[19] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant has only one factor which tends to support the imposition of a stay (being that "there may be some prejudice to the Applicant"). The Respondent stated that the Commission, when weighing and assessing the competing factors, should be cautious in granting a stay for an unknown length of time where the prejudice to the Applicant appears to be negligible, but there is an imposition on the resources of the Respondent and the Commission.

[20] The Respondent concluded that the Applicant's position suggested that an accused should never have to litigate civil proceedings while criminal proceedings are on foot. The Applicant's representative stated that the Applicant did not seek to rely on such an entitlement. The submissions of the Applicant only relate to his current situation and do not relate to the implementation of a general rule.

• [21] The Applicant submitted that in the case of McMahon, the New South Wales Supreme Court set out principles in considering a stay, but that this should not be rigidly applied in the Commission in accordance with the Full Bench decision of Visy Board Pty Ltd v Rustemovski and Ahmadayar.[10] The Applicant's representative distilled the following principles from Visy Board Pty Ltd v Rustemovski and Ahmadayar[11] in support of the grant of a stay:

"The discretion is required to be exercised having regard to the Commission's central obligation to provide a fair hearing to parties in proceedings before it;

Such an obligation arises from s577 of the Fair Work Act which directs the Commission to perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that is 'fair and just' and from the implied obligation to act judicially; and

Treating the McMahon guidelines as a 'test' to be satisfied as a condition precedent to the exercise of the Commission's discretion, serves to obfuscate the Commission's primary obligation, to ensure that the parties are afforded a fair hearing'; and

Ultimately the question for the Commission in determining this Stay Application is 'what does justice require in the circumstances?"

[22] The Respondent submitted that while the McMahon principles are not a checklist, they are guidelines that inform the discretion and should provide the framework in the Commission's consideration of the factors in exercising the discretion whether to stay a matter.

[23] The Applicant's representative stated that while there is no right to silence in a civil proceeding, that there is potential for the Applicant to be subjected to real prejudice if the Applicant is cross-examined in the arbitration of the unfair dismissal application, before the Criminal Proceedings are determined. The Criminal Proceedings are about the same underlying facts as the unfair dismissal application. Therefore the Applicant's representative submitted that he may be faced with an invidious choice between the right to silence for the Criminal Proceedings or prosecuting his unfair dismissal remedy. The Applicant stated that the Commission in determining the unfair dismissal, by default would need to determine whether the Applicant committed fraud which would be tested by way of cross-examination.

[24] The Applicant submitted that the real risk of prejudice in relation to this application occurs in circumstances where the conduct leading to the dismissal is the same factual basis as to the Criminal Proceedings, where the standard of proof is different in the criminal jurisdiction to the Commission's unfair dismissal proceedings. Therefore it was stated there may be different outcomes reached in those different jurisdictions. This may then hinder the Applicant's right to silence in the Criminal Proceedings when he has already given evidence under oath in the Commission including during cross-examination, on matters common to the two proceedings.

[25] The Applicant acknowledged, as raised by the Respondent, that he has already made admissions and filed written evidence. However it was raised that these were yet to be subject to cross-examination in the Commission, which applies different rules of evidence and procedure to that of the courts in criminal proceedings. The Respondent reiterated that the Applicant had already waived his right to silence, and therefore that this was not a real risk of prejudice to the Applicant for the proceeding continuing.

[26] The Respondent submitted that a s.128(4) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) certificate could be used in these circumstances of the unfair dismissal, rather than delaying the unfair dismissal hearing. Section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) states:

"128 Privilege in respect of self‑incrimination in other proceedings

(1) This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness:

(a) has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(2) The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness:

(a) that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and

(b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if:

(i) the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or

(ii) the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and

(4) The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that:

(a) the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and

(b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence.

(5) If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence.

(6) The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if:

(b) after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection.

(a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and

(b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence;

cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence.

(8) Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned.

(9) If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence.

(10) In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant:

(a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or

(b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue.

(11) A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act.

(12) If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by the person in a proceeding in a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section.

(13) The following are prescribed State or Territory provisions for the purposes of subsection (12):

(a) section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales;

(b) a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of subsection (12).

(a) a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4; and

(b) a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth, other than a proceeding referred to in paragraph (a).

Note 1: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege: see section 187.

Note 2: Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty.

Note 4: Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007)."

[27] The Respondent has suggested the provision of a certificate under s.128(4) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to prevent the Applicant's answers being used in any other proceedings. The Commission is not a court and not bound by the rules of evidence. Reliance on a certificate, as suggested, often leads to a cumbersome exercise (just as endeavouring to caution the witness prior to answering questions that may be self-incriminating). I do not agree that the prejudice can be wholly answered by the provision of the certificate as suggested.

[28] Undertaking an unfair dismissal hearing which has issues in common with criminal proceedings cannot be cured by the provision of a s.128(4) certificate. Conducting a hearing with a certificate on that procedural basis interferes with the principles of open justice. That is, if the certificate is going to be relied on to ensure the Applicant's answers are not relied on in any other proceeding or in any other way, this would interfere with the overall conduct of the case. It would be necessary to close the court room and the transcript and decision would have to be suppressed in accordance with the reliance on the certificate to prevent any reference to the Applicant's answers in any other proceedings.

[29] In providing evidence in the unfair dismissal proceedings, the core tests on such evidence arise from the elements of s.387 of the Act. Answering questions on these matters, such as those regarding the valid reason, would expose the Applicant to self-incrimination as like questions enabling the assessment of the Criminal Proceedings would be a feature that traverses the same ground; this presents a real prejudice to the Applicant.

[30] In addition, the Applicant raised that the Commission has a strict 21 day timeframe for lodgement, which contrasts to the typically longer limitation period in civil proceedings. The Applicant had no choice but to make his application to meet the Act timeframes, he could not wait to see whether he would be pursued for criminal proceedings.

• [31] The Applicant submitted that while the stay would be on indefinite terms given it is currently unclear how long the Criminal Proceedings would take, that the Respondent's witnesses have committed their evidence into witness statements and therefore any prejudice in terms of (the lapse of time from the Criminal Proceedings) would have reduced impact on the witnesses' recollection, so this is unlikely to be significant. However, the Respondent submitted that the indefinite nature of the Criminal Proceedings substantially weighs against granting the stay as the Commission cannot properly assess the prejudice with the delay of the Hearing. Distinct from other cases referred to by the Respondent,[12] this is not a case where there are no known dates. The matter has been listed for Mention before the Magistrates Court. It has been taken into consideration that there is not a final date for the proceedings, but the Criminal Proceedings are on foot and progressing before the Court.

• [32] In Baker v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police[13] the Federal Court of Australia was considering an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 by two officers who had been charged with assault and unlawful imprisonment offences involving a member of the public. After the charges had been laid, the General Manager of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) issued notices to the Applicants saying that the AFP was considering terminating their employment under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 and issuing a notice under that Act on the basis that the matters alleged in the charges amounted to serious misconduct. The Applicants were invited to put submissions to the General Manager as to why the specified actions should not be taken. The Applicants contended that their right to silence was being negated, by the actions of the AFP and such actions amounted to, amongst other things, an interference with the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings. The Court there described the dilemma of each Applicant as follows:

... if he does not respond to the invitation to defend himself against dismissal and a s 40K declaration, then he may well be dismissed and a declaration made, but if he does defend himself, whatever he says may be used against him in the forthcoming criminal proceedings.[14]

It is clear that neither s 28 nor s 40K of the AFP Act abrogate the right to silence by compelling the employee to speak, such as is the case with, for example, ss 39_,_ 40 and 40A of the AFP Act and s 7(5) and (6) of the Complaints Act_. Put another way, neither of the Applicants is obliged to incriminate himself by reason of the opportunity afforded to him. It is argued for the respondent that the dilemma in which the Applicants find themselves is no worse in principle than that facing parties in concurrent criminal and civil litigation. There is a long line of authority which establishes that the granting of a stay of civil proceedings in those circumstances is discretionary in the civil court and that the choice of either fully pursuing a civil claim or a defence to a civil claim or not doing so to avoid the risk of self-incrimination is not sufficient in itself to warrant a stay. This line of authority, which is generally seen as commencing with McMahon v Gould_ (1982) 7 ACLR 202 and, in this Court, Cameron's Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] FCA 406; (1984) 4 FCR 428, has been applied in this Court as recently as the decisions in Chambers v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 163 and Golden City Car & Truck Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) ATC 4779.[15]

• [34] The Commission in the case of Gaz Man (previously cited) noted that the principles derived from McMahon had been adopted in other matters in which, as was the case in McMahon, the Applicants for the stay were the defendants in both the civil and criminal proceedings. The Commission also noted that a similar approach had been adopted in respect of Applicants in civil proceedings and specifically, the Applicants in relation to termination of employment matters under predecessor legislation.[16] In re-emphasising guideline (i) from McMahon the Commission said:

Injustice to a defendant in the criminal proceedings is a relevant consideration in considering competing interests of the parties, but it must be a real and not merely a notional danger.[17]

• [35] In Visy Board Pty Ltd t/a Visy Board v Rustemovski and Ahmadyar[18] a Full Bench of the Commission dealt with an appeal against a decision at first instance to adjourn unfair dismissal proceedings in circumstances where the Appellant employer also had proceedings on foot in the Federal Court of Australia alleging contravention of civil penalty provisions of the Act by various parties, but not including the Applicants in the unfair dismissal proceedings. The Bench noted that although those Applicants were not named as parties to the Federal Court proceeding, it was alleged in the pleadings that those persons had directed, authorised and/or organised employees to take certain industrial action.[19] In refusing permission to appeal, the Bench concluded that the Commissioner at first instance was not bound to apply McMahon.[20] The Bench went on to say:

[43] In McMahon v Gould Wootten J had to decide whether a civil proceeding brought by a liquidator against the defendant in respect of acts done by him as a director should be stayed until the determination of criminal proceedings involving the same subject matter pending against the director. Wootten J identified as 'guidelines' a series of matters to consider in determining the exercise of the discretion to stay the civil proceeding. The circumstances in the present matter are quite different - it is the Applicants who are seeking the 'stay' and the discretion being exercised is a statutory, not an inherent power. In any event it appears to be common ground that the McMahon v Gould 'guidelines' do not purport to establish a rigid code and that the consideration that bear upon a decision to stay a proceeding will vary according to the individual case (see Websyte at [115]).

[44] It may be noted that in De Simone the Victorian Court of Appeal observed (at [7]):

'The McMahon v Gould guidelines have been applied in Australian courts many times... Often the case will be determined without express reference to the guidelines but by reference to the justice of the situation, and in that sense such cases follow the McMahon v Gould line of authority.'

[45] It is important to bear in mind that the Commissioner at first instance was exercising a general discretion. In Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission the High Court made the following observations about the nature of 'discretion':

'"Discretion" is a notion that "signifies a number of different legal concepts". In general terms, it refers to a decision-making process in which "no one [consideration] and no combination of [considerations] is necessarily determinative of the result." Rather, the decision-maker is allowed some latitude as to the choice of the decision to be made. The latitude may be considerable as, for example, where the relevant considerations are confined only by the subject-matter and object of the legislation which confers the discretion. On the other hand, it may be quite narrow where, for example, the decision-maker is required to make a particular decision if he or she forms a particular opinion or value judgment.' [Emphasis added]

[46] The discretion exercised in the present case was only confined by the subject matter and objects of the FW Act and, as such, the decision maker had considerable latitude as to the decision to be made.

[47] In such circumstances the McMahon v Gould principles may be of some assistance, by way of broad guidance, but each case must be determined having regard to its particular circumstances and to the statutory framework within which the discretion is to be exercised. The discretion was required to be exercised having regard to the Commission's central obligation to provide a fair hearing to parties in proceedings before it. Such an obligation arises directly from s.577(a) of the FW Act, which directs the Commission to perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that 'is fair and just', and from the implied obligation to act judicially. One aspect of the duty to act judicially is the obligation to afford a party a reasonable opportunity to allow his or her case to be put.

[48] In our view the rigid application of the McMahon v Gould guidelines in the present context may also operate to inappropriately confine the exercise of the Commission's discretion. As Bowan LJ observed in Gardner v Jay:

'When a tribunal is invested by Act of Parliament or by Rules with a discretion, without any indication in the Act or rules of the grounds upon which the discretion is to be exercised, it is a mistake to lay down any rules with a view to indicating the particular grooves in which the discretion should run, for if the act or the Rules do not fetter the discretion of the Judge why should the court so do.'

[49] Elevating any of the McMahon v Gould guidelines into a 'test' to be satisfied as a condition precedent to the exercise of the Commission's discretion - as the Appellant appears to contend - also serves to obfuscate the Commission's primary obligation, to ensure that the parties are afforded a fair hearing. Ultimately the relevant question is: what does justice require in the circumstances? (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)

• [36] The exercise of the Commission's discretion in this case must be undertaken in accordance with the legislative context in which the present application arises. Regard must be had to the statutory framework which the Act establishes for dealing with applications for relief from unfair dismissal. This includes the objects of the Act itself and in particular, the objects of Part 3-2[21] which provide:

(a) to establish a framework for dealing with unfair dismissal that balances:

(i) the needs of business (including small business); and

(b) to establish procedures for dealing with unfair dismissal that:

(ii) address the needs of employers and employees; and

(c) to provide remedies if a dismissal is found to be unfair, with an emphasis on reinstatement.

(2) The procedures and remedies referred to in paragraphs (1)(b) and (c), and the manner of deciding on and working out such remedies, are intended to ensure that a "fair go all round" is accorded to both the employer and employee concerned."

"577 Performance of functions etc. by the FWC

(1) The FWC must perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that:

(b) is quick, informal and avoids unnecessary technicalities; and

(d) promotes harmonious and cooperative workplace relations."

[38] It is apparent from the above provisions, that there is a statutory requirement for the Commission to deal with matters as expeditiously as possible, whilst at the same time recognising that there will almost invariably be a balancing of interests and considerations involved in the performance of the Commission's functions. There is also a need to ensure that the outcome is fair and just and, in the case of matters arising under Part 3-2, a requirement that there is a "fair go all round" afforded to both parties.

• [39] As a general proposition, once an application is commenced, both parties can expect that the matter will be dealt with as quickly as possible. Unnecessary delay in any matter is inconsistent with the proper administration of justice.[22] In Kvackaj[23] the Commission was dealing with, and ultimately refused, an adjournment application by an Applicant who had filed his original application for an unfair dismissal remedy on 12 November 2003 and was still pressing for an adjournment in May 2005. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd[24] the Commission stayed proceedings for over eighteen months at the suit of a respondent in circumstances where criminal proceedings had yet to be commenced. In Visy Board[25] the Commissioner at first instance granted an adjournment in circumstances where the Federal Court proceedings on which the Applicant relied had not, at the time of the decision, been listed for hearing but was programmed for mediation some two months later. In this instance the Criminal Proceedings have been commenced, and the Applicant has already attended Court for the first Mention which has been adjourned to 16 February 2026.

[40] The current circumstances have been taken into account against the performance functions of the Commission in accordance with s.577 of the Act. The filing of the material in the Applicant's matter has not been completed and the hearing dates needed to be adjourned to consider the stay application. Currently, the Criminal Proceedings are relisted for a date in the Toowoomba Magistrates Court. However, in addition, s.577(a) must be considered in order that proceedings are fair and just, by considering the fairness of the parties presenting their case with limited prejudice.

[41] In terms of any delay, generally, it is true that a witness's memory may fade over time. The Respondent's assertion that they may be prejudiced by the diminished memories of witnesses is a relevant consideration. However, the Applicant and any witnesses he might call will be in a similar position. It is also relevant that the majority of the witness evidence has been filed in the unfair dismissal proceedings.

• [42] It is noted that the Applicant has sought reinstatement and compensation in the substantive application. There is, as was argued in Visy,[26] a desirability in having matters dealt with quickly where reinstatement is sought. However, to the extent that the remedy of reinstatement becomes available to the Applicant, the potential delay would generally present an additional obstacle to an Applicant rather than work against the interests of a Respondent resisting an order for reinstatement.[27] Similarly, it seems that an Applicant in these circumstances would have to acknowledge that in considering any order for compensation or lost pay, the Commission would have to have regard to the fact that the delay in the hearing of the matter to which any order might relate was brought on at the Applicant's initiative as a result of the stay sought. The statutory scheme for the remedy of compensation or lost pay in unfair dismissal matters allows for such contingencies to be taken into account.[28]

[43] In order to properly present his unfair dismissal case, the Applicant would likely have to give evidence and be subjected to cross-examination on that evidence. Such evidence could then be used against him in the Criminal Proceedings. It is apparent there would be a substantial and direct overlap in the factual material, that would be relevant to the determination of both matters, as both relate to the same incident. The alleged facts of the Criminal Proceedings form a significant basis for the reasons for dismissal in relation to the unfair dismissal application. Whilst it is true that the Applicant is not obliged to respond to questions, to incriminate himself in the unfair dismissal proceeding, there is a real risk of injustice to the Applicant in that the presentation of his case may be hampered by the need to avoid the prospect of self-incrimination. This may affect the nature and reliability of the evidence the Applicant is prepared to give at the unfair dismissal proceedings in order to preserve matters for the Criminal Proceedings.

• [44] In Styche v Commonwealth of Australia (Represented by The Australian Signals Directorate)[29] the direct overlap of the criminal proceedings and unfair dismissal application was considered:

[76] ... I agree with the Applicant that the issues for determination in the Criminal Proceedings directly relate to this Application, being the reasons on which the Respondent relied in terminating his employment. Whilst the Respondent is correct that the Commission is not bound by the same rules of evidence and onus of proof imposed on the Courts, I nevertheless agree with the Applicant that the testing of the evidence in the Criminal Proceedings will have a bearing on the Commission Proceedings and the question of whether the Respondent had a valid reason to dismiss the Applicant.

[77] As a result, there is considerable argument that the interests of justice may be best served by giving primacy to the Criminal Proceedings in considering the stay application. I have taken this into account. (emphasis added)

[45] In this matter there is a commonality between the cases on the facts of the matter.

• [46] There is another aspect of the statutory scheme for unfair dismissal matters that should be taken into account. An Applicant must bring an application within 21 days after the dismissal takes effect or within such further period as the Commission allows[30]. Unlike other civil proceedings, an Applicant under Part 3-2 is not able to safely delay the commencement of a proceeding to a time more suited to avoiding any potential conflict with extant criminal proceedings without the real risk that an extension of time would be refused and the cause of action extinguished.

[47] Given the update that the Criminal Proceeding was adjourned (on request of the CDPP) to 16 February 2026, this provides an assurance that the Criminal Proceedings are underway and are being progressed. This has been taken into account as weighing in favour of exercising the discretion to grant a stay order. I have taken into account what I consider to be limited prejudice to the Respondent together with the real risk of prejudice to the Applicant if the stay order is not granted.

• [48] The Respondent submitted the Applicant either had already failed to exercise his right to silence or that the Applicant could seek another remedy to enable him to be examined for a hearing in this matter. I am not persuaded by either of these arguments, and I am concerned that the Applicant could be prejudiced in the Criminal Proceedings by cross-examination in the unfair dismissal proceedings given the overlap of the material.[31] It is recognised as the Respondent points out that the Applicant has broken his right to silence. At the time the questions were initially answered by the Applicant, he was an employee answering questions from his employer and as a self represented party, but even when represented, at that time, he had no knowledge of the criminal charges being raised. Such prejudice would be effectively dealt with if a stay order is granted. If the stay order is not granted, the Commission is obligated to warn an Applicant and manage the cross-examination in a manner consistent with managing the risks of self-incrimination. This then often reduces the weight that can be attributed to the resulting evidence, where the Applicant on this basis resiles from answering critical questions, it makes a resultant decision vulnerable on the basis of untested matters.

[49] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated prejudice beyond the prejudice the Respondent would experience due to the stay. To manage any prejudice from the delay, the Parties are directed to immediately notify Chambers on conclusion of the Criminal Proceedings to allow for an expeditious hearing to be listed in the unfair dismissal matter.

[50] I am satisfied taking into account the case authorities, the legislative tests, the circumstances and submissions of parties, that I should exercise discretion to grant the stay of Mr Murphy's application and adjourn the matter. The stay will be limited to the finalisation of the Criminal Proceedings. In the interim, the Parties will have liberty to apply if circumstances change.

(a) Mr Murphy's application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Act is stayed pursuant to s.589 of the Act until the finalisation of the Criminal Proceedings currently on foot; and

(b) Within 7 days of the conclusion of the Criminal Proceedings, the Applicant must advise the Commission in writing; and

[1] McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLC 202, applied in Visy Board Pty Ltd v Rustemovski & Ahmadyar [2018] FWCFB 1255 at [12]; Darby v Grace Removals (Australia) Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 2202 at [30], [42]; General Manager, Fair Work Commission v Asmar (Stay Application) [2025] FCA 67 at [25].

[4] Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, 392.

[5] R v Frolchenko [1998] QCA 43.

[6] Bannister v Director-General Department of Corrective Services [2005] 1 Qd R 117 (Bannister).

[10] [2018] FWCFB 1255 at [47]- [49].

[12] For example, Andrews v Stay Cool Refrigeration (Aust) Pty Ltd T/A Gladstone Refrigeration and AirConditioning [2023] FWC 209; McLaren v Ithaca Crystals Pty Ltd [2024] FWC 3471.

[13] [2000] FCA 1339

[18] [2018] FWCFB 1255.

[22] Esso Australia Pty Ltd; Esso Offshore Enterprise Agreement 2011 [2018] FWC 6244 at [19].

[23] Kvackaj v. Monash University 3 June 2005, PR 958598.

[24] [2014] FWC 9205.

[25] [2017] FWC 6463.

[29] [2022] FWC 273.

[31] Sorby v Commonwealth [1983] HCA 10; (1983) 152 CLR 281.

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