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austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2026/78
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2026-03-13
Original judgment source is linked above.
Camden [2026] QBCCMCmr 78
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)
INTERIM ORDERS - whether interim orders are warranted in the circumstances.
[1] This application relates to the maintenance of windows at the scheme. The applicant ultimately seeks 6 final orders about window maintenance. The final orders sought include an order that the body corporate be required to engage an appropriately qualified consultant to inspect all the windows at the scheme and provide a report with recommendations and an order declaring that the body corporate's duty to maintain requires the replacement of windows that cannot be returned to good condition.
[2] While her application for final orders is pending, the applicant is seeking 2 interim orders about the committee's February 2026 decision to engage a contractor to refurbish the scheme's windows.
[3] The applicant challenges the committee's decision on several grounds. She says the cost of one of the two quotes proposed for the window refurbishment works exceeds the committee's spending limit. She also says the committee failed to act reasonably in making a decision because the motion and approved quote do not provide sufficient detail about the works to be undertaken. The applicant also says the committee failed to act reasonably when it decided to engage a contractor who is not licensed by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC).
[4] The first interim order sought by the applicant is that the body corporate be restrained, except for any emergency works, from implementing the decision to engage the named contractor to undertake window refurbishment works. The second interim order sought is that the body corporate be restrained from undertaking any non-emergency maintenance works or replacement of windows until final orders are made.
[5] In opposing the application for interim orders, the committee says the applicant has a history of disputes with the body corporate. It views this application for interim orders as an attempt by her to force her will on the committee and body corporate and as a misuse of the dispute resolution service.
[6] Regarding the first interim order sought, it says the committee complied with the legislative requirements and validly resolved to engage a contractor to perform window maintenance works. It says scheduling of maintenance works frequently happens after they have been authorised and occupiers will be notified in advance. It acknowledges that the contractor does not currently hold a QBCC licence but says the contractor's application for such a licence is in the advanced stages and expects it will be approved in the next few weeks. It says works will not be started until it has confirmed the licence has been issued.
[7] The committee opposes the second interim order sought on the grounds it would operate to preclude the body corporate from meeting its statutory maintenance obligations. Based on inspections by 5 window maintenance contractors, it maintains the majority of windows are in good condition, notwithstanding their age, and replacement parts are still available for repairs.
[8] For the reasons that follow, I have dismissed the application for interim orders.
[9] The scheme known as Camden CTS 11034 (Camden) is located in St Lucia. It was registered as building units plan 4149 in 1981 and consists of 15 lots and common property. The scheme is subject to the provisions of the Act and its community management statement (CMS) shows it is regulated by the Standard Module.
[11] The respondent is the Body Corporate for Camden.
[12] The Commissioner referred the application for interim orders to department adjudication under section 247(2)(b) of the Act.
[13] An adjudicator has jurisdiction, and the power to make orders that are just and equitable in the circumstances, to resolve a dispute between certain parties about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or CMS, or about the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties, under the Act or CMS.[1] The parties to the dispute are the owner of a lot in the scheme and the body corporate.[2] This dispute concerns the exercise of powers and claimed contraventions of the Act. I am thus satisfied this is a dispute within the dispute resolution provisions of the Act and within the jurisdiction of an adjudicator.[3]
[14] There is no statutory requirement to obtain comment from a respondent or affected party before an interim order is decided. In the circumstances, where the committee's motion had not been implemented, I gave the committee for the body corporate a short opportunity to provide its comments on the application for interim orders.
[15] It is the applicant's position that the body corporate is not meeting its statutory duty to maintain windows at the scheme. She asserts that the body corporate is contravening the legislation if it does not repair, or in the case of windows that cannot be repaired, replace, all windows that are not in good condition.
[16] As background, the applicant explains the windows in the building are more than 40 years old. She says the exposure to sun, rain, wind and saltwater has caused them to deteriorate. She says rubber seals, both those between the frame and brickwork and those between the frame and glass, are failing. There are also problems with the locks and almost all sliding windows are difficult to slide because the rollers do not work properly. She says further that a builder who renovated her lot considered her windows to be in poor condition and, given their age, recommended replacement because parts could not be sourced.
[17] The applicant says an estimator inspected the windows in her lot and in Lot 6 on 11 February 2026. His report was circulated to the body corporate. To summarise, she says the report identified that the windows manufactured and installed in approximately 1981 with glazing to then applicable standards. The report states that rollers, tracks, and wedges (that hold the glass into the frame) are worn and require replacement. Further, where the glass in the windows is not to current standards, it is unlikely a contractor would undertake refurbishment due to the safety risk of breaking aged glass. Even if such works were undertaken, cost would likely be comparable to installing new window units.
[18] The applicant says the body corporate has not undertaken any regular preventative window maintenance. She reports that several lot owners have experienced leaks and water ingress that she believes is associated with the poor condition of the windows and not, as the current secretary believes, due to unusual weather events or the "reality of climate change."
[19] She says the committee and the body corporate have considered multiple motions over the past several years relating to windows, including motions for a specialist firm to inspect the windows and provide a report, owner motions for the replacement of windows in their lot, and various motions for inspections and maintenance. Despite the issue being on the committee agenda for a year, she says minutes of meetings provide no meaningful information.
[20] By her application, the applicant is challenging the committee's decision to engage a contractor to undertake maintenance works to windows at the scheme. Included with the application was a copy of a notice of a vote outside committee meeting (VOCM) that was circulated to the committee and all owners on 27 January 2026. Two motions for choosing a contractor to refurbish the scheme's windows were proposed for committee consideration.
[21] Motion 1 proposed the committee decide to engage a named contactor at a maximum cost of $12.041.45 to replace rollers, the latch, and silicone sealing of gaps on the sliding sections of the windows. A quote from the contractor was attached. The accompanying notes explained that the quote was based on an hourly rate for a maximum of 3 days' work. If the works took less time, the cost would be lower. Owners also would have the option to opt out of having their windows refurbished.
[22] Motion 2 proposed the committee decide to engage an alternative contractor to refurbish the windows at a cost of $39,825. A quote from that contractor was also attached. The accompanying notes explained that the works would include replacement of all rubber on sliding windows, whether needed or not and, if glass was broken during the process, the body corporate would bear the cost of replacement glass. Gaps in the rubber were not to be filled with silicone and window latches would not be replaced.
[23] By email dated 28 January 2026, the secretary advised that the committee had decided by a vote of 5 in favour and 1 against, to pass Motion 1 and that Motion 2, with 1 in favour and 5 against, failed to pass.
[24] The applicant is seeking an interim order restraining the body corporate - except for urgent or emergency works - from taking steps to implement its decision to engage the named contractor to:
... undertake planned preventative maintenance or repairs on any windows on the building or replace any windows
[25] The applicant also seeks a second interim order restraining, with the exception of urgent or emergency works, the body corporate more broadly from:
... start[ing] any planned maintenance or repairs on any windows in the building or replace any windows.
[26] By way of background, the committee (through its secretary) provides a history of disputes involving the applicant. It says disputes with the applicant are a burden and take up considerable time.
[27] The committee considers this application to be misconceived. It says the applicant is dis-satisfied with its approach to maintenance and is misusing the dispute resolution process in an attempt to control the body corporate. It says the applicant is in effect asking the adjudicator to prevent the body corporate from carrying out its legislative obligations to maintain the common property windows. It claims further that the applicant is not aware of all the relevant facts because she has failed to participate in any genuine self-resolution.
[28] In opposing both of the interim orders sought, the committee says:
[29] The only issue to decide at this time is whether one or more of the requested interim orders are warranted and appropriate.
[30] I am empowered to issue an interim order if I am satisfied "on reasonable grounds, that an interim order is necessary because of the nature or urgency of the circumstances to which the application relates."[4] If I am satisfied such an order is necessary, I may make an interim order that is just and equitable. Adjudicators often make interim orders in the form of a temporary injunction (an order not to do something) to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of an application.
[31] To determine if it is just and equitable to make an interim order, there must be some reason in law to make an order. For this, I must consider the substantive issues in dispute. The applicant must satisfy me that there are serious legal questions to be answered. At this stage, an applicant does not need to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that their legal arguments will be successful.[5] Rather, I must be satisfied there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify making an order.
[32] Higher courts considering whether to make interlocutory restraining orders indicate that what amounts to a sufficient likelihood of success may depend upon the nature of the claim and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order sought.[6]
[33] As a result, I must also consider the practical reasons for and the likely effects of an interim order. This is known as assessing the balance of convenience between the parties. To do this, I must consider the inconvenience or harm to the applicant if I do not make an interim order but she prevails on the application for final orders. I must weigh that against the harm to the body corporate if I grant an interim order and the applicant is later unsuccessful in the application for final orders.
[34] Accordingly, to determine whether I am satisfied any of the interim orders are warranted and appropriate, I will consider whether serious legal issues with sufficient likelihood of success have been presented and I will also consider the inconvenience and potential for harm to the respective parties if interim orders are made or not.
[35] In a scheme registered as a building units format plan of subdivision, as Camden is, the body corporate is responsible (with some limited and express exceptions) for maintaining doors and windows and associated fittings situated in a boundary wall separating a lot from common property in good condition.[7]
[36] After receiving the results of the VOCM, the applicant emailed the committee raising issues with its decision-making about window maintenance.
[37] The applicant says the body corporate is required to consider 2 quotes but Motions 1 and 2 are proposing different works and are not comparable quotes. She also says the body corporate has set the committee spending limit at $15,000. Although Motion 1 proposed works costing $12,041, Motion 2 proposed a quotation for works costing $39,825. Where one of the quotes exceeded the committee's spending limit, the applicant says the committee is not permitted to make a decision on either motion.
[38] The applicant also says the committee failed to act reasonably in making decisions about window maintenance. Specifically, she says the committee did not act reasonably where there is no detail in the motions about the number of windows to be repaired, the condition of those windows, and which repairs are to be carried out to which windows. The applicant says further that the motions do not provide any information about the funding for the refurbishment works nor when the work will be undertaken.
[39] Multiple provisions in the body corporate legislation may apply to a motion proposing that the body corporate spend money on works.
[40] One question is who may decide the motion. Certain spending for the body corporate may be approved by the committee whilst other spending must be approved by the members of the body corporate at a general meeting.
[41] The committee may only make and give effect to decisions for spending on works or services that cost up to the "relevant limit for committee spending."[8] The monetary amount of that limit may be set by owners by ordinary resolution at a general meeting.[9] Where a body corporate has not set its own limit at a general meeting, the legislation provides for a default limit.[10]
[42] A project cannot be split into separate proposals to avoid this requirement. The legislation expressly provides that
... if a series of proposals forms a single project, the cost of carrying out any 1 of the proposals is taken to be more than the relevant limit for committee spending if the cost of the project, as a whole, is more than the relevant limit.[11]
[43] In this case, it is not disputed that the body corporate has set the committee spending limit at $15,000.
[44] Another question is how a motion for spending on works must be proposed.[12] For motions proposing "major spending," the legislation requires that 2 quotes must be presented to and considered by the body making the spending decision.[13] The body corporate is given the power to set, by ordinary resolution, its own "relevant limit for major spending." If a body corporate has not set its own limit, the legislation provides for a default limit.[14]
[45] Section 174 of the Standard Module - "Quotes for major spending decided by committee" governs major spending decisions that are to be made by a committee. For works costing less than the committee's spending limit but more than the body corporate's limit for major spending, the section requires the committee to obtain and consider two quotes.[15]
[46] Where the relevant limit for committee spending at Camden was recently set at $15,000, the applicant claims the legislation requires the committee to obtain and consider 2 comparable quotes for window maintenance and that each quotes is under its $15,000 spending limit.
[47] My preliminary view is that where Motion 1 proposes works costing more than the relevant major spending limit of $10,000 for the scheme, the committee was required by section 174 of the Standard Module to obtain a second quote. It did so, in the form of the quote for Motion 2.
[48] The applicant suggests, however, that the two quotes do not comply with section 174 because Motions 1 and Motion 2 are not quotes for the same works. Motion 1 proposed an hourly rate plus the cost of materials for replacing rollers, latches, and silicone sealing of gaps but did not include replacing rubber seals. In contrast, Motion 2 proposes a service per window for replacing rubber seals but not latches.
[49] I am satisfied for preliminary purposes, however, that Motions 1 and 2 are both proposing the "carrying out of work" in the form of maintenance to windows at the scheme. My initial view is that they would likely satisfy the two-quote requirement. In other words, I am not satisfied the applicant has raised a legal question with a sufficient chance of success for me to make an interim order on this basis.
[50] The applicant also argues that the committee was not only required to obtain and consider 2 quotes but, in order to comply with the legislative requirements, both quotes had to be under the committee's spending limit. Where Motion 2 proposed spending above the limit, she claims the motions and decisions were thus invalid.
[51] The legislation does require a committee to obtain 2 quotes for major spending. While one of the quotes must necessarily be below the committee spending limit, it is my preliminary view, however, that there is nothing in the legislation expressly requiring that both quotes be below the committee spending limit.
[52] In other words, my initial view is that as long as one of the quotes is below the committee spending limit, there is nothing in the legislation (or the purposes underlying the 2-quote requirement) to preclude a committee from obtaining and considering a second quote that is above its spending limit. Of course, a committee is precluded from deciding to approve such a second quote because that would have the effect of authorising spending beyond its limit. As the committee in this case notes, if for some reason a committee prefers the work be done by the contractor providing a higher quote above its limits, it would need to propose motions at a general meeting for approval by the body corporate.
[53] For these reasons, I am not satisfied at this stage that the applicant has raised a serious legal question with sufficient chance of prevailing on that issue when it comes to final orders.
[54] The committee has a statutory duty to act reasonably.[16] The phrase "act reasonably" is used in the ordinary sense of the words to mean that the actions - the process of considering an issue - must be genuine, evidence-based, and rational.[17] To be rational in making a decision means a decision-maker is required to evaluate relevant factors that have a bearing on the issue and to ignore irrelevant factors.[18] The specific factors to be considered will vary depending on the context of the decision and the scheme.
[55] In this case, the applicant claims the committee failed to act reasonably when it decided to pass Motion 1 because, among other things:
[56] In its submission about the application for interim orders, the committee has addressed each of these arguments. It says the contractor's QBCC licence is pending and the works will not commence until the licence has been issued. It says it acted reasonably in deciding to approve Motion 1 because:
[57] At this preliminary stage, I am not satisfied the applicant has raised a serious legal question about whether the committee had sufficient information about, and could therefore rationally consider, several factors that were relevant to its decision whether to approve Motion 1.
Urgency, nature of the circumstances and potential harm
[58] The applicant says if an interim order to restrain the committee, it may proceed to implement its decision for Motion 1. If the interim order is not made but the applicant later prevails on her application for final orders, she says:
[59] In contrast, she says if interim orders are granted but she is ultimately unsuccessful in her application, the only harm to the body corporate is a temporary delay for window repairs. She says further that, any harm to lot owners and the body corporate is limited because the requested interim orders have been proposed to still permit the body corporate to undertake urgent or emergency window replacement or repair works.
[60] In response, the committee says the applicant would prefer the body corporate to install new windows rather than maintaining the current ones. It says she has not engaged in self-resolution and is (mis)using the dispute resolution process to force the body corporate to proceed with window maintenance in the manner she prefers. Where the body corporate has complied with the legislative requirements, it says it should be able to proceed with fulfilling its maintenance obligations. For the first interim order sought, it says it does not intend to proceed with the works until the contractor is licensed. As such, the harm perceived by the applicant - that any works will not be covered by the QBCC - is unfounded.
[61] Moreover, the committee says if the second interim order is made, such an order would be harmful because it would place a serious restriction on the body corporate's ability to perform its maintenance obligations. It would also be harmful in the sense it would waste months of the committee's time and efforts in getting this organised.
[62] Even if I was satisfied the applicant had a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the legal questions she has raised, given the nature of the circumstances I am not persuaded there is any urgency for interim orders or that the balance of harm weighs in favour of making either the first or second interim orders sought.
[63] Where the committee has considered the issue of QBCC licencing and I accept its representation it will not proceed with the works authorised by Motion 1 until the contractor has obtained such a licence, there is no urgency or harm to the body corporate if interim orders are not made.
[64] The harm to the body corporate and other lot owners if interim orders are made but the applicant is ultimately unsuccessful is that the body corporate would be restrained from complying with its statutory obligation to maintain and there will be delays in restoring windows to good condition.
[65] For the applicant, if interim orders are not made but she prevails on the application for final orders, the only potential for harm is that some of the maintenance works may not be successful in restoring one or more windows to good condition and additional expense may be incurred by the body corporate to do so. However, that potential for harm appears limited. And, to the extent the works contemplated by Motion 1 proceed and an owner considers the works to be unsuccessful in restoring a window to good condition, an affected owner may make an application for an order that the body corporate undertake additional maintenance works, including that the body corporate to replace a particular window.
[66] I have dismissed the application for interim orders for the reasons given above.
[67] If the dispute is not resolved and the applicant does not withdraw the application, the application for final orders will remain to be determined. The application for final orders will be referred back to the Commissioner to progress under the Act. The dispute may then be resolved by an adjudicator with the benefit of submissions from the respondent, owners, and other affected persons.
[2] Section 227(1)(b) of the Act
[3] Sections 226, 228 and 276 of the Act
[5] Although an applicant must identify a genuine legal issue to be decided, the granting of an interim order by itself does not indicate whether or not an applicant will ultimately be successful on their application for final orders.
[6] See e.g., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 80 ALJR 1672 at [65] citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622 - 623
(1968) 118 CLR 618
(2006) 80 ALJR 1672