[2012] WASAT 217
General information, not legal advice.
State Administrative Tribunal (WA)
2012-11-12
Mr P
Original judgment source is linked above.
26 The MVD Act provides a regime to regulate dealing in motor vehicles. Part II of the MVD Act deals with the licensing and registration of various categories of persons who wish to engage in that activity.
27 Section 16(1) of the MVD Act relevantly deals with the application for and grant of a yard manager's licence and provides as follows:
Subject to this Act, a person who applies to the Commissioner in the approved form for a yard manager's licence and pays to the Commissioner the prescribed fee therefor shall be granted such a licence upon satisfying the Commissioner
...
(b) that he is a person of good character and repute and a fit and proper person to hold such a licence; and
(c) that he understands fully the duties and obligations imposed by this Act on dealers, yard managers and salespersons[.]
...
The criteria of 'good character and repute' and 'fit and proper person'
28 The Tribunal needs to be satisfied that the applicant is both 'of good character and repute' and is a 'fit and proper person' to hold a yard manager's licence, to the extent that those criteria do not overlap; Real Estate and Business Agents Supervisory Board v LJW [2011] WASCA 35 (LJW), at [25].
29 In Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127, Dixon CJ and McTiernan and Webb JJ considered the expression 'fit and proper person' and said, at 156 157:
The expression 'fit and proper person' is of course familiar enough as traditional words when used with reference to offices and perhaps vocations. But their very purpose is to give the widest scope for judgment and indeed for rejection. 'Fit' (or 'idoneus') with respect to an office is said to involve three things, honesty knowledge and ability: 'honesty to execute it truly, without malice affection or partiality; knowledge to know what he ought duly to do; and ability as well in estate as in body, that he may intend and execute his office, when need is, diligently, and not for impotency or poverty neglect it'. When the question was whether a man was a fit and proper person to hold a licence for the sale of liquor it was considered that it ought not to be confined to an inquiry into his character and that it would be unwise to attempt any definition of the matters which may legitimately be inquired into; each case must depend upon its own circumstances. (Citations omitted)
30 The expression was also considered by Hale J in Maxwell v Dixon [1965] WAR 167, in the context of a refusal of an application to renew a land agent's licence. At 169, his Honour said:
It is true that 'fit and proper' must be interpreted in the light of the subject-matter of the Act in which the expression appears. It, and the equivalent 'suitable', appears in a wide variety of licensing Acts, and it normally comprises the three characteristics of honesty, knowledge and ability: Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v NSW (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127, at 156157. Clearly different qualifications are needed by eg lawyers, transport operators, hotel keepers and land agents, but as is shown by the cases cited in the judgment referred to, it is not necessary to confine oneself to the special provisions of the Act in question in deciding whether a man is fit provided one gives weight only to matters which can fairly be seen to be relevant to the vocation in issue.
The issue whether an appellant has shown himself to be 'a fit and proper person', within the meaning of s 16(1) of the [Commercial and Private Agents] Act, is not capable of being stated with any degree of precision. But for the purposes of the case under appeal, I think all I need to say is that, in my opinion, what is meant by that expression is that an applicant must show not only that he is possessed of a requisite knowledge of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon him as the holder of the particular licence under the Act, but also that he is possessed of sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character as to permit him to be safely accredited to the public, without further inquiry, as a person to be entrusted with the sort of work which the licence entails (cf Ex parte Meagher [1919] NSWStRp 83; (1919) 19 SR (NSW) 433, at 442).
31 It is clear from the statutory regime that the motor vehicle dealers industry is regulated for the protection of the public and that honesty and integrity are required such that the public are not at risk of purchasing motor vehicles from those who may be considered to be unscrupulous, dishonest or fraudulent; Minitti v Motor Vehicle Industry Board [2011] WASCA 275 at [25].
32 As to what constitutes 'good character', the Tribunal is assisted by Newnes JA in LJW at [28]:
While 'good character' does not have a precise meaning, it ordinarily refers to a person's moral qualities (whether known to others or not), as opposed to the estimation in which (fairly or unfairly) the person is held by others, that is, their repute: Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1996] FCA 663; (1996) 68 FCR 422, 431432; Re T & Director of Youth & Community Services (1980) 1 NSWLR 392, 398399.
33 At [30], his Honour goes on to state that a person may be of good repute but, unknown to those who hold that particular opinion, have serious deficiencies in their moral character, and conversely, a person may not be of good repute because of a widespread but mistaken belief that they are, for example, dishonest when, in fact, they are possessed of good moral qualities.
34 The significance of prior convictions in the context of an inquiry into the fitness and propriety to hold vocational licences was considered in Tavelli v Johnson (Unreported, WASC, Library No 960693, 25 November 1996), in which Wheeler J, in the context of an agent's licence, set out a number of factors which are relevant to the Tribunal's deliberations in a matter of this nature. In this regard, her Honour said:
It must be stressed therefore that there can be no inflexible rules and no policy but that the discretion falls to be exercised anew in the circumstances of each application in the light of the statutory framework.
With that caution borne firmly in mind, however, some factors relevant to prior convictions can be listed. Convictions will, in my view, generally be regarded as more serious in the statutory context if:
(1) they occur in the course of or relate to the carrying out of the occupation of inquiry agent. See New Broadcasting Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1987] AATA 151; (1987) 73 ALR 420;
(2) they are offences of dishonesty, broadly understood. This is so because, as I apprehend it, the Act is concerned with the integrity of the gathering and presenting of material in Court and that material may be suspect, where the character of the agent suggests dishonesty;
(3) they occur while the person is the holder of a licence under the Act;
(4) they are otherwise so serious, either in themselves or as representing a course of disregard for the law, as to reflect particularly adversely on the character of the person committing them.
Indications that a person may be of good character and a fit and proper person notwithstanding previous convictions may be gleaned from the following factors:
(1) where the person convicted demonstrates genuine remorse and contrition, true insight and understanding of the earlier turpitudes. See Good v Medical Board of WA; unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 940678; 6 December 1994 at 31 and the cases there cited. The understanding demonstrated will generally carry more weight if it can be shown that it is demonstrated by the person's actions as well as by the person's words;
(2) if the offences were committed a substantial time ago. I would not suggest, however, that any set period will result in the expunging of the effect of previous convictions on character and much will depend on the additional factors I list and, in appropriate cases, on others;
(3) any change in the person's circumstances from the time of the commission of the offences which indicates that the factors giving rise to the offences have been eliminated;
(4) a person's character generally since his commission of the offences including his lack of offending, age, family support, paid and voluntary work and character references. As to character references, I would caution that they will often be of more value if it appears from their terms that they were made in full knowledge of the fact of the commission of the offences.
35 Prior convictions and the significance of those convictions must always be considered in light of all the evidence which the parties have presented, rather than in isolation, with particular regard to the vocation and what duties the vocation entails for which the licence is sought; Smith v DirectorGeneral of Transport [2004] WASCA 64 at [36].
36 The respondent, and therefore the Tribunal, may have regard to the pending charges, but ought also to consider whether the charges are selfevidently unsustainable; Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263 at [46] and [47]. In relation to a consideration of pending charges, the Tribunal, as it does with prior convictions, will consider whether they occurred during or in the course of carrying on duties pursuant to the particular vocation, whether they are such that they may result in a lack of confidence of the public in the applicant undertaking those duties, and the nature of and circumstances surrounding those pending charges.
37 At [25], the Tribunal has set out the respondent's reasons for the decision under review. In addition to those matters, the respondent made the following submissions at the hearing:
38 The respondent submits therefore that the Tribunal should reach the same decision as that reached by the respondent, being that the applicant does not meet the criteria set out under s 16(1)(b) and (c) of the MVD Act.
39 The applicant's position, in summary, can be set out as follows:
40 On the basis of the above submissions, the applicant therefore submits that the Tribunal should find that he meets the criteria set out under s 16(1)(b) and (c) of the MVD Act.
41 In a review proceeding, subject to the provisions of the relevant enabling Act, the Tribunal may affirm the decision that is being reviewed, vary that decision or set it aside and substitute its own decision. The Tribunal may also send the matter back to the decisionmaker for reconsideration. The review is to be by way of a hearing de novo and it is not confined to matters that were before the decisionmaker; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) s 27(1). The reasons for the original decisionmaker's decision do not limit the Tribunal in conducting the review proceeding; SAT Act s 27(3).
42 Leaving aside the question of honesty, which will be dealt with separately, the Tribunal has formed the view that the applicant's prior convictions are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to support a finding that the applicant is not of good character and not a fit and proper person to hold a yard manager's licence. The Tribunal has formed this view based on the following considerations.
43 The prior convictions between 1997 and 2001 are regarded by the Tribunal as having occurred long enough ago that they should not be given much weight. The cultivation conviction, the breach of the restraining order and the recent assault charge occurred in more recent times. However, none of the prior convictions occurred during or are related to the applicant's vocation.
44 The Tribunal does not accept the respondent's submission that the prior convictions evidence a propensity for aggressive and violent behaviour, such that the applicant would not be able to deal with the public in the context of his vocation in a calm and reasonable manner. The applicant's assertion that he had never had a complaint made against him by a member of the public during the course of his employment history was not contested at the hearing, and his character referees speak highly of him and his abilities to deal with difficult situations. This was also the oral evidence of his current employer, Mr Diamantis.
45 The applicant relied on eight character references. Seven of the character references have been written by those who have worked with the applicant within his vocation and all speak highly of his character, his ability, and his relationship and dealings with customers. In particular, the Tribunal gives weight to the character reference and oral evidence of Mr Diamantis, being a dealer principal of a reputable dealership and who, with full knowledge of the applicant's history and record, speaks very highly of the applicant and his character. The Tribunal does not accept the submissions of the respondent to the effect that it is in Mr Diamantis' own commercial interests to give such evidence. In the Tribunal's view, Mr Diamantis was a credible witness and the Tribunal accepts his evidence as being honestly held. The Tribunal also gives some weight to the character references from Mr Phillip McLardy, dealer principal of Osborne Park Volkswagen, who has known the applicant for 12 months, and that of Mr Brendan Hede, wholesale buyer for Subaru Osborne Park, who has known the applicant for over five years, both of whom provided positive character references for the applicant with some knowledge, by implication, of the applicant's criminal history.
46 The Tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence that he had insight into his misconduct and his desire to 'turn his life around'. The applicant was seen by the Tribunal as genuinely remorseful.
47 It is also relevant that the applicant appears to have a stable home environment and the continued support from his family. The applicant's home life and responsibilities have, in recent years, improved significantly in that he has recently purchased a family home with his partner and has achieved joint custody of his fouryearold son from a previous relationship.
48 The Tribunal considers that the pending charges are relevant to its deliberations, but they should be seen in the context of all other evidence and in relation to the particular vocational licence in question. The Tribunal notes that the pending weapons charge is being defended by the applicant. In addition, the Tribunal accepts the submission of the applicant that the circumstances surrounding each of the pending charges could be regarded as exceptional and do not relate to the applicant's vocation. In relation to the weapons charge, the circumstances seemingly arose in the context of the applicant's brother being seriously assaulted in a nightclub. In relation to the CCC Charges, the applicant failed to disclose information to the CCC in circumstances where he feared for his own and his family's safety and was therefore under considerable duress. The Tribunal therefore accepts the applicant's submission that, in the circumstances, those pending charges should be given little weight in the context of a determination as to whether the applicant is of good character and is a fit and proper person in order to hold a yard manager's licence.
49 The Tribunal will now turn to deal with the issue of honesty and whether the matters submitted by the respondent are such that they must result in a finding that the applicant is not of good character or a fit and proper person.
50 In relation to the submission that the applicant did not disclose the CCC Charges on his Application, the Tribunal does not accept that this evidences the dishonesty of the applicant. The applicant gave evidence at the hearing that he had never heard of the CCC before being summoned to give evidence, and that he did not appreciate that he had an obligation to disclose those pending charges when completing his Application. The Tribunal accepts the applicant's evidence that he was under the mistaken belief that all that was required by him was to disclose 'police' charges, and that he believed that he had met that obligation by attaching his NPC to the Application. It would have been prudent for the applicant to have asked the respondent whether that information was required. However, the Tribunal accepts the evidence of the applicant that the Application was completed in haste, which may explain why this further enquiry was not made.
51 The respondent submitted that the varying versions of events provided by the applicant to Ms Bam, in their telephone conversations in respect of the then pending assault charge, also evidences the propensity of the applicant not to be entirely forthcoming in his dealings with the respondent. The applicant conceded in oral evidence that he chose not to disclose to Ms Bam, in his initial telephone conversation with her on 4 July 2012, the fact that his brother was involved in the incident. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was providing information to Ms Bam in difficult circumstances and accepts the applicant's evidence that he felt a degree of discomfort in disclosing details in relation to charges which were yet to be tried. The respondent submitted that the applicant fully understood his rights not to say anything at all in respect of the circumstances of the pending charge. The Tribunal does not agree. In the Tribunal's view, the applicant would have felt that he was under some pressure to give an explanation to the respondent rather than be seen to be refusing to give any information at all.
52 Clearly, the applicant was not forthcoming to the respondent in his original version of the events leading up to the assault charge by omitting to disclose the involvement of his brother. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that this omission may have been partly motivated by the applicant feeling uncomfortable in discussing criminal matters which were then pending, it does not entirely explain the applicant's behaviour. The respondent submits that the applicant was attempting to minimise the severity of the circumstances of the assault. However, in the Tribunal's view, it would have been more favourable to the applicant to explain the circumstances of the assault by way of defending his brother who, the applicant believed at the time, was under assault by three people, rather than the version of events the applicant initially provided, that he was defending an attempt to steal his motor vehicle. The Tribunal therefore does not accept that the omission was made in order to advance the applicant's own interests. The Tribunal also does not accept that this omission itself evidences a propensity on the part of the applicant to act in a dishonest, fraudulent or unscrupulous manner, such that he could not be trusted by the public in transactions of the nature which occur in his particular vocation. The Tribunal found the applicant to be genuinely remorseful of this behaviour and accepts his evidence that he understands his mistakes in this regard.
53 The respondent also relied upon the cultivation conviction as further evidence of the alleged lack of honesty of the applicant in that he misled the Court by pleading guilty to the charge when, in fact, the cannabis plant belonged to a friend of his who was on parole. The applicant gave evidence that he pleaded guilty to the offence because he believed that he was morally guilty, given that the plant was under his control. We do not accept this. It is more likely that the applicant acted out of some misguided loyalty. The Tribunal does not condone such an action, which is a serious departure from what is required when pleading to a charge. However, we do not consider that this conduct means that the applicant has a propensity for dishonesty, such that it establishes a risk to the public in dealings with the applicant within the context of the motor dealer industry. In the Tribunal's view, this conduct does not invite the conclusion that the applicant is, or would be, dishonest, unscrupulous or fraudulent in his motor vehicle transactions with members of the public.
54 Further, in relation to the particular issue of honesty, the respondent also relies upon the charges that the applicant lied to the CCC in relation to whether he was present at the fight at the motorplex. It is not in contention between the parties that the applicant did initially provide false information to the CCC in this regard, but he subsequently provided a statement and admitted to his presence. The applicant gave evidence that he initially lied because he was fearful for his safety and his family's safety due to the possibility of retaliation from the outlawed motorcycle clubs if he were to give evidence to the CCC. When the applicant subsequently gave that evidence, he did so after temporarily relocating his partner in order to protect her safety. In the Tribunal's view, this incident of dishonesty has been satisfactorily explained and, again, is completely unrelated and out of context with the duties that the applicant undertakes as a yard manager. In the Tribunal's view, it does not show a propensity for dishonesty, or fraudulent or unscrupulous behaviour in financial dealings or dealings with the public within his particular vocation.
55 In relation to the pending weapons charge, the respondent submits that this is yet another example of the applicant's alleged dishonesty. Ms Bam's evidence was that, during a telephone conversation with the applicant on 10 July 2012, the applicant informed her that, during the incident at the Saint nightclub, he had said the words 'back up or I'll bloody stab you' to one of the doormen. This assertion has now been denied by the applicant. The parties accept that Ms Bam holds the belief that this was what was said to her. Ms Bam was not called for the purposes of crossexamination, but the Tribunal accepts, as the applicant did at the hearing, that Ms Bam would simply have stood by her evidence that that is what she believed the applicant told her during that telephone conversation. The applicant gave credible oral evidence at the hearing that he did not make the statement attributed to him by Ms Bam. Without in any way suggesting that Ms Bam was anything but mistaken, we prefer the evidence of the applicant. The statement in question is inconsistent with the charge made against him and would have been a statement which he would have known would reflect adversely against him. In addition, the Tribunal notes that none of the witness statements given by those present at the time of the incident refer to the applicant making that statement or a similar statement. It may have been that something similar to those words were said by the applicant to Ms Bam during the telephone conversation along the lines as recollected by the applicant in para 10 of Exhibit 3. However, the Tribunal finds that Ms Bam's recollection of those words is inaccurate and therefore does not accept the submission that the applicant has changed his story or misled the respondent in this regard.
56 The Tribunal therefore considers that there is no basis to find that the applicant has a propensity to be dishonest, unscrupulous or fraudulent, such that he cannot be found to be a person of good character or a fit and proper person in the context of his particular vocation. In the Tribunal's view, the public is not at risk of being dealt with in an unscrupulous or fraudulent manner in transactions occurring as part of the applicant's duties as a licensed yard manager in the motor dealer industry.
57 In relation to the matter of whether the applicant is of good repute, the Tribunal does not accept the submissions of the respondent that the appropriate test is whether a reasonable member of the public would consider the applicant to be a person of good repute, given the number and serious nature of the applicant's past convictions, news media reports of his alleged association with an outlawed motor cycle club and the pending CCC Charges. What is important is how the applicant is regarded by people who know him.
58 The applicant, as noted earlier in these reasons, has filed and relied upon eight character references and, although some of those references do not refer to the applicant's prior convictions and pending charges, a number of them do and they all speak of the applicant being of good repute. Therefore, the Tribunal does not accept the submission of the respondent that the applicant is not a person of good repute.
59 Lastly, the respondent submitted that the Tribunal should find that the applicant does not have the ability and knowledge to perform the duties required of him as a licensed yard manager. The Tribunal does not accept this submission, as it is based on two brief periods of time during which the applicant performed yard manager duties whilst not being licensed, although he held the mistaken belief that he was licensed. The applicant gave evidence in this regard to explain why he held that belief, and the Tribunal accepts that evidence.
60 Taking all of those considerations above into account, the Tribunal has reached the view that, notwithstanding the prior convictions, pending charges, alleged incidences of dishonesty by the applicant, and the two periods of time within which the applicant continued in employment as a yard manager and was unlicensed, the applicant is a person of good character and repute, a fit and proper person to hold a motor vehicle yard manager's licence and he fully understands his duties under the licensing scheme of the MVD Act.
61 The respondent submitted that, if the Tribunal was to uphold the applicant's application, the licence ought to be granted subject to conditions. The parties had agreed in advance what those conditions might be, and the Tribunal accepts that those handed up by the parties at the hearing are appropriate.
(a) charged with any offence in any State or Territory of Australia and the particulars of the charge; or
(b) convicted of any offence and the particulars of it; or
(c) the subject of any finding or report by the Corruption and Crime Commission or any similar body and the particulars of the finding or report.
I certify that this and the preceding [62] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127
Minitti v Motor Vehicle Industry Board [2011] WASCA 275
Real Estate and Business Agents Supervisory Board v LJW [2011] WASCA 35
Smith v DirectorGeneral of Transport [2004] WASCA 64
(1987) 73 ALR 420
(1955) 93 CLR 127
(1996) 68 FCR 422
(1980) 1 NSWLR 392