Rita Cameron v Walker Legal

Background 6In 2001 Ms Cameron brought a claim in the District Court against Qantas for damages for personal injury arising out of a forklift accident in March 1999 in the course of her employment. The matter settled for $940,000 inclusive of costs on 1 February 2008 in the course of the hearing before McLoughlin DCJ. Later that month Ms Cameron sought to resile from the settlement. On 6 June 2008 Qantas paid the net settlement monies into court by way of interpleader. Ms Cameron unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal from the consent orders made by his Honour: see Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd [2008] NSWCA 275. 7Ms Cameron then filed a notice of motion alleging that the consent orders were made as the result of undue pressure upon her and should be set aside. McLoughlin DCJ dismissed that motion on 14 April 2009. Ms Cameron successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which granted her leave to appeal, and by consent set aside the orders made by McLoughlin DCJ. The matter was remitted to the District Court. 8Ms Cameron filed a further notice of motion in the District Court. On 28 January 2010 Johnstone DCJ dismissed the motion upon the basis that it was irregular and because Ms Cameron had foreshadowed an intention to commence proceedings in this Court. 9On 13 May 2010 Ms Cameron filed a statement of claim in this Court once again alleging that the District Court settlement was infected by undue pressure that had been placed upon her and that it should be set aside. On 25 May 2010, Qantas filed a notice of motion seeking to have the statement of claim struck out. On 13 July 2010, Ms Cameron filed an amended statement of claim. On 21 July 2010, the second defendant filed a notice of motion seeking to have the amended statement of claim struck out. Schmidt J gave Ms Cameron leave on 13 August 2010 to amend the amended statement of claim, but ordered her to pay costs: see Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd [2010] NSWSC 899. 10On 22 September 2010, Ms Cameron filed a further amended statement of claim. Three days later the second defendant filed a notice of motion seeking to have the further amended statement of claim struck out. Latham J struck out that pleading on 25 February 2011: see Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd [2011] NSWSC 178. Her Honour also refused leave for Ms Cameron to file a further version of her pleading. Ms Cameron was ordered to pay costs. 11Pursuant to the orders of Schmidt J and Latham J, the second defendant filed an application for assessment of his costs. Those costs were in due course assessed at $53,898 plus $1,866 for the costs of the assessment. On 23 November 2011, costs assessor R W Gulley issued certificates of determination of these costs. On 13 December 2011, the second defendant filed the certificate of determination in respect of these costs and caused judgment to be entered against Ms Cameron for the amount of $53,898. Ms Cameron had not sought originally to challenge these costs but ultimately did so. This is referred to below in more detail. 12On 15 February 2011, Ms Cameron filed a notice of motion seeking orders, among others, that she be paid the settlement monies held by this Court. As already noted, I directed on 22 June 2011 that Ms Cameron be paid, out of the funds in court, all monies apart from sums representing the approximate amount of contested claims for costs against her. I dismissed the balance of Ms Cameron's notice of motion on 23 September 2011. 13Pursuant to my orders made on 23 September 2011, the second defendant filed an application for assessment of costs. Those costs were assessed at $26,198.40 plus $784.57 for the costs of the assessment. On 1 March 2012, costs assessor R W Gulley issued certificates of determination of these costs. On 21 March 2012, the second defendant filed the certificate of determination in respect of these costs and caused judgment to be entered against Ms Cameron for the amount of $26,331.40, being the amount of the second defendant's assessed costs plus a registration fee of $133. 14Ms Cameron had earlier filed an application on 1 July 2011 seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of Latham J referred to earlier. The Court of Appeal dismissed that application with costs on 26 August 2011: see Cameron V Qantas Airways Ltd [2011] NSWCA 258. On 23 September 2011 Ms Cameron filed an unsuccessful application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal. 15Pursuant to the orders of the Court of Appeal, the second defendant filed an application for assessment of costs. Those costs were assessed at $20,679.80 plus $592.11 for the costs of the assessment. On 1 March 2012, costs assessor R W Gulley issued certificates of determination of these costs. On 21 March 2012, the second defendant filed the certificate of determination in respect of these costs and caused judgment to be entered against Ms Cameron for the amount of $20,812.80 being the amount of the second defendant's assessed costs plus a registration fee of $133. 16On 5 March 2012, Ms Cameron filed applications for review of determinations of a costs assessor in respect of the two assessments made by costs assessor R W Gulley on 1 March 2012. Ms Cameron annexed to the applications her grounds for making the applications for review. They were relevantly as follows: "1.The whole bill of Walker Legal claimed by Mr Bruce Yeldham has already been paid and the costs claimed were filed by Ms Vitalone of Mr Yeldham's office. Mr Yeldham has deliberately and falsely made these claims again. 2. An amount of $53,898.22 was determined by the same costs assessor, Mr Richard Gulley on 23 November previously and 2 more claims are made again falsely. 3. Previously Mr Walker was paid $26,200. 4. The amounts allowed to be repeatedly claimed out on a Workers Compensation that was forced on the plaintiff Mr Stephen Walker was unreasonable on its face. 5. The costs applicant has written different file numbers to confuse the matters. 6.The costs applicant was not even part of the proceedings and the file number 2001/92202 was a transfer file only. 7. All the proceedings were heard on the same day and time and I the plaintiff was there, not Mr Bruce Yeldham and 2 file numbers were integrated by the Registrar to act as one. 8. All these costs are claimed because Mr Walker was negligent and that previously on 1 February 2008 Mr Walker stood over me and forced me repeatedly accept the settlement/orders, that I signed under extreme duress. 9. That under the legal Profession Regulation 2005 Schedule 3 the costs for legal services in workers compensation matter was not adhered to by the solicitors who have been dishonest and violated the rules of the professional conduct and both behaved in a discriminatory manner and breached their duty of care." 17It should be noted that once the Manager, Costs Assessment refers a determination of a costs assessor to a panel for review upon the filing of an application for review, such as that filed by Ms Cameron, the operation of the original determination is suspended: see s 377 Legal Profession Act 2004. 18Ms Cameron's applications for review came before a Costs Review Panel constituted by costs assessors Michael John Dyson and Marilyn Filewood. On 17 August 2012, they issued a Certificate of Determination of Costs by Costs Review Panel in each matter in identical terms save for the amount of costs as follows: "*1. The review is determined by *affirming the certificate of determination of costs assessor Richard Gulley issued on 1 March 2012. *2. The amount determined as a fair and reasonable amount of costs to be paid to the *review respondent as determined by the costs assessor is $26,198.40 / $20,679.80. 3. The certificate of determination of costs of the costs assessment issued on 1 March 2012 is affirmed. 4. The amount assessed excludes the cost of review for which a separate certificate has issued (section 379 of the Act). *5. The panel ends the suspension of the determination of the costs assessor (section 377 of the Act). A statement of reasons accompanies and forms part of this determination." 19The reasons of the Costs Review Panel are in evidence before me as an annexure to the affidavit of Katherine Ann Allsop sworn 19 November 2012. They are referred to later in these reasons. 20Ms Cameron filed a similar application for review on 4 May 2012 in respect of Mr Gulley's costs assessment made on 23 November 2011. However, that application was out of time. The Manager, Costs Assessment therefore proceeded to determine her application for an extension of time within which to do so. The second decision about which Ms Cameron complains before me is therefore the Manager's decision, communicated by and contained in his letter dated 5 October 2012, refusing to grant Ms Cameron an extension of time within which to file her proposed application for review of Mr Gulley's 23 November 2011 costs assessment.

The first proceedings 21On 20 September 2012, Ms Cameron commenced fresh proceedings against Walker Legal by filing a document described both as a summons commencing an appeal and as a summons seeking leave to appeal (Part 50). Those proceedings were given the case number 2012/293348. The summons purports on its face to relate only to the decision of the Costs Review Panel already mentioned. In the way of things, the document contains information and expansive reference to things that might not ordinarily be expected to appear in a summons of this type. As the document would seem clearly to have been prepared without the benefit of legal advice, and as Ms Cameron appears in this Court unrepresented, it is preferable to refer to the contents of the summons in detail lest any suggestion of oversight or other inference be drawn from a failure to do so. 22Details of the appeal are set out in the summons as follows: "1.The plaintiff seeks leave for an extension of time under UCPR 51A.2A(1)(c) seeking leave to appeal. 2. The plaintiff seeks leave to appeal in accordance with Legal Profession Act 2004 s 385(1), (2). 3. The plaintiff appeals from the whole of the decisions below in relation to Costs (Assessment) Review Certificate of Determination matter No 2011/395446 (2001/92202). 4. The plaintiff appeals from part of the decision below in relation to Nos 1 and 2 of the Certificate of Determination in the Costs (Assessment) Review matter No 2011/395439 (2010/118941)." 23The orders sought commence in effect by repeating the details of the appeal. The burden of the orders sought is that the appeal be allowed and that the decision of the Costs Review Panel be set aside. Some of the flavour of the orders sought reappears in the appeal grounds. With some inconsequential abbreviations, those grounds are in these terms: "1. The Certificate of Determination by the Review Panel was only made available by the court on 5 September 2012 to the plaintiff and defendant. 2. That the amounts charged are exorbitant in the Review and Costs matter for a 30 minute hearing in the Court of Appeal. The amount being $20,679.80 total amount of the Assessors Costs/Managers Costs Assessment for Certificate was $592.11 and the Review Panel's Costs/Manager Costs Assessment Certificate is $850.11, the whole total being $22,122.12. 3. That the amounts charged are exorbitant in the Review and Costs matter for a transfer of proceedings from the District Court to the Supreme Court and a notice of motion for monies for the plaintiff which the Registrar of the Court merged as one. They were not part of the proceedings, Qantas Airways Ltd were as they filed the interpleader matter in the District Court. All the matters were allocated on the same day and time and Mr Dicker took it on himself to speak on behalf of the other defendant and so they are now claiming costs for it. The amount being $26,198.40, total amount of the Assessors Costs/Managers Costs Assessment Certificate was $784.57 and the Review Panel's Costs/Manager Costs Assessment Certificate is $962.50 the whole total being $27,945.47. 4. There is an outstanding amount of approximately $53,898.22 for the statement of claim hearings which has been assessed and allowed to be reviewed by the defendant and his Honour which is held up in the Costs Assessment section since 4 May 2012. 5. The plaintiff had filed a statement of claim against her former solicitor Mr Stephen James Walker of the firm Walker Legal together with another defendant (Qantas Airways Ltd) in the Supreme Court of NSW on 13 May 2010. 6. The statement of claim was filed because of the forced settlement in the District Court where Mr Stephen Walker and Mr Stuart Moffett [sic, Moffet] (Barrister) were in court for 3 days only as the hearings were almost concluded and prepared for by another firm. They were only in court on 31 October 2007, 2 November 2007 and 1 February 2008 on the day when I was bullied into submission. 7. The plaintiff was without a break and under extreme duress from 9.30am to 4.30pm. The forced settlement was not made in good faith and bullied, all day by the defendant Mr Stephen Walker and Mr Stuart Moffett in the Workers Compensation matter in which the plaintiff was squashed by a forklift during the time of her employment. 8. The defendant Mr Stephen Walker was negligent, breached his duty of care, caused the severely injured to suffer mental breakdown, depression, major financial losses in exemplary and aggravated compensatory damages, loss of two jobs, superannuations, payments for major surgeries and rehabilitation all the plaintiff's life. Loss of liberty and life, denied fair and natural justice, causing a lump sum debt in costs that the severely injured plaintiff who lives in chronic pain is forced to pay. Mr Walker and Mr Moffett made agreements with the previous solicitors to reduce their costs in court on the same day, but later claimed exorbitant amounts and got paid. 9. Mr Stephen Walker was paid the amount of $26,200 on 29 July 2009 for his costs by the District Court and stated that all of the plaintiff's evidence inclusive of photos, documents, files and exhibits be returned to her. Only some of it was returned. They are in breach of the court orders made in the District Court. 10. Mr Moffett still attended court claiming more costs without basis until his Honour made orders that everything should be returned to the plaintiff. Mr Moffett stopped attending court but still the items were not returned. 11. In the Supreme Court Mr Walker did not attend the Court himself but hired the firm Yeldham Price O'Brien Lusk and barrister Mr Matthew Dicker to act for him. A one inch high set of copies of documents were sent by Ms Vitalone of Yeldham Price O'Brien only. 12. That Mr Moffett who is not part of the proceedings had also decided to claim monies without a bill of costs in taxable form, or in the submissions that his Honour Justice Harrison had directed to do so then to be filed, he had previously filed a submission and is now misleading the courts that he had filed it. There is no court seal to clarify he had filed and sent a copy to the plaintiff. I have not received that copy with the date and seal of the Supreme Court. He had not showed up in court for approximately 6 months and now decided to appear again. 13. That the defendant deliberately sabotaged my matter causing major losses in everything especially my health and finances. My life has been drastically changed because of them."

The second proceedings 24On 22 October 2012, Ms Cameron commenced further proceedings against Walker Legal by filing another document described both as a summons commencing an appeal and as a summons seeking leave to appeal (Part 50). These proceedings were given the case number 2012/328671. The summons purports on its face to relate only to the decision of costs assessor R W Gulley and the certificate of determination of costs assessed at $53,898 plus $1,866 for costs of the assessment issued by him on 23 November 2011. Once again, for the reasons adopted by me in respect of Ms Cameron's earlier summons, it seems to be appropriate to refer to the terms of this later summons in some detail. 25The details of the appeal are given in the following terms: "1. The plaintiff seeks the relief to be granted to declare the decision of the Manager Costs Assessment invalid or void in the Honourable Courts and the matter to be judicially reviewed. 2. The plaintiff seeks to appeal from the whole of the decisions below in relation to Costs (Assessment) and Determination matter No 2011/259858 (2011/402135) which is exorbitant. 3. The plaintiff appeals from the decision below in relation to the explanations of the Manager, Costs Assessment in regard to the delay, as the delay was made in not providing the Certificate of Determination in the Costs (Assessment) by the Costs Assessment section in time in the first place. 4. That on 30 April 2012 during the hearing, Mr Matthew Dicker Barrister for the defendant said that I had not filed a Review for the matter No 2011/00259858 (2011/402135) for the amount of $53,898.22. I told his Honour that I was out of time as I did not get the Certificates on time. Mr Dicker then told his Honour that I had liberty to apply, which I did, and after 6 months the Manager determined not to extend time to lodge a Review Application, which is unjust and unfair and prejudiced. 5. The plaintiff was sent a letter by the Manager, Costs Assessment saying he had sent a letter dated 12 June to Walker Legal's solicicitors, Mr Bruce Yeldham giving them 2 weeks notice in which they were to respond to the matter being reviewed and send in any submissions, which they did not do and the Manager did not do anything about it until now when he took up a new position in the District Court on 8 October 2012." 26The orders sought by Ms Cameron in this latest summons were as follows: "1. The plaintiff seeks relief to be granted to declare the decision of the Manager Costs Assessment invalid or void in the Honourable Courts and the matter judicially reviewed. 2. The plaintiff seeks to appeal from the whole of the decisions below in relation to Costs (Assessment) and Determination matter No 2011/259858 (2011/4021350) as it is unfair, exorbitant and denied natural justice. 3. The plaintiff appeals from the decision below in relation to the explanations of the Manager, Costs Assessment in regard to delay, as the delay was made in not providing the Certificate of Determination in the Costs (Assessment) by the Costs Assessment section in time in the first place. 4. That the appeals be allowed. 5. That the decision of the Manager Costs Assessment, letter dated 5 October 2012 and received by the plaintiff on 11 October 2012 and of the whole of the decision of the court below be set aside. 6. The plaintiff seeks in place of the decision of the court below in the Manager Costs Assessment's Decision that the defendant pay for his own costs as the plaintiff has been denied natural justice and is unreasonable on its face as the defendant is claiming for costs in matters that they were not part of and as well as this claim for costs and other costs which was incurred because of their negligence and breach of duty of care. 7. The plaintiff seeks in place of the decisions of the court below orders that the defendant pay all of the plaintiff's costs in all the matters in the District and Supreme Courts the same amount the defendant is charging the plaintiff as costs were awarded against the defendant as well. 8. The plaintiff seeks orders again that the defendant return all exhibits, photographs, documents, files and evidence produced in the District Court and are in breach of court orders made by his Honour Judge Johnstone in the District Court to return everything. 9. Order that the defendant pay for this summons commencing an appeal. 10. The plaintiff seeks leave to appeal for any such further orders, determinations and directions the Court deems fit." 27The summons then contains twenty-two so-called appeal grounds. It is difficult to summarise them without to a considerable extent doing an injustice to their content as a whole. However, doing the best I can, it seems that there is a further repetition of Ms Cameron's oft-repeated earlier complaints. Ms Cameron feels prejudiced, as the Costs Assessment Manager never returned her phone calls. The decision was unreasonable. She has suffered further delays, costs and loss of monies caused by bad faith on the part of Mr Walker and Mr Moffet, which they are continuing to exhibit towards her. The amounts charged are exorbitant. The 1 February 2008 settlement was a forced settlement into which she entered after being bullied into submission. Ms Cameron is in chronic pain. Mr Walker deliberately sabotaged her matter causing major losses and her life has been drastically changed.

Evidence and submissions 28Ms Cameron swore a number of affidavits in apparent support of her claims in each matter. These were affidavits sworn on 20 September 2012, 22 October 2012 and 11 December 2012. The last of those is the largest and it annexes earlier affidavits sworn by Ms Cameron in various other contexts. 29At the conclusion of the mention of these matters before me on 13 December 2012, I directed Ms Cameron to file and serve any written submissions upon which she proposed to rely by 29 January 2013. In the events that occurred it appears that Ms Cameron complied with that direction even though her submissions were not drawn to my attention until only quite recently. Apart from the delay in furnishing these reasons for judgment, nothing adverse to Ms Cameron's interests arises from that misunderstanding. She was not at fault in any way for that delay or any delay. 30The submissions are headed Submissions in Response to Mr Moffet's Submissions. I have read them several times. They are in major respects redolent of the matters referred to by Ms Cameron in her grounds of appeal and constantly revert to the settlement about which she is dissatisfied and to the sabotage of her case as the result of the alleged misconduct and incompetence of her legal advisers who forced her to compromise her case by the use of unfair tactics and undue pressure. 31Ms Cameron also filed submissions on 19 November 2013. I am not aware whether or not the defendant has received a copy of these submissions or otherwise objects to Ms Cameron relying upon them. I propose to have regard to them in any event. These latest submissions are directed to allegations of collusion and other misconduct by lawyers involved at the time of the settlement of the original proceedings in the District Court and deal with the complicated litigious history that Ms Cameron's matters have enjoyed since then.

Consideration The first proceedings 32Division 11 of the Legal Profession Act is headed Costs Assessment. Subdivision 5 of Division 11 is headed Review of Determination by Panel. Section 382 of the Act is to be found in subdivision 5 of Division 11 and applies to Ms Cameron's proceedings with respect to the Costs Review Panel. It provides as follows: "382 Appeal against determination of panel (1) Subdivision 6 (Appeals) applies in relation to a decision or determination of a panel under this Subdivision as if references in Subdivision 6 to a costs assessor were references to the panel. (2) Subject to subsection (1), the panel's determination of an application for review of a costs assessor's determination is binding on all parties to the assessment that is the subject of a review and no appeal or other review lies in respect of the determination."

33Subdivision 6 of Division 11 of the Act is headed Appeals. Sections 384 and 385 are to be found in that subdivision and are in the following terms: "384 Appeal against decision of costs assessor as to matter of law (1) A party to an application for a costs assessment who is dissatisfied with a decision of a costs assessor as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings to determine the application may, in accordance with the rules of the District Court, appeal to the Court against the decision. (2) After deciding the question the subject of the appeal, the District Court may, unless it affirms the costs assessor's decision: (a) make such determination in relation to the application as, in its opinion, should have been made by the costs assessor, or (b) remit its decision on the question to the costs assessor and order the costs assessor to re-determine the application. (3) On a re-determination of an application, fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received at the original proceedings, may be given. 385 Appeal against decision of costs assessor by leave (1) A party to an application for a costs assessment relating to a bill may, in accordance with the rules of the District Court, seek leave of the Court to appeal to the Court against the determination of the application made by a costs assessor. (2) A party to an application for a costs assessment relating to costs payable as a result of an order made by a court or a tribunal may, in accordance with the rules of the court or tribunal, seek leave of the court or tribunal to appeal to the court or tribunal against the determination of the application made by a costs assessor. (3) The District Court or court or tribunal may, in accordance with its rules, grant leave to appeal and may hear and determine the appeal. (4) An appeal is to be by way of a new hearing and fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received at the original proceedings, may be given. (5) After deciding the questions the subject of the appeal, the District Court or court or tribunal may, unless it affirms the costs assessor's decision, make such determination in relation to the application as, in its opinion, should have been made by the costs assessor." 34Although Ms Cameron has nominated s 385 of the Legal Profession Act in the details of her appeal, that section would not appear to be of assistance to her in this Court for obvious reasons. Elsewhere in her summons Ms Cameron has specified the type of claim as "Administrative Law - Review Decision UCPR 45.3(1)(d) Schedule 8." UCPR 45.3(1)(d) provides as follows: "45.3 The Administrative Law List (1) The following proceedings in the Supreme Court are to be entered in the Administrative Law List: ... (d) proceedings in appeals or applications to the Court in respect of decisions of a public body or a public officer under any enactment specified in the rules for the purposes of this subrule." 35Schedule 8 deals with the assignment of business in the Supreme Court. The Legal Profession Act 2004 is not notified as legislation in Column 1 of that schedule. 36It is difficult in the circumstances to appreciate precisely what is the nature of Ms Cameron's application in the first proceedings. She has not sought orders in the nature of prerogative relief pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970. No appeal lies to this Court pursuant to s 385 of the Legal Profession Act. 37Ms Cameron referred me to George Nassour v Anthony Mark Malouf [2011] NSWSC 356. That was a case in which her Honour Harrison AsJ considered the application of s 208L and s 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987. Those sections are the effective equivalent of s 384 and s 385 of the 2004 Act. Her Honour set aside the decision of the Costs Review Panel in that case and determined that the fair and reasonable costs payable to the solicitor was nil. The main issue in the proceedings was whether the Costs Review Panel had provided adequate reasons on certain aspects of its decision. 38In Levy v Bergseng [2008] NSWSC 294; (2008) 72 NSWLR 178 at [50], Rothman J held that the issue of the denial of procedural fairness was a ground of appeal that raises decisions as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings as follows: "[50] The four major grounds, upon which the plaintiff in these proceedings relies, (together with the ground raised by the defendant in its cross-claim) are, at least in part, questions of law. Certainly the issues going to the denial of procedural fairness, the absence or inadequacy of reasons, the construction of the Costs Agreement, and the jurisdiction of the Review Panel are grounds which raise decisions as to a matter of law arising in the proceedings..." 39That was also a case in which the equivalent provisions in the 1987 Act applied. There was no question in either of those cases that the Supreme Court was the proper court for the commencement of proceedings by way of appeal of the type for which s 384 and s 385 of the 2004 Act provide. However, such an appeal now lies to the District Court and not to this Court. 40On the one hand it would obviously be preferable if I were able to determine this matter on some basis other than a jurisdictional issue. On the other hand, if this Court is without jurisdiction to determine the matter, comments by me upon the hypothetical merits of Ms Cameron's claims may be potentially inimical, even though entirely irrelevant, to any consideration of her claims by the District Court. Be all that as it may, it seems to me that howsoever viewed, both Ms Cameron's original submissions and the latest ones filed by her are not directed to the point currently in issue. That is, whether or not the decision of the Costs Review Panel on 17 August 2012 is somehow vulnerable to either being set aside or otherwise effectively challenged. 41It is fairly clear that that is what Ms Cameron wants, but it is by no means clear why she says it should happen. It is not without significance to observe that neither set of submissions filed by Ms Cameron refers to that decision in any particular detail at all and neither brings forward any reasoned assault upon it. There is no suggestion based on evidence that Ms Cameron was denied procedural fairness of that the Costs Review Panel's reasons were somehow inadequate. Having regard to the grounds upon which Ms Cameron sought to challenge the original costs assessment by Mr Gulley, the Costs Review Panel's reasons were on one available view commendably informative. I put aside entirely the question of whether or not a matter of law arising in the proceedings has been identified. 42It goes without saying that I have had particular regard to the wealth of both relevant and not altogether relevant evidence filed by Ms Cameron in support of the summons in the hope of possibly discerning there some material putting the validity of the Costs Review Panel decision in doubt in a way that is justiciable before me. However, there is nothing of that nature to be found anywhere in that material. There is by way of contrast a considerable amount of material in which Ms Cameron complains yet again about the circumstances attending the settlement on 1 February 2008 and about the conduct of those involved who Ms Cameron clearly sees as having both cheated and bullied her into a settlement, which on her case she neither wanted nor should have expected. That issue and Ms Cameron's protestations about it have by now well and truly run their course and constant reagitation of these matters does not helpfully or reliably inform the present application. 43As will be apparent, I have examined the reasons of the Costs Review Pane in detail. They refer to all of the grounds for review cited by Ms Cameron and provide reasons why in the opinion of the members of the Costs Review Panel they were without merit. I have not had drawn to my attention in any way at all why those reasons were inappropriate or inadequate or in breach of some or any obligation imposed upon the members of the Costs Review Panel to give adequate or sufficient reasons for their determination. It has not been suggested that they acted upon some wrong principle or took account of irrelevant matters, or conversely that they failed to have regard to some relevant matters. 44The Costs Review Panel referred in terms to s 375(1) of the Legal Profession Act providing that the Panel may review the determination of the costs assessor and may either affirm the costs assessor's determination or set it aside and substitute such determination in relation to the costs assessment as in their opinion should have been made. The Costs Review Panel also referred to s 375(2) providing that it has all the functions of a costs assessor and is to determine the application for review in the manner that a costs assessor would be required to determine an application for assessment of costs in the first instance. The Costs Review Panel also referred to s 375(3) providing that the review is to be conducted on the evidence that was received by the costs assessor and, unless it otherwise determines, the Panel is not to receive submissions from the parties to the assessment or receive any fresh evidence. 45The Costs Review Panel also clearly had regard to the terms of s 364 of the Legal Profession Act, which it reproduced in its Statement of Reasons for Determination of Review. That section provides as follows: "364 Assessment of costs-costs ordered by court or tribunal (1) In conducting an assessment of legal costs payable as a result of an order made by a court or tribunal, the costs assessor must consider: (a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the costs relate, and (b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner, and (c) what is a fair and reasonable amount of costs for the work concerned. (2) In considering what is a fair and reasonable amount of legal costs, a costs assessor may have regard to any or all of the following matters: (a) the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer responsible for the matter, (b) the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter, (c) the quality of the work done and whether the level of expertise was appropriate to the nature of the work done, (d) the place where and circumstances in which the legal services were provided, (e) the time within which the work was required to be done, (f) the outcome of the matter. (3) An assessment must be made in accordance with the operation of the rules of the relevant court or tribunal that made the order for costs and any relevant regulations. (4) If a court or a tribunal has ordered that costs are to be assessed on an indemnity basis, the costs assessor must assess the costs on that basis, having regard to any relevant rules of the court or tribunal and relevant regulations." 46The Costs Review Panel indicated in terms that "to the extent considered relevant", the matters referred to in s 364 "have been taken into account." 47The Costs Review Panel expressly rejected the allegation that the bills had already been paid and that the claims for costs were being made deliberately and falsely. There was nothing in any of the material before the Panel to indicate any duplication. The Panel perceived that Ms Cameron was in several respects asking it to go behind the original costs orders, which the Panel steadfastly declined to do. It otherwise determined that the costs assessor's conclusions were correct and that the costs assessments made by him were fair and reasonable. 48Nothing presented to me by Ms Cameron in her evidence or in her submissions has provided the slightest reason to suspect, far less to conclude, that the decisions of the Costs Review Panel should be set aside or otherwise dealt with to some similar effect. Ms Cameron's claim for a judicial review of the Costs Review Panel's decision is wholly without substance. I would not have been satisfied that Ms Cameron had made out a case based upon a denial of procedural fairness, or any other case either, if I had otherwise had jurisdiction to consider the matter. The second proceedings 49Ms Cameron's summons in these proceedings once again invoked UCPR 45.3(1)(d) and Schedule 8. 50With respect to the second proceedings, s 373(1) of the Legal Profession Act would appear to be relevant. It is as follows: "373 Application by party for review of determination (1) A party to a costs assessment who is dissatisfied with a determination of a costs assessor may, within 30 days after the certificate under section 368 (Certificate as to determination) or 369 (Recovery of costs of costs assessment) has been forwarded to the parties that sets out the determination of the costs assessor or within such further time as the Manager, Costs Assessment may allow, apply to the Manager, Costs Assessment for a review of the determination." 51Ms Cameron is concerned with the decision made by James Howard, communicated by his letter dated 5 October 2012. Mr Howard was at that time the Manager, Costs Assessment. Mr Howard indicated in his letter that he had "determined not to extend the time to lodge a review" and set out his reasons for coming to that decision. Those reasons were as follows: "Reasons When considering an application to extend time to lodge a review I consider the delay, the explanation for the delay, the merits of the application and any prejudice or what is just and fair in the circumstances. Background The application was finalised by Mr Gulley on 23 November 2011; I sent the certificates to the parties on 7 December 2011; The review applicant lodged her application for review on 4 May 2012 having notified the review respondent of its [sic, her] intention to apply for a review. Delay The delay is approximately five months. Explanation for Delay The explanation for the delay is not rational, it covers some time period on or around late November 2011 to early December 2011, but does not explain why no further steps were taken to make an application for review until late April/early May 2012. The review application was only filed due to the intervention of the Associate Justice it seems in raising the possibility, but it also seems the review applicant was aware this was possible in any event. There is not an acceptable explanation for the delay. Prejudice No prejudice to the parties has been identified, other than there are current proceedings concerning judgments as result of registered certificates and it is in the interest of parties generally to resolve the issue of any costs as early as possible. Merits Review Application I do not understand what is asserted to be the merits of the applications. The submission 'To right the wrongs done to the injured plaintiff' do not have any particulars that relate to costs or the unreasonableness of the costs incurred. The submissions mostly relate to allegations of negligence in the provision of legal services, not to any matters in Mr Gulley's reasons. A costs assessor's role does not include reviewing and determining allegations of professional negligence. Just and Fair in the Circumstances On balance, it seems to me that despite the inadequate explanation for the delay, the question of the extending time depend upon the merits of the review application, which I believe do not have any prospects of succeeding. It appears just and fair in the circumstances to me not to extend the time. Appeal/Review Please note under the Legal Profession Act 2004 there is no appeal against a determination of the Manager, Costs Assessment made under s 373 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. However, a determination of the Manager, Costs Assessment is able to be judicially reviewed by filing a summons in the Common Law - Administrative Law Division of the Supreme Court of NSW." 52The second proceedings are therefore proceedings for judicial review of Mr Howard's decision to refuse to extend the time for Ms Cameron to bring her application for review of costs assessor Gulley's assessment dated 23 November 2011. 53Ms Cameron has in the context of this decision once again failed to provide any reasoned or sound basis for criticising Mr Howard's conclusions. The decision appears on its face to deal with her application in a fair and ordered way. Ms Cameron has not suggested that Mr Howard took account of irrelevant matters or failed to take account of any relevant ones. She does not suggest that she was not given an opportunity to be heard. Ms Cameron has paid lip service to the concept of a denial of natural justice but has in no way fleshed out that suggestion with any sensible content. She has not provided a basis to conclude that she was denied procedural fairness necessitating some different outcome or result. 54The modern statement of the hearing rule appears in Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584-5 as follows: "The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention... In this respect the expression 'procedural fairness' more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations... When the doctrine of natural justice or the duty to act fairly in its application to administrative decision-making is so understood, the need for a strong manifestation of contrary statutory intention in order for it to be excluded becomes apparent. The critical question in most cases is not whether the principles of natural justice apply. It is: what does the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances of the particular case?" 55Nothing proffered by Ms Cameron in her evidence or her submissions appears to identify or trigger the finding of any failure by Mr Howard to conform to the constraints of what the High Court said in that case. Nor has anything else that has come to my attention caused me to consider that Ms Cameron's plea for a judicial review of his decision has even a faint prospect of success.

Conclusions 56These applications are still more examples of Ms Cameron's unfortunate inability to move on from the 1 February 2008 settlement about which she has long complained. At a theoretical level there is nothing procedurally or substantively wrong with Ms Cameron's dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Costs Review Panel or with Mr Howard's decision refusing an extension of time. Putting aside the jurisdictional issue touching the first of those, however, Ms Cameron has not sought to support any of her contentions with proper evidence or proper arguments. She has once again resorted to the mantra of discontent with the settlement rather than attempting to demonstrate, assuming that it could be demonstrated, that the respective decisions are vulnerable to challenge on proper grounds. 57As I indicated at the commencement of these reasons, I once held out some hope that Ms Cameron would preserve and protect what was then left of her settlement monies, rather than constantly risk their diminution and dissipation in payment of avoidable adverse costs orders acquired in hopeless proceedings. I am unable and disinclined to offer any further assistance in this regard. 58I consider that each set of proceedings should be dismissed. Costs would ordinarily follow the event so that Ms Cameron should pay the costs of the defendant in each case. I propose to make orders to that effect. My orders are as follows:

1. In proceedings number 2012/293348 the summons is dismissed with costs.
2. In proceedings number 2012/328671 the summons is dismissed with costs.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 January 2014