[2020] VSCA 289
General information, not legal advice.
Court of Appeal (Vic)
2020-11-19
Mr P, John Dixon J, Priest JA, Kyrou JA, Osborn JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
DPP v Byrne [2019] VCC 1771 (Judge Mullaly)
PURSUANT TO S 315 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2009
CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal - Sentence - One charge of intentionally causing injury, one charge of possessing a prohibited weapon - Unprovoked attack on inmate in prison exercise yard - Repeated punching and kicking of victim - Sentence of 5 years and 6 months' imprisonment on intentionally causing injury charge - Applicant undergoing another sentence - Effective cumulation of 3 years - Total effective sentence of 16 years' imprisonment with non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months - Institutionalised offender with disadvantaged background and significant criminal history of violent offending - Limited prospects of rehabilitation - Whether sentence on charge of intentionally causing injury manifestly excessive - Whether order for cumulation excessive and breached principle of totality - Leave to appeal refused.
1 On 29 October 2019 the applicant, Dwayne Byrne, then aged 26 years, pleaded guilty in the County Court at Melbourne to one charge of intentionally causing injury,[1] and to the summary offence of possessing a prohibited weapon.[2] On that day, his Honour Judge Mullaly sentenced the applicant to be imprisoned for five years and six months on the intentionally causing injury charge and for one month on the summary charge (wholly concurrent). The judge ordered that two years and six months of the sentence be served concurrently with a sentence the applicant was then serving, effecting cumulation of three years on the previous sentence. This resulted in a total effective sentence of 16 years' imprisonment. The judge fixed a non-parole period of 12 years and six months.
2 The sentence upon which the judge imposed cumulation was itself the product of two prior sentences. On 28 September 2016, the applicant was sentenced by John Dixon J in the Supreme Court to a total effective sentence of 12 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine years for attempted murder and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.[3]
3 The sentence for attempted murder related to an incident on 7 February 2015 in which the applicant had stabbed a complete stranger six times in an unprovoked and frenzied attack.
4 Whilst being held at the Melbourne Remand Centre as a result of the attempted murder, the applicant participated in a prison riot. He was subsequently sentenced by his Honour Judge Taft in the County Court to two years' imprisonment with one year being concurrent with his previous sentence.[4] A new non-parole period was fixed at nine years and six months. Thus at the time the applicant fell to be sentenced by Judge Mullaly, he was serving a total effective sentence of 13 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine years and six months.
5 The applicant has sought leave to appeal against the sentence on the charge of intentionally causing injury on the following grounds:
Ground 1A: The sentence imposed on the charge of intentionally cause injury is manifestly excessive.
Ground 1B: The order for cumulation is excessive and breaches the principle of totality.
6 On 23 April 2020, Priest JA refused leave to appeal pursuant to s 315 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
7 The applicant has elected to renew his application for leave before this Court. For the reasons that follow, we would refuse leave to appeal.
8 The offending took place on 24 January 2018 when the applicant was an inmate at Barwon Prison. It was described in the summary of prosecution opening as follows:
9 At the outset of his reasons for sentence,[5] the sentencing judge recorded that the applicant had been held since early 2017 in a high security environment at Barwon Prison. More particularly, he had been locked in a single cell 23 hours a day. The judge flagged the harsh nature of these conditions as a consideration to which he would return.
10 His Honour then described the offending and characterised it as a brutal and extremely violent attack. He detailed the extensive facial injuries suffered by the victim.
11 His Honour noted the applicant's plea of guilty which although not early was 'important'.
Your counsel here calculated that you have been in the community about eight months since 2011. You have had, as she also calculated and I have mentioned, many youth justice sentences prior to that period of 2011. There is no doubt your impoverished upbringing, your exposure to violence, to drugs and alcohol abuse, homelessness and institutional care and incarceration have left a deep mark on you.
Your capacity to deal with ordinary human interactions is very poor. Your current circumstances in custody entrench this. You are isolated in prison, kept in a single cell for 23 hours a day. You are institutionalised; that is the sad truth.
What remains important to you and is your one glimmer of hope is your two daughters. You became a father as a teenager. You have remained in touch with your children notwithstanding your difficulties in incarceration. In short, your daughters mean a lot to you. There are regular visits and they are your only interest or interaction that you have with normal community or family life. Your sister, to her credit, maintains your contact.[7]
13 The central submission advanced on behalf of the applicant upon the hearing of the application for leave to appeal was that the totality of the sentence imposed must be assessed in the context of the circumstances in which the applicant has been held in custody.
14 In particular, the applicant had been the subject of 23 hour a day lockdown for some 14 months at the date of sentence and continued to be the subject of that regime, although there were prospects that it would be relaxed.
15 We accept that the burden of imprisonment upon the applicant has been, and is likely to be, more burdensome than it is ordinarily, both by reason of the objective harshness of the regime under which the applicant is held and because he is psychologically fragile.
16 Further, we accept that the applicant can also call in aid his plea of guilty, his personal background, his psychological difficulties and the fact that his relationship with his daughters coupled with his age raise at least some possibility that he will be motivated to rehabilitate.
17 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the sentencing judge squarely addressed each of these issues and correctly identified the key consideration in sentencing the applicant as being the principle of totality.
18 As the respondent submitted, the applicant's argument is essentially that insufficient weight was given to a particular factor in the sentencing synthesis.
19 The central difficulty confronting the applicant is that there were significant factors favouring a stern penalty in his case.
20 We respectfully adopt the observations of Priest JA as to the significance of the applicant's demonstrated propensity for serious violence.[11] His Honour concluded:
As against the scant factors going in mitigation, the present offence involved extreme violence in a custodial setting, perpetrated by a man with a history of violence, then undergoing sentence for an earlier offence of extreme violence. Quite clearly, the applicant's crime was a grave example of the offence of intentionally causing injury - by a hair's breadth falling short of intentionally causing serious injury - accompanied by a number of unpleasant and unsettling features. By any measure, the applicant's attack on Marcus was vicious, and the injuries caused very severe.
Proportionality and totality were both important principles that required reflection in the sentence imposed. The application of those principles, however, needed to be informed by the objective gravity of the applicant's crime; general and specific deterrence; denunciation; the applicant's poor prospects of rehabilitation; and, given his violent propensities, the need to protect the community.[12]
21 It is also relevant that the applicant's lockdown has been the product of his own behaviour. In particular, an assault of the kind here in issue gives rise to questions of protection of the community including obvious and significant issues of ongoing duty of care to prison staff and other prisoners. Whilst the burden of the circumstances in which the applicant has been held must be acknowledged, the origin of that burden must moderate the mitigatory effect which can be given to it. It is also relevant that the applicant's circumstances within the prison system may change.
22 Finally, the prison context in which this sickening assault took place necessarily requires substantial weight to be given to the factors of general and specific deterrence.
23 When these matters are placed in the balance, we are not persuaded that it is reasonably arguable that the sentence imposed on the charge of intentionally causing injury was manifestly excessive or that the order for cumulation is excessive and breaches the principle of totality. In all the circumstances of the case, material cumulation was appropriate although it was also necessary to provide for meaningful concurrency as the sentencing judge did. The totality of the sentence imposed was not disproportionate to the totality of the offending in issue.
24 We add for completeness that we see no arguable error in the non-parole period imposed by the sentencing judge. Having regard to the applicant's record, a practical judgment was required as to an appropriate period. The non-parole period provided for was comfortably within the appropriate range.
25 Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against sentence will be refused.
[1] Crimes Act 1958, s 18. The maximum penalty is 10 years' imprisonment.
[2] Control of Weapons Act 1996, s 5AA. The maximum penalty is 2 years' imprisonment.
[3] See R v Byrne [2016] VSC 580 (John Dixon J); on appeal against conviction, Byrne v The Queen [2017] VSCA 253 (Priest, Beach and Hansen JJA).
[4] See DPP v Byrne (County Court of Victoria, Judge Taft, 29 March 2017).
[5] DPP v Byrne [2019] VCC 1771 (Judge Mullaly) ('Sentencing Reasons').
[6] See R v Byrne [2016] VSC 580, [17]-[18], [20] (John Dixon J).
[9] Byrne v The Queen (Supreme Court of Victoria, Priest JA, 23 April 2020) [14] citing Phillips v The Queen; Liszczak v The Queen [2017] VSCA 313, [54] (Osborn and Priest JJA).
[10] Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477-8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571, 595 [44]. See also Leishman v The Queen [2019] VSCA 270, [22].
[11] Byrne v The Queen (Supreme Court of Victoria, Priest JA, 23 April 2020) [17]-[19] and the authorities there referred to - R v O'Brien and Gloster [1997] 2 VR 714, 718 (Charles JA); Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477-8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Leishman v The Queen [2019] VSCA 270, [19], [22]; Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571, 595 [44].
[12] Byrne v The Queen (Supreme Court of Victoria, Priest JA, 23 April 2020), [22]-[23].
Byrne
The Queen [2020] VSCA 289
(1988) 164 CLR 465
(2013) 249 CLR 571