austlii:cth/FedCFamC1F/2025/393
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC1F
2025-06-13
Carew J
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Carder & Pearson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
In addition to the use of pseudonyms for the parties, other changes have been made to the published judgment to protect the identity of a party or a witness. Such changes (other than when a letter is used instead of a name or an address) are apparent on the face of the judgment by the use of square brackets.
The effect of section 61E of the Family Law Act is that if I grant leave and an adoption order is made, the parental responsibility of any person who had parental responsibility for the child immediately before the adoption ceases. That applies to both Mrs Cahill and Mr Fryar. Mr Fryar understands that that will be the effect of an ultimate adoption order. This is the issue that led me to raise with Mrs Cahill whether she wanted to become an applicant rather than a respondent, namely, that on that basis, if an adoption order is made in favour of both Mr and Mrs Cahill, then they will thereafter have parental responsibility for the child. In other words, although the effect of section 61E is that Mrs Cahill would nominally lose her parental responsibility for the child, upon the adoption, the effect of the adoption would be that she gets it back.
...
- My decision to transfer my parental rights is not because I do not wish to be a part of his life but because I believe this is the decision that is best for his future stability and wellbeing.
- I do not wish for [the child] to be exposed to ongoing conflict between the mother and I and consider that in the circumstances I consider this adoption is the best way for him to be protected from such conflict and to be able to grow up in a stable household.
- [The stepfather] has been a consistent presence in [the child's] life and it is clear to me he has taken on the role of father. While it is painful for me to relinquish my rights, I recognise that [the stepfather] is in a better position to be able to provide for the daily care, guidance and support [the child] needs in his life.
(a) My dearest [the child],
I want you to know this decision was made with much consideration and not made lightly. It does not mean that I do not love you. It means I love you so much that I want you to have the best possible life, free from the conflict and challenges that have come between your biological parents. I hope you grow up happy, loved and supported.
Please always remember you were never unwanted and you will always have a special place in my heart. No matter where life takes you I will always be cheering for you, proud of you and loving you from afar. You will always be my son and I will always love you.
(Emphasis in original)
I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Carew.
[2] Brock & Brock [2007] FamCA 1594 at [12]; Tanner & Cape [2011] FamCA 665 at [4]; Orr & Leach [2022] FedCFamC1F 217 at [11]; cf Hanlon & Hanlon [2022] FedCFamC1F 435 at [45]-[46].