1. Mr Caspersz took delivery of a new car from the first respondent ('G&W Smith Pty Ltd') on 29 November 2018. He alleges that there were imperfections in the vehicle's aftermarket window tint and paint protection.
2. On 23 August 2019 he made a claim in VCAT against G&W Smith Pty Ltd and the second respondent ('Honda') for $38,574.32,[1] being the cost of the car and other costs, against the first and second respondents.
3. The litigation history of this proceeding is long and has been summarised in a Supreme Court decision which I will not repeat here.[2] There have been several hearing dates vacated, interlocutory applications, applications for reconstitution of the Tribunal and multiple appeals by Mr Caspersz to the Supreme Court of various orders, including interlocutory orders, of the Tribunal. Three of Mr Caspersz's appeal applications in the Supreme Court remain ongoing.
4. For the purposes of this decision, I provide the following brief procedural background.
5. On 18 June 2020 Ms Caspersz sought to join Mr Dale Smith (director of the first and third respondent) and Garry and Warren Smith Group ('G&W Smith Group') as respondents to the proceeding. Mr Caspersz was directed by the Tribunal to file and serve a 'proposed point of claim'.
6. On 25 June 2020 Mr Caspersz filed an 'additional points of claim' which included G&W Smith Group and Mr Dale Smith as listed respondents.
7. On 1 July 2020 a final hearing date of 6 July 2020 was vacated. Mr Caspersz was granted leave to amend his points of claim in the form of the additional points of claim and G&W Smith Group was joined as the third respondent to the proceeding. Leave was not granted for Mr Smith to be joined as a respondent to the proceeding.
8. On 8 July 2022 Honda made an application for the proceeding to be dismissed as against them.
9. On 11 August 2022 Honda's dismissal application was refused and the Tribunal made further orders directing Mr Caspersz to file a Revised Points of Claim in a form compliant with previous orders of the Tribunal. The Tribunal ordered:

If the applicant has not complied with [filing a Revised Points of Claim] by 22 September 2022 either respondent may make a further application for an order summarily dismissing or striking out the proceeding, upon notice given to the applicant a reasonable time before the date of the further directions hearing, and the application may be heard and determined during the further directions hearing.[3]

1. On 28 June 2023 the Tribunal dismissed the proceeding as against Honda pursuant to section 78 of the VCAT Act.[4] Mr Caspersz has appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (proceeding S ECI 2023 03491).
2. On 24 August 2023 the Tribunal ordered Mr Caspersz pay the costs Honda had incurred for the period of 12 April 2022 to date.[5] Mr Caspersz has appealed this decision to the Supreme Court (proceeding S ECI 2023 04461).
3. On 3 October 2023 Mr Caspersz emailed the Tribunal seeking a stay of the 28 June 2023 and 24 August 2023 orders.
4. On 10 October 2023 the Tribunal listed the matter for directions hearing on 1 November 2023 to consider, among other issues, Mr Caspersz request for a stay dated 3 October 2023.[6]
5. On 31 October 2023 the Tribunal advised the parties the directions hearing listed for 1 November 2023 was vacated due to member unavailability. Orders dated 13 November 2023 re-listed the matter to a date to be fixed, and the directions hearing was subsequently listed for 1 March 2024.
6. On 16 February 2024, due to member unavailability, VCAT adjourned the directions hearing to 27 May 2024.
7. On 12 March 2024 Mr Caspersz learnt that both of his parents had passed away.
8. Between 2 April 2024 and 27 May 2024 Mr Caspersz sent the Tribunal correspondence, which I refer to below, seeking an adjournment of the 27 May 2024 directions hearing.
9. On 24 May 2024 the Honda filed an application seeking the hearing on 27 May 2024 proceed, and the following directions:
   1. The Directions Hearing on 27 May 2024 proceed ex parte if the applicant (Mr Caspersz) chooses not to appear.
   2. Paragraph 78 of the applicant's affidavit of 23 October 2023 be struck out.
   3. The applicant's application for a stay of the Tribunal Orders A and B of 24 August 2024 be declared a nullity or alternatively dismissed as an abuse of the Tribunal's processes.
   4. A declaration be made that the second respondent has no standing or obligation to spend further resources in C6315/2019, as it proceeds between the applicant and the first and third respondents.
10. On 27 May 2024 the directions hearing proceeded. Mr Caspersz did not appear. The Tribunal made orders including a costs order and an order striking out Mr Caspersz's claim against the first and third respondents.
11. On 12 June 2024 Mr Caspersz filed an application pursuant to section 120 of the VCAT Act to reopen the Tribunal's orders of 27 May 2024.
12. A brief history of listing the section 120 application is as follows.
13. On 24 June 2024 the Tribunal listed the section 120 application for hearing on 4 July 2024 (adjourned to 11 July 2024 by orders of the Tribunal dated 28 June 2024, as there had been an administrative oversight by the Tribunal in listing the matter for 4 July 2024).[7]
14. By email dated 25 June 2024 Mr Caspersz indicated he sought an adjournment of his section 120 application until after May 2025.
15. On 1 July 2024 Mr Caspersz again sought an adjournment until after May 2025. By order dated 10 July 2024 the Tribunal adjourned the hearing until 14 November 2024.
16. On 4 and 22 October 2024 My Caspersz sought an adjournment of the 14 November 2024 listing.
17. By orders dated 22 October 2024, the Tribunal granted this adjournment on the papers and ordered that the proceeding would be listed for a directions hearing on a date to be fixed.
18. On 4 November 2024, having not responded to Mr Caspersz's adjournment applications of 4 and 22 October 2024, Honda filed an application for a directions hearing/orders, and an application pursuant to section 120 of the VCAT Act to re-open the Tribunal's orders of 22 October 2024.
19. On 12 November 2024 the Tribunal noted Honda now opposed the adjournment, and listed Mr Caspersz's adjournment application for a directions hearing on 17 December 2024.
20. Mr Caspersz was given the opportunity to call medical evidence at the 17 December 2024 directions hearing (which he did not do) in support of his application for an adjournment, which he sought until June 2025.
21. After considering Mr Caspersz's application for adjournment at the directions hearing, a three-month adjournment was granted, and the matter was listed for hearing on 25 March 2025.
22. On 7 March 2025 Mr Caspersz wrote to the Tribunal, seeking an adjournment of the 25 March 2025 hearing date on the same mental health grounds. The parties were advised that the Tribunal would hear the application for adjournment on the hearing date but in the event the application was refused, the parties should be prepared to proceed with the hearing.
23. On 18 March 2025 the second respondent, Honda, made an application under section 75 to summarily dismiss Mr Caspersz's section 120 application. The parties were advised this application would be considered at the hearing on 25 March 2025.
24. At the hearing on 25 March 2025, following submissions, Mr Caspersz's application for an adjournment was refused. The Tribunal also determined it would be unfair to Mr Caspersz to hear a section 75 application when the hearing date, originally listed on 11 July 2024, was for his section 120 application.
25. Honda's section 75 application was made in respect of Mr Caspersz's section 120 application.[8] In light of my following decision on the section 120 application, the section 75 application has now lapsed.

1. The application is brought under section 120 of the VCAT Act which provides:

Re-opening an order on substantive grounds

(1) A person in respect of whom an order is made may apply to the Tribunal for a review of the order if the person did not appear and was not represented at the hearing at which the order was made.

(2) An application under subsection (1) is to be made in accordance with, and within the time limits specified by, the rules.

(3) The rules may limit the number of times a person may apply under this section in respect of the same matter without obtaining the leave of the Tribunal.

(4) The Tribunal may -

(a) hear and determine if it is satisfied that -

(i) the applicant had a reasonable excuse for not attending or being represented at the hearing; and

(ii) it is appropriate to hear and determine the application having regard to the matters specified in subsection (4A); and

(b) if it thinks fit, order that the order be revoked or varied.

• (4A) For the purposes of subsection (4)(a)(ii), the matters are -

(a) whether the applicant has a reasonable case to argue in relation to the subject-matter of the order; and

(b) any prejudice that may be caused to another party if the application is heard and determined.

• (4B) The Tribunal may hear and determine an application under this section despite subsection (4A)(b) if the Tribunal is satisfied that any prejudice that may be caused to a party may be addressed by an order for costs under section 109 or an order for reimbursement of fees under section 115B or both.
• (4C) In deciding to hear and determine an application under this section the Tribunal may require the applicant to give any undertaking as to costs or damages that the Tribunal considered appropriate.

1. Section 4.24 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2018 (Vic) states:

(1) An application for review of an order under section 120 of the Act must be made within 14 days after the applicant becomes aware of the order.

(2) No more than one application may be made under section 120 of the Act by the same person in respect of the same matter without leave of the Tribunal.

(3) An application under section 120 of the Act must -

(a) state -

(i) the name, current address, telephone number and electronic address of the applicant; and

(ii) the number of the original proceeding for which the review is requested; and

(iii) the date on which and the manner in which the applicant became aware of the order in respect of which a review in requested; and

(iv) the applicant's reasons for not attending or not being represented at the original hearing; and

(b) exhibit any documents in support of the matters referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i), (ii) (iii) and (iv).

(4) On the lodgement of an application under section 120 of the Act the principal registrar -

(a) may require the applicant to comply with the requirements of subrule (3) by requesting the applicant provide information as referred to in that subrule; and

(b) must advise the applicant and other parties by notice of the procedures of the Tribunal with respect to the future conduct of the application.

1. The 27 May 2024 orders provide:
   1. The first and third respondents are granted leave to be represented by Mr Dale Smith, company director.
   2. The second respondent is granted leave to be represented by legal practitioners and Counsel at today's directions hearing.
   3. To the extent that the applicant's emails of last week might constitute an application for an adjournment of today's directions hearing, that application is refused.
   4. The applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023 is dismissed.
   5. The applicant shall pay the second respondent's costs of and incidental to the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023, to be assessed by the Costs Court on a standard basis under the County Court Scale.
   6. The proceeding as between the applicant and the first and third respondents is struck out.
   7. The principal registrar is directed to send the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria a copy of the applicant's email dated 10:55am on 23 May 2024, with a copy of this Order.
2. The orders also include a 'Background,' the facts of which Mr Caspersz took issue.

1. Mr Caspersz gave evidence on affirmation and made submissions at the hearing.
2. In relation to his reason for not attending the 27 May 2024 hearing, Mr Caspersz relied on the correspondence, including two letters from his GP, he sent to VCAT between 2 April 2024 and 27 May 2024. Mr Caspersz also gave further evidence as to the state of his health at that time. I consider this evidence below.
3. His submissions in relation to section 120(4A)(a) as to whether he has a reasonable case to argue in relation to the subject matter of the orders are as follows:

Order 1: The first and third respondents are granted leave to be represented by Mr Dale Smith, company director.

1. Mr Caspersz referred to orders of the Tribunal dated 11 August 2022 which set aside a witness summons he had issued on Mr Smith.
2. Mr Caspersz submitted if Mr Smith was not able to be one of his witnesses, he should not have been granted leave to represent the First and Third Respondents.[9]

Order 2: The second respondent is granted leave to be represented by legal practitioners and Counsel at today's directions hearing.

1. With respect to Order 2, Mr Caspersz submitted:

I disagree with that too, because on one hand Deputy President Lulham is saying that well, if the Second Respondent - - he's confirmed in there that he's granting them leave because they need to explain the position and is saying here, "The nature and complexity of the Applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for including a lengthy affidavit and exhibits filed by the Applicant warranted the Second Respondent to be represented by counsel at today's hearing." But hang on a minute, that was on the basis that they hadn't submitted affidavit material. Because he is saying here, he's saying, "I'm satisfied that the two affidavits contain text which are not properly to be contained in the affidavit and that if the Second Respondent was obliged to file affidavit material in reply would incur unnecessary cost" which means that they didn't supply any affidavits in response to my two affidavits. That's why they didn't want to attend the hearing. So his justification for them attending with respect to costs because they needed to be represented by legal practitioners and counsel, because they hadn't submitted any affidavit material to defend my affidavits of the 24th and 23rd of October 2023.[10]

Order 3: To the extent that the applicant's emails of last week might constitute an application for an adjournment of today's directions hearing, that application is refused.

1. Mr Caspersz objected to DP Lulham's tone and comments during the hearing, referring to the transcript from 27 May 2024 which reads: 'so it becomes this tumbling bowling ball that never stops rolling.'[11]
2. Mr Caspersz submitted DP Lulham was not respectful and had presented 'hurdle after hurdle' for him with his revised points of claim.[12]
3. Mr Caspersz submitted President Justice Quigley had stated DP Lulham would not be involved with his case and then he continued to hear the case.[13]
4. Mr Caspersz relied on his emails to VCAT and the Supreme Court as to why he was seeking the adjournment. His parents passed away on 10 March 2024 and he found them on 12 March 2024. He explained in evidence he did not realise he had a 'problem' (with his mental health) until he went to the doctor in April 2024. He went back in May 2024 as he was feeling worse and was referred to psychologist Ms Sandra Pucci.[14]

Order 4: The applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023 is dismissed.

1. To contextualise Mr Caspersz's submissions, I provide the following brief background.
2. On 6 June 2023 Mr Caspersz's case against Honda was heard as a contested hearing on an application made by Honda to dismiss the claim against them under section 78 of the VCAT Act.
3. On 28 June 2023 orders were made dismissing his claim as against Honda ('the Honda dismissal order').[15] On 26 July 2023 Mr Caspersz sought leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court (proceeding S ECI 2023 03491).[16]
4. Following a contested costs hearing on 27 July 2023, on 24 August 2023 an order was made that Mr Caspersz pay Honda's costs of the proceeding ('the Honda costs order').[17] On 21 September 2023 Mr Caspersz sought leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court (proceeding S ECI 2023 04461).
5. On 8 August 2023 Mr Caspersz applied to the Tribunal for a stay of the Honda dismissal order.
6. On 24 August 2023 a Chambers order was made that Mr Caspersz's application for a stay of the Honda dismissal orders were a nullity.
7. On 7 September 2023 AsJ Irving handed down his decision in Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors.[18] This decision concerned Mr Caspersz's application for leave to appeal various orders of the Tribunal including a previous refusal by the Tribunal to grant Mr Caspersz a stay of orders.
8. On 3 October 2023 Mr Caspersz applied to stay the Honda costs order.
9. On 6 October 2023 orders were made listing the mater for a directions hearing. There orders noted the following:

The applicant's "formal request by application to stay both ... Orders made on 24 August 2023" made in his email of 1:45pm on 3 October 2023 is inconsistent with the Order and Reasons of Irving AsJ published at [2023] VSC 555

1. Mr Caspersz's submissions disputed that his application for a stay on 3 October 2023 was inconsistent with AsJ Irving's decision. Mr Caspersz referred to the following from AsJ Irving's decision:

I am satisfied that the following aspects of Mr Caspersz's first ground are arguable. Senior Member Vassie's reliance on Quick to dismiss Mr Caspersz's stay application was incorrect because:

(a) Quick is distinguishable from Mr Caspersz's case because Quick dealt with applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the trial division and not appeals from VCAT to the trial division of the Supreme Court;

(b) Quick is inconsistent with s 149 of the VCAT Act which enables VCAT to stay its own order pending appeal; and

(c) Senior Member Vassie's decision leaves s 149 of the VCAT Act inapplicable.[19]

1. Notwithstanding having found at least one of Mr Caspersz's proposed first ground of appeal arguable, His Honour refused leave to appeal on the basis his first ground would impose substantial injustices, as it was an interlocutory order. His Honour also noted that:
   • Mr Caspersz had made a further unsuccessful application for a stay in the Supreme Court.
   • An appeal on this ground would serve no practical purpose in circumstances where Mr Caspersz's underlying proceedings have been finally dismissed and Mr Caspersz has filed an application for leave to appeal that dismissal.
   • Mr Caspersz dispute with the respondents has become hopelessly fragmented with Mr Caspersz prosecuting a multiplicity of proceedings relating to the preparation of the VCAT proceeding. To allow Mr Capsersz to pursue an appeal on his first ground would increase the time and costs and decrease the efficiency of finally resolving the dispute between Mr Caspersz and the respondents, which would be inconsistent with the overarching purposes of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic).[20]
2. Mr Caspersz submitted the reasoning of AsJ Irving showed SM Vassie was incorrect to not grant a stay of the 24 August 2023 Honda costs order, even though AsJ Irving dismissed Mr Caspersz's application seeking leave to appeal interlocutory orders made by VCAT. AsJ Irving's decision is on appeal by Mr Caspersz (proceeding S ECI 2023 00577).
3. Mr Caspersz submitted the Transcript of the 27 May 2024 hearing indicated Ms Cockram asked the Tribunal if the stay application could be struck out for abuse of process.[21]
4. Mr Caspersz submitted DP Lulham incorrectly referred to and based his decision to dismiss his stay application on SM Vassie's decision, which he submitted AsJ Irving had found to be incorrect.

Order 5: The applicant shall pay the second respondent's costs of and incidental to the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of Orders made 24 August 2023, to be assessed by the Costs Court on a standard basis under the County Court Scale.

1. Mr Caspersz referred to the following in DP Lulham's 'Background' to the orders of 27 May 2024:

I am satisfied that these two affidavits contain text which are not properly to be contained in affidavit, and that if the second respondent was obliged to file affidavit material in reply it would incur unnecessary costs.

I am satisfied that the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023 is misconceived, serves no purpose, and is an abuse of process, and in those circumstances I am satisfied that the application should be dismissed. I am satisfied that the applicant's claim that he needs to defer the hearing of his purported application for a stay for "at least" 12 months has not been established.

I accept the second respondent's submissions that it is fair for the Tribunal to order the applicant to pay the second respondent's costs of and incidental to the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023, to be assessed by the Costs Court on a standard basis under the County Court Scale. I note in this respect that the second respondent expressly relied upon sections 109(2), (3)(a) & (c) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) in support of its application for costs. I also note that the nature and complexity of the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay including the lengthy affidavits and exhibits filed by the applicant warranted the second respondent being represented by Counsel at today's hearing, thus satisfying the criterion under section 109(3)(d) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.[22]

1. Mr Caspersz also referred to the fact there was no application for costs in Honda's application filed with the Tribunal on 24 May 2024.[23]
2. The issue of costs arose because DP Lulham raised it with Honda as follows:

Yes. All right. Well, look, I am satisfied on the basis of that submission that I should dismiss this application for a stay. Now, look, do you seek your costs of the stay application?[24]

1. Mr Caspersz submitted this indicated DP Lulham's bias against him.
2. Mr Caspersz referred to DP Lulham's reference to Mr Caspersz refusing over a long period to articulate his case properly.[25] Deputy President Lulham referred to the case being in 'broad brush' terms.[26]
3. Mr Caspersz submitted that in July 2020, Honda did a safety recall of vehicles including the one subject to this proceeding, so Mr Caspersz brought this to the attention of the Tribunal.[27] Mr Caspersz submitted he sent correspondence to VCAT at the same time which nobody responded to.
4. Mr Caspersz submitted that in April 2021 DP Lulham described Mr Caspersz's claim as substantial because of his addition, post the recall, of the fuel pump to the claim. Mr Caspersz submitted he did not know how the fuel pump could make the claim substantial, when the substantial claim was the value of the vehicle.[28]
5. Mr Caspersz submitted he wanted his money back, and costs involved, and even Honda's own expert agreed. Mr Caspersz submitted this was subsequently changed in the expert's second report.
6. Mr Caspersz also referred to SM Vassie's orders setting aside the subpoena he had issued on Mr Smith and removing Mr Smith as a witness. He also referred to email correspondence between himself and Mr Smith which showed that Mr Smith was the one who had told him to go to VCAT.[29]

Order 6: The proceeding between the applicant and the first and third respondents is struck out.

1. Mr Caspersz took issue with this section in DP Lulham's Background to the orders of 27 May 2024:

In relation to the first and third respondents, I find that as a result of the applicant's refusal to comply with previous directions of the Tribunal, the applicant has not articulated the basis of his claim against the first and third respondents in a way that could allow them to understand the basis of those claims. The first and third respondents have been significantly prejudiced by the applicant's conduct in this proceeding. The applicant's failure to appear at today's directions hearing results in him not seeking any directions which might facilitate his claims against the first and third respondents being heard. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the first and third respondents' application for an order that the proceeding against them be struck out. As the first and third respondents have not engaged legal practitioners in this VCAT proceeding, no application for costs was made by them.[30]

1. Mr Caspersz submitted the first and third respondents knew all about the claim which is documented in his points of claim. Mr Caspersz submitted that Honda had agreed that they and Honda were liable.

Order 7: The principal registrar is directed to send the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Victoria a copy of the applicant's email dated 10:55am on 23 May 2024, with a copy of this Order

1. Mr Caspersz noted DP Lulham sent his orders and included an email Mr Caspersz had sent to VCAT to the Supreme Court. He noted no contempt proceedings had been commenced against him, and he submitted that he could not be in contempt because all he was doing was stating facts.[31]

1. On 28 June 2023 the Tribunal dismissed Mr Caspersz's complaint as against Honda.[32] Ms Cockram referred to the reasons for the decision at paragraph [58] which reads:

On 31 May 2021 Honda filed and served a written submission opposing Mr Caspersz's application to amend. Included in this submission were the points that by 31 May 2021 the proceeding had been on foot for 647 days; according to Mr Caspersz, he was aware of the fuel pump recall in August 2020 but did not seek leave to amend his claim to include the fuel pump until 26 April 2021; that Mr Caspersz did not produce any evidence to show that the fuel pump in his vehicle is defective; and that a voluntary product safety recall is a precautionary process and does not mean that a vehicle will necessarily have an issue relating to the recall or that the vehicle is not of acceptable quality entitling the consumer to reject it. Mr Caspersz replied by email of 3:59pm on 1 June 2021, accusing the author of the submission of making false statements, attempting to deceive the Tribunal, and saying that Orders should be made against Honda under section 78 of the VCAT Act.[33]

1. Ms Cockram also referred to the decision of O'Meara J where Mr Caspersz's leave to appeal orders of the Tribunal dated 11 August 2022 was dismissed.[34]
2. Honda was subsequently awarded costs by the Tribunal.[35]
3. Mr Caspersz's application to stay both of these orders was refused, as was leave to appeal by AsJ Irving. Ms Cockram referred to DP Lulham's in Chamber orders of 6 October 2023, and the following recitals:

Relevantly,

at paragraphs 29-31 of Irving AsJ's Reasons, the Associate Judge makes clear that the applicant appealed against Senior Member Vassie's Order of 15 December 2022. There can be no ambiguity about that point.

at paragraphs 49-57 of Irving AsJ's Reasons, the Associate Judge refused to grant leave to appeal against Senior Member Vassie's Order of 15 December 2022 in respect of Senior Member Vassie's dismissal of the application for a stay.

at paragraphs 66-69 of Irving AsJ's Reasons, the Associate Judge described the applicant's proceeding before the Associate Judge as an abuse of process in that it was unjustifiably oppressive to the respondents.

The applicant's "formal request by application to stay both ... Orders made on 24 August 2023" made in his email of 1:45pm on 3 October 2023 is inconsistent with the Order and Reasons of Irving AsJ published at [2023] VSC 555.[36]

1. With respect to the directions hearing on 27 May 2024, Ms Cockram made the following submissions:

Mr Caspersz indicated he could not attend the hearing, and that he would refer the case to the media, Honda wrote to the Tribunal requesting the matter proceed ex parte so that everything was above board and transparent;[37]

Mr Caspersz was on notice of the application for an ex parte hearing, he was aware the Directions Hearing was listed for 27 May 2024, he was corresponding with the Tribunal and was able to send detailed emails, which is inconsistent with his submissions he was unable to focus and concentrate on legal matters;[38]

Mr Caspersz's affidavits on 23 and 24 October 2023 were treated by DP Lulham as objectionable and unreasonable. In his affidavit of 7 March 2025 Mr Caspersz refers at paragraph [5] to rely on all of his previous affidavits filed in the VCAT and Supreme Court proceedings, of which, Ms Cockram submitted, there were 15.[39] Ms Cockram submitted this was what DP Lulham was referring to when describing it as oppressive to Honda and would cause them to incur unnecessary costs if they were required to respond;[40]

Mr Caspersz's application was for a stay of orders, and DP Lulham was satisfied to dismiss these applications. She referred to the Transcript of this Direction Hearing where DP Lulham says the stay applications are invalid;[41]

Mr Caspersz has a collateral purpose of his section 120 application, which was conceded by Mr Caspersz in his earlier submissions, being that he is seeking to avoid the costs orders that had been awarded against him;[42]

With respect to Order 2, Ms Cockram had been appearing for Honda for three of four years and that her continued appearance was to assist the Tribunal as an officer of the Tribunal. Ms Cockram referred to Hannah v Music and Mechanical Workshop Inc[43] and that the chance of Mr Caspersz succeeding on this type of triviality was hopeless;[44]

With respect to Order 5, there was no reasonable case to stay the order for costs. Ms Cockram submitted that costs follow the event, and DP Lulham was following well known principles in section 109 of the VCAT Act;[45]

With respect to Order 3, this was now 'non operative' as the matter proceeded. Mr Caspersz did not appear in person to make the application for an adjournment. Ms Cockram submitted that Honda suffers prejudice from the continual attempts by Mr Caspersz to adjourn the proceedings;[46] and

With respect to Order 7, Ms Cockram submitted the Supreme Court has an inherent power to punish someone for contempt. Ms Cockram submitted it was a matter for the court as to whether they pursue that course.[47]

1. Ms Cockram also referred to DP Lulham's reasons in the decision of 28 June 2023 (the Honda dismissal decision), and that he had stated the claim by Mr Caspersz was never properly articulated.[48]
2. With respect to the three appeals at the Supreme Court, Ms Cockram submitted they had been delayed because of Mr Caspersz's mental health and him making requests for pro bono legal assistance. Ms Cockram said they had been listed for hearing in the Supreme Court on 4 February 2025. Ms Cockram said they were vacated as Mr Caspersz had said he would not appear. Ms Cockram said that Honda has filed three applications for summary dismissal and all three proceedings are listed for directions on 27 March 2025.[49]

1. Mr Smith gave evidence on oath and supported all the submissions made by Ms Cockram. Mr Smith submitted that Mr Caspersz's synopsis has been that if someone does not agree with them, they must be lying, which he rejected.[50]
2. Mr Smith submitted Mr Caspersz has not given a reasonable excuse for his absence from the 27 May 2024 hearing, and that he is still unable articulate his claim. Mr Smith submitted that all Mr Caspersz is fighting about now is the enforcement of costs [51]
3. Mr Smith requested the proceedings against the first and third respondents remain struck out.

1. Mr Caspersz has made an application under section 120 of the VCAT Act to re-open the orders of 27 May 2024 as he did not appear and was not represented at the hearing when the orders were made.
2. Although the matter on 27 May 2024 was listed for a directions hearing, I am satisfied that orders made encompassed the determination of substantive matters by the Tribunal.
3. Mr Caspersz bears the onus to satisfy the Tribunal that the requirements of section 120 are satisfied.
4. Section 120(4) of the VCAT Act involves a two-part process.
5. The first stage requires consideration of:

Whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for not attending or being represented at the hearing; and

Is it appropriate to hear and determine the application having regard to the matters specified in section 120(4A).

1. The second stage of section 120(4) is determining the application for review and the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, order that the order in question be revoked or varied.
2. This decision considers the first stage of section 120.
3. I take into account the contents of Mr Caspersz's emails sent to the Tribunal and parties from 2 April 2024 seeking an adjournment, and all the evidence and submissions at the hearing on 26 March 2025, including Mr Caspersz's section 120 application and affidavit dated 7 March 2025.

1. In Mr Caspersz's section 120 application, and in his affidavit dated 7 March 2025, he states the reason he did not appear was because:

I refer to various emails sent to VCAT from 8th April 2024, stating my valid reasons for not being able to attend and my supporting two (2) medical letters from the GP of 10 May 2024 and 15th May 2024 attached to my email to VCAT sent at approximately 11.12am on 22nd May 2024.[52]

1. An email dated 2 April 2024 appears to be the earliest advice to VCAT[53] from Mr Caspersz's stating he required a 12 month adjournment due to his parents' passing on 12 March 2024. Mr Caspersz sent the following emails to VCAT.

1. Mr Caspersz addressed this email to the Supreme Corut of Victorian and Principal Registrar of VCAT. It provided:

In accordance with my prior correspondence,[54] please be advise that, at this stage, I do NOT expect to be in a position to be able to progress any matters in relation to the VCAT proceeding C6315/2019 itself or any of the related Court proceeding's S ECI 2022 03693, S ECI 2023 00577, S ECI 2023 03491 and S ECI 2203 04461 for at least the next twelve months in view of the very recent passing of both of my parents and my consequent emotional state, and further, the seriousness of the proposed investigations of the circumstances surrounding the passing of both of my parents. The only alternative resolution which may exist in the interim is that the parties reach some mutual 'without prejudice' settlement of all proceedings (VCAT and the Court) prior. However, in this regard, I leave this option with the Respondents as to its progression of any mutual settlement between the parties.

Accordingly, I am in no position whatsoever to participate in any hearing on 11 April 2024, specifically in relation to the Court proceeding S ECI 2023 00577.In this regard, please also have the VCAT file in regard to S6315/2019 and the Courts records updated accordingly with respect to my inability to continue with ALL of the existing Supreme Court proceedings for at least the next 12 months.[55]

1. This email was addressed to the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Principal Registrar of VCAT. It provided:

...my position as outlined in my email of 2 April 2024 remains unchanged in view of my current emotional state. As outlined previously, the only other alternative resolution which may exist in the interim (after the Respondent's consent) is that the parties reach some mutual 'without prejudice' settlement of all proceedings (VCAT and the Court) prior. However, in this regard, I will leave this option with the Respondent as to its progression of any mutual settlement between the parties.

Accordingly, I now await the Respondent's consent to having the VCAT proceeding and ALL of the existing Court proceedings (as outlined above) stayed for at least the next 12 months in view of my personal situation and circumstances. Respectfully, in this regard, relatively, I recall that VCAT unilaterally postponed (despite my very valid objections) a very significant hearing in the VCAT proceeding, being originally scheduled on 27 September 2022 to a rescheduled date of 27 October 2022 (being a period of one month), because of a Jewish holiday, of which such delay had numerous serious adverse and unfair explicit implications for me in both the VCAT proceeding and the various Court appeal proceedings. Therefore, my request for a stay of ALL proceedings for at least the next 12 months, in view of my personal circumstances, relatively speaking to a religious holiday, is in no way considered unreasonable. Respectfully, further, these ongoing required communication from myself is also adversely impacting on my current personal situation and mental state.[56]

1. This email was addressed to the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Principal Registrar of VCAT. It provided:

In the event that my reasonable request for a stay / adjournment of ALL proceedings (VCAT and the Court) for a least the next 12 months cannot be fulfilled and/or by consent by the Respondent on the numerous justifiable correspondence which I have already provided to VCAT, the Court and the Respondent, then, respectfully, I (or my representative, as applicable) will be left with no other choice than to take the appropriate lawful action, in time, against the State of Victoria (encompassing VCAT and the Court) and the Respondent's for the ongoing torment, suffering and mental anguish which is unreasonably being continued to be inflicted on myself. I just cannot believe that such action is being undertaken in view of all of my personal circumstances which is clearly explicitly evident. Simply all such actions are only indicative of persons who don't believe that both of my parents have recently passed (all of which has been widely covered in the media, although a lot of the coverage is untrue) and my consequential emotional state. Respectfully, such actions are only indicative of heartless biased individuals, the type of which who would defer an important directions hearing by a month to the explicit detriment of myself because of a Jewish holiday without even any formal application being made by the Second Respondent (despite VCAT's assertions in its Order correspondence of 14 September 2022) - in this regard where is there any commensurate lawful justice fairly applied to my current explicit factual situation? Respectfully, why isn't all of the facts which I have clearly outlined already to all of the affected parties more than enough to support my justifiable requested stay / adjournment when such events are clearly facts which have also already been made available publicly in the media. In this regard, I believe Order 46 - 'Applications' of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure} Rules 2015 and aspects of the Civil Procedure Act 201 O contain provisions which would allow for the Court's discretion 'as it thinks fit' to determine my application request 'on papers' in view of the extreme exceptional proven factual circumstances I have been encountered with. Further, for comparative purposes, a copy of the respective VCAT Order also made 'on papers' on 14 September 2022 and the Second Respondent's application by email is attached for the Court's information and records for all the various Court proceeding files.

I will leave it to the representatives of the Court and VCAT to critically review their own consciences with respect to making a decision on my justifiable request for a stay / adjournment of all of the proceedings (VCAT and the Court) for at least the next 12 months, in the event that the Second Respondent does not provide its consent of my requested stay/ adjournment of all proceedings (VCAT and the Court) for at least the next 12 months. Further, as already outlined previously, the only other alternative resolution which may exist in the interim within the next 12 months is that parties reach some mutual 'without prejudice' settlement of all proceedings (VCAT and the Court) prior. However, in this regard, I will leave this option with the Respondent as to its progression of any mutual settlement between the parties.[57]

1. Mr Caspersz addressed this email to the VCAT Principal Registrar, State Attorney General and Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission.
2. This email states:

...since 12 March 2024 following the sudden unexpected death of both parents under unknown circumstances which is currently being investigated, and my inability to participate and/or prepare for in any current legal proceedings (VCAT and the Supreme Court of Victoria) for at least the next 12 months.

I refer to the current scheduled directions hearing on 27 May 2024 (as identified on the VCAT website), which, however, should have already been cancelled following my correspondence to VCAT since 2 April 2024 (copy attached).

I confirm, once again, that I am personally in no position to continue with any current legal matters, including these VCAT proceedings C6315/2019, for at least the next 12 months. In this regard, I refer to the two (2) attached doctors letters of 10 May 2024 and 15 May 2024 which respectively unreservedly supports this position. Accordingly, I request that the scheduled VCAT directions hearing on 27 May 2024 be cancelled and that the VCAT proceeding by place on hold / stayed for at least the next 12 months.

The Respondents have been copied into this email correspondence.[58]

1. The email goes on to raise issues with the respondent's delay, corrupt and biased actions by VCAT, the respondents 'lies' with VCAT's support and VCAT's 'double standards' continuing acceptance of the respondent's position over his.
2. The email also includes two letters from Dr Shanthini Sathiyalingam dated 10 May 2024 and 15 May 2024.
3. The 10 May 2024 Dr Sathiyalingam letter provides:

This is to state that the bearer is currently grieving following the sudden unexpected demise of his parents on 12/3/24 in unknown circumstances & is unable to concentrate or focus on daily chores. His is physically & emotionally distressed & exhausted requiring supports to overcome this trauma & return to normalcy. He requires at least a year deferred for the legal matters he is pursuing.[59]

1. The 15 May 2024 Dr Sathiyalingam letter provide:

Further to the letter dated 10/5/24, I would like to state that bearer is having extreme anxiety & adjustment disorder, which requires psychological counselling initially followed by anti anxiety/antidepressant medications as required in due course. With regards to follow ups, if the grief becomes pathological grief, he would benefit consultation with a psychiatrist for specialised Management. The process will take time to heal & bearer needs atleast (sic) 12 months for him to be able to focus & concentrate on important matters, especially legal matters. Should you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me with bearer's authority.[60]

1. At the hearing before me, Mr Caspersz gave the following evidence about why he did not attend the hearing on 27 May 2024.

[Y]ou have to understand my position at the time. We are talking about March ... I believe they passed away on the 10th of March but only found them on the 12th of March so the official records are on the 12th of March. It was all over the media so wasn't as if I was saying something that wasn't factually correct. It was all over the media

...

I'm also relying on the fact how can I - - that process only commenced in May. I don't recognise - - I don't recognise a person who has a problem doesn't recognise that they have a problem to go and seek medical help. It's only because I went to my doctor in April, okay, and she said see how you are going and I went through all the issues and she said we will assess it. That's why I went back to her again in May because I wasn't changing. It wasn't improving, nothing was improving other than getting worse. That's why I went back to her. So, that's when she gave her referral to me on the 16th of May to see Dr - - to see Sandra Pucci but she explicitly put down there in terms of what I was suffering from.[61]

1. On 11 April 2024, Mr Caspersz did not appear at the Supreme Court for the scheduled hearing for one of his appeal proceedings.[62]
2. Justice Keogh adjourned the hearing of the appeal and directed Mr Caspersz's other two appeals be listed and heard together on 11 June 2024. His Honour also listed the proceedings for directions on 15 May 2024. His Honour's orders provide:

1. By email dated 12 March 2024, the plaintiff advised the court that he could not complete any matters in this and associated proceedings due to the death of his parents.

...

3. By email dated 5 April 2024, the plaintiff advised the court he would be unable to attend the hearing listed on11 April 2024 or participate in this or any related proceeding for at least 12 months.[63]

1. On 15 May 2024 Mr Caspersz appeared at the directions hearing before Judicial Registrar McCann, stating he was unwell.[64]
2. Judicial Registrar McCann vacated the 11 June 2024 hearing date and listed the matter for 28 November 2024. Judicial Registrar McCann also made pre-trial directions for the preparation of the trial and her orders noted:

B. By email dated 12 March 2024 the applicant advised the court that he could not complete any matters in this and associated proceedings due to the death of his parents.[65]

1. The transcript of the directions hearing reveals Mr Caspersz sought the matter be adjourned for at least 12 months and objected to the scheduled hearing date.[66]
2. At the section 120 hearing, the Tribunal was advised the three appeals have not yet been heard in the Supreme Court but were listed for a directions hearing on Honda's applications for summary dismissal a few days later.

1. In the 'Background' accompanying the dated 27 May 2024 orders, DP Lulham noted:

The applicant did not appear at today's directions hearing.

Last week the applicant sent several emails, to the Attorney General, the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, the Victorian Government Solicitors Office, and the Supreme Court of Victoria, sometimes copying in the Tribunal and on other times making the Tribunal the first addressee. In an email sent at 10:55am on 23 May 2024 which the applicant did not send to the Court, the applicant alleged that "Members of the Supreme Court of Victoria have corruptly and biasedly (sic) assisted VCAT with its corruption". I am concerned that the applicant has engaged in contempt of the Supreme Court of Victoria and I will direct the principal registrar to send the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court a copy of that email for their consideration.

Within the above emails were letters from a general practitioner dated 10 May 2024 and 15 May 2024. The emails were not exhibited to an affidavit by the general practitioner. There is no explanation why the general practitioner issued the second letter. There is no explanation as to any qualification held by the general practitioner to opine on psychological issues. Neither letter stated that the applicant is undergoing treatment from a psychologist. In the general practitioner's letter of 15 May 2024 it is asserted that the applicant needs "at least" 12 months to be able to focus and concentrate on legal matters.

The applicant was able to prepare and send the emails received by the Tribunal and others last week, and his preparation of those emails is inconsistent with an assertion that he cannot focus and concentrate on legal matters.

It is clear from the applicant's emails of last week that he was aware that the directions hearing would take place at 9:30am on 27 May 2024. I am not satisfied that there is any reason why the applicant could not appear, or be represented, at today's directions hearing.[67]

1. In this application I am considering whether Mr Caspersz had a reasonable excuse for not attending the hearing.
2. In determining whether Mr Caspersz had a reasonable excuse for not attending the hearing, what might constitute a 'reasonable excuse' is likely to be considered a question of fact.
3. In Avonwood Homes Pty Ltd (in liq) v Milodanovic[68] VCAT accepted when determining what is a reasonable excuse it should adopt a liberal approach. In Celona v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd [69] VCAT noted the word 'reasonable' imports an explanation or excuse that does not '...have to be an especially compelling explanation...'.[70]
4. These cases distinguish situations where the respondent was 'hiding' or where a party seeking to set aside an order has ignored the proceedings.
5. In this case Mr Caspersz cannot be accused of ignoring or hiding from the proceedings. From and including 2 April 2024 he sent nine emails to VCAT (and the Supreme Court) dated 4 April, 5 April (at 9.20 am and 5:00pm), 9 April and then to VCAT only, dated 22 May, 23 May (at 10.55am and 12.20pm) and 24 May 2024, advising of the personal circumstances of his parents' deaths[71] and advising he is unable to prepare for any legal proceedings and will not be for at least 12 months given his 'consequent mental state.
6. I note two aspects of Mr Caspersz's emails about his parents' deaths.
7. Firstly, in his earliest correspondence to the Tribunal he states:

I do NOT expect to be in a position to be able to progress any matters in relation to VCAT proceeding ... or any of the related Court proceedings ... for at least the next 12 months in view of the very recent passing of both my parents and my consequent emotional state, and further, the seriousness of the proposed investigations of the circumstances surrounding the passing of both of my parents...'[72]

1. Mr Caspersz is, in effect, seeking an adjournment of a case in which he is the applicant, for a period over 12 months. However, his emails do not read as requests, but rather as demands and statements of fact.
2. I note a request for an adjournment is at the discretion of the Tribunal and consideration will include weighing the interests of all parties to the proceeding.
3. Secondly, Mr Caspersz was seeking 'at least 12 months' for an adjournment in early April 2024 prior to producing any medical evidence in support of this period of time. The letters from his treating GP, dated 10 and 15 May 2024, note 'the bearer needs at least 12 months' for him to be able to focus and concentrate on important matters.' It is not explained how this 12-month period is arrived at. An inference could be drawn that Mr Caspersz has told the doctor he requires 'more than 12 months.'
4. Further the first letter dated 10 May 2024 from Dr Sathiyalingam refers to Mr Caspersz being 'physically & emotionally distressed & exhausted.' The letter dated 15 May 2024 refers to him having 'extreme anxiety & adjustment disorder...'. A GP will not usually make this diagnosis, but will refer a patient to a psychologist, (as later happened here), or psychiatrist, for a formal diagnosis. The GP does refer to a potential referral to a psychiatrist should grief become 'pathological.'
5. Mr Caspersz's request for an adjournment period of over 12 months is an extraordinarily long period of time for any litigant to request. The applicant is the party driving the proceedings. It is a highly unusual application, particularly in the absence of supporting specialist medical evidence. There are other factors relevant to an adjournment application such as fairness to the parties, any prejudice to the parties, and the impact on the Tribunal's resources and listing pressures for other Tribunal users.
6. Reflecting an intention to partially accommodate his circumstances and request, Mr Caspersz's Supreme Court proceeding that was listed for hearing on 11 April 2024 was initially consolidated with the other two proceedings, adjourned until 11 June 2024, and then adjourned again for final hearing in November 2024.
7. In Alesci v Salisbury[73] Bongiorno J noted section 120 'concentrated on the actions of the person affected by the order made in his or her absence'[74] and is a section 'to be construed liberally.'[75]
8. In my view Mr Caspersz has established he had a reasonable excuse for not attending the VCAT hearing on 27 May 2024 for the following reasons:
   • Focussing on his actions, he has, albeit clumsily, requested an adjournment of the proceeding where he is the claimant, because of his 'consequent emotional state' to the unexpected passing of both of his parents on 12 March 2024. The fact of his parents' passing is not in dispute;
   • He supported his 'consequent emotional state,' and to that extent, being unwell, with two letters from a doctor, which although imperfect, are not in dispute;
   • Mr Caspersz gave evidence to the Tribunal at his section 120 application that his medical condition was escalating to the extent on 16 May 2024 he was referred by his GP to see psychologist Ms Sandra Pucci;[76]
   • Mr Caspersz gave VCAT and the parties adequate notice of his inability to attend, dating back to 2 April 2024, some eight weeks prior to the directions hearing date;
   • He has sent nine emails on the same topic to VCAT informing that because of this, he would not be able to participate in and or prepare for the hearing in VCAT or any related court proceedings for at least 12 months. He has not ignored or avoided dealing with the fact the case was listed for a directions hearing;
   • Although he requested an adjournment of 'at least 12 months,' this period was not a binary question for the Tribunal, as indicated by the Supreme Court's approach.
9. At the section 120 hearing, Mr Caspersz made submissions and gave evidence under affirmation. His evidence was unchallenged.
10. In these circumstances Mr Caspersz has not ignored or avoided the hearing listed for 27 May 2024. His actions could be described as assiduous in his advice to VCAT of his situation which he supported with two letters from his treating GP. In so far as it is necessary to consider Mr Caspersz not being represented at the hearing, I accept his evidence he is unable to afford legal representation and does not qualify for pro bono legal assistance schemes.[77] He has provided an explanation which satisfies the requirement in section 120(4)(a)(i) that he had a reasonable excuse for not attending or being represented at the hearing

It is appropriate to hear and determine the application.

1. Section 120(4)(a)(ii) provides it is appropriate to hear and determine the application having regard to the matters specified in subsection (4A). I now turn to consider the matters specified in subsection (4A).

(a) whether the applicant has a reasonable case to argue in relation to the subject-matter of the order

1. In Allesch v Maunz[78] Kirby J stated, 'there will be no miscarriage of justice if the party affected by the impugned order cannot demonstrate an arguable case that reopening the matter might reasonably produce a materially different result which is more favourable to that party.'[79]
2. Mr Caspersz made submissions with respect to all 7 orders made on 27 May 2024.
3. I consider the substantive orders made on 27 May 2024. I note orders 1 and 2 are specific to leave granted to appear at the directions hearing on 27 May 2024. Order 3 concerns the 'purported' adjournment application, which was refused, and the directions hearing proceeded. I have considered above whether Mr Caspersz had a reasonable excuse for not attending the hearing. Order 7 has been complied with by the Principal Registrar.
4. The substantive orders relevant to whether Mr Caspersz has a reasonable case to argue are as follows:

Order 4: The applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023 is dismissed.

1. By email dated 3 October 2023, Mr Caspersz advised the VCAT Principal Registrar both sets of VCAT orders dated 24 August 2023 are on appeal to the Supreme Court and made a 'formal request' for a stay of both orders dated 24 August 2023 (these being the Honda costs order and an order refusing his request for stay of orders made on 28 June 2023).[80]
2. Mr Caspersz is seeking a stay of the Honda costs order.
3. On the transcript of the Directions Hearing on 27 May 2024, DP Lulham noted on 15 December 2022, SM Vassie dismissed Mr Caspersz's application for a stay of interlocutory orders without any adjudication of its merits. DP Lulham noted Mr Caspersz had appealed SM Vassie's order and the appeal was dismissed. DP Lulham stated, 'So he's actually seeking, if you like, from me today, a stay knowing that he said last time that that was inappropriate.'[81]
4. Mr Caspersz submits that the decision of AsJ Irving shows SM Vassie did have the power to order a stay, and AsJ Irving's judgement confirms, he was incorrect in his decision when he said he did not have that power.
5. Mr Caspersz submitted that DP Lulham was therefore incorrect to dismiss his application for a stay on the grounds that SM Vassie was correct.
6. The relevant part of AsJ Irving's judgment stated:

The plain English terms of s 149 of the VCAT Act do not limit the power of VCAT to stay the operation of any order it makes pending the determination of any appeal instituted under Part 5 of the VCAT Act. The terms of s 149 are not on their face, and in the context of an appeal from VCAT to the trial division of this Court, easily reconcilable with the reasoning of Beach JA in Quick. Mr Caspersz's preferred construction of the section, that VCAT may grant a stay of its orders pending appeal, is at least arguable.[82]

1. This satisfies me that Mr Caspersz has a reasonable case to argue regarding his application for a stay.

Order 5: The applicant shall pay the second respondent's costs of an incidental to the applicant's purported application to the Tribunal for a stay of the Orders made 24 August 2023, to be assessed by the Costs Court on a standard basis under the County Court scale.

1. Mr Caspersz submitted there was no indication in the second respondent's written materials filed with the Tribunal that they were seeking costs against him. Further, there was no application for costs by Counsel on behalf of the second respondent at the hearing. The transcript confirms costs were raised by DP Lulham and then ordered under section 109.[83]
2. As Mr Caspersz was not on notice of this application, this could constitute a denial of natural justice.
3. Further, as I have found he has a reasonable case to argue in his application for a stay, a costs order, if he is successful, would not follow the event under section 109(1) of the VCAT Act.
4. I am satisfied Mr Caspersz has a reasonable case to argue with respect to this order.

Order 6: The proceeding as between the applicant and the first and third respondent is struck out.

1. The 'Background' to the 27 May 2024 orders states:

In relation to the first and third respondents, I find that as a result of the applicant's refusal to comply with previous directions of the Tribunal, the applicant has not articulated the basis of his claim against the first and third respondents in a way that could allow them to understand the basis of those claims. The first and third respondents have been significantly prejudiced by the applicant's conduct in this proceeding. The applicant's failure to appear at today's directions hearing results in him not seeking any directions which might facilitate his claims against the first and third respondents being heard. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the first and third respondents' application for an order that the proceeding against them be struck out. As the first and third respondents have not engaged legal practitioners in this VCAT proceeding, no application for costs was made by them.[84]

1. Mr Caspersz submitted he has filed his points of claim and an amended points of claim. The respondents have filed defences to his points of claim. There have been expert reports exchanged. He submitted the only change to his claim he sought to make was in respect of the fuel pump issue and the national recall of the Honda. He denied that he had not complied with previous directions of the Tribunal.
2. Mr Caspersz's case had progressed to a point of claim, defence, experts and amendment to claim. Although the multiplicity of legal proceedings, surrounding his claim are complex, his claim, as outlined in his VCAT application dated 23 August 2019, is an ordinary civil claim filed at VCAT, being a claim of under $40,000 against the Respondents due to alleged defects in a car he had purchased from them.[85]
3. Given his claim has been struck out, the substantial hearing of his claim may well produce a materially different result that is more favourable to him. I have not made a detailed assessment of the merits of Mr Caspersz's civil claim, and this is not a finding on the ultimate substantive merits of that claim, but on the subject matter of order 6. For these reasons I am satisfied he had a reasonable case to argue on the merits of this order.

(b) any prejudice that may be caused to another party if the application is heard and determined.

1. Further delay, protraction of the proceedings and lack of finality of the proceeding are obvious prejudices to the first and third respondents if the section 120 re-opening order is made.
2. Mr Smith did not point to specific prejudice other than frustration at how Mr Caspersz has conducted the proceedings and that he has spent hundreds of hours on this proceeding. [86] Ms Cockram made some brief submissions with respect to Order 6, and that there has been prejudice to the first and third respondent due to the prolonged nature of this proceeding since 2019.[87]
3. Ms Cockram noted, in relation to Order 3, the continued prejudice that Honda had suffered because of Mr Caspersz continued attempts to adjourn the proceedings.[88]
4. I take these considerations into account.
5. I have considered the matters in section 120(4A), that Mr Caspersz has a reasonable case to argue with respect to orders 4, 5 and 6, although there the prejudice of delay and lack of finality to the other parties. I am satisfied it is appropriate to hear and determine the application. Mr Caspersz's substantive case was struck out and a costs order was made against him without notice. There has been no hearing on the merits of the claim against the first and third respondents. These are factors in favour of it being appropriate to hear and determine the application.
6. Under section 120(4), I am satisfied Mr Caspersz has discharged his onus as to having a reasonable excuse for not attending or being represented at the hearing. I find it is appropriate to hear and determine the application having regard to matters specified and referred to above in subsection (4A).
7. For these reasons Mr Caspersz's application to re-open the orders of the Tribunal dated 27 May 2024 under section 120(4)(a) of the VCAT Act is granted. The re-opening of the hearing, under section 120(4)(b), is referred to the Principal Registrar for listing.

[1] The Applicant's points of claim dated 27 November 2019 claimed $38,574.32, see Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2024] VSC 8.

[2] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2024] VSC 8, [1] - [22].

[3] Order of the Tribunal dated 11 August 2022, Order 10.

[4] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2023] VCAT 739.

[5] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Proprietary Limited (Civil Claims) (Costs) [2023] VCAT 987.

[6] On 9 October 2023 the matter was listed for directions hearing on 25 October 2023. This was vacated by the Orders of 10 October 2023, and the listing was adjourned to 1 November 2023.

[7] See, Order of the Tribunal dated 28 June 2024.

[8] Transcript of the VCAT section 120 hearing 25 March 2025, ('T') 45:14 - 45:30.

[11] Transcript of 27 May 2024 Directions Hearing, 5:21.

[13] Justice Quigley's decision of Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2022] VCAT 1102 dismissed Mr Caspersz's application for reconstitution of the Tribunal on the basis no member had been allocated to the hearing.

[15] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2023] VCAT 739.

[16] Order of the Tribunal dated 24 August 2023, Background 'A'.

[17] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) (Costs) [2023] VCAT 987.

[18] [2023] VSC 555.

[19] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors [2023] VSC 555, [55].

[20] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors [2023] VSC 555, [57].

[21] At 4:17 - 5:2 of the Transcript of the 27 May 2024 hearing, Ms Cockram is recorded as saying 'we say the stay application is an absolute abuse of process. So it's really - we are in your hands, Deputy President, as to how you want to proceed with the application ... we are in your hands as to how you would like to proceed with the stay application'.

[22] Order of the Tribunal dated 27 May 2024, 3-4.

[24] Transcript of Directions Hearing 27 May 2024, 8:2 - 8:5.

[25] Transcript of Directions Hearing 27 May 2024, T 10:13-10:14.

[26] Transcript of Directions Hearing 27 May 2024, T 10:16 and 10:28.

[30] Orders of the Tribunal dated 27 May 2024, 4.

[32] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2023] VCAT 739.

[33] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2023] VCAT 739, [58].

[34] See, Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] VSC 8.

[35] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Proprietary Limited (Civil Claims) (Costs) [2023] VCAT 987.

[36] Order of the Tribunal dated 6 October 2023.

[41] Ms Cockram referred to 5:13 - 5:15, and 6:14 - 6:22 of the Transcript of 27 May 2024 Directions Hearing.

[43] [2000] VCAT 415.

[52] Affidavit of Adrian Caspersz dated 7 March 2025, [11]A1.

[53] Mr Caspersz appears to have informed the Supreme Court by emails dated 12 and 13 March 2024, which he provided to VCAT on 2 April 2024.

[54] This being a reference to prior correspondence addressed to the Supreme Court which he attached to this email.

[55] Email from Mr Caspersz to VCAT dated 2 April 2024 (emphasis in original).

[56] Email from Mr Caspersz to VCAT dated 4 April 2024 (emphasis in original).

[57] Email from Mr Caspersz dated 5 April 2024 (emphasis in original).

[58] Email from Mr Caspersz dated 22 May 2024 (emphasis in original).

[59] Letter from Dr Sathiyalingam dated 10 May 2024.

[60] Letter from Dr Sathiyalingam dated 15 May 2024.

[62] This was a listing for hearing Mr Caspersz's appeal of AsJ Irving decision, Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors [2023] VSC 555, which Mr Caspersz had filed on 6 October 2023.

[63] Order in proceeding S ECI 2023 00577 dated 15 April 2024.

[64] Transcript in proceeding S ECI 2023 00577 & Ors dated 15 May 2024, 1:16-17.

[65] Orders in proceeding S ECI 2023 04461 dated 15 May 2024.

[66] See generally, Transcript in proceeding S ECI 2023 00577 & Ors dated 15 May 2024.

[67] Orders of the Tribunal dated 27 May 2024.

[68] [2005] VCAT 1297; (2005) 23 VAR 189.

[69] [2012] VCT 403 ('Celona v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd').

[70] Celona v Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd, [12].

[71] In his 12:20pm of 23 May 2024 and his 24 May 2024 Mr Caspersz did not advise of his personal circumstances but referred to previous correspondence in which he had.

[72] Email dated 2 April 2024 from Adrian Caspersz to VCAT (emphasis in original).

[73] [2002 VSC 475 ('Alesci v Salisbury').

[77] T 8:3 - 8:12. Mr Caspersz submitted this in respect to his application to adjourn the section 120 hearing, which I refused.

[78] [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 ('Allesch v Maunz')

[80] By email dated 8 August 2023, Mr Caspersz had advised the VCAT Principal Registrar and Honda that VCAT's orders dated 28 June 2023 have been appealed to the Supreme Court and 'formally' requested VCAT stay its orders

[81] Transcript from 27 May 2024, 4:23 - 4:26.

[82] Caspersz v Garry & Warren Smith Pty Ltd & Ors, [2023] VSC 555, [54].

[83] Transcript from 27 May 2024, 8:2 - 8:5.

[84] Orders of the Tribunal dated 27 May 2024, 4.

[85] Ms Caspersz's application to VCAT dated 23 August 2019.

[86] In his submissions, Mr Smith indicated he was happy with the submissions Ms Cockram had made on this point, see T 115:4 - 115:6.