85] Portelli Statement (n 83) [4]; Transcript (n 7) [PN277].
[108] Cooke Statement (n 65) [41(a)].
[133] Edwards v Giudice [1999] FCA 1836; (1999) 94 FCR 561, 564; King v Freshmore (Vic) Pty Ltd (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Ross VP, Williams SDP, and Commissioner Hingley, 17 March 2000), [24].
[134] Qantas Airways (n 13) [286].
[137] [2024] FCA 369 ('Lehrmann').
[139] [2018] FWCFB 279, [125]; see also Coogee Legion Ex-Service Club Ltd v Giblin [2024] FWCFB 270.
[140] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362 (Dixon J), 350 (Rich J).
[141] Ibid 362 (Dixon J); see also Lehrmann (n 137) [98]-[104].
[142] [2024] FWCFB 364, [49].
[143] Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) [2000] FCA 1084; (2000) 103 FCR 1, [118]-[123]; Flint v Lowe (1995) 22 MVR 1; S v M (1984) 36 SASR 316, 319-20.
[149] Transcript (n 7) [PN1826]-[PN1827].
[151] Van Heerden Statement (n 43) [6].
[160] Portelli Statement (n 83) [4]; Transcript (n 7) [PN277].
[165] Portelli Statement (n 83) [5].
[181] Cooke Statement (n 65) [28(b)].
[183] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681, 685.
[184] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371, 373 ('Selvachandran').
[187] Diaz v Anzpac Services (Australia) Pty Limited [2016] FWCFB 7204, [12].
[188] B, C and D v Australian Postal Corporation [2013] FWCFB 6191; Beijing Capital Airlines Co Limited T/A Beijing Capital Airlines v Shan [2019] FWCFB 3867.
[189] B, C and D v Australian Postal Corporation [2013] FWCFB 6191, 13 [36].
[192] Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology v Asher [2010] FWAFB 1200, 14 [26].
[193] Ibid; Osman v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Ross VP, Lacy SDP and Commissioner O'Connor, 17 October 2001); Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 222; (1995) 60 IR 1; Selvachandran (n 184).
[196] Witness Statement of Robin Furber dated 23 September 2025 (Furber Statement), [3].
[202] Ibid 123-8; Transcript (n 7) [PN1989].
[204] Ibid [PN4], [PN1446]-[PN1449].
[220] Hyde v Serco Australia Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 3989, [102] ('Hyde').
[222] (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Ross VP, Drake DP and Commissioner Cargill, 4 November 1997).
[229] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 390(3)(a)-(b).
[230] [2025] FWCFB 69, [58].
[231] [2014] FWCFB 7198 ('Nguyen').
[236] Ibid [PN1673]-[PN1674], [PN1676].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Cassandra Cooke
National Jet Express Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 434
(1937) 59 CLR 395
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2001) 51 NSWLR 572
(2012) 38 VR 618
(1999) 94 FCR 561
(2000) 103 FCR 1
(1995) 22 MVR 1
(1984) 36 SASR 316
(1995) 185 CLR 410
(1996) 142 ALR 681
(1995) 62 IR 371
(1995) 60 IR 1