[2024] QSC 46
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2024-03-22
Crowley J
Original judgment source is linked above.
FENCING - where the parties own adjoining properties with shared boundaries - where the parties are not connected to the mains water supply - where there was an agreement for shared ownership and benefit of the water bore to be sunk on the shared boundary - where a water bore was sunk wholly on the land of the respondent - where there was a mistake in where the bore was sunk - where the mistake was not known until recently - where owners of both adjoining properties jointly made lasting improvements to the water bore - where there was shared use of the water bore for nearly 40 years -
whether the applicant is entitled to a property vesting order under s 197 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld).
GENERALLY - CREATION - where the respondents purchased the property in 1991 - where the respondents are the registered proprietors of a lot with a fee simple interest in the land - where the easement was not in existence when the respondent's lot was first registered - where the easement particulars have never been recorded in the freehold land register against the lot - where the applicant uses their property as a family holiday home and short-term holiday rental - where there may be alternative water sources available to the applicant - where the bore is used primarily to water the garden and for outdoor purposes - whether the applicant should have a statutory right of user to access and use the respondent's bore or have acquired an easement by prescription through long user.
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 184, s 185(1)(c), s 185(3) s 200,
Water Act 2000 (Qld), s 27, s 101(1)(c), s 1046
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27, cited
Connellan Nominees Pty Ltd v Camerer [1988] 2 Qd R 248, considered
Delohery v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltd
(1904) 1 CLR 289, cited
Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Paluso [2005] QSC 112; [2006] 1 Qd R 42, cited McClymont v Nelson [2023] QSC 59, distinguished Newman v Powter [1978] Qd R 383, cited
Western Australia v Manando [2020] HCA 9; (2020) 270 CLR 81, considered
2040 Logan Road Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paddington Mews CTS 39149 [2016] QSC 40, cited
Simpson Quinn Lawyers for the applicants Colville Johnstone Lawyers for the respondents
others, including the Byrnes, was only ever with their agreement and consent, as a neighbourly gesture, which they have now withdrawn.
enclosure to house the pump. Mr Mills reimbursed Mr Plant half of the costs of the expenses for the bore, pump and enclosure.
opened from left to right, not front to back, and the exhaust pit was not in the location shown on the diagram, but was instead where he had indicated, behind the pump enclosure and situated on the neighbouring property.
by the Summersons. The Palmers did not have mains electricity connected to their property. They did not have any ready alternative to run the pump save for using the Summersons' electricity supply. The Palmers would contribute to the electricity costs in various ways. They would send up boxes of vegetables to the Summerson property or Ashley Palmer would occasionally leave cash on the pump box.
responded, 'No, she has to ring me first'. According to Mr Leatham, at no stage during that exchange did Ashley mention that the Palmers owned the bore.
stated that he did so because it was his understanding that the pump and the bore were shared and they were going to have to halve the costs.
basis. Without water from the bore she would have serious concerns about the reliability of the water supply to the property.
I presume Les mentioned the bore is jointly owned with neighbour behind.
It is in the boundary and we jointly use the electric pump but there is nothing stopping each owner having their own pump
The contract (if we proceed) should reflect this
however it was still a jointly owned bore in her view, as she had been advised by the Summersons at the time she purchased the property.
Hi Jane, sorry I didn't get back to you sooner, I guess you were calling about the bore, I have had the property surveyed and it confirms that the bore is inside our boundary...the existing shelter of the bore encroaches on your property and I will rebuild the shelter so it doesn't cross the boundary...due to the unfortunate circumstances there will no longer be any access to the bore...
$20,000 for the bore itself and there would be additional costs for a pump. He further advised the due to the space requirements for a new bore, it would have to be sunk in the Byrnes' front yard and that may cause access problems because of the trees they had there.
Ashley had told her they were letting her use the bore for her property only and that they had put a lock on the pump enclosure because Ashley had had troubles in the past with the Wilkinsons and Mr Leatham.
Byrnes' backyard. It would instead have to be drilled in the front yard, which was filled with trees that would first need to be removed to allow access for a drilling rig. He confirmed Titan Drilling Group did not have a drilling rig small enough for the job. He believed a smaller drilling rig could do the job if the front yard was first cleared of trees and other obstacles.
$1,500/sqm. He calculated the value of the potential loss of a 0.07m2 piece of land by reason of the suggested boundary realignment as $105.
$100 would be appropriate for the granting of an easement over the Palmers' property to permit the Byrnes to access the bore and draw water from it.
2015 or 2016 when the sprinklers unexpectedly came on at the Palmers' property, causing water to go through a car and the Palmers' house. He said this happened because 'they' did not know how to operate the pump and they were 'fiddling with all the taps trying to work out how to do it'. Mr Palmer agreed that he had not referred to these matters in his affidavits.
Can and should a property vesting order be made in favour of the Byrnes?
Where a person makes a lasting improvement on land owned by another in the genuine but mistaken belief that -
(a) such land is the person's property; or
(b) such land is the property of a person on whose behalf the improvement is made or intended to be made;
application may be made to the court for relief under this division.
(1) If in the opinion of the court it is just and equitable that relief should be granted to the applicant or to any other
person, the court may if it thinks fit make any 1 or more of the following orders -
(a) vesting in any person or persons specified in the order the whole or any part of the land on which the improvement or any part of the improvement has been made either with or without any surrounding or contiguous or other land;
(b) ordering that any person or persons specified in the order shall or may remove the improvement or any part of the improvement from the land or any part of it;
(c) ordering that any person or persons specified in the order pay compensation to any other person in respect of -
(i) any land or part of the land; or
(ii) any improvement or part of the improvement; or
(iii) any damage or diminution in value caused or likely to be caused by or to result from any improvement or order made under this division;
(d) ordering that any person or persons specified in the order have or give possession of the land or improvement or part of the improvement for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court may specify.
(2) An order under this division, and any provision of the order, may -
(a) include or be made upon and subject to such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit, whether as to payment by any person of any sum or sums of money including costs (to be taxed as between solicitor and client or otherwise), or the execution by any person of any mortgage, lease, easement, contract or other instrument, or otherwise; and
(b) declare that any estate or interest in the land or any part of the land on which the improvement has been made to be free of any mortgage, lease, easement or other encumbrance, or may vary, to such extent as may be necessary in the circumstances, any mortgage, lease, easement, contract, or other instrument affecting or relating to such land or any part of the land; and
(c) direct that any person or persons execute any instrument or instruments in registrable or other form necessary to give effect to the declaration or order of the court; and
(d) order any person to produce to any person specified in the order any title deed or other instrument or document relating to any land; and
(e) direct a survey to be made of any land and a plan of survey to be prepared.
196. Such persons include the successor in title to any person upon whose land the improvement or any part of the improvement was intended to be made. I pause here to note that whilst both Mr and Mrs Byrne are the named applicants here, it is only Mrs Byrne who is a successor in title for the property at 8 Tarwine Street.
2 Macquarie Dictionary (online at 14 March 2024) 'make' (defs 1, 2, 3, 7).
potentially produce absurd results. Application of the provision would instead depend entirely upon whether the friend held the mistaken state of mind, irrespective of the landowner's state of mind.
196 within the context of the entirety of the PLA generally and the specific provisions Part 11 of the PLA in particular and to have regard to the purpose of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to address.
3 Newman v Powter [1978] Qd R 383.
(a) the nature, extent and purpose of the lasting improvement;
(b) the size, location, value and features of the land upon which the lasting improvement has been made;
(c) the nature and circumstances of the mistake and what the parties knew about those matters;
(d) the time that has elapsed between the making of the lasting improvement, the discovery of the mistake and the application for relief;
(e) the relationship between the parties;
(f) the conduct of the parties in respect of use of the lasting improvement and the mistake;
(g) the nature of the relief sought;
(h) the consequences for the applicants if the relief sought is not granted; and
(i) the consequences for the respondents if the relief sought is granted.
Nature, extent and purpose of the lasting improvement
Nature and circumstances of the mistake and the parties' knowledge
The time elapsed since the mistake, discovery and the application for relief
by the Wilkinsons with Mr Leatham, who apparently responded by stating that he was in control of the bore not the Palmers.
Wilkinsons using the bore. This aspect of the conversation was disputed. I prefer Mrs Byrne's evidence that Ashely Palmer agreed to leave a key with Mel Byrne as she had requested, but that he never did. Mrs Byrne's evidence, both in her affidavit evidence and when tested in cross-examination, was consistent on this point. In contrast, the content of the conversation was not a matter that Ashley Palmer explained in his affidavit evidence at all. Indeed, he made only passing reference there to the fact that there had been 'contact' with Mrs Byrne on that date. He only elaborated upon the conversation for the first time during the oral evidence in chief he gave, by leave, at the hearing. Given the importance of this evidence to the issues in dispute, I find it completely inexplicable and implausible that, if it occurred as he said, it was not part of his affidavit evidence. It seems to me his evidence about what was said in this conversation was simply an expedient attempt to explain his decision to refuse to provide the Byrnes with any further access to the bore.
Consequences for the applicant if the relief sought is not granted
adduced about the costs and viability of the Byrnes purchasing water from another external source and having it transported to their property.
Consequences for the respondent if the relief sought is granted
and value of the land in question are the most significant and carry the greatest weight. In my view, those factors clearly demonstrate that it would be just and equitable to grant the relief sought.
Can and should an order be made for a statutory right of user by way of an easement?
180 Imposition of statutory rights of user in respect of land
(1) Where it is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of any land (the dominant land) that such land, or the owner for the time being of such land, should in respect of any other land (the servient land) have a statutory right of user in respect of that other land, the court may, on the application of the owner of the dominant land but subject to this section, impose upon the servient land, or upon the owner for the time being of such land, an obligation of user or an obligation to permit such user in accordance with that order.
(2) A statutory right of user imposed under subsection (1) may take the form of an easement, licence or otherwise, and may be declared to be exercisable -
(a) by such persons, their servants and agents, in such number, and in such manner and subject to such conditions; and
(b) on 1 or more occasions; or
(c) until a date certain; or
(d) in perpetuity or for some fixed period; as may be specified in the order.
(3) An order of the kind referred to in subsection (1) shall not be made unless the court is satisfied that -
(a) it is consistent with the public interest that the dominant land should be used in the manner proposed; and
(b) the owner of the servient land can be adequately recompensed in money for any loss or disadvantage which the owner may suffer from the imposition of the obligation; and
(c) either -
(i) the owner of the servient land has refused to agree to accept the imposition of such obligation and the owner's refusal is in all the circumstances unreasonable; or
(ii) no person can be found who possesses the necessary capacity to agree to accept the imposition of such obligation.
(4) An order under this section (including an order under this subsection) -
(a) shall, except in special circumstances, include provision for payment by the applicant to such person or persons as may be specified in the order of such amount by way of compensation or consideration as in the circumstances appears to the court to be just; and
(b) may include such other terms and conditions as may be just; and
(c) shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be registered as provided in this section; and
(d) may on the application of the owner of the servient tenement or of the dominant tenement be modified or extinguished by order of the court where it is satisfied that -
(i) the statutory right of user, or some aspect of it, is no longer reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use of the dominant land; or
(ii) some material change in the circumstances has taken place since the order imposing the statutory right of user was made; and
(e) shall when registered as provided in this section be binding on all persons, whether of full age or capacity or not, then entitled or afterwards becoming entitled to the servient land or the dominant land, whether or not such persons are parties to proceedings or have been served with notice or not.
(a) direct a survey to be made of any land and a plan of survey to be prepared; and
(b) order any person to execute any instrument or instruments in registrable or other form necessary
for giving effect to an order made under this section; and
(c) order any person to produce to any person specified in the order any title deed or other instrument or document relating to any land; and
(d) give directions for the conduct of proceedings; and
(e) make orders in respect of the costs of any of the preceding matters and of proceedings generally.
(6) In any proceedings under this section the court shall not, except in special circumstances, make an order for costs against the servient owner.
owner includes any person interested whether presently, contingently or otherwise in land.
statutory right of user includes any right of, or in the nature of, a right of way over, or of access to, or of entry upon land, and any right to carry and place any utility upon, over, across, through, under or into land.
utility includes any electricity, gas, power, telephone, water, drainage, sewerage and other service pipes or lines, together with all facilities and structures reasonably incidental to the utility.
Burns J considered the scope of the requirements of s 180(1), stating:
The enquiry whether what is proposed is "reasonably necessary in the interests of the effective use in any reasonable manner of any land" involves two steps, although they are more often than not taken together. The first is whether the proposed use of the dominant tenement is a use in a reasonable manner of that land and the second is whether that use is reasonably necessary. That said, an applicant for relief does not have to demonstrate that "each and every use (in a
4 [2016] QSC 40, [28] (footnotes omitted).
reasonable manner) of its land is one for which the obligation of user is reasonably necessary" for it is enough if the applicant "can point to a particular use and seek to make its case in relation to it".
One should not interfere readily with the proprietary rights of an owner of land.
(a) The requirement of ‛reasonably necessary' does not mean absolute necessity.
(b) What is ‛reasonably necessary' is determined objectively.
(c) Necessary means something more than mere desirability or preferability over the alternative means; it is a question of degree.
(d) The greater the burden of the imposition that is sought the stronger the case needed to justify a finding of reasonable necessity.
(e) For a right of user to be reasonably necessary for a development, the development with the right of user must be (at least) substantially preferable to development without the right of user.
(f) Regard must be had to the implications or consequences on the other land of imposing a right of user.
180. They further say they are willing to pay reasonable compensation to the Palmers for the imposition of the obligation and that the Palmers unreasonably refused their earlier request to agree to registration of an easement of the kind now sought.
5 [2005] QSC 112; [2006] 1 Qd R 42, 47- 48 [23].
6 [2023] QSC 59 (North J) ('McClymont').
I have no difficulty with the proposition that a land owner with an established entitlement to water can obtain a statutory right of user in the form of an easement under s 180 of the PLA to facilitate the movement of water over the land of another to his land, Ward v Hull is an example. But the circumstances applying here are very different. The State has not allowed or authorised the plaintiffs to take water from the subject bore. There is a certain circularity in the plaintiffs' case in light of Sections 26 and 27 of the Water Act. They seek an easement to protect water flow which flow the statute does not protect and simultaneously they assert their interest in a water flow to establish the easement.7
bore, the Byrnes are otherwise reliant upon rainfall and the water tanks on their property for a water supply. It is also true, as I have found, that there has long been shared use of the water bore and I accept the Byrnes likely purchased the property with an expectation that they would continue to have access to, and use of, the water bore.
property. In particular, they did not adduce any evidence about the capacity of their water tanks or the likelihood that they might run dry if the Byrnes were unable to access and use the bore to top them up.
$20,000 for the bore to be sunk. Other than obtaining a verbal quote for the estimated costs of sinking a bore the Byrnes had not otherwise pursued this option and have not seriously investigated the potential viability of sinking their own bore.
Have the Byrnes acquired an easement by prescription?
8 Delohery v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltd (1904) 1 CLR 289, 308-309 (Griffith CJ).
198A Prescriptive right of way not acquired by user
(1) User after the commencement of this Act of a way over land shall not of itself be sufficient evidence of an easement of way or a right of way having been acquired by prescription or by the fiction of a lost grant.
(2) If at any time it is established that an easement of way or right of way over land existed at the commencement of this Act, the existence and continuance of the easement or right shall not be affected by subsection (1).
(3) For the purpose of establishing the existence at the commencement of this Act of an easement of way or right of way over land user after such commencement of a way over that land shall be disregarded.
As to the issue of permission, the Byrnes say that it is clear on the evidence that they Palmers never gave permission, either expressly or impliedly, for the use of the bore.
10 [1988] 2 Qd R 248 ('Connellan').
registered proprietors of their lot before the commencement of the LTA, by virtue of ss 200 and 201 of the LTA their interest in their land was automatically taken to be a registered interest under the LTA when that Act commenced_._ Thus, unless a relevant exception applied, by virtue of s 184 of the LTA, they enjoy indefeasibility of title in respect of their land, free from all other interests, including the suggested easement by prescription. The only possible exceptions to the indefeasibility of their interest are those provided by s 185. The Byrnes do not contend that any of those exceptions arise in this case.
(a) for the Byrnes to prepare a transfer instrument in registerable form in respect of that portion of the Palmers' land that is to vest in Mrs Byrne;
(b) directing the Palmers to execute the transfer instrument once prepared;
(c) for the preparation and execution of mutual easement instruments in registerable form to enable the Palmers and the Byrnes to enter upon each other's land so that the owners and agents of each property may access, use and maintain the bore, pump and pump enclosure;
(d) directing the Palmers and Mrs Byrne to execute the mutual easement instruments once prepared; and
(e) that the Byrnes pay the costs and expenses associated with each of the above matters, including any legal costs.
Byrne
Palmer [2024] QSC 46
(2009) 239 CLR 27
(1904) 1 CLR 289
(2020) 270 CLR 81