BYX22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 241

1. The applicant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who held a temporary protection visa in Australia. Shortly before that visa ceased, the applicant applied for a subsequent temporary protection visa. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a subsequent temporary protection visa and the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant seeks judicial review of the Authority decision in the Court's jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[1] (Migration Act).
2. The applicant relies on an amended application by which he asserts that the Authority made jurisdictional errors by:

(a) engaging in extreme irrational or illogical reasoning, making findings without any probative basis, and failing to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information; and

(b) failing to apply the law in relation to the proper apportionment of weight to prior administrative decisions and, in so doing, engaging in extreme irrational or illogical reasoning, making findings without a probative basis and failing to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information.

1. For the reasons explained below, the applicant has not established that the Authority made a jurisdictional error. His application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

1. The applicant previously held a temporary protection visa which was granted on 8 September 2015.
2. On 8 June 2018 the applicant applied for a subsequent temporary protection visa.
3. The applicant claimed that he would face harm in Sri Lanka because he is suspected of supporting or being involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and was forcibly recruited by the LTTE. The applicant gave evidence in relation to his claims for protection on a number of occasions, including but not limited to evidence given:

(a) in a statutory declaration made on 6 January 2013 (2013 statutory declaration);

(b) at an interview with an officer of the Minister's Department on 8 October 2013 in relation his earlier protection visa application (2013 interview);

(c) at a hearing before the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) on 11 February 2015 (RRT hearing);

(d) in his application for a subsequent protection visa signed on 8 June 2018;

(e) in a statutory declaration made on 19 February 2021 (February 2021 statutory declaration);

(f) at an interview with an officer of the Minister's Department on 16 November 2021 (2021 interview); and

(g) in a statutory declaration made on 23 November 2021 (November 2021 statutory declaration).

1. On 23 February 2022 a delegate refused to grant the applicant a subsequent protection visa and the matter was referred to the Authority for review in accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act.
2. The Authority purported to affirm the delegate's decision on 10 May 2022. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision and on 21 February 2024 Judge Egan of this Court made an Order quashing the Authority's purported decision and remitting the matter to the Authority for reconsideration: see BYX22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 141 (BYX22).
3. On 19 July 2024, upon reconsideration, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa and it is this decision which is the subject of the current proceeding. Given the confined nature of the grounds in the judicial review application, it is not necessary to provide a detailed summary of the Authority decision. The parts of the Authority decision that are relevant to the grounds of application are referred to below in the consideration of the grounds.

1. By an amended application filed on 5 March 2025, the applicant advances the following grounds:
   1. In assessing integers of the Applicant's claim the Second Respondent (Authority) engaged in extreme irrational or illogical reasoning, made findings without any probative basis, and failed to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information.
      1. In relation to the claims of the Applicant to be required to undertake involuntary periods of labour for the LTTE the Authority reached findings of extreme irrational or illogical reasoning that were not open to it.
      2. In relation to the claims of the Applicant regarding his disclosure of involvement with LTTE in Mannar IDP Camp, the Authority failed to probatively engage with the nature of a purported discrepancy in the Applicants testimony and as such engaged in extreme irrational or illogical reasoning, made findings without any probative basis, and failed to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information.
   2. The Second Respondent (Authority) failed to apply the law in relation to the proper apportionment of weight to prior administrative decisions, and in so doing engaged in extreme irrational or illogical reasoning, made findings without any probative basis, and failed to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information.
2. Counsel for the applicant indicated at the hearing that ground 1(B) would not be pressed. Therefore, I have not considered that ground in the reasons below.
3. The evidence before the Court comprises the court book filed on behalf of the Minister on 25 November 2024 and an affidavit of Simon Josiah Mason filed on behalf of the applicant on 17 March 2025, which annexes a transcript of the protection visa interview.

GROUND 1(A): IS THE AUTHORITY'S FACT-FINDING AFFECTED BY ILLOGICALITY OR IRRATIONALITY?

1. The applicant asserts by ground 1 that the Authority made findings of fact that were illogical or irrational or without a probative basis.
2. There is no material dispute between the parties as to the relevant principles that apply and, as the relevant principles are well known and have been summarised in a number of cases (including, for example, CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496; [2016] FCAFC 146 at [60]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210; [2016] FCA 516 at [52], [54]-[56]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [131], [135]), it is unnecessary to set them out in detail in this judgment.
3. In addressing this ground, I accept the Minister's submission that the determination of whether the Authority's findings were illogical or irrational needs to assessed on the evidence as it was before the Authority, and not as it is recast or differently emphasised for the purpose of this judicial review proceeding: see Calvey v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 104 at [33], [46]; Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473; [2003] HCA 71 at [1].

The applicant's evidence in relation to his involuntary periods of labour with the LTTE

1. The applicant's allegation of illogicality or irrationality relates to the Authority's consideration of his claim to have been forced to complete periods of forced labour with the LTTE.
2. The applicant gave evidence in the 2013 statutory declaration about the periods of forced labour he was required to perform for the LTTE. He said at [6]-[7] of the statutory declaration (emphasis added):
   1. As forced recruits we were not treated like other fighting members of the LTTE - we played an assistant role and were not sent directly into battle. We helped carry injured soldiers and defended the LTTE camps when they were attacked by the Sri Lankan Army. We only ever returned fire. We also performed menial duties like preparing food and caring for the injured LTTE fighters in hospital.
   2. Every four or five months I would be called to the front line for a period of ten days. At this time I was living in [place omitted] with my wife. In the period between December 2006 until we were displaced and went into the camp in Mannar in August 2008 I went three to the front line times. Each time I performed the duties as described above.
3. In a decision of a delegate of the Minister in relation to the earlier protection visa application of the applicant, the delegate described that at the 2013 interview the applicant claimed that he was forcibly recruited by the LTTE in 2007 and required to undertake training. He claimed that he had to assist the LTTE every three months for 15 consecutive days, with duties including transporting injured soldiers, digging bunkers, preparing food and other odd jobs. The applicant claimed that he was never trained with weapons and never carried a weapon.
4. The RRT, in its decision relating to the applicant's earlier protection visa application, provided the following summary of the applicant's evidence at the RRT hearing in relation to this aspect of his claim (emphasis added):

The applicant was forced to undergo training with the LTTE between 2006 and 2008. Many people from his village, including the applicant's elder brother, were compelled to do this. The applicant was told he had to do the 15 day training or he would be taken to the fighting front. When his training was completed he assisted the LTTE by looking after injured fighters and digging bunkers. He would do this for 15 days every 3 months, until he ran away to Mannar. He did not carry any weapons in his work with the LTTE.

1. In the 2021 interview, in response to the question, 'How many times did you go to the front line?', the applicant responded:

Okay. They, I don't know sir. Many times I am not sure about the, it's the number of times but between 2007 and 2009 every three months we must do our duty for 15 days. We must work minimum 15 days so one in three months I used to go for 15 days. So this nearly two to three years time.

The Authority's findings and reasoning in relation to the applicant's claim

1. While the Authority accepted that the applicant was forced to work for the LTTE, it identified an inconsistency in the amount of time the applicant was required to work for the LTTE. It addressed this at [75] of its reasons, where it said (emphasis added):

I acknowledge that the applicant may not have been able to recall how many times he helped the LTTE when he gave evidence in 2021 given the significant lapse of time. While the applicant has insisted since his 2013 protection visa interview that he helped the LTTE once every 3 months and each time for 15 days, I find that evidence difficult to reconcile with his unequivocal evidence in his 2013 statutory declaration, where he stated that he went to frontline 3 times and 10 days each time. Also of note, the applicant stated in his 2013 statutory declaration that if people 'refuse to fight they [the LTTE] also take them to the frontline for longer periods, not just the ten days for most recruits'. The applicant's 2013 visa application and statutory declaration was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer/migration agent and an interpreter. I do not consider the detailed information he gave in his 2013 statutory declaration was by mistake/error of some kind. I consider his evidence in his 2013 statutory declaration is more convincing. Like the delegate, I have difficulty accepting the applicant's later evidence that he worked for the LTTE more frequently and each time he did more days, than what he initially claimed. I am not satisfied that the applicant was called upon by the LTTE once every 3 months and each time he performed work for the LTTE for 15 days.

1. Rather, the Authority accepted that the applicant was forced to perform supporting work for the LTTE on three occasions from 2007 to August 2008.

Were the Authority's findings illogical or irrational?

1. The applicant submitted that there was no inconsistency between the applicant's evidence in the 2013 statutory declaration, where he claimed that he that he was called to the front line three times for 10 days each time, and his subsequent evidence that he was required to assist the LTTE every three months for 15 consecutive days. The applicant submitted that the evidence was reconcilable because the latter evidence related to his service with the LTTE more generally and the specific reference to the applicant being required to go to the front line three times for a period of 10 days each time is a subset of the broader periods of service with the LTTE for 15 days every three months.
2. I do not accept that the findings made by the Authority were illogical or irrational. Rather, I accept the Minister's submission that it was open to the Authority to find it difficult to reconcile the applicant's evidence in his 2013 statutory declaration with his subsequent evidence.
3. The Authority considered that the applicant gave 'unequivocal evidence' in the 2013 statutory declaration that he went to the front line three times, each time for a period of 10 days. The applicant described the frequency of this service as every four or five months. Unless the applicant's evidence, as it was before the Authority, was that the service the applicant referred to in the 2013 statutory declaration was different to, or a subset of, his later evidence that he was required to work for the LTTE for a period of 15 days every three months (I address this below), then it was open to a logical and rational decision maker to find it difficult to reconcile the evidence given by the applicant in the 2013 statutory declaration with his subsequent evidence.
4. I do not accept the applicant's submission that the periods of front line service to which the applicant referred were clearly a subset of the broader service the applicant was required to perform for the LTTE.
5. In advancing his submissions on this point, Counsel for the applicant primarily relied on the applicant's evidence in the 2021 interview where, when asked how many times he went to the front line, the applicant could not recall and then continued:

... but between 2007 and 2009 every three months we must do our duty for 15 days. We must work minimum 15 days so once in three months I used to go for 15 days. So this nearly two to three years time.

1. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant drew a clear distinction between being sent to the front line and being asked to do duty, which was for 15 days every three months. Counsel for the applicant submitted that this interchange makes clear that being sent to the front line is a clearly a subset of that wider 15 days every three months that the applicant was required to serve. I do not agree. There is nothing in the words used by the applicant to indicate that the requirement to do duty for 15 days every three months was a reference to a type of service that was broader than that which was the subject of the question to which he responded, namely, the number of times he was sent to the front line. This is the case whether the words are considered in isolation or in the context of the totality of the applicant's evidence.
2. Counsel for the applicant also referred to the applicant's evidence in relation to front line tasks and more menial tasks. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant drew a distinction between menial and less onerous tasks performed and tasks rendered at the front line in the 2013 statutory declaration, in the paragraphs extracted at [17] above.
3. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant's evidence at [6] of his 2013 statutory declaration was a reference to broad assistance rendered and then at [7] he moved on to more specific assistance he was required to give at the front line. At the hearing I referred Counsel for the applicant to the final sentence of [7], where the applicant indicated that the duties he already referred to were the duties he performed at the front line and asked him to explain the basis of the submission that there is a distinction between general menial duties and duties at the front line in [6] and [7]. In response, Counsel for the applicant submitted that the line about the duties referred to above does not constrain those duties to duties performed at the front line, and the evidence should be interpreted as the applicant asserting that he had done all of those duties, plus he has been to the front line and performed those duties at the front line too.
4. Counsel for the applicant submitted that this ought to be read in conjunction with the applicant's November 2021 statutory declaration, in which he referred to being given tasks by the Sea Tigers such as unloading boats. Counsel for the applicant submitted that this would be a menial task that falls into assistance behind the front line rather than at the front line.
5. I do not consider that the applicant's reference to tasks that he performed and the description of some tasks as menial draws any clear distinction between front line tasks and other tasks. I accept the submission of Counsel for the Minister that the applicant's reference to tasks that he performed in the 2013 statutory declaration draws no distinction between front line tasks and other tasks. This is particularly so in the light of the final sentence of [7]. I also acknowledge the submission of Counsel for the Minister that, on the evidence before the Court, it appears that when the applicant referred to his duties when he gave evidence in his 2013 interview that he was required to perform service for 15 days every three months, the description of duties was consistent with that in his 2013 statutory declaration. Likewise, in subsequent evidence, the applicant's description of his duties was similar (until he subsequently added unloading boats for the Sea Tigers). There is nothing in the applicant's evidence about his duties that draws any meaningful distinction between front line service and other service, in a way that would indicate that the applicant was referring to the 10 days service at the front line on three occasions as a subset of a broader period of service for 15 days every three months.
6. Given these findings, it was open to the Authority to find it 'difficult to reconcile' the applicant's evidence, to prefer his 'unequivocal' evidence that he served on three occasions for 10 days each time, and to not be satisfied that the applicant was required to serve the LTTE every three months for 15 days each time. There is nothing illogical or irrational in the Authority's findings.
7. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary to address the detailed submissions that the parties made about materiality.
8. Ground 1 is not established.

GROUND 2: DID THE AUTHORITY ERR IN ITS APPROACH IN DEPARTING FROM FINDINGS MADE IN AN EARLIER DECISION?

1. As noted above, the applicant was previously granted a protection visa following a decision from the RRT favourable to him. The RRT relevantly found:
   1. The Tribunal found the applicant to be a credible witness. He presented his evidence in a clear and straightforward manner without apparent embellishment. The evidence he gave was consistent with available country information about the LTTE's former presence in the north of Sri Lanka, their interaction with Tamil villagers, and the impact of the Sri Lankan government's war with the LTTE on the local Tamil populations.
   2. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was forced to do some training and provide assistance to the LTTE from about 2006 to 2008. The Tribunal accepts the applicant was put in an IDP camp run by the Sri Lankan army in about 2008 and kept there for about one year.
   3. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant's admissions of receiving training from the LTTE and providing assistance to the LTTE, caused the Sri Lankan authorities to mark him with suspicion so that they subjected him to ongoing harassment in the form of questioning, stringent reporting requirements, and threats.

1. The Authority referred to the RRT decision at [40] of its reasons and extracted [27]-[29] of the RRT's reasons (also extracted at [36] above). The Authority then said at [41] of its reasons:

It was based on these factual findings and on the country information available at that time (20 March 2015) that the RRT found that there was a real chance that the applicant would be detained, questioned and beaten or tortured on return to Sri Lanka on the basis of his actual or perceived connection to the LTTE.

1. The Authority then acknowledged the applicant's submission based on Commonwealth of Australia v Snell (2019) 269 FCR 18; [2019] FCAFC 57 (Snell) and Judge Egan's judgment in BYX22: Authority reasons at [43]-[45] (both of these judgments are addressed in greater detail below). The Authority then said at [46]-[50] (footnotes omitted):
   1. The RRT in making its credibility findings stated that the evidence that the applicant had given was consistent with 'available country information about the LTTE's former presence in the north of Sri Lanka, their interaction with Tamil villagers, and the impact of the Sri Lankan government's war with the LTTE on the local Tamil populations'. On its face, it would appear that the RRT was referring to the impact of the LTTE and the war on Tamil populations in the north in general, rather than information about Tamils whose connection with the LTTE went beyond mere residence in an LTTE controlled area, such as those who were subjected to forcible recruitment from the LTTE and who were involved in the LTTE. The RRT did not cite the particular country information it referred to.
   2. Notably, since the RRT's decision in 2015, the applicant made his subsequent TPV application in June 2018 shortly before his TPV granted in 2015 was about to expire. Although he only made brief claims on the visa application form, in response to the Department's request for further information, a relatively detailed statement of claims dated 24 February 2021 was submitted with the assistance of his lawyer. The applicant's subsequent TPV interview before the delegate ran for 2 hours and 55 minutes. The delegate in his decision referred to a significant amount of new country information which was not before the RRT.
   3. In assessing the applicant's claims and evidence below, I have considered a significant amount of contemporaneous independent country information which does not appear to have been before or considered by the RRT.
   4. I consider that the RRT's decision made in 2015 was based on (adopting the language of the Full Court in Snell) 'limited knowledge'. I do not accept the applicant's submission that there are almost entirely the same factual materials in the current application as those that were before the RRT. In assessing the real chance or real risk of harm, I have also considered more recent independent country information which was not available to the RRT in 2015.
   5. My task under Part 7AA of the Migration Act is to engage in a de novo consideration of the merits of the referred decision (i.e., the decision of the delegate dated 23 February 2022 in this case). While I have regard to the RRT's decision, as explained below, I hold significant concerns over some aspects of the applicant's claims. In reaching my findings below, I have thoroughly considered the applicant's evidence/submissions made over time and have had regard to various sources of independent country information.
2. After making factual findings in relation to the applicant's claims, in particular regarding his claimed LTTE involvement and the claimed adverse interest of the Sri Lankan authorities in the applicant, taking into account his own evidence and relevant country information, the Authority referred again to the RRT decision at [116]:

While the applicant is not expected to read the mind of the CID as submitted, key aspects of applicant's claims are not consistent with the body of country information referred to above. The significant concerns discussed above seriously undermine the credibility and reliability of his claims. I take into account that the RRT in 2015 found the applicant to be a credible witness and accepted that 'the applicant's admissions of receiving training from the LTTE and providing assistance to the LTTE, caused the Sri Lankan authorities to mark him with suspicion so that they subjected him to ongoing harassment in the form questioning, stringent reporting requirements and threats.' However, in my view the RRT's finding was based on limited evidence, and without the benefit of the extensive independent country information before me which I have thoroughly considered, as well as evidence given by the applicant since that decision was made.

1. The Authority did not accept that the applicant was subject to reporting requirements after 2010 or that he was of adverse interest to the authorities at the time he left Sri Lanka or that he came to the adverse attention of the authorities after he left Sri Lanka.

1. As can be seen from the ground as pleaded, the applicant asserts that the Authority failed to apply the law in relation to the proper apportionment of weight to be attributed to prior administrative decisions, and thereby engaged in irrational or illogical reasoning, made findings without any probative basis and failed to carry out its statutory task by failing to consider relevant information.
2. Taking into account the applicant's arguments as they developed in submissions, there are two core aspects to the applicant's ground. The first relates to how Snell should be interpreted. The second relates to whether the Authority's reasons disclose a rational basis for departing from the RRT's findings.

1. The applicant, in advancing submissions on this ground, relies primarily on Snell as well as Judge Egan's references to Snell in BYX22.
2. In Snell, the Full Court was required to determine whether it had been open to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), in reviewing a decision under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) (Seafarers Act), to exclude evidence that undermined an earlier administrative decision in which it had been determined that the applicant's employment had contributed in a material way to his injury. The Full Court determined that the obligation on the AAT to conduct the review was untrammelled by any previous determination and the AAT had to take into account any relevant information. Issue estoppel did not apply and the earlier decision did not give rise to any limitation on the material that the AAT might consider.
3. The Full Court then said at [76] (emphasis added):

Given that the existence of an earlier decision does not give rise to any limitation on the material which the Tribunal might consider on a review of a decision under the Seafarers Act, what then is the position when it is confronted with the existence of an earlier inconsistent decision? The general approach of Bennett J in Cheung [v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 176 FCR 20; [2009] FCA 241] ought to be adopted. Her Honour's reasoning gives full force and effect to the operation of s 62 of the SRC Act which expressly authorises the determining authority to reconsider decisions once made. In undertaking that reconsideration, both the decision-maker and the Tribunal are required to make a decision in accordance with the Act which necessitates assessing all material relevant to the issues to be decided. As Bennett J observed, the power in s 78 is untrammelled and there is no requirement to consider or take into account the earlier decision or to apply it. An earlier decision by the decision-maker (including an earlier decision of the Tribunal which is deemed to be that of the decision-maker) is information or material with which the Tribunal may inform itself (s 33(1)(c) of the AAT Act) and it can give it the weight which it considers to be appropriate. Where no new evidence has been advanced which relevantly undermines or alters the effect of the earlier decision it is most likely that, if the application for review is not disposed of in a summary manner, the earlier decision will have significant if not overwhelming weight. Where, on the other hand, new information is available which suggests the earlier decision was based on incorrect facts or limited knowledge, be it scientific knowledge or otherwise, the weight which might be afforded to the earlier decision may be minimal or non-existent.

1. The Full Court then observed at [77] that there was nothing that required the decision-maker to commence the decision-making process with any predisposition that relevant material ought not be considered merely because the issue to which it is relevant had been determined as part of an earlier decision.
2. The Minister correctly submitted that the part of Snell relied on by the applicant is obiter dictum and therefore not binding on the Court. The applicant does not dispute this, although Counsel for the applicant suggested that the comments have now been adopted in BYX22. I accept that the observations of the Full Court in Snell are not binding on this Court.
3. Snell was decided in a very different statutory context to the present matter and it is noteworthy that the Full Court emphasised that its conclusions were very much based on the interrelationship between the relevant provisions of the Seafarers Act and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). In my view, some caution should be exercised when applying Snell in a migration context, given the different statutory regime.
4. In BYX22, Judge Egan adopted the Full Court's observations in Snell in a migration context. In that case, the applicant raised two grounds. The first ground asserted illogicality or irrationality in fact finding. The applicant was successful on this ground, with Judge Egan finding that, in making adverse credibility findings against the applicant, the Authority unreasonably placed too much reliance upon the applicant's failure to have earlier raised certain factual matters about his involvement with the Sea Tigers. Judge Egan considered that earlier general statements made by the applicant were capable of encompassing the new matters raised. The Authority's approach was found to be unreasonable in circumstances where the Authority could have invited the applicant to attend an interview so that it could assess his credibility for itself: see BYX22 at [22]. Judge Egan found that, having failed to conduct its own interview where questions of credibility could have been resolved one way or another, the Authority erred in a jurisdictional way, 'particularly in circumstances where the RRT had earlier found the applicant to be a witness of credit': BYX22 at [24]. It was in this context that Judge Egan adopted what was said by the Full Court in Snell at [76], and observed that new information provided by the applicant about his interaction with the Sea Tigers did not detract from or alter in any significant way the information the applicant provided in 2013: BYX22 at [25]. Having found this way in relation to ground 1, Judge Egan considered it unnecessary to address ground 2, which was based on Snell.
5. The applicant submitted that it was implicit in Judge Egan's judgment that the threshold for distinguishing the RRT's prior administrative decision had not been met, based on Judge Egan's observation at [25] of BYX22 that the '(new) information did not detract from, or alter in any significant way, the information provided by the applicant to the delegate in 2013'. I do not accept this submission. In the context of the judgment as a whole, that comment needs to be seen as relating to the applicant's new evidence about his involvement with the Sea Tigers, and not a more general observation about his evidence. Further, the basis on which Judge Egan found error was the Authority making adverse credibility findings based on the applicant's new information about his involvement with the Sea Tigers, and which Judge Egan considered did not detract from his previous evidence. Judge Egan's concern was the adverse credibility findings made without affording the applicant an interview. There was no implicit finding that it was not reasonably open to the Authority to reach a different finding to that made by the RRT.
6. The Minister submitted that Judge Egan's application of Snell was erroneous. I do not need to decide this point in this matter. Judge Egan's adoption of Snell was obiter dictum in the context of the ground he addressed and it is not binding on me in any event. It is unclear whether the parties made submissions to Judge Egan addressing the very different statutory context in which Snell was decided.
7. While I briefly address below some of the submissions advanced by the parties in relation to the statutory context, I do not in this judgment need to consider in any detail the extent to which Snell should be applied in a migration context. That is because, even assuming Snell does apply, the applicant's ground fails because the applicant has not established that the Authority misconstrued Snell.
8. I then turn to the applicant's submissions about how Snell should interpreted.
9. In submitting that the Authority misapplied Snell, the applicant made the following written submissions about how Snell should be interpreted and applied:
   1. The essence of Snell is that while prior decisions of administrative bodies do not result in res judicata nor do they give rise to issue estoppel, the principle of consistency in public administration necessitates that for an administrative decision-making body on exercise of a reconsideration power to apply no weight to prior determinations the basis of the prior decision must first be impugned as having been decided on either 'incorrect facts' or 'limited information'. The Court held in Snell that an inference the decision was made on the basis of 'limited information' arose when 'new emphasis has been advanced which relevantly undermines or alters the effect of the earlier decision' [emphasis in applicant's submissions] (at [76]).
   2. Under Snell, the question of whether the previous decision could be effectively set aside (and given no weight) on the 'limited information' basis turns on whether the new information relevantly either undermines or alters the effect of the earlier decision (at [76]).
      • The term 'undermines' ought to be taken to mean that on retrospective review the information before the prior decision-maker can no longer be taken to be probative; in that it does not prove what it then purported to prove.
      • The compound term 'alters the effect of' ought to be taken to mean information, that if known at the time of the prior decision, would have alerted the decision-maker that the information before them was 'limited information'.
   3. This sets a higher standard than simply a finding that information has developed or changed in complexion between one decision and the next (as all categories of information are wont to do in the effluxion of time). If a prior decision were to be capable of being disregarded simply on the basis of updated information, then no prior decision would hold any level of weight other than that discretionarily applied by the decision maker. Rather, the Full Court in Snell has given effect to the principle of consistency in public administration by requiring that prior administrative decisions ought not be disturbed or departed from without cause, and that in establishing cause, subsequent decision makers must probatively assess the new evidence as meeting a threshold that impugns the basis of the prior decision. There must be some characteristic in the new information that renders the prior information deficient in a material fashion and vitiates the weight attributable to the foregoing decision.
10. In response, the Minister submitted that Snell did not establish any principle to the effect that the Authority should have decided the same as the previous decision unless the earlier decision is impugned as being based on incorrect facts or limited information. The Minister submitted that, properly construed, Snell stood for no such principle and particularly not in the statutory context of the Authority's decision.
11. I prefer the Minister's submissions in relation to this aspect of the applicant's ground.
12. I do not accept that Snell stands for any proposition to the effect that the Authority could only choose to give no weight to the RRT decision if it considered that the RRT decision was based on incorrect facts or limited information. What Snell makes clear is that the weight to be given to a prior administrative decision is a matter for the decision-maker, and the decision-maker's power was 'untrammelled' by a prior inconsistent administrative decision, at least in the statutory context in which Snell was decided. Indeed, both in [76] of Snell and in Cheung v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 176 FCR 20; [2009] FCA 241 (Cheung), which was approved in Snell, the courts made clear that the decision-maker was not required to apply the earlier determination or even to take it into account in the statutory context that applied, but could do so in the exercise of their discretion.
13. I accept the Minister's submission that the final comments in [76] of Snell are a statement as to what would often happen, rather than any principle of what must happen. The Court was making the observation that if a decision-maker takes into account an earlier determination, the decision-maker may give weight to that determination as it considers appropriate, and if there is no new evidence that undermines or alters the effect of the earlier determination, it is likely that the earlier decision will be given significant or overwhelming weight. This, however, should not be construed as meaning that the decision-maker must give significant or overwhelming weight to the earlier determination unless there is new evidence that undermines or alters the effect of the earlier determination. Likewise, the Court's observation that where new information is available that suggests the earlier determination was based on incorrect facts or limited knowledge, the prior determination may be given minimal or no weight is an expression of what may occur in many cases. It should not be interpreted as establishing any principle that a prior determination may only be given minimal or no weight if it was based on incorrect facts or limited knowledge.
14. Both parties made brief submissions about the statutory context in which the Authority made its decision and what it means for the application of Snell. Given that I have not accepted the applicant's construction of Snell, I make only brief observations about the submissions.
15. The Minister's submissions appear to proceed on the basis that Snell will apply to the decision-making process adopted by the Authority, with the Authority untrammelled by the previous determination and with there being no need to consider or take into account the RRT decision or to apply it. The Minister's submissions on this point were brief and, in the absence of detailed submissions, I express no view as to whether the Authority was required to consider the RRT decision if it formed part of the review material given to it under s 473CB of the Migration Act, having regard to s 473DB of the Migration Act. It is unnecessary to express a view on this given that the Authority clearly considered the RRT decision in this case.
16. The Minister submitted that the applicant's construction of Snell would impose a fetter on the Authority's function that is not found in Part 7AA of the Migration Act.[2] The Minister submitted that this was particularly so in circumstances where the Authority was not exercising the same statutory power as the RRT exercised in respect of a different review application. In response to this, Counsel for the applicant submitted that irrespective of the enabling legislation that allowed the RRT and the Authority to conduct their respective reviews, in both cases, the decision-maker was considering whether the applicant met the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
17. It is true that the statutory power requiring the RRT and the Authority to conduct their respective reviews differed. The Authority's powers were conferred by s 473CC of the Migration Act whereas the RRT's powers were conferred by ss 414 and 415 of the Migration Act, as those provisions existed at the relevant times. There may be some cases before the Court where a detailed analysis of the powers conferred by ss 414, 415 and 473CC of the Migration Act is required but this is not such a case, as the parties did not advance detailed submissions as to the significance of the different powers being exercised and I have not accepted the applicant's construction of Snell.
18. I also accept that both the RRT and the Authority considered whether the applicant met the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. Although that provision has been amended since the applicant's first protection visa application, the types of matters that fell for consideration by the RRT and the Authority were similar. Both parties appear to accept that the delegate and the Authority were required to form their own views as to whether the applicant met the relevant criteria in considering the applicant's subsequent protection visa application. The applicant's complaint relates to the weight that the Authority gave to the RRT decision, rather than the fact that the Authority reached a different conclusion. However, applying Snell, the weight to be given to the RRT decision was a matter for the Authority and I have not otherwise accepted the applicant's submissions on the construction of Snell. Further, neither party has identified any provision in the Migration Act that prescribes how a decision-maker is to treat a decision made in respect of an earlier application for a visa by the same applicant. That the RRT and the Authority were both considering s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act does not alter any of the views I have expressed above.
19. There is nothing in the Authority's reasons to suggest that it misapplied Snell or that it otherwise erred in its consideration of the RRT decision or the weight it applied to that decision.

The Authority's approach was not illogical or irrational

1. The applicant's complaint is that the Authority's finding that the RRT decision was based on 'limited information' was illogical or irrational. This aspect of the applicant's complaint follows from his submission that the Authority misconstrued or misapplied Snell. However, I found above that the Authority did not misconstrue or misapply Snell. To the extent that the applicant's assertion of illogicality or irrationality turns on the applicant's submissions as to how the Authority ought to have construed Snell, it is not established.
2. There are, nevertheless, a number of aspects to the applicant's assertion of illogicality and irrationality that warrant more detailed consideration.
3. The Authority, in finding that the RRT decision was based on 'limited information', did not accept the applicant's submission that the factual materials before the Authority were almost entirely the same as those that were before the RRT and also noted the availability to the Authority of a significant amount of contemporaneous independent country information that was not before the RRT.
4. The applicant submitted that the 'updated factual material' relied on by the Authority was an adverse assessment of the applicant's credibility, which the Authority relied on to ultimately give no weight to the RRT decision. The applicant submitted that the Authority layered its adverse credibility finding on several instances of perceived inconsistency, including in relation to the circumstances and content of the involuntary training regime the applicant was forced to undertake by the LTTE, the frequency and periods of forced labour, the extent to which the applicant disclosed his full involvement in the LTTE to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the frequency with which the applicant was required to report to the CID following his time in an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp and in relation to the applicant's withdrawal and reinstatement of his claims over a six day period shortly after his arrival in Australia.
5. The applicant submitted that the evidence he gave after the RRT decision, which the Authority relied on to conclude that the evidence before the RRT was limited evidence, was either:

(a) not new evidence;

(b) asserted without particularisation as to how it undermined or altered the evidence already addressed by the RRT; or

(c) not central or significant material in the light of the essential claims of the applicant.

1. I address in turn each of the matters the applicant alleges that the Authority relied on to make adverse credibility findings or otherwise depart from the RRT decision.
2. The applicant submitted that, in relation to the contents of the involuntary training the applicant was required to do with the LTTE, the Authority raised concerns about the applicant's evidence in his entry interview, in which the applicant said that he did weapons training, and his later statements, in which he denied weapons training. The applicant submitted that the nuance was already before the RRT and the RRT accepted that the applicant was forced undertake 15 days of training in the LTTE.
3. I acknowledge that the Authority expressed the view at [62] that the shift in the applicant's evidence raises concerns about the reliability of the applicant's evidence. The Authority, after considering the relevant country information before it, accepted the applicant's later evidence that he did not receive weapons training. I also acknowledge these inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence were also in the evidence before the RRT.
4. The applicant submitted that, in relation to the frequency and periods of forced labour for the LTTE, there was no actual discrepancy in the applicant's evidence, which was also the evidence before the RRT.
5. I have addressed this above, in the context of ground 1, and found that it was open to the Authority to find that there was an inconsistency in the applicant's evidence and to prefer his earlier evidence. I acknowledge that the same inconsistency was in the evidence that was before the RRT.
6. The applicant submitted that, in relation to the extent to which the applicant disclosed his full involvement in the LTTE to the CID, the Authority failed to take into consideration the probative weight of the apparent inconsistency, which was peripheral and not significant to the applicant's central claims.
7. The Authority considered that the applicant's claim made since his 2021 protection visa interview that he withheld critical information from the authorities about his LTTE involvement while in the IDP camp was in 'stark contrast' to his evidence in 2013 where he said that he told the authorities exactly what he had done: Authority's reasons at [84]. The Authority preferred the applicant's earlier evidence and was not satisfied that the applicant deliberately withheld information from the authorities. It was open to the Authority to identify this as an inconsistency in the applicant's evidence and to place weight on it in assessing the applicant's credibility. I do not accept that on any proper view, the inconsistency was peripheral and not significant. The inconsistency related to the information that the applicant had disclosed to the Sri Lankan authorities, which the Authority considered to be directly relevant to the level of interest the authorities had in the applicant. The Authority considered it significant that, following the applicant's disclosure of his LTTE involvement, he was not identified as a someone to be of adverse interest to the authorities when he and his family were released from the IDP camp: Authority's reasons at [87].
8. The applicant submitted that, in relation to the frequency in which the applicant was required to report to the CID following his time in the IDP camp, the Authority was concerned that the claimed period of reporting was not compelling. However, this same integer was before the RRT which considered it and accepted it was credible.
9. The Authority considered the applicant's evidence in relation to his release from the IDP camp and his later requirements to have to report to the local authorities. The Authority considered that the applicant had provided no compelling evidence as to why the local CID would be interested in the applicant based on the information he told the authorities in the IDP camp after he had been cleared in the IDP camp: Authority's reasons at [103]. I acknowledge that the factual information provided by the applicant in relation to this aspect of his claims was also before the RRT.
10. The applicant submitted that, in relation to the applicant's withdrawal and reinstatement of his claims over a six-day period shortly after his arrival, the Authority drew the conclusion that this was of maximum concern in its assessment of the applicant's credibility. However, the same information was before the RRT which did not draw any adverse credibility inference.
11. I acknowledge that the Authority considered the applicant's requests made in September 2012 to voluntarily return to Sri Lanka 'seriously undermine' the applicant's claimed reasons that led to his departure: Authority's reasons at [110]. I also acknowledge that this information was before the RRT.
12. In relation to the country information, the applicant submitted that the RRT cited 16 items of country information and the Authority relied on 17 items of country information, including an updated report by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The applicant submitted that all bar five items cited by the Authority predate the RRT decision. The applicant submitted that the Authority cited the country information without explicating whether, and in what manner, the information differed to the information before the RRT. The applicant submitted that the Authority appears to have determined that the updated information speaks for itself, but this is inadequate. The applicant submitted that in reaching the conclusion that the country information before the RRT was limited information, the Authority failed to undertake a probative engagement into the manner that the new country information relative relevantly undermined, or contradicted in a material fashion, the information previously before the RRT.
13. While the Authority's findings were, at times, different to those made by the RRT despite the similarity in the information before the RRT and the Authority, I do not accept that any of the matters identified by the applicant demonstrate illogicality or irrationality in the Authority decision. The Authority has carefully analysed the applicant's evidence and the country information and made findings that were open to it on the evidence before it. Contrary to the applicant's submission, the Authority was not required to explain why any additional information before it rendered the information before the RRT to be 'limited information'. Rather, the Authority was required to engage in a de novo consideration of the merits of the delegate's decision, by considering the protection visa application afresh and determining for itself whether it was satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a protection visa: Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16 at [17].
14. The Authority was not required to set out in its reasons a comprehensive analysis of the country information that was before the RRT and the country information that was before the Authority to explain in its reasons how that country information differed and how any country information that was not before the RRT might have impacted the RRT decision had it been available to the RRT.
15. The Authority was required to make a written statement that set out its decision and the reasons for the decision: s 473EA of the Migration Act. The RRT decision was one part of the material that was before the Authority but the Authority was not reviewing that decision and was not required to explain in detail why it departed from the RRT's findings on each occasion it did so. To the extent that the applicant's submission appears to be that the Authority ought to have given more comprehensive or particularised reasons for why it did not reach the same findings as the RRT, this is not a basis to find illogicality or irrationality in the Authority's decision.
16. I accept the Minister's submissions that the Authority was not required to give more detailed reasons in relation to the weight it placed on the RRT decision. In advancing this submission, the Minister relied on Pallas v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 149. In that case, the Full Court at [45] expressed that the decision-maker 'was not obliged in his reasons to articulate the minutiae of his consideration or his weighing processes'. Although that observation was made in the context of s 501G of the Migration Act, there is sufficient similarity between the relevant parts of s 501G and 473EA of the Migration Act for the observation to be apposite in this matter.
17. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal decision is affected by illogicality or irrationality.
18. Finally, in the course of his oral submissions, Counsel for the applicant submitted that it may be appropriate to view this ground as a procedural fairness ground. I do not agree and Counsel for the applicant did not press this point. Section 473DA of the Migration Act provides that Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Migration Act, together with two further provisions that have no application in this matter, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority. The applicant has not identified any provision in Division 3 of Part 7AA that the Authority failed to comply with and, in my view, it is more appropriate to consider this ground on the basis in which it was pleaded.

1. The applicant has not established that the Authority made any jurisdictional error. The application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-eight (88) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams.

[1] Significant amendments have been made to the Migration Act following the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Migration Act in this judgment are references to the provisions of the Migration Act in effect at the relevant time of the events described in this judgment. All references to the Immigration Assessment Authority are to the Authority as it existed at the time the applicant's matter was before it for review.

[2] Both parties made submissions at the hearing as to whether the construction preferred by the applicant would result in a 'fetter' of the Authority's discretion. Given I have not accepted the applicant's construction, it is unnecessary to address the submissions on whether it would amount to a 'fetter' of discretion.