Cahill v Rideshare Solutions Pty Ltd [2025] QCATA 44

• [4] The Adjudicator found that Mr Cahill signed the rental agreement. She relied upon his acknowledgement in this regard. The Adjudicator found that the terms in relation to payment for damage caused to the rental vehicle appeared in five pages of a document which was provided to Mr Cahill when he was asked to digitally sign the agreement. The Adjudicator acknowledged that there was uncertainty as to whether a further two pages of a document formed part of the document sent to Mr Cahill for signing. Any claim for recovery of amounts referred to in those two pages was withdrawn by Rideshare.
• [5] The Adjudicator found that Mr Cahill knew or ought to have known that he would be responsible for any damage on return of the vehicle.
• [6] Mr Cahill argued that he saw a crack in the grille soon after collecting the car but did not notify Rideshare. He argued that there was no crack in the bumper bar when he returned the vehicle.
• [7] The Adjudicator found that a reasonable person would have notified the hirer of damage evident upon collection. She found that damage was sustained to the grille during the course of Mr Cahill's hire and that he must bear responsibility for the cost of repair of that crack.
• [8] As to the crack on the bumper bar, the Adjudicator could not tell clearly from either the photographs taken by Mr Cahill upon return of the vehicle, or the photographs taken by Rideshare, whether there was a crack in the bumper bar at the time of return of the vehicle.
• [9] The Adjudicator said that there was no evidence the crack had been caused in the Rideshare workshop when the grille was removed, as contended by Mr Cahill.
• [10] It was found on the balance of probability that the crack in the bumper bar was more likely to have been sustained in the course of whatever caused the crack in the grille, because they are so connected. The Adjudicator said that no rational explanation can be given for treating the cracks differently. She thought that the evidence speaks for itself in that there is no other rational alternative explanation for the presence of the crack, particularly as it was directly adjacent to the crack in the grille.

Is the application for leave to appeal or appeal out of time?

(a) the application for leave to appeal or appeal was filed out of time and no extension of time has been sought or granted. Further, on this basis the Appeal Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the application for leave to appeal; and

(b) if an extension of time is to be considered submissions should be sought from the parties.

• [12] Mr Cahill says that he requested reasons for the decision and filed his application for leave to appeal or appeal within 28 days of receipt of the transcript of the reasons. The Tribunal's file reveals that Mr Cahill had some initial difficulty in accessing QTranscripts through no fault of his own, but nevertheless was ultimately provided with a transcript of the reasons on 17 November 2023. On this basis I accept that the application for leave to appeal or appeal was filed within time.
• [13] If for any reason the application for leave to appeal or appeal could be said not to have been filed in compliance with s 143(4) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ('QCAT Act'), the Appeal Tribunal on its own initiative grants an extension of time to the date of filing on 13 November 2023. In doing so I note that there is no irremediable prejudice to Rideshare on the basis that no stay of the decision below was granted to Mr Cahill.

• [14] By s 142(3) of the QCAT Act, Mr Cahill must obtain leave to appeal. He must show that there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected and the appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice.[1]

• [15] Mr Cahill submits that it was an error of law to allow Mr Saunders, the general manager of Rideshare to represent Rideshare in the proceeding, rather than a Director of the company, and further that Mr Bax, a former lawyer was allowed to represent Rideshare. To this latter point Mr Cahill says that Mr Bax participated in the proceeding and that he overwhelmed Mr Cahill so that he was unable to present his case adequately.
• [16] Mr Cahill says that it was an error of law not to dismiss Rideshare's application under s 48 of the QCAT Act in circumstances where Mr Bax was not entitled to represent Rideshare and Mr Cahill suffered an unfair disadvantage from Mr Bax's involvement.
• [17] Rideshare submit that the Adjudicator accepted Mr Saunders was the sole representative of Rideshare who had ostensible authority on behalf of the company to conduct the proceeding. Further, Mr Bax did not seek to represent or appear for Rideshare. He was present only as a support person.
• [18] Further, Rideshare submits that no application was made by Mr Cahill to have the proceeding dismissed under s 48 of the QCAT Act on the basis of Mr Bax's involvement.
• [19] It is a matter for the Adjudicator as to how the hearing is conducted and whether she is satisfied that a person appearing on behalf of a company has authority to do so. No error is apparent in the exercise of her discretion to allow Mr Saunders to conduct the hearing.
• [20] The transcript reveals that whilst the Adjudicator was seeking to clarify that Mr Saunders had authority to conduct the hearing on behalf of Rideshare, Mr Bax advised the Adjudicator that he held a power of attorney for Rideshare if it became necessary for any decisions to be made by the company in the course of the hearing. Beyond that assurance offered to the Adjudicator he did not seek leave to appear on behalf of Rideshare and did not participate in the hearing. Mr Saunders conducted the hearing on behalf of Rideshare.
• [21] The Adjudicator correctly informed Mr Cahill that leave is only required for the appearance of a legal representative on behalf of a party at a hearing, but parties are free to seek legal advice and support as they see fit.[2]
• [22] The transcript records that Mr Cahill responded "No problem" when this was explained to him. I do not see any evidence of a lack of procedural fairness in the hearing or that Mr Cahill was not able to put his case to the Adjudicator.
• [23] Mr Cahill did not apply to have the matter struck out under s 48 of the QCAT Act because of Mr Bax's involvement. The reference to s 48 of the QCAT Act in this context is in any event misconceived.
• [24] Mr Cahill cannot succeed on the grounds of appeal relating to representation of Rideshare at the hearing.

• [25] Mr Cahill submits that an error of law and/or fact occurred when Rideshare introduced additional material in a summary of evidence submitted at the hearing, which was not in the initial submission. That additional material is said to be time stamped photographs of the vehicle before delivery to Mr Cahill. The basis of the complaint is that the lack of such photographs in the initiating application was apparently discussed at a conciliation conference. Mr Cahill suggests by reference to s 66J of the QCAT Act, that the documents are cloaked with confidentiality so that they could not be later relied upon.
• [26] Rideshare submits that it did not seek to rely upon any admissions or other statements made by Mr Cahill at or during the mediation of this matter so a reference to s 66J of the QCAT Act is misplaced. It says that no inadmissible evidence was relied upon by Rideshare.
• [27] In my view there has been no breach of s 66J of the QCAT Act. The photographs referred to were relevant and properly put before the Adjudicator.
• [28] This ground of appeal cannot succeed.

• [29] Mr Cahill submits that it was an error of law and/or fact that the Adjudicator accepted the Rideshare agreement was binding given:

(a) page two of the document has a place for a signature which acknowledges the terms and conditions of the agreement but remains unsigned. The signature on page seven of the electronic document does not acknowledge acceptance of any terms;

(b) the document could not have been signed at the time shown as 4.47pm because that was a time after delivery of the vehicle and when Mr Cahill was not present at Rideshare;

(c) the tax invoice for the moneys claimed shows discrepancies with the Rideshare agreement as to kilometres and fuel on collection and kilometres travelled upon return;

(d) the signature panels and acknowledgements were meant to be signed; and

(e) the Adjudicator was wrong to suggest that Mr Cahill should have recorded pre-existing damage to the vehicle on page one of the agreement because his evidence was that he could not access the original agreement and he was never given a copy.

• [30] Rideshare submits the Adjudicator found that relevant parts of the contract were signed by Mr Cahill. Further, during the hearing Mr Cahill admitted that his electronic signature appeared on the contract. Finally, Mr Cahill does not identify any error of law or fact in relation to the findings of the Adjudicator in relation to the issues raised by Mr Cahill as to the agreement.
• [31] Mr Cahill agreed in evidence that he affixed an electronic signature to a digital hire agreement. That agreement is seven pages in length. His signature appears on the final page of the agreement at the end of five pages of terms and conditions, including the term which relates to the responsibility of the hirer of the vehicle to pay for any damage to the vehicle caused or contributed to by the authorised driver.
• [32] Mr Cahill did not seek to prove that the term had been interposed without his knowledge. He complains that he was unable to print the agreement after signing it, he did not sign the signature panel on the second page and that there were discrepancies between the agreement and a separately generated tax invoice. These matters were addressed in evidence by Rideshare, apparently to the satisfaction of the Adjudicator.
• [33] None of the matters raised by Mr Cahill relate to the liability for damage clause, nor do they vitiate the contract. The general rule is that where there is no vitiating element, and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document.[3] There is no error on the part of the Adjudicator in finding that Mr Cahill was bound by the relevant term.
• [34] This ground of appeal cannot succeed.

• [35] Mr Cahill submits that there was an error of fact regarding photographs tendered by Rideshare, accepted by the Adjudicator, as having been taken immediately prior to delivery of the vehicle. He says that the photographs show the time the images were uploaded as opposed to when they were actually taken. He says that Rideshare did not provide evidence that the vehicle was not damaged before it was collected by Mr Cahill.
• [36] Mr Cahill further submits that there was an error of fact and/or law regarding photographs tendered by Mr Cahill in that the photographs show a crack in the grille and no crack in the bumper bar, but the Adjudicator found fault in the photographs.
• [37] Further, it was not correct to find that the crack in the grille and the crack in the bumper bar occurred at the same time.
• [38] Rideshare says that the findings of fact were open to the Adjudicator on the evidence before her.
• [39] Evidence was given by Rideshare as to an application called "We Integrate" which is used to photograph vehicles and to then immediately upload the photographs to a record keeping system, bearing a date stamp.
• [40] A photograph dated 2 June 2022 showing no damage to the front of the vehicle was in evidence. The Adjudicator was entitled to rely on that evidence to find that the vehicle was undamaged prior to hire by Mr Cahill.
• [41] As to Mr Cahill's photographs, it is not for the Appeal Tribunal to say what an Adjudicator could or could not see in photographs tendered in evidence. An Appeal Tribunal would not set aside a finding of that nature.
• [42] As to the finding that the bumper bar and grille cracks occurred at the same time, that is an inference the Adjudicator was entitled to draw on the basis that the crack in the grill and bumper bar were not present at the date of hire and they appear in Rideshare's photographs to be directly adjacent. The Adjudicator was entitled to find as she did that there was no evidence of any other explanation for the cracks.
• [43] None of the grounds of appeal raised by Mr Cahill will succeed.

• [44] I find that Mr Cahill has not established a reasonable argument as to error on the part of the Adjudicator. There is no substantial injustice to Mr Cahill which requires the intervention of the Appeal Tribunal.
• [45] Leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is dismissed.

[1] Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20 [10].

[2] Hall v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCATA 108.

[3] Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165.