BWC18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1586

1. It is a matter of history of which judicial notice may be taken that a long-running civil war and insurrection in Sri Lanka in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) opposed the government, was brought to an end militarily in 2009.
2. Sixteen years later, a sequel to that conflict is, as this case evidences, still to be found in the Australian judicial system. That sequel arises in this way.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in the Australian external territory of the Cocos Islands by boat on 17 September 2012. He had no visa issued under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) authorising that arrival. He was, therefore, for the purposes of the Act, an unlawful maritime arrival. Initially thereafter, the appellant lodged an application for a protection (subclass 866) visa. Thereafter, on 11 February 2016, he lodged a valid application for a different visa: a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). That application was, in the first instance, considered by a delegate of the ministerial predecessor to the active party respondent to the present appeal, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Minister).
4. On 31 August 2017, that delegate decided not to grant the appellant a SHEV. Under the then provisions of the Act with respect to such a decision, it was referred for review by the then Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority). Such review is not a full review on the merits, although the Authority is independent of the Minister. Particular limitations attend the material which the Authority may consider.
5. On 26 March 2018, for reasons given that day, the Authority decided to affirm the decision of the Minister's delegate not to grant the appellant a SHEV.
6. In turn, the appellant instituted proceedings in the then Federal Circuit Court on 12 April 2018 by which he sought the issuing of constitutional writs directed to the end of quashing the Authority's decision and requiring that it be made afresh. The Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's judicial review application on 1 November 2021, for reasons given ex tempore that day: CBWC18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC 2G 302.
7. The appellant now appeals against that order of dismissal.
8. Before turning to the merits of the appeal, some explanation should be given, having regard to the evident great lapses of time as to why it is that the case has taken so long to progress through the Commonwealth's judicial branch of government in relation to the original jurisdiction. As the date of hearing might indicate, it appears that apart from any considerations arising from the sheer volume of cases of this kind with which that court has to deal, its more timely hearing was affected by the impact of various measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In turn, although the appeal was also filed in 2019, it too has been affected, so it seems, by a combination of measures taken in response to that pandemic and, again, the sheer volume of such cases in this court. It should be noted, though, that the appellant has not pressed for an earlier hearing. Even so, that the case does have such a lengthy history in the judicial branch of government is one factor making it desirable that, if possible, the case be not just heard, but also determined today.
9. I suspect strongly, with respect, that such a consideration also informed why it was that the learned primary judge similarly disposed of the case on the day it was heard for reasons given ex tempore. In the circumstances, such a course was, with respect, highly desirable.
10. The amended notice of appeal is, with respect, somewhat prolix, but at least recognising that it is appellant, not original, jurisdiction which the court exercises. The grounds of appeal, in effect, recite that the Circuit Court fell into error by not upholding one or more of the alleged jurisdictional errors with which it was alleged the Authority's decision was attended. The appellant alleged that the Circuit Court should have concluded that the Authority's decision was attended by jurisdictional error because of one or more of the following reasons: its satisfaction that the criteria for the visa were not met entailed a failure to apply the real chance test; was unreasonable; or entailed a failure to engage in a proper, genuine and realistic consideration (the appellant's terminology) with respect to the appellant's mental condition and the effect that this would have on the appellant if the appellant were returned to Sri Lanka.
11. It is convenient, first, to deal with the allegation that there was a failure to engage in a proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the claims made by the appellant in his visa application. In support of the proposition that there existed such an obligation and a need for an active intellectual engagement with the claim, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant, to Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352 (Carrascalao).
12. Carrascalao is one of a number of cases decided in this court at intermediate appellate level prior to the judgment of the High Court in Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 27; (2022) 275 CLR 582 (Plaintiff M1/2021). Having regard to Plaintiff M1/2021, especially at [24] to [26], considerable caution must, in my view, be taken in relation to continued reliance upon authorities such as Carrascalao. In the joint judgment of Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ, in Plaintiff M1/2021, at [24] to [26], the following was stated:

[24] Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations. Adopting and adapting what Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said in Tickner v Chapman, the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decisionmaker is not obliged "to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims" made by a former visa holder.

[25] It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement - the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker - will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.

[26] Labels like "active intellectual process" and "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating "a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any [decision-maker's] decision can be scrutinised".51 That is not the correct approach. As Mason J stated in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, "[t]he limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind". The court does not substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker.

[footnote references omitted]

1. These observations, particularly those found in [26], counsel against a court exercising original judicial review jurisdiction or intermediate appellate jurisdiction therefrom transgressing, however, unintentionally into an impermissible form of merits review under the guise of holding that a particular administrative decision-maker, such as the Authority, has not given genuine consideration to a particular issue. The more submissions progressed on behalf of the appellant today, the more, with all due respect, I felt I was the subject of a solicitation to engage in a form of merits review under the guise of an invitation to conclude that there was no proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the claims that were made.
2. As to what those claims were and how they were dealt with, in the first instance, the claims are summarised by the Authority at considerable length, including as developed and refined in a supplementary statement dated 15 May 2017 at [21] and [22] of the Authority's reasons. These state, respectively:

Applicant's claims for protection

1. The applicant's claims can be summarised as follows. In his SHEV application and at the interview with the delegate on 9 August 2017 (the interview) he claimed:

• He is a Tamil Hindu who was born in Mullaitivu in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.
• His parents remain in Sri Lanka but are living separately. He had a brother and a sister.
• His father operated a business with some of the applicant's uncles in the Vanni but was also forced to work for the LTTE. He worked as a border control agent from the 1990s until the ceasefire in 2002. He would report to the LTTE if the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) was encroaching on LTTE territory.
• Sometimes the LTTE would come to the house and tell the applicant's father to come and help with other tasks. This included digging bunkers and labouring jobs. His father was also trained in sending and receiving messages.
• After the ceasefire, his father moved to Colombo and ran a business with the applicant's uncles. The uncles were reasonably wealthy and could pay bribes to get released if they were arrested.
• The applicant stayed in the North with his mother. As a student, he would help with LTTE celebration days. He did not have to do this but did it because he wanted to.
• His problems started in 2008. His family was living in Karainagar in Jaffna, near a SLN base. Before they had come there, the SLN had issued passes to people living there but the applicant's family came later and did not get a pass.
• When the war started again, he came under suspicion because he did not have a SLN pass and his National Identity Card (NIC) showed that he was born in Mullaitivu. The authorities used to question him about this all the time and accuse him of being LTTE.
• On about 14 October 2008, in the evening, he was standing with some friends near the SLN base. Some SLN men asked them why they were so close to the base and said that they were not allowed to be there. The SLN beat the applicant, made him kneel down and take his shirt off and then blindfolded him with his shirt. He had to wait for senior officers to come.
• The senior officers asked him questions about who he was and why he was there. He pointed out his house and one of the officers said that he needed to come to the camp to sign in every day. The applicant said that he could not do that because he went to school and he was then told to sign in on Saturdays and Sundays. He was released after about six hours.
• The other boys had SLN permits but one of them, who was older, was also told to report every day.
• The first day that the applicant signed in, one of the officers went back to his house with him and searched it.
• In November or December 2008, he was standing outside his house with some friends. CID officers came and asked to see their NIC. When they saw that the applicant was from Mullaitivu they accused him of being LTTE.
• He became scared of the harassment and so in 2009 he went to Kurunegala in the North West Province. He had to get permission from the police to go there. About two months after he left, CID came to the house and asked his mother where he was. His mother told them that the applicant was working in Kurunegala and provided the address.
• About a month later, CID went to his employer in Kurunegala to confirm if the applicant was working there.
• The applicant was scared and called his uncle in Colombo. His uncle told him that he could not come to Colombo because the uncle was sheltering a number of other people but the applicant was scared and went to Colombo in August 2010. He stayed in hiding in Colombo, did not leave his uncle's house and did not register with the authorities. He worked in his uncle's wholesale business as a cashier and storekeeper.
• He sometimes went back to Karainagar to visit his family. In May 2011, he was questioned by the CID in Karainagar. He recognised one of the officers from the previous questioning in 2008.
• In May 2012, he returned to Karainagar for a religious festival. The police stopped him and accused him of speeding. The police asked for money but he did not have any so the police took his licence from him.
• He was scared of further harassment and so he left Sri Lanka and came to Australia.
• After he arrived in Australia, his mother received a letter saying that he had to pay a fine and go to court about the traffic offence. His mother knew someone who worked at the court and paid them a bribe so that they would get his licence back and resolve the matter.
• In Australia he had two Facebook accounts and used one to post comments and articles that were pro-Tamil/LTTE and critical of the Sri Lankan government. A person from Karainagar who is a member of the UNP saw the posts and obtained the applicant's telephone number. He told the delegate that this "political" account separate to his personal account. This person ("T") called the applicant and threatened to harm him if he did not stop making these posts. The applicant told his mother and she told him to shut down this account. He did so but still operates his personal Facebook account.
• He has attended pro-Tamil activities, protests, celebrations, Martyr's Days and other activities while he has been in Australia. He supports Tamil separatism.
• On 18 June 2016, his sister committed suicide in Sri Lanka. After the suicide, T began making hateful and vile comments about her on Facebook and the applicant thinks T may have been involved in some sort of sexual violence that led to the suicide.
• The applicant's brother was also claiming protection in Australia but he could not cope with the suicide of the sister or the distressing Facebook posts. The applicant's brother began drinking alcohol and in November 2016, he committed suicide.
• The applicant is suffering from depression, grief and loss. He has been prescribed medication and has been referred for counselling. If he goes back to Sri Lanka, everyone will question him about the suicides and he will not survive these questions. Everyone in the village looks at the family differently because of what happened.
  1. In a supplementary statement dated 15 May 2017 (the supplementary statement) provided prior to the interview he claimed:
• He had been afraid to admit the full extent of his father's activities when he prepared the statement in his SHEV application. He had been afraid to detail his own support of the LTTE in case the Australian government put him in immigration detention.
• His father was actually a member of the LTTE, specifically the "Ellai Paddai" unit. This was a territorial control unit of the LTTE.
• His father dug bunkers and distributed food. His father also monitored the area for any suspicious activities and reported these activities to senior LTTE members. This meant that his father knew where the LTTE stored food and supplies, where their military groups for stationed, and the names and identities of senior LTTE personnel. His father also had to visit battle sites.
• His father had to be available for service whenever required, sometimes for two or three days at a time. When he was not working with the LTTE, he ran a medium sized grocery shop. The applicant's mother looked after this shop whenever his father was with the LTTE.
• In about 2002, the LTTE called on his father more frequently. His father had to attend dangerous areas such as battle sites which were being targeted by the government and the applicant's mother was afraid that he would be caught in shelling. The applicant's father left the area secretly and went to work in Colombo with the applicant's uncle, who was also a supporter of the LTTE. The uncle was a financial supporter of the LTTE and was very rich. In 2008 and 2009, this uncle was arrested by the CID and was "extorted".
• When the 2002 ceasefire was brokered, his father returned and took the applicant's mother and siblings to Jaffna where they had a house. The applicant stayed in the Vanni for a few months with relatives to continue his school. He joined his family in Karainagar, Jaffna in about October 2002.
• There was an LTTE propaganda committee in Karainagar and this committee asked Tamil boys to come to events to show their support. The applicant had to go to families of people who had lost children fighting in the war and asked for photographs of the deceased. He carried these photographs at commemoration events. He used to help build and decorate stages, handout sweets and programs, and decorate the streets with LTTE banners and slogans.
• Shortly before he left Karainagar to go to Kurunegala, there was a third incident which he had not previously claimed. One evening, his sister was home alone when she noticed a group of six armed and uniformed SLN offices outside the house. Three of them came into the house and started to question her and she became afraid and called out. Some bus drivers came to find out what was happening and one who could speak Sinhalese heard that the SLN officers were asking where the applicant was. The bus driver told the officers that the applicant's sister did not know his whereabouts. After this incident, the applicant immediately made arrangements to leave.
• He left Karainagar to work in Kurunegala in 2009 and then went to Colombo in August 2010.
• In May 2011, he returned to Karainagar and showed his identity card to government officials at the checkpoint upon his arrival. About five days later he was approached by government officials, as he has explained in his earlier statement. This incident prompted him to flee back to Colombo.
• In May 2012, he returned to Karainagar for a religious festival. He was stopped by the police while riding his motorbike and accused of speeding and not wearing a helmet. He was told that he would have to pay a fine. He knew that he had not been speeding and so he returned to Colombo without paying the fine. Shortly after he left Sri Lanka, his mother received a notice stating that he had to present himself at court in 14 days. One of his cousins took the letter to the police station and the officers told the cousin that if he paid a bribe the situation would be resolved. The cousin paid the bribe and the applicant's licence was returned.
• Since coming to Australia he has made a number of posts on Facebook that are critical of the Sri Lankan government. He used an account separate to his personal account. He posted information about how Tamils are neglected by the government as well as photographs and videos showing atrocities committed by the government in the later stages of the war. He also posted photographs of himself attending Hero's Day celebrations in Australia on three occasions.
• On 18 June 2016, his sister committed suicide in Sri Lanka. Shortly after, he started to receive messages on Facebook accusing his sister of being an immoral woman. When he told his family they were traumatised. To be considered immoral in Sri Lanka is extremely shameful and because the posts had been public, many members of the family's community seen them.
• In September 2016, he started to receive threatening phone calls from T, a member of the UNP. T was born in Karainagar but now lives in Colombo and operates a shop opposite the one operated by the applicant's father and uncle. T accused the applicant of publishing adverse information on Facebook and warned him to consider his family still living in Sri Lanka. T also repeated the comments that had been posted about the applicant's sister and accused her of having relations with the applicant's uncle. The applicant has blocked this number and deactivated his political Facebook account.
• On 13 November 2016, his brother committed suicide in Australia. His brother had travelled to Australia shortly after the applicant but the applicant does not know why he chose to take his life.

1. In turn, the learned primary judge, at [4] to [44], offered a careful and accurate summary of the way in which these claims were dealt with by the Authority. I say accurate because neither party gainsaid the accuracy of the Circuit Court's summary. Indeed, when I measure that summary against the Authority's reasons, which are detailed, I am reinforced in the view that the primary judge's summary is accurate.
2. As to the allegation of a failure in relation to application of the real chance test, it needs at once to be stated that the allegation is an alleged failure of application, not an alleged failure to understand what satisfaction as to a real chance entailed. Thus, I did not understand the appellant to contend that the Authority's reasons, read as a whole, failed to display an understanding of what constituted a real chance as explained by the High Court in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (Chan).
3. The Authority did not, in terms, refer to Chan, but it did explicitly, at [23] and [24], remind itself, in an unremarkable way - unremarkable in terms of displaying an understanding of the meaning of those provisions of s 5H and s 5J of the Act with respect to when a person is a refugee (s 5H) and what constitutes a well-founded fear of persecution (s 5J). So insofar as the appeal seeks to impeach the conclusion of the learned primary judge that the Authority correctly identified the relevant law and applied it, I too see no substance in that allegation.
4. What remains is the alleged error of unreasonableness. The Act posits a satisfaction-based test in relation to, materially, visa criteria found in s 36(2A)and s 36(2AA) of the Act. It was long ago established that such satisfaction-based decisions are not unexaminable by the judicial branch on judicial review. A very useful, with respect, canvassing of authorities which establish that is to be found in an enduringly authoritative judgment given by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611.
5. So I readily accept that if unreasonableness were established, it was open to the Circuit Court to quash the Authority's decision. Considerable care, however, needs to be taken both on original jurisdiction judicial review and in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in finding error on the part of any administrative decision-maker who has attend reasons for that decision. Not do so would be defiant of the exhortation found in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, which deprecates the reading of administrative reasons narrowly and with an eye for error.
6. The reasons offered by the Authority are very detailed indeed. In the original jurisdiction and on appeal, attention came to be focused on, in relation to unreasonableness, the way in which it was alleged the Authority's satisfaction had failed to address the consequences for the appellant in relation to his mental health condition on return to Sri Lanka.
7. In my view, either from the perspective of the appellant's claim for being a refugee to whom protection obligations were owed, or for complementary protection, the allegation as to unreasonableness must fail. The learned primary judge reached just that conclusion. The Authority concluded, after a very detailed consideration of the material before it with respect to the appellant's mental health, the following at [70]:

The information referred to by the appellant corroborates that mental problems can carry some social stigma at a community level. However, the applicant has not provided any other evidence and the review material does not indicate that persons in the applicant's position have been subjected to harm by their local communities beyond this stigma. The submission that the appellant may react in a manner that could expose him to harm is speculative, and I take into account that if he does return to his village, he will be able to live in the family home with his mother and will not be living on his own within the community. If he returns to live with his father in Columbo, he will not be living within the community, in any event. While I accept that it will be distressing for the applicant if his community ignores him or avoids him, I do not consider this is conduct which arises to serious harm.

1. I interpolate and repeat that the Authority had earlier expressly correctly identified the statutory test with respect to serious harm. The other passage I should cite in this regard is at [72] of the Authority's reasons, wherein, it is stated:

Overall, I am not satisfied that the applicant will face a real chance of harm arising from his mental health condition.

1. I note expressly that the Authority has made direct reference to real chance in reaching that conclusion. There is nothing there which would suggest any misapplication of the statutory reference to real chance. With respect to complementary protection, the following paragraphs in the Authority's reasons should be set out. At [91], the Authority stated:

Apart from the reports from the mental health social worker noted above, there is no other medical or psychological evidence in the material. There is no information before me that the applicant received or continues to require any ongoing treatment, other than antidepressant medication. There is nothing in the information before me, including information provided by the applicant, that indicates that persons held in detention in Sri Lanka are denied access to medical treatment, including mental health treatment or medication. I am satisfied that the applicant does not face a real chance of harm on this basis if he was held in short detention.

1. I, again, note the explicit reference to real chance, and I will delete the reference to as far as complementary protection:
   1. Apart from the reports from the Mental Health Social Worker noted above, there is no other medical or psychological evidence in the material. There is no information before me that the applicant received, or continues to require any ongoing treatment other than anti-depressant medication. There is nothing in the information before me (including the information provided by the applicant) that indicates that persons held in detention in Sri Lanka are denied access to medical treatment, including mental health treatment or medication. I am satisfied that the applicant does not face a real chance of harm on this basis if he was held in short detention.
   2. Further, even if the applicant was held in short detention, I am satisfied that the provisions and penalties of the I&E Act are laws of general application. The country information before me does not suggest the I&E Act is discriminatory on its terms, that the law is applied in a discriminatory manner or that it is selectively enforced. To the extent that the applicant may be fined, detained or questioned under the I&E Act, I am satisfied this would not constitute serious harm in this case. In any event, I am satisfied that this would be the exercise of laws of general application that apply to all Sri Lankans equally and that it is not discriminatory conduct and therefore, is not persecution: s.5J(4).
   3. Considering all of the above, I am not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm because of being a returned asylum-seeker or for having departed Sri Lanka illegally.
   4. Having regard to all of the evidence, information and my findings above, I am satisfied that the applicant does not face a real chance of harm because of: any real or imputed association, including family association, with the LTTE; any previous interactions with the police or military; any involvement in commemoration activities in Sri Lanka or Australia; or for being a Tamil male and a Hindu from the North. I am also satisfied that he does not face a real chance of serious harm because of: any reason arising from the suicides of his sister and brother including comments on Facebook or social media; any reason associated with his mental health; or for having departed Sri Lanka illegally.
   5. As I have found that the applicant does not have an adverse security profile with the authorities and for the reasons given above in respect of his other claims, I am also satisfied that the applicant's cumulative circumstances do not give rise to a real chance of serious harm.

Refugee: conclusion

1. The applicant does not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s.5H(1). The applicant does not meet s.36(2)(a).

1. As far as complementary protection is concerned, the Authority's reasons state, at [106]:

I have accepted that the applicant may be distressed and upset because of questions from his friends and community about the suicides in his family.

1. I interpolate that the appellant, sadly, was found himself in circumstances where both a sibling sister in Sri Lanka, as well as a sibling brother in Australia had committed suicide:

There is nothing in the review material which indicates that this distress or upset will include or lead to any conduct which would or could constitute significant harm as defined above. I am satisfied that the applicant does not face real risk of significant harm for this reason.

1. When one reads each of the quoted passages in the context of the reasons of the Authority, as a whole, it is, in my view, pellucid that the Authority did, as the Circuit Court found, address the claims made by the appellant. It is nothing to the point that if put in different ways, perhaps supported by further material, the claims made by the appellant may have enjoyed different success administratively. In relation to an exercise of judicial power, unreasonableness is not to be found in alternative ways in which a claim might have been viewed administratively. The joint judgment in Plaintiff M/21, at [26], refers to a statement made by Sir Anthony Mason in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24, at 40:

The limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must continually be borne in mind.

1. That limited role is also the subject of a seminal exposition by Sir Gerard Brennan in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, at 36, where his Honour stated:

The court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and subject to political control for the repository alone.

1. The Authority's reasons are rational. These observations apply just as much to a conclusion of unreasonableness with respect to administrative satisfaction as they do to a conclusion of unreasonableness in relation to the exercise of an administrative discretion. Where reasons have been given for an administrative decision and those reasons, as here, are rational, then it would be a very rare case indeed where one would find unreasonableness on the basis of outcome.
2. There were, perhaps, signs in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332, that elements of proportionality might have been recognised with respect to finding the unreasonableness jurisdictional error. Later authority, and in particular, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541, underscores, though, that any notion of proportionality would only be found in extreme situations.
3. A conclusion as to unreasonableness of outcome is inherently context-specific. In the context of the present case, and given the reasoned explanation for the Authority's absence of satisfaction in respect of each limb of the claim, there is just no basis at all for a conclusion that the Authority's satisfaction was unreasonable. The conclusion reached in those terms by the learned primary judge was, in my view, plainly right.
4. For completeness, I should make reference to an allegation that in some way, shape or form, greater attention ought to have been given to the subject of availability of antidepressant medication. It is enough to observe that the reasons of the Authority expressly indicate that this subject was considered.
5. The case is just one of those where an applicant for a visa failed, for reasons that are entirely rational, to satisfy the Authority as to eligibility. What follows from the foregoing is that the appeal must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Logan.