Leave to amend granted
5 At the hearing, I indicated that the leave sought by Ms Cameron would be granted, being satisfied that was what justice required in the circumstances.
6 There is a protracted history to the bringing of these proceedings. Ms Cameron was injured in a fork lift accident in March 1999 at the Qantas jet base, where she was employed by the first defendant Qantas. In 2001 she brought proceedings in the District Court in relation to the accident. Liability was accepted by Qantas, but quantum was in issue.
7 Ms Cameron was represented at the District Court hearing on 1 February 2008 by Walker Legal and Mr Moffett, of counsel. There had previously been a number of other firms of solicitors which had represented her in her pursuit of her claims.
8 The matter was part heard, listed for one day for final submissions. The prospect of settlement was then raised by McLoughlin DCJ. The transcript of the proceedings reveals that his Honour explained to Ms Cameron that he raised the prospect of settlement because there was a complex medical situation and conflicting medical opinions to be resolved. The risks of litigation might make a compromise an attractive way forward for the parties, given what they each risked in the litigation. His Honour adjourned to enable the parties to consider what he had raised. A settlement was later announced and consent orders were made.
9 His Honour then permitted Ms Cameron to address him. She told his Honour that she was very disheartened by the process and the decision which she had reached, without having had the chance herself to speak her mind. She said that her solicitors and barrister had been really good, but she was not happy. His Honour observed that one of the benefits of a compromise was that it took away the stressors of litigation, which he hoped would occur for her. He also observed that the figure agreed appeared to him to be a proper one, reflecting concessions on both sides. He observed that money could not make all that had occurred better, but the settlement removed the risk of appeals and further litigation, once a decision had been given.
10 Ms Cameron soon sought to resile from the settlement. Walker Legal's retainer was terminated and it had no further involvement in the matter. It later sought payment of its costs.
11 On 6 June 2008, Qantas was granted relief by interpleader, permitting it to pay the balance of the settlement moneys into court. There were disputes in respect of those moneys between Ms Cameron and her former legal representatives. Some of the settlement moneys remain with the District Court, some have been paid to Ms Cameron's former legal advisers and some to Ms Cameron herself.
12 Ms Cameron sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal (see Cameron v Qantas Airways Limited [2008] NSWCA 275). That leave was refused. Ms Cameron then pursued a motion in the District Court, seeking to have the consent orders set aside. That motion was dismissed after a hearing on the merits, in which she and the defendants led evidence. Ms Cameron again appealed to the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the District Court (see Cameron V Qantas Airways Ltd [2009] NSWCA 339).
13 Ms Cameron then filed a further motion in the District Court. On 28 January 2010, Johnstone DCJ dismissed the motion, Ms Cameron accepting that it was incompetent. There has been no application for leave to appeal from that decision. At that hearing Ms Cameron announced her intention to bring her application to the Supreme Court.
14 At the hearing of the defendants' motions, Ms Cameron confirmed that what she sought to achieve by her application to this Court, was to have the consent orders made in the District Court set aside. She also wishes to pursue a new hearing of her damages claim in this Court. Ms Cameron explained that she proposes to make an application to have the District Court proceedings transferred to this Court and is taking steps to that end.
15 From the existing pleadings, it is apparent that Ms Cameron has serious complaints, particularly about the alleged conduct of Mr Walker, in relation to the settlement, amongst other things. Whether she wishes to pursue those complaints in these proceedings, or merely seeks to rely on those matters to pursue her application to have the consent orders set aside, is not clear.
16 Nevertheless, in the circumstances, as they developed, I was satisfied that justice demanded that Ms Cameron, an unrepresented litigant, be given an opportunity to replead the case which she actually wishes to advance. Those amended pleadings must conform to the requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.
17 Those Rules are intended to ensure that both the defendants and the Court are given a clear indication, from the outset, of the claims which are made by Ms Cameron; the factual basis upon which those claims are advanced; and the orders which are sought. The parties' pleadings have important functions to perform in relation to the conduct and eventual hearing of the case, particularly in relation to the identification of the legal and factual issues lying between the parties and the evidence which is relevant to their determination.
18 Ms Cameron's current pleadings are embarrassing, in the sense that is discussed in the authorities, namely that they are unintelligible, imprecise and ambiguous, depriving the defendants of a proper opportunity of understanding what actual allegations comprise the substance of her claims. They do not provide material facts to support the serious allegations made (see Kirby v Sanderson Motors Pty Limited [2001] NSWCA 44; (2001) 54 NSWLR 135, Hodgson JA (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing) at 142-143). In Gunns Limited v Marr [2005] VSC 251, Bongiorno J observed that: