BXT23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 508

1. This is a matter where the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had a subjective fear of returning to Bangladesh, where he was a citizen, but was not satisfied that fear was well-founded. The Tribunal comprehensively rejected the applicant's credibility, finding he was not a witness of truth on the basis of 17 matters set out in its reasons.
2. At the hearing before me, the applicant's counsel conceded that, in substance, his case stood or fell as to whether he could challenge those credibility findings on the basis of lack of active intellectual consideration by the Tribunal of the submissions made, and evidence given, by the applicant.
3. For the reasons which follow, I find there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's credibility findings, and the application made to this Court under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) must be dismissed with costs.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh, who, having arrived in Australia on a Student visa in 2007, lodged a Protection visa application in 2014 which was rejected by a delegate of the Minister, a decision affirmed by the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) following a hearing conducted over two days in 2022. The application to this Court was made in July 2023 within the prescribed time, and was allocated to me in late 2025.

1. At the hearing before me, the court book was tendered by the Minister and received in evidence without objection. The only other evidence sought to be adduced was from the applicant, being a report by a registered psychologist dated February 2026 based on a single assessment of the applicant two weeks earlier. At the hearing, I rejected the tender of that report, and I now give my reasons for doing so.
2. First, the report was not the subject of sworn or affirmed evidence by affidavit or in person by the psychologist (and in relation to the recited history) by the applicant. Second, it does not comply with the requirements of r 17.22 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth), which provides as follows:

(1) An expert report, including a Court expert's report, must:

(a) be signed by the expert who prepared the report; and

(b) contain an acknowledgement at the beginning of the report that the expert has read, understood and complied with the Practice Direction; and

(c) contain particulars of the training, study or experience by which the expert has acquired specialised knowledge; and

(d) identify the questions that the expert was asked to address; and

(e) set out separately each of the factual findings or assumptions on which the expert's opinion is based; and

(f) set out separately from the factual findings or assumptions each of the expert's opinions; and

(g) set out the reasons for each of the expert's opinions; and

(h) contain an acknowledgement that the expert's opinions are based wholly or substantially on the specialised knowledge mentioned in paragraph (c); and

1. Finally, and fundamentally, the draft report, even assuming it had been received in proper form as sworn evidence in compliance with the rules, failed to meet s 55(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act), which provides:

The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding.

1. The corollary of s 55 is s 56(2) of the Evidence Act, which provides:

Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible.

1. The applicant's legal representative was unable to explain how a report based on a single presentation by the applicant almost three and a half years after the Tribunal hearing could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of any fact in issue in this judicial review proceeding.
2. Counsel referred to Ground 6 of the application, asserting the Tribunal's "[f]ailure to consider a substantial, clearly articulated claim concerning reintegration capacity", of which mental health was an aspect. As I will later explain, this ground fails in any event, but even if it succeeded, there was no explanation as to how a psychological assessment conducted almost three and a half years after the Tribunal hearing could meet the relevance test.
3. Counsel for the applicant expressly conceded that, save for the references in paragraphs 130 to 132 of the decision, he accepted the Minister's submission that mental health was not raised by the applicant in his visa application, his interview with the delegate or in his oral evidence before the Tribunal. Paragraphs 130 to 132 of the Tribunal's reasons state:
   1. Seventeenth, in his Statutory Declaration dated 24 March 2014 and his Statement dated 23 August 2022, the applicant gave evidence of the impact of his ex-wife's conduct and the conduct of her family members on his mental health. He provided details of medical and psychological treatment he has received in Australia and provided a number of supporting medical documents. He provided the Department with a Psychological Report dated September 2014 which indicates that he met the criteria outlined by the DSM-V for a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Major Depressive Episode.
   2. The applicant's evidence is that he has been working as a security officer for 5 years and worked throughout the Covid 19 pandemic and lockdowns. He has undergone counselling in the past and is no longer having counselling. His former Psychologist gave him tools and techniques for dealing with anxiety and depression. The Tribunal noted that Bangladesh has many Psychologists, particularly in Dhaka, should he need to consult a Psychologist in Bangladesh in the future. The Tribunal also noted that his parents, based on his evidence, are wealthy people and can pay for his counselling if he is unable to do so.
   3. The applicant responded that they are not discussing seeing a Psychologist or paying a Psychologist. His main concern is that if he returns to Bangladesh, they will give him a life sentence.

1. It can be seen that the proposed evidence, even if put into otherwise admissible form, would have failed the threshold set in s 55 of the Evidence Act as to relevance. For all of these reasons, I rejected the tender of the evidence. No other evidence was sought to be adduced at the hearing before me by the applicant.
2. At the hearing before me, counsel for the applicant relied upon his instructing lawyer's written submissions without elaboration, save for the matter just mentioned and Ground 6 (which I will shortly come to), but otherwise made the concession noted in [2] above.

1. Grounds 1, 5 and 6 asserted failures to consider and determine substantial, clearly articulated grounds; Grounds 3 and 4, asserted illogicality and/or legal unreasonableness in relation to critical credibility findings; and then, in Ground 2, there was an asserted error by the Tribunal described as "[m]isperformance of the complementary protection task" in relation to the alleged failure to consider risk cumulatively.
2. The applicant's claims, which were largely rejected by the Tribunal, were said to have arisen in 2013 and 2014. The applicant had come to Australia with his then wife in 2007, but their relationship deteriorated. In approximately June 2013, the applicant made plans to go back to Bangladesh with his ex-wife in an attempt to save his marriage.
3. The applicant's version of events included allegations that, when he went to Bangladesh, he was forced to sign divorce papers by his ex-wife's family under threats of death (including threats to shoot him), coerced into signing four sheets of blank paper and threatened by his ex-wife a year later when he had returned to Australia that, if he returned to Bangladesh, her family would torture and kill him, such that his fears were he would be blackmailed, kidnapped and killed if he returned to Bangladesh. The applicant contended the authorities would not protect him because his ex-wife's family members were active in the "current Awami League government and had powerful connections within government and the police and had made continuous threats to him".
4. In the applicant's response to the Tribunal's hearing invitation, in answer to the question, "Is there any issue that may affect your ability ... to take part in the hearing (e.g. a health problem or disability)?", he ticked "[y]es", and provided the following details:

Depression, anxiety, shortness of breath, loss of focus, post trauma, physical health issues including chest pain, shortness of breath

(As per the original)

1. The Tribunal expressly had regard to its guidelines on vulnerable persons and on the assessment of credibility: [133] of the Tribunal's reasons. The Minister submitted that there was no articulation of mental health claims beyond this, and in particular, neither in this document nor at any time before the Tribunal did the applicant say that any lapses in memory had been caused by his asserted conditions. Significantly, the applicant provided a written statement to the Tribunal where he made 13 new claims, as set out in paragraph 26 of the Tribunal's decision.
2. The Tribunal, in very lengthy reasons, summarised the original claims (see paragraphs 21 to 24), the new claims (25 to 26), and then, between paragraphs 29 and 132, assessed the applicant's various claims, ultimately finding at paragraph 134:

Having considered all of the applicant's claims and all the evidence, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is not a witness of truth. The Tribunal finds that he embellished some of his claims and fabricated others. The Tribunal formed the view that he was manufacturing some of his evidence as he was giving it and was prepared to say anything to obtain a Protection visa without any regard for the truth.

1. In paragraphs 135 to 150, the Tribunal indicates, in detail, which parts of the applicant's evidence and claims were accepted and which were not. Although it did so succinctly, I am satisfied, as I later discuss, that there was active intellectual consideration of the claims made. The Tribunal then reached a conclusion that the applicant had a subjective fear of returning to Bangladesh, but was not satisfied that it was well-founded (see paragraph 151), nor that the applicant was at risk of serious or significant harm for any reason were he to return to Bangladesh then or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Consequently, it rejected the claims for protection obligations either under the Refugees Convention or the complementary protection criterion (see paragraphs 153 to 156).
2. The Tribunal provided 17 listed reasons for not finding the applicant to be a credible or reliable witness, and in the course of giving those reasons often recited that it had raised at the hearing with the applicant its concerns with the veracity of the applicant's evidence. As I mentioned above, the applicant's counsel properly conceded before me that, in substance, if he could not establish a jurisdictional error in relation to the credibility findings, the application must fail.

1. Ground 1 concerned rejection of the applicant's:

... material claim that he faced harm in Bangladesh from his former spouse's family (and/or their associates), including that threats and attacks against his family/property in [Bangladesh] ... (including an incident in or about 2017) were connected to the former spouse's family.

1. This was based on the contention that the applicant's parents' home had been attacked, vandalised and destroyed by terrorists linked to the applicant's ex-wife and family. This was considered at length at paragraphs 94 to 109 of the Tribunal's reasons as being the eleventh ground for rejection of the applicant's evidence.
2. The Tribunal's reasons noted that, initially, the applicant said that the ransacking of his parents' home in December 2017 occurred when his parents were not there, but at the Tribunal hearing he gave evidence that his father was physically assaulted and his leg or feet had been injured in this incident. When reminded that this was inconsistent with his earlier evidence, the applicant then said it was not the same incident, but rather one his mother had told him about.
3. He nevertheless pressed the allegation, and when asked whether he thought it was important to mention his father had been assaulted, his response was, "it is important but what can [I] do[?]" (see paragraph 98). The Tribunal understandably found the failure to mention his father being previously physically attacked "raises serious concerns about his credibility and the veracity of this claim". The applicant also attached media reports from Bangladesh, together with English translations, referring "to a gang of notorious terrorists attacking the applicant's father's house".
4. The Tribunal (eg, in paragraph 149 of its reasons) did accept that there was an attack on his parents' home and vandalism, but that the reason for it was a local land dispute, rather than anything to do with the applicant and his ex-wife's relationship with him; at [148], it did not accept that the parents' home was attacked, vandalised and destroyed by terrorists linked to the ex-wife and her family. This was significant because it led it to the finding that the applicant had not satisfied the Tribunal that he was of adverse interest to the Bangladeshi police or any other authority (see [150]).
5. It was certainly open to the Tribunal to proceed in the logical way it did to weigh up the evidence of the applicant and to reject it.
6. There is no jurisdictional error here, in particular there is none concerning the credibility findings.

1. Ground 3 concerned the Tribunal's failure to engage with evidence concerning the applicant's mental health. The difficulty is that there is no evidence the applicant ever advanced his state of mental health as a protection claim; as noted above, his mental health and supporting documentation was considered, but the applicant's own evidence was that he was no longer attending counselling and that his former psychologist had given him tools and techniques to deal with anxiety and depression (eg, at [130] to [131].
2. Given mental health was not raised as a protection claim and that he was no longer receiving treatment, this aspect of the application must fail.

1. Ground 6, the asserted failure to consider the applicant's ability to reintegrate in Bangladesh, involved no substantially clearly articulated protection claim concerning harm in respect of mental health, employment opportunities or economic destitution were the applicant to return to Bangladesh. Rather, as the Minister correctly submits, the applicant's evidence was that he was no longer receiving treatment, and had the tools to manage his mental health. Ground 6 fails.

1. Ground 4 again contends that the Tribunal did not rationally engage with the applicant's explanation for difficulties in recall and presentation. The Tribunal applied the relevant guidelines at [133]. However, as already noted, the applicant had not contended that he was having difficulties in recall and presentation. He had not asked for an adjournment of the Tribunal hearing and the evidence he relied on was insufficient to convince the Tribunal that this was relevant to its assessment of his credibility. As the Minister correctly submitted:

This was not a case where the Tribunal relied on minor inconsistencies in the details of the applicants account, such as dates or locations. Rather, the concerns identified by the Tribunal were that the applicant had raised entirely new claims in his evidence before the Tribunal, his claims had exaggerated in seriousness across time generally, and that some of his claims appeared to be entirely fabricated.

These attacks on factual and credibility-based findings cannot succeed.

1. Ground 5 alleges the Tribunal failed to engage with material country information regarding the "ineffective enforcement of protective laws in Bangladesh", but that is not so. As the Tribunal said in paragraph 122 of its reasons:

The Tribunal noted that the country information indicates that violence against women in Bangladesh is widespread and the laws against domestic violence are not effectively enforced by the Police. The Tribunal noted that if the Bangladeshi Police do not protect women against violence that is happening in Bangladesh, it is highly unlikely that they will protect his ex-wife from violence against him particularly as his ex-wife lives in Australia, the assault took place in Australia, there is no victim or witnesses in Bangladesh and the Australian authorities have already dealt with that matter.

1. Given the Tribunal's finding the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of serious or significant harm in Bangladesh, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to go on to consider the availability of effective state protection, including country information on that topic. That ground fails.

1. Ground 2 concerned the asserted failure of the Tribunal, in its assessment of the complementary protection criterion, to assess the cumulative risk arising from the applicant's circumstances, including the asserted targeting by his former spouse's family and associates, the land dispute and the inability to obtain effective protection. The applicant, however, did not advance a claim that he feared harm because of land disputes, and, in any event, the Tribunal found he was not at risk of serious harm or significant harm as a result (see paragraph 150 of the reasons).
2. The Tribunal found there was not a real chance the applicant would face serious harm, and the claims of risk and fear faced by him were classically questions of fact: as Goodman J said in CVD19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 747 at [20]:

The second part of the proposed second ground of appeal suggests that "[t]he Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicants upon his returns (sic) to India under current BJP government". The risks and fears faced by the appellant were a question of fact (rather than a question of construction) and that question of fact was dealt with thoroughly by the Tribunal in a manner which discloses no jurisdictional error. It is, of course, not part of this Court's role to review the factual findings made by the Tribunal outside of any relevant ground of jurisdictional error.

(Emphasis in original)

1. The Tribunal was permitted to reject the evidence, as it did. It is not for the Court to examine for itself the veracity of these matters, as that would be impermissible merits review: as a Full Court of the Federal Court said in SZUEP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 94 at [27]:

There is not a great deal of country information in the Appeal Book. It is primarily found at Attachment B to the Statement of Decision and Reasons of the Tribunal. Having read it, the claim that it was not open to the Tribunal to find as it did, particularly at [88], in relation to that information fails. To say that some of the matters on which the Tribunal made findings were "taken out of context" shows no more than that the appellants disagree with the evaluation of the country information made by the Tribunal. However, subject to principles of legal unreasonableness, the weight to be given to country information is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]. Similarly, to submit that the country information report was negative misunderstands the nature of the question for the Tribunal. The Tribunal was not concerned with the position of women in South Africa generally but with the narrower question of, for example, State tolerance or condonation of domestic violence and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law.

1. For all of these reasons, the applicant is unable to effectively attack the credibility findings which led directly to the rejection of his claims. That being so, and in the absence of any other jurisdictional errors being asserted or established, the application must be dismissed with costs.
2. The Minister seeks that costs be payable in the sum of $5,400. That is an appropriate amount given the matters raised.

1. The orders of the Court are that:
   1. The application be dismissed.
   2. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $5,400.

I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Renwick.