Trisap Group Pty Ltd ACN:605 674 502 t/as Mining And Fertiliser

Directions Hearing (complex interlocutory application)

Carillon Group Pty Ltd v Trisap Group Pty Ltd [2026] VCAT 212

1. The final hearing date of 30 April 2026 is confirmed.
2. The applicant's interlocutory application is dismissed.
3. The parties' attention is drawn to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Order made 4 June 2025, and to their respective obligations to give full discovery of documents which are continuing.
4. No order as to costs.

Ms Laurel K Walker (i.e., Ms Young Sun Kim-Walker), director

1. In today's interlocutory hearing, both sides were self-represented. The applicant had expressed its application, and the reasons or grounds for that application, in affidavits of Ms Young Sun Kim-Walker deposed to on 19 January 2026 and 3 March 2026 and the exhibits to those affidavits. The respondent had filed and served brief written submissions, by email at 12:47pm on 25 March 2026.
2. Because the parties were self-represented it was unsurprising that the documents contained some expressions to which they attached a different meaning than would a legal practitioner. For example, in paragraph 1 of the respondent's written submissions, the respondent argued that the Tribunal "lacks jurisdiction". The President made an Order on 22 January 2025 in which he ruled that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim by Carillon Group Pty Ltd against the respondent for the payment of fees and reimbursement of expenses under the contract alleged by Carillon Group Pty Ltd. Accordingly, it was apparent that the respondent's submission about "jurisdiction" was intended to mean no more than that the Tribunal should not grant the applicant's interlocutory application. In a broadly similar vein, in today's hearing both sides agreed that the "Federal Court proceeding" which they had both alluded to but had not identified by name or Court number, concerned entities other than the parties in this VCAT proceeding, and concerned issues which are not relevant to this VCAT proceeding. It follows that the "Federal Court proceeding" has no impact on VCAT's jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims identified by the President in the Order of 22 January 2025.
3. On 4 June 2025, the Tribunal had ordered both parties to make full discovery of relevant documents by 20 August 2025. Specifically, paragraph 7 of that Order required each party to send to VCAT and to the other party "a copy of all documents in their possession or control which relate to the issues in dispute". Obviously, "the issues in dispute" are the issues identified in the President's Order of 22 January 2025 as, it would be hoped, articulated in the Points of Claim and Points of Defence.
4. In today's hearing, it was not disputed that the applicant had complied with the Order for discovery. The applicant said that the respondent had served copies of documents on it, but that the applicant did not consider that it had complied with the Order. In other words, the applicant said - in effect for the first time in today's hearing - that the respondent had not given adequate discovery.
5. The applicant's interlocutory application of 19 January 2026 can now be understood to be an application for supplementary discovery of documents. The interlocutory application was phrased as if it was an application for a Mareva injunction in which the applicant was seeking the preservation of an extraordinarily broad collection of documents which arguably might be held by any public company, but which by their description do not appear to "relate to the issues in dispute".
6. As reflected in the Order made by the President on 22 January 2025, and as expressed in the applicant's Points of Claim dated 2 July 2025, the applicant alleges that it was retained to provide business establishment and administration services for a fee of $2,000.00 per month commencing 1 September 2024, plus expenses. The applicant alleges that the retainer was made in a binding verbal agreement made in September 2014 which was ratified by the respondent after its incorporation on 22 May 2015. The applicant alleges that it performed the services between 1 September 2014 and 5 January 2018, and that - taking into account a payment made by the respondent in 2016 - it is owed $61,778.50 plus interest pursuant to statute. It is convenient to call this "the contract claim".
7. The applicant also alleges, further or alternatively to the contract claim, that the respondent engaged in unconscionable conduct within the meaning of section 21 of the Australian Consumer Law (Victoria). Particulars of this alleged conduct are set out under paragraph 13 of the pleading.
8. The parties understand that some other text in the Points of Claim dated 2 July 2025 is superfluous because of the President's Order made 22 January 2025. For example, paragraph 14 asserts a breach of directors' duties by Messrs Watts and Ramsey and refers to sections 181 and 182 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It is clear that these superfluous passages do not raise a jurisdictional issue under authorities such as the Court of Appeal's decision of Thurin v Krongold Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 226, because of the President's Order explained that the Tribunal could not hear such Corporations Act matters.
9. In the years before Thurin v Krongold it had been thought - on the rare occasions that a Federal matter appeared to be raised in a VCAT proceeding - that VCAT could put aside the Federal matter because it lacked jurisdiction to hear it, but continue to hear the rest of the case. Authorities such as Thurin v Krongold explained that this was erroneous, and that the presence of the Federal matter resulted in VCAT losing all jurisdiction. A summary of the jurisprudence is contained in Van Sanden v Mercedes-Benz Australia/Pacific Pty Ltd [2025] VCAT 128, particularly in the first 16 paragraphs of the Reasons.
10. However, the parties' pleadings must be objectively assessed by the Tribunal or Court faced with this situation. Objective assessment of pleadings (and objective construction of contacts for that matter) is a conventional aspect of Australian law. It has been said in the context of the "Federal matter issue" that it is up to the Court to determine whether a party has raised a Federal matter or not, and that the party's own belief of what their document means is not decisive.
11. Properly understood, the Points of Claim in this proceeding do not purport to raise claims which the applicant knows are outside VCAT's jurisdiction. In D'Angelo v The Domicile Group Pty Ltd [2025] VSC 395 the Supreme Court made clear that an objective assessment of the legal basis of an applicant's claim should be made when reading pleadings if there was a possibility of a "Federal matter issue" emerging, and that the mere fact that the pleading contains a word or expression which appears to raise a Federal matter is not conclusive in making that objective assessment. For example, in D'Angelo the applicant had referred to the "Australian Consumer Law" and the Court objectively assessed those words as meaning, in the context of Mr D'Angelo's proceeding, the Australian Consumer Law (Victoria) in relation to which VCAT undoubtedly has jurisdiction.
12. My objective assessment of the Points of Claim dated 2 July 2025 - which includes the facts that it was filed a few months after the President's Order made 22 January 2025 and had not been drafted by a lawyer - is that they do not seek to raise a Federal matter in this proceeding, but that mentions of the Corporations Act are in effect additional Particulars of the allegation that the respondent had engaged in unconscionable conduct. I simply could not accept that this self-represented litigant, having seen the President's Order made 22 January 2025, could have deliberately decided to raise a Federal matter which would deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction. The applicant's subjective intention was not to raise a "Federal matter", and my objective assessment is that it did not do so.
13. I now turn to the application which, objectively, is before the Tribunal on this occasion: namely for an order which would compel the respondent to give supplementary discovery of documents.
14. The applicant's affidavits of 19 January 2026 and 3 March 2026 do not properly identify "issues in dispute" in relation to which it alleges that the respondent has not given discovery.
15. Further, as in its own submissions the respondent concedes that the applicant's claim is a claim for payment of an alleged debt, the applicant will have the burden of proving its central allegations that it was retained; that the retainer was ratified by the respondent company; that the applicant provided the alleged services and rendered its invoices; that the claims for payment are for services provided under the agreement; that the respondent has not paid the sums rightfully owing; and in the alternative that the respondent engaged in unconscionable conduct essentially by leading the applicant on to supply the services whilst intending not to pay for them.
16. Having been ordered to give discovery of all relevant documents in its possession or control, if the respondent does not have written evidence confronting the applicant's claims, then that should be to the applicant's advantage in the proceeding. It is not in the applicant's interests to try to force the respondent to find evidence which would support the respondent's defence.
17. Similarly, if the respondent attempts to rely on documents in the hearing, which were in its possession or control but which it failed to discover, it will likely be prevented from doing so.
18. In the circumstances, on the basis of the material filed I am not persuaded that the applicant has established that the respondent's discovery to date is inadequate.
19. If, however, the respondent's consideration of the affidavits of Ms Young Sun Kim-Walker deposed to on 19 January 2026 and 3 March 2026 causes it to conclude that it has not given proper discovery, then it should give adequate discovery almost immediately. The hearing is listed for 30 April 2026 and there is no material before the Tribunal at present which would suggest that the hearing date should be adjourned.
20. Finally, as both parties are self-represented, there is no basis on which either of them could seek costs of the interlocutory application.