BWK19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2008

1. This decision is about whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) committed jurisdictional error in affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's delegate (Delegate) to refuse the application for a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa).
2. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Australia on 11 February 2015 as the holder of a visitor visa.[1]
2. On 16 April 2015, the Applicant lodged an application for a Protection Visa. The Application claimed that the Applicant had left India because of death threats he had received from members of the Hindu Extremist Party; these were ostensibly made because he was a member of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI).[2]
3. The Applicant elaborated on his protection claims in a statement appended to the application. By way of summary, it asserted:

(a) that the Applicant had been an active member of the "Muslim Student Federation (MSF), [and] later on... started working with National Democratic Front (NDF) and [SDPI]";

(b) that the Applicant "was an active member and local leader of SDPI Malappuram district";

(c) that in February 2014, the Applicant wrote an article detailing Narendra Modi's involvement in the Godhra and Gujarat riots of 2002. The Applicant expressed a desire for people to know the "real face" of Modi, in the leadup to the 2014 national election and called for Modi and other involved political leaders to be held criminally responsible;

(d) that Hindu extremists began threatening the Applicant in response to him having published the article. The Applicant detailed a specific incident, occurring on 28 June 2014, in which his house was broken into by RSS workers, and the local leader "Carpenter Ganeshan". The Applicant described being threatened in front of his family, and being told that he should leave the country, "otherwise [he and his] family [would] be killed". He asserted that, a few days later, the individuals returned to his home and threatened to burn it down if he did not open his door. The Applicant escaped, without the individuals seeing, and fled to "Mysore where [his] sister-in-law and family her family were";

(e) that RSS members consequently visited the Applicant's relatives to locate him;

(f) that the Indian authorities would be unable to protect the Applicant and his family because those making the threats were "leaders of [the] ruling party in India"; and

(g) that if he stayed in India, he and his "family would not survive" and would be killed "instantly" upon returning.[3]

1. On 22 July 2016, the Delegate - pursuant to the power conferred on the Minister by s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and delegated by s 496 of that Act - refused to grant the Protection Visa sought by the Applicant.
2. The Delegate refused the application on the basis that they were not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee within the meaning of the Act, nor that the Applicant satisfied the complementary protections criteria. Accordingly, it was concluded that Australia's protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act were not enlivened by the Applicant's circumstances.[4]
3. By operation of the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate. [5]

1. On 11 August 2016, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision.
2. On 15 August 2016, the Tribunal:

(a) rang the Applicant in order to request the Delegate's decision record. They subsequently put this request in writing and forwarded it to the Applicant;[6] and

(b) acknowledged the Applicant's application for review. Appended to this letter was an Information for refugee review applicants fact sheet.[7]

1. On 16 August 2016, the Applicant forwarded the Delegate's written Decision Record to the Tribunal.[8]
2. On 6 March 2019, the Tribunal sent the Applicant an Invitation to Attend a Hearing.[9] On 11 March 2019, the Tribunal informed the Applicant that the hearing had been rescheduled to 2 April 2019.[10] Attached to both letters was an Information about hearings fact sheet.[11]
3. On 25 March 2019, the Applicant responded affirmatively to the hearing invitation.[12]
4. The hearing took place as scheduled, with the Applicant assisted by a Malayalam interpreter.[13]
5. On 11 April 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision to refuse the Protection Visa application; the Applicant was notified of the decision that same day.[14]

1. The Tribunal's decision is 10 pages long and spans 63 paragraphs. It is useful to outline this decision in detail.
2. Before substantively considering the Applicant's claims and evidence, the Tribunal member:

(a) identified the visa applied for, and the decision made by the Delegate in respect of it;[15]

(b) summarized the claims of the Applicant and the evidence supplied to the Tribunal in support of such claims;[16]

(c) summarized the Tribunal hearing;[17]

(d) identified the criteria for a Protection Visa, as well as the mandatory considerations the Tribunal was required to have regard to.[18]

1. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was a citizen of India and did not have a right to enter or reside in any other country[19]; it did not, in a general sense, accept the Applicant's claims to be true.[20] More specifically, the Tribunal:

(a) did not "accept [that] the [A]pplicant wrote an article about Modi's involvement in the Gujarat violence or the Godhra train carriage" and that this claim had been "manufactured".[21] A number of factual issues supported this finding, namely:

(i) a copy of the alleged article had not been provided to the Department or Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view, in this regard, "that if the applicant was leaving his home country to claim protection in another... as a consequence of having written a controversial article, he would have brought a copy of that article with him";[22]

(ii) despite claiming that President Modi had "planned and masterminded" the violence in Gujarat, he was unable to point to evidence in support of this claim. Indeed, it was put to the Applicant by the Delegate that the "country information indicates that people who write about the Gujarat communal violence... point to several things they say Modi was purported to have done which provoke the violence"; the Applicant in turn, "claimed that he did know about those things but that he could not express them".[23] When the Tribunal raised this issue with the Applicant, the Applicant's "explanation... for his inability to discuss the view that Modi may have been involved in the Gujarat violence was that he was suffering from mental tension and fear". The Tribunal regarded this inability to provide information in relation to the issue as casting doubt on the Applicant's "claim to have written the article";[24]

(iii) in the Applicant's evidence to the Tribunal, he had merely "handwritten a notice and posted it locally"; this conflicted with his previous claims that the article had been published, and that he wrote articles for the Malappuram Times;[25]

(b) was not satisfied the "applicant ha[d] ever held a journalist card". This was supported by the issues with his claims enumerated above, as well as the Tribunal's view that "if the [A]pplicant was genuinely interested in writing articles about local issues, he would have been familiar with the Sachar Report... [and] able to give more details about his writing";[26]

(c) was not satisfied that the Applicant was a member or office holder of the SDPI. This was supported by:

(i) the Applicant's inability to provide an SDPI membership card;

(ii) the Applicant not being listed on the SDPI Malappuram area website (and providing inconsistent explanations for this);[27]

(d) was not satisfied that, if the Applicant was a member of the "Muslim Student Federal and/or the National Democratic Front, those affiliations... cause him to fear returning to India";[28]

(e) was not satisfied "the [A]pplicant travelled to Australia because he feared harm in India". This conclusion was supported by the above findings, as well as the fact that the Applicant returned to India twice after the incident in which the Applicant was alleged to have been threatened at his home;[29]

1. In light of these conclusions, the Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act.[30] Accordingly, the decision of the Delegate was affirmed.[31]

1. On 7 May 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision (Originating Application).
2. The application was made within the 35-day prescribed time period,[32] and is brought pursuant to section 476 of the Act, which confers upon this court, in relation to migration decisions, the "same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution". That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters "where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."[33]
3. The Applicant seeks the following orders:

(a) an order that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed (writ of certiorari); and

(b) a writ of mandamus directed to the Tribunal requiring them to determine the Protection Visa application according to law.

1. The Applicant listed nine grounds of review in his Originating Application (incorporated below as they appeared in the Originating Application)

1. I am [states Applicant's name and DOB], and I am holder of Indian Passport [Applicant lists passport number]

2. I have severe threat in my home country which is why I apply for the protection visa on 20th April 2015. I tell in my story all the strong reason I have for the protection but the officer not listen to me and refuse my protection visa application on 22nd July 2016.

3. I then apply to Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review of this decision and I explain to them all the reasons why I really need the protection. I attend a hearing for this on 2nd April 2019 to give more evidence and to explain my situation.

4. The AAT did not consider my reasons fairly and confirm the decision of immigration department on 11th April 2019.

5. I believe that the AAT and Department of Home Affair did not consider the facts, reasons and evidence I provided to support my application.

6. The unfair decision of the department and AAT will ruin my life because I still have strong fear to go back to my country. I would like Federal Circuit Court to consider this when looking at my case.

7. I think AAT has made jurisdictional error in making decision for my application and I would like the Federal Circuit Court to review it.

8. I would like the court to find this jurisdictional error so that my application can be returned to the AAT for further reassessment.

9. I can provide court any information they need to help me with my problem and I think the court for their time.

1. On 17 May 2021, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
2. On 26 May 2021, a registrar of this Court made, inter alia, the following orders:

(a) that the Applicant file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence at least 28 days before the Final Hearing; and

(b) Minister to file any written submissions and further evidence in reply at least 14 days before the Final Hearing.

1. These orders were effectively reissued on 20 August 2025.
2. On 14 November 2025, the Minister filed written submissions.
3. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the application for judicial review filed 7 May 2019;

(b) a Court Book numbering 220 pages filed (marked as Exhibit R1); and

(c) the Minister's submissions, filed 14 November 2025.

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted and listed by it on 13 October 2025; and

(b) heard on 28 November 2025, and proceeded in person at the Court's Melbourne Registry.

1. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court assisted by a Punjabi interpreter. The Minister was represented by Anthony Gardner, solicitor at Mills Oakley.
2. The Court confirmed with the Applicant that they had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. To assist the Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(1) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[34]

(2) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[35]

(3) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[36]

(4) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[37]

(5) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[38] and

(6) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[39]

1. It was also explained to the Applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant the Applicant the visa they seek. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at.[40]
2. The explanations provided to the Applicant were interpreted. Based on the Applicant's responses the Court is confident they properly comprehended the scope and purpose of the hearing.
3. Noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on his grounds of review and to outline any other concerns he might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[41]
4. Before this Court the Applicant, did not make any substantive submissions in support of the grounds set out in their application despite being given every opportunity to do so.
5. Mr Gardner relied upon the Minister's written submissions.
6. After the Minister made their submissions, the Court invited the Applicant to respond to what the Minister's representative had said. The Applicant made no further submissions.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. In Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[42] his Honour Judge Fary summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:

48. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.

49. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[43]

50. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[44]

51. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[45] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[46] Different kinds of error may overlap.[47] The categories are not closed.[48] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[49]

52. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[50] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[51] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[52]

1. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
2. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[53]

1. At the hearing before the Court, the Applicant was invited to make submissions about:

(a) why he believed that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and

(b) each of the nine grounds of review.

1. The Applicant provided no explanation to clarify the contention of any of the grounds of review. Nor did they provide any particulars.
2. The Minister submitted that the decision of the Tribunal was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Court as presently constituted incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 36 to 46 of the Minister's outline of submissions.

1. I am [states Applicant's name and DOB], and I am holder of Indian Passport [Applicant lists passport number]

3. I then apply to Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review of this decision and I explain to them all the reasons why I really need the protection. I attend a hearing for this on 2nd April 2019 to give more evidence and to explain my situation.

1. Grounds One and Three constitute factual assertions.
2. Grounds One and Three do not establish jurisdictional error.

2. I have severe threat in my home country which is why I apply for the protection visa on 20th April 2015. I tell in my story all the strong reason I have for the protection but the officer not listen to me and refuse my protection visa application on 22nd July 2016.

1. Ground Two is directed towards the decision of the Delegate As explained, by reason of the Act the Court had no jurisdiction to review the Delegate's decision.
2. Ground Two does not establish jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

4. The AAT did not consider my reasons fairly and confirm the decision of immigration department on 11th April 2019.

5. I believe that the AAT and Department of Home Affair did not consider the facts, reasons and evidence I provided to support my application.

1. Ground Four and Five allege that the Tribunal failed to consider the Applicant's "reasons", "facts, or "evidence". Both grounds are bare allegations not supported by particulars.
2. When these grounds were put to the Applicant, he declined the opportunity to provide particulars. It is unclear - even upon close scrutiny of the Tribunal decision - how the member failed to consider any materials relevant to assessing the Applicant's claims.
3. The Tribunal:

(a) accurately summarised the Applicant's claims;[54]

(b) clearly and comprehensively outlined the evidence before it, including that provided at the hearing of 2 April 2019;[55]

(c) closely scrutinised this evidence, in order to assess the credibility of the Applicant's claims;[56] and

(d) in light of cogently identified inconsistencies, refused to accept the Applicant's claims as true.[57]

1. In DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[58] Justices Kenny, Kerr and Perry of the Federal Court helpfully summarised the legal principles relevant to the making of credibility findings. Their Honours said:

[30] The relevant principles can be summarised as follows.

(1)While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109; 154 ALD 221; [2016] FCAFC 174 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; 302 ALR 572; 136 ALD 41; [2013] FCA 317 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).

(2) Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; 266 ALR 367; 115 ALD 248; [2010] HCA 16 (SZMDS) that:

135.... A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.

(3) By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant's evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), "[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant_[2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 353 ALR 641 at 650_to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 676; [2002] FCAFC 437 at [54]." Equally jurisdictional error may be established by "a process of reasoning which damns a man's credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document": SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 181 FCR 113; 112 ALD 501; [2009] FCA 1470 at [37].

(4) Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that:

56. An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal's decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal's decision-making processes from scrutiny ...

(5)A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, "extreme" illogicality must be demonstrated "measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions" (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, "[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal's reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality": CQG15 at [61].

1. In light of the cautious approach to be taken by the Court, the Applicant's failure to provide particulars in respect of Grounds Four and Five, and the Court's own close reading of the Tribunal Decision, this Court is satisfied that - in making its adverse credibility findings - the Tribunal's decision was logical, rational and untainted by other jurisdictional error.
2. Grounds Four and Five are dismissed.

6. The unfair decision of the department and AAT will ruin my life because I still have strong fear to go back to my country. I would like Federal Circuit Court to consider this when looking at my case.

1. The Applicant, in Ground Six, contends that the Tribunal's Decision is "unfair"; this reflects a mistaken understanding of this Court's role. As was explained to the Applicant, the task of this Court is to consider whether the Tribunal Decision was attended by jurisdictional error - this is an inquiry distinct from broader considerations of "fairness", even if there will inevitably be some degree of overlap between fairness and error.
2. To the extent that Ground Six contends that the Applicant does indeed have a "strong fear" of returning to his country of origin, it invites the Court to impermissibly assess the merits of the Applicant's claims.
3. In this manner, Ground Six does not establish jurisdictional error.

7. I think AAT has made jurisdictional error in making decision for my application and I would like the Federal Circuit Court to review it.

1. When asked in Court why BWK19 believed that the "AAT ha[d] made jurisdictional error", the Applicant expressed his desire to remain in Australia. When reminded that this was the Applicant's last opportunity to present his case to this Court, he responded that he had "Nothing to say".
2. Ground Seven is a bare assertion and, absent particulars, does not establish jurisdictional error.

8. I would like the court to find this jurisdictional error so that my application can be returned to the AAT for further reassessment.

1. Ground Eight expresses the Applicant's wish for the Tribunal's Decision to be remitted. A statement of aspiration is incapable of establishing jurisdictional error - it is not a proper ground of review.

9. I can provide court any information they need to help me with my problem and I think the court for their time.

1. Ground Nine expresses the Applicant's gratitude to the Court, and his willingness to provide information in support of his claims.
2. Ground Nine is not a proper ground of review.

1. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[59] at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the Applicant's grounds as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part and, for the following reasons, the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises out of the substantive application.

1. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The Court will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[5] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338A(1)(c), 474, 476(2)(a), 476(4).

[32] Migration Act s 477(1).

[33] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[34] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198 ('Craig').

[37] SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].

[38] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].

[39] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].

[40] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[41] [2019] FCA 600 at [7].

[42] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620.

[43] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[44] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [17] (Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ).

[45] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[46] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152, [3] ('LPDT').

[47] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323, [82].

[49] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351, [82].

[51] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506, [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[52] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[53] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, [40].

[58] [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 353 ALR 641.

[59] [2015] FCA 1391.