2. It is unnecessary to canvas the facts in any further detail. The Commissioner found that the appellant suffered from an anxiety disorder. At 3 of his reasons for judgment he correctly postulated the relevant legal test the appellant had to satisfy in order to qualify for compensation. He said:

"What the worker must show in this case is that she has suffered an

injury which is a disease which has arisen out of and in the course

of her employment and to which her employment has contributed to a

substantial degree."

"There seems to me to be little doubt on the basis of the worker's

own evidence, and it is conceded by the employer, that the worker's

condition arises out of and in the course of her employment."

4. The claim failed because the Commissioner was not satisfied that "her employment contributed to a substantial degree" to an "injury which is a disease".

5. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the Commissioner erroneously construed the meaning of "employment" secondly occurring in s25(1)(b) and that this error led to his conclusion that the appellant had not established that her employment had contributed to a substantial degree to the anxiety disorder. On the facts of this case it is a little hard to understand how the Commissioner could have been satisfied that the injury, which is a disease, arose out of and in the course of her employment but not satisfied that the employment contributed to that injury to a substantial degree. There was no question of the degree of the contribution. The Commissioner's reasons make it clear that in his opinion the employment did not contribute to the injury at all.

6. There can be no doubt that "employment" bears the same meaning wherever it appears in s25(1). Indeed, Mr Jago who appeared for the respondent, did not submit to the contrary. The Commissioner did not expressly state the contrary either but Miss Lambert, who appeared for the appellant, submitted that the only explanation for the apparently conflicting findings was that the Commissioner took the view that "employment" secondly enacted in s25(1)(b) meant something different from "employment" firstly enacted. The courts have frequently construed the meaning of "employment" as enacted in workers' compensation legislation. It has long been recognised as meaning not only the performance of the actual work which a person is required to do, but includes "the natural incidents connected with the class of work" per Charles R Davidson and Co v McRobb (1918) AC 304 at 321. See also for example, Whittingham v Commissioner of Railways (WA) [1931] HCA 49; (1931) 46 CLR 22; Kavanagh v The Commonwealth [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547; Hatzimanolis v ANI Corporation Ltd [1992] HCA 21; (1991-1992) 173 CLR 473. Applied to the present case, "employment" in s25(1)(b) is a reference to the performance each working day, of the appellant's duties as spelled out in her duty statement which was tendered in evidence, and all that which was reasonably incidental thereto including interaction with fellow employees, students and visitors to the Conservatorium. It was the interaction between the appellant and her supervisor, the former's perception of her work load and her perception of her treatment at the hands of the supervisor and the department head, that caused the anxiety disorder and resultant incapacity for work. The documentary psychiatric evidence suggested no other cause and the Commissioner's reasons for judgment refer to no other cause. This no doubt led to the Commissioner's finding that the injury which was a disease, arose out of and in the course of her employment. The Commissioner referred to the year that the appellant worked in another department during which the symptoms of the disorder abated, and said, "(the disorder) has undoubtedly arisen out of and in the course of the employment because by moving to a different department her stress levels have lessened". He then said:

"However, it is the way that she is reacting to her inability to

perform her duties harmoniously with her fellow employee that is

causing her stress. It is not the work place itself, ie not the

employment itself which is contributing to a substantial degree to

that stress. Lest it might be thought that it is obvious that her

presence in that particular office is causing her stress and that

would amount to contribution to a substantial degree, in my view it

has to be that her duties are contributing to a substantial degree

to that stress."

7. I interpose here that error appears to have occurred in that passage as the Commissioner seemed to be of the view that "employment" secondly enacted in s25(1)(b) was confined to the performance of work the appellant was required to do by the terms of her duty statement and did not include all that which was reasonably incidental to or ancillary to the performance of those duties. That this error occured seems to be confirmed by the next passage in the reasons for judgment:

"I see nothing in the evidence which convinces me on the balance of

probabilities it is more probable than not that it is her duties

and the performance of them, that is causing her the stress. In

plain words it is my view that her stress is caused by her

inability to get on, for whatever reason, with her supervisor and

her head of department. Although this arises out of that

relationship, an employment relationship, it is not the employment

which contributes to a substantial degree to the stress."

8. The finding that the stress "arises out of that relationship, an employment relationship" is of necessity, a finding that the employment caused the stress disorder (Kavanagh (supra) at 556). The work place interaction with the supervisor was the psychological stresor that operated on the "inability to get on" causing the injury which was a disease and the resultant incapacity for work. On the facts as found by the Commissioner, a proper application of the law could have resulted only in a finding that the appellant's employment had contributed to a substantial degree to the injury which the Commissioner found arose out of and in the course of her employment.

9. Accordingly, I conclude that there was an error of law. The order of the Commissioner will be quashed. I will hear counsel with respect to the final disposition of this matter.