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The chronology recorded by Steward J is short. On 30 October 2023, the applicant's solicitor received instructions to act in the special leave application. After reviewing the case and receiving written advice from Senior Counsel dated 14 December 2023, the solicitor formed the view that the firm could no longer continue to act [1]. The solicitor considered the case to have “limited or no prospects of success” and considered that it “may meet the definition of 'vexatious proceeding' pursuant to s 77RL of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)” [1]. The firm also referred to a possible risk of professional embarrassment if it continued acting [1].

Those statements describe the solicitor's assessment, not a finding by Steward J. The Court did not decide whether the special leave application had limited or no prospects, whether it met the definition in s 77RL, or whether continuing to act would cause professional embarrassment.

On 21 December 2023, a solicitor at Unified Lawyers emailed the applicant to explain that the firm intended to withdraw and asked him to sign a form called “Notice of Intention to Act in Person” [2]. The applicant said by telephone that he would not sign it. He had been told that if he did not sign, more time and costs would be involved [2]. On 12 January 2024, the solicitor filed the application for leave to withdraw under r 6.02.5(c) of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) [3]. It was supported by an affidavit and an exhibit containing correspondence between the firm and the applicant [4].

Steward J granted the application. The orders also required the solicitor to serve the order on the applicant and every other party, and to notify the Court and every other party in writing of the applicant's last known address for service. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of his solicitors of and incidental to the withdrawal application.

Why the court decided this way

The reasons focus on two matters: compliance with the notice requirement and whether withdrawal and the associated costs order were appropriate.

First, Steward J considered the procedural requirement in r 6.02.5(c). The judgment says that the solicitor had to give written notice to the applicant of the intention to seek leave to withdraw before making the application. The judge considered the solicitor's affidavit and the correspondence exhibited with it, and was satisfied that the requirement had been met [5]. The correspondence described in the reasons included the 21 December email telling the applicant that the firm intended to withdraw [2].

Second, having regard to that evidence, Steward J was “satisfied that in all the circumstances it is appropriate for leave to be granted” [5]. The judgment does not identify a list of factors or set out a general test beyond this case-specific conclusion. It records relevant context, including the firm's review of the case, senior counsel's written advice, the firm's stated concerns, and the communications with the applicant [1]-[4]. It does not say that any one of these matters alone required the grant of leave.

The costs order is similarly explained at a high level. Steward J said that it was appropriate “for the applicant to bear the costs of this application” [5]. The formal order invokes rr 50.01 and 51.02 of the Rules and specifies that the applicant must pay the costs of his solicitors “of and incidental to this application”. The reasons do not provide a separate analysis of those rules or explain the costs order beyond the judge's conclusion that it was appropriate in all the circumstances.

The remaining orders address the practical consequences of withdrawal. The solicitor had to serve a copy of the order on the applicant and every other party, and provide written notice to the Court and every other party of the applicant's last known address for service. These are directions made in this proceeding. The judgment does not discuss wider consequences for the conduct or merits of the special leave application.

Before and after state of the law

This judgment does not describe the law before the decision, canvass competing authorities, or announce a new general principle. Its stated legal framework is limited to provisions of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth): r 6.02.5(c) for the application to withdraw, and rr 50.01 and 51.02 for the costs order. It also records that the solicitor considered s 77RL of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) potentially relevant to the case. The Court does not interpret or apply s 77RL in deciding the withdrawal application.

The judgment's practical contribution is its application of r 6.02.5(c) on the evidence presented. The judge found that the written-notice requirement had been met because the affidavit and correspondence established prior notice to the applicant [5]. It also records that the applicant did not sign the form titled “Notice of Intention to Act in Person”, but that fact did not prevent the Court from granting leave in this instance [2], [5]. The judgment does not say that such a form is always required, that a client’s refusal to sign is irrelevant in every case, or that notice by email will necessarily satisfy the rule in other circumstances.

After this decision, the operative outcome in this proceeding was that the solicitor could withdraw, subject to the associated service and address-for-service orders, and the applicant bore the costs of the application. On the text provided, no broader change to the law can be attributed to the judgment. It is a short procedural decision by a single Justice, and it does not purport to settle the merits of the underlying appeal or give an extensive account of the rule's operation.

For practitioners and compliance professionals, the distinction between what the Court decided and what the solicitor asserted is central. The solicitor's view about prospects and possible vexatiousness explains the context for the application, but the Court's express findings concern written notice, the appropriateness of leave, and costs [1], [5]. Treating the solicitor's assessment as a judicial determination would go beyond the reasons.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [1], the reasons explain that the solicitor received instructions on 30 October 2023 and later decided that the firm could no longer continue to act, after reviewing the case and receiving senior counsel's advice. In plain English, this is the firm's account of why it sought permission to withdraw. It is not a ruling on whether the proposed appeal was weak or vexatious.

The same paragraph says that the solicitor considered the case might meet the definition of a “vexatious proceeding” under s 77RL of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). In plain English, the solicitor raised a concern about that statutory provision. Steward J did not decide whether the provision applied.

At [2], the reasons record that the firm emailed the applicant about its intention to withdraw and requested that he sign a “Notice of Intention to Act in Person”. The applicant said he would not sign. The account shows that the applicant was informed of the intended withdrawal and that the solicitor sought his signature on a form. It does not establish any general rule about the legal effect of refusing to sign that particular form.

At [5], Steward J says: “I am satisfied that the applicant's solicitor has complied with the requirement under r 6.02.5(c) of the Rules to give notice in writing to the applicant of the solicitor's intention to apply for leave to withdraw prior to making the application to this Court.” In plain English, the judge accepted that the applicant received the required written notice before the formal application was filed.

The next sentence at [5] says the judge was satisfied that “in all the circumstances” leave should be granted and that the applicant should bear the costs. In plain English, the judge made a case-specific decision to allow withdrawal and allocate the costs of the application to the applicant. The short reasons do not set out a more detailed balancing exercise or a general costs formula.

The formal orders add procedural directions: service of the order on the applicant and every other party, and written notification of the applicant's last known address for service. These directions ensure that the relevant parties and the Court receive the information specified in the order. The judgment does not describe any further consequence if those directions are not followed.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is relevant to a narrow procedural situation: a solicitor on the record in a High Court matter applies for leave to withdraw under r 6.02.5(c), and the Court is asked to assess whether the required written notice was given and whether leave and costs orders are appropriate. In Carevic, the evidence included an affidavit and correspondence between solicitor and client [4], and the judge expressly relied on that material in finding the notice requirement satisfied [5].

The decision may be useful when considering the importance of documenting the notice process. Here, the record described a written email to the applicant advising that the firm intended to withdraw, followed by a formal application supported by sworn evidence and exhibited correspondence [2]-[4]. The judgment does not say that the exact same documents or communication method must be used in every matter. It establishes only that the evidence in this case satisfied the judge.

It may also be relevant where a client declines to sign a form connected with acting in person. In this case, the applicant's refusal to sign did not stop the judge from granting leave [2], [5]. That outcome should be understood in the context of the full record, including the finding of prior written notice and the conclusion that leave was appropriate in all the circumstances.

The decision is not a precedent on how courts should assess the merits of special leave applications, how to determine whether proceedings are vexatious, or when a solicitor may withdraw as a matter of professional conduct generally. Those subjects are not analysed. Nor does the judgment decide whether the applicant's refusal to sign the form created any separate legal consequence.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later decisions, and the material provided gives no subsequent cases applying, distinguishing, approving or criticising Carevic v Carevic [2024] HCASJ 1. It is therefore not possible, from this source alone, to describe how later courts have treated it.

The only other case identified is Carevic & Carevic [2023] FedCFamC1A 165, a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) from which the applicant sought special leave to appeal [1] and [n 2]. Steward J refers to it as the underlying decision, not as an authority for a proposition about withdrawal or costs. The High Court judgment does not summarise its reasoning.

Accordingly, this judgment's value as precedent should be described narrowly on the available text. It records a finding that r 6.02.5(c)'s notice requirement was met on the evidence in this application and that leave and costs orders were appropriate. Any claim about its treatment by later courts would require sources beyond the judgment supplied here.

Still-open questions

Several questions remain unanswered by the reasons. The judgment does not reproduce the full text of r 6.02.5(c), rr 50.01 or 51.02, or s 77RL. It does not give an extended interpretation of any of those provisions. Accordingly, this decision alone does not establish the full requirements of a withdrawal application, the complete range of relevant considerations, or the general basis for allocating costs.

The reasons also do not explain what the senior counsel advice said, beyond its date, or set out the firm's full assessment of the case. They do not assess the proposed appeal's prospects or decide whether it was vexatious. The stated concerns remain the solicitor's view [1], not the Court's conclusion.

The judgment does not say whether the applicant was otherwise represented after withdrawal, how he proceeded with the special leave application, or what ultimately happened to that application. Nor does it state whether the parties disputed the application, whether the respondent took a position on it, or whether the Court heard oral submissions. Those details cannot be inferred from the orders or the short reasons.

Finally, the decision does not formulate a general rule about the type of written communication sufficient to give notice, the minimum content of such notice, or the significance of a client's refusal to sign a notice-of-intention form. The judge's express finding is confined to the affidavit and correspondence before the Court in this application [4]-[5].

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.