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[2020] HCA 18
respondent. Application dismissed without an oral hearing under r 25.09.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), with the plaintiff to pay the first defendant’s costs.
The High Court dismissed Bussa's application. It held that he had used the wrong procedural route: he tried to challenge the Federal Court's decision through a High Court writ application without first applying for special leave to appeal or explaining why he had bypassed the ordinary appeal process. The Court also said his visa argument had no arguable basis. The relevant regulation required evidence of an application for a skills assessment to accompany the visa application when lodged. Evidence of an assessment application made and supplied later could not meet that requirement. The Court dismissed the application without an oral hearing and ordered Bussa to pay the first defendant's costs.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,151 words · generated 03/10/2026
In Bussa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] HCA 18, Nettle J considered an application in the High Court's original jurisdiction. The applicant, Vincent Pranay Bussa, was an Indian citizen seeking a Skilled (Provisional), Subclass 485 Temporary Graduate visa in the Graduate Work stream. His nominated occupation was Electronics Engineer ([1]–[3]).
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The visa criterion at the centre of the dispute was cl 485.223 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). It required that, when the visa application was made, it be “accompanied by evidence that the applicant had applied for an assessment” of skills for the nominated occupation by a relevant assessing authority ([3]).
Bussa lodged his application on 19 August 2015. He answered “no” to the form’s question asking whether he had applied for a skills assessment. Elsewhere, he gave the date and reference number for an assessment by Engineers Australia conducted on 29 January 2014, but did not disclose that he had failed it ([4]). After the delegate requested evidence of a skills assessment, Bussa provided a receipt for a later assessment application, dated 3 November 2015. He also failed that assessment, a fact not known to the delegate at the time ([5], [7]).
The delegate refused the visa on 27 January 2016 because Bussa had not applied for a skills assessment before lodging his visa application ([6]). The Tribunal affirmed that decision. It found that the application had not been accompanied by the required evidence and noted Bussa’s evidence that he had failed the later assessment and had been barred from reapplying for 12 months ([7]).
Bussa’s judicial-review application was dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Court dismissed his appeal, accepting the approach taken in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 85 ([9]–[11]). He then sought writ relief in the High Court, repeating arguments about later evidence, the effect of ss 54, 55 and 56 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the Tribunal’s alleged failure to allow more time ([12]).
The High Court dismissed the application, ordered Bussa to pay the first defendant’s costs, and did so without an oral hearing under r 25.09.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) ([15]).
The Court gave two connected reasons. First, it treated the choice of procedure as an abuse of process. Bussa sought to challenge the Federal Court’s decision on its merits by invoking the High Court’s constitutional or other writ jurisdiction. He had not applied for special leave to appeal and had supplied no explanation for departing from the ordinary appellate process ([13]).
Nettle J described unnecessary recourse to constitutional or prerogative writs as a course that had “long been deprecated”. The ordinary appellate route remained the relevant course even though it required special leave. The judgment states that seeking merits review by writ, rather than by an application for special leave, without explaining the departure, “is an abuse of process” ([13]). The principle is procedural: it concerns the use of the High Court’s original jurisdiction as a substitute for the ordinary appeal process.
The Court also explained the discretion associated with extraordinary relief. Even if a ground for judicial review were established, the Court would be disposed to refuse relief unless satisfied that the ordinary appellate remedy was “less convenient, beneficial and effective” in the interests of the parties or the public ([13]). In Bussa’s case, there was no explanation for not following the ordinary process.
Second, the Court concluded that the application did not present an arguable substantive basis for relief ([14]). The decisive textual point was the difference between a criterion asking whether an applicant “has” specified skills and one requiring that an application “was accompanied by” evidence of an application for assessment. Nettle J explained that this difference in wording “reflects a difference in effect” ([14]).
The former kind of criterion may be capable of being met through later evidence considered under ss 54, 55 and 56 of the Migration Act. But cl 485.223 instead fixes attention on what accompanied the visa application when it was made. Evidence supplied later about an assessment application made after visa lodgement could not meet that requirement ([14]).
The Court adopted the reasoning in Khan that the clause was designed to ensure an applicant had already applied for assessment, and was therefore ready and willing to undergo it at the earliest opportunity. Without that requirement, an applicant might use the visa application and merits-review process to defer acquiring the skills required by the substantive visa criterion ([9], [14]). The judgment thus connected the clause’s wording to its apparent function: it was not merely asking whether the applicant eventually obtained an assessment, but whether the assessment process had been initiated by the time the visa application was made.
The judgment addressed two related legal propositions, while not purporting to provide a comprehensive account of migration law.
Before Bussa, the Federal Court Full Court had considered cl 485.223 in Khan. As Nettle J recounts, Khan treated the clause as requiring an applicant to have applied for a skills assessment before lodging the visa application, so that the applicant was ready to undergo assessment promptly. It also reasoned that later assessment evidence was not “relevant information” for the purpose of satisfying cl 485.223 ([9], [14]). Nettle J held that Khan was determinative of Bussa’s substantive argument ([14]).
The plaintiff had relied on Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 84 ALJR 251; 264 ALR 417. Nettle J distinguished it. Berenguel concerned criteria that asked whether an applicant “has” prescribed skills at the time of application. The High Court explained in Bussa that the wording of those criteria differed from cl 485.223, which asks whether the application itself was accompanied by specified evidence ([14]). The point is not that later evidence is always irrelevant in migration matters. Rather, the significance of later evidence depends on the wording of the particular criterion.
The judgment’s account of ss 54, 55 and 56 is correspondingly limited. Those provisions did not assist Bussa in relation to cl 485.223 because the criterion concerned accompanying evidence at the time of lodgement. The Court did not say that those provisions are generally inapplicable to visa applications; it explained why they could not change the temporal focus of this particular requirement ([14]).
After Bussa, the propositions stated in this judgment are that cl 485.223 requires evidence of an application for skills assessment to accompany the visa application when lodged, and that an unexplained attempt to obtain merits review through writ proceedings instead of the ordinary appellate process is an abuse of process ([13]–[14]). The supplied judgment does not provide any post-2020 decisions, so it cannot establish how later courts have applied or limited those propositions.
At [13], Nettle J stated that “to seek review of a judgment on the merits by application for constitutional or other writs, rather than by application for special leave to appeal, without any explanation for the departure from the ordinary course, is an abuse of process.”
In plain English, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction should not be used as an unexplained substitute for the usual appeal route. A litigant who wants a higher court to revisit a judgment on its merits must engage with the ordinary appellate process, including any special-leave requirement.
At [13], the Court also said it would be disposed to refuse extraordinary relief unless ordinary appellate review were “less convenient, beneficial and effective” in the relevant interests. This explains why writ relief is not simply an alternative route available whenever a party is dissatisfied with a lower-court decision. The Court considered both the suitability of the ordinary appeal path and the unexplained departure from it.
At [14], Nettle J contrasted criteria referring to whether an applicant “has” prescribed skills with cl 485.223, which asks whether the application “was accompanied by” prescribed evidence. In plain English, the first formulation concerns whether a substantive state of affairs existed at the relevant time, and the second asks what evidence was supplied with the application. The exact statutory wording determines whether later material can matter.
At [14], the Court endorsed the explanation that the clause encourages an applicant to apply for assessment at the earliest opportunity. The practical purpose described is to prevent an applicant from using the time taken by visa processing and merits review to postpone acquiring the skills required by the visa criteria.
Finally, Nettle J said that whether Bussa had acquired a positive skills assessment by the time of judicial review was irrelevant ([14]). That statement follows from the clause’s focus on the application as made. A later positive assessment could not retrospectively alter what accompanied the visa application at lodgement.
The procedural reasoning is relevant where a litigant seeks to challenge a judgment on its merits through an application for constitutional or other writ relief, rather than the ordinary appellate process, and gives no explanation for doing so. The judgment specifically says that this remains so even where the ordinary process requires an application for special leave ([13]). The case does not establish that every writ application is an abuse; its stated concern is an unexplained departure from the ordinary route when seeking review of a merits judgment.
The migration-law reasoning is relevant to the particular form of criterion in cl 485.223: a requirement that an application, “when made”, be “accompanied by” evidence that the applicant had applied for skills assessment. It is especially pertinent where the assessment application was made, or evidence of it was provided, only after the visa application was lodged ([3], [14]).
The distinction drawn in Bussa also matters when comparing differently worded criteria. The judgment contrasts “was accompanied by” with language asking whether an applicant “has” prescribed skills. It therefore cautions against assuming that later evidence operates identically across separate criteria. The legal effect depends on the particular text and the time the criterion identifies ([14]).
The case does not decide every question about the sufficiency or form of evidence that might accompany a visa application, nor does it address every possible exception to a visa criterion. Its application should be confined to the rule and wording examined in the judgment.
The supplied reasons contain no decisions made after Bussa and therefore do not show how later courts have treated it. No subsequent application, distinction, limitation or overruling can be responsibly identified from this source alone.
Within Bussa, Nettle J applied Khan as determinative of the interpretation of cl 485.223 ([14]). He distinguished Berenguel because it concerned differently worded criteria ([14]). The judgment also recounted that the Federal Circuit Court had discussed Anand v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection when considering whether “accompanied by” might permit flexibility. However, Nettle J’s own conclusion rested on the distinction from Berenguel and the reasoning in Khan ([9], [14]).
The judgment cited a number of authorities about unnecessary recourse to writs and the discretion to refuse extraordinary relief ([13]). Those citations support the procedural discussion, but the supplied text does not set out each authority’s full facts or subsequent treatment. The most direct account of the rule applied in Bussa is the Court’s own statement at [13].
The judgment does not resolve how cl 485.223 might apply to factual circumstances different from Bussa’s, such as a case involving disputed proof that an assessment application had already been made by visa lodgement, or a different form of evidence supplied with the application. Its holding concerns the temporal requirement and the later material in the record before Nettle J ([3]–[5], [14]).
Nor does the judgment give a general ruling on every effect of ss 54, 55 and 56 of the Migration Act. It explains that those provisions could not make post-lodgement material satisfy this particular “accompanied by” criterion, while contrasting it with a different kind of criterion addressed in Berenguel ([14]).
The reasons do not determine whether any separate procedural or factual issue might have arisen in the Tribunal’s handling of Bussa’s case. They state that the lower courts were correct to apply Khan, and that the High Court application presented no arguable basis for relief ([14]). The judgment does not separately analyse each allegation in the plaintiff’s grounds about an extension of time or exceptional circumstances.
Finally, the supplied judgment does not provide later authorities that might clarify the reach of its procedural statement about writ applications or the interpretation of similar visa criteria. Any broader account of subsequent law would require sources beyond this judgment.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: the High Court of Australia (www.hcourt.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NETTLE J
VINCENT PRANAY BUSSA PLAINTIFF
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL
AFFAIRS & ANOR DEFENDANTS
Bussa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2020] HCA 18
Date of Judgment: 24 April 2020
M164/2019
ORDER
Application dismissed.
The plaintiff pay the first defendant's costs of the application to this Court.
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Bussa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
High Court – Original jurisdiction – Applications for constitutional or other writ – Determination without hearing – Abuse of process – Where plaintiff seeks orders inter alia to quash orders of superior court of record dismissing appeal from judgment dismissing application for judicial review of decision of administrative tribunal affirming decision by delegate of defendant Minister – Where plaintiff has not applied for special leave to appeal or provided explanation for departure from ordinary appellate process – Whether application is an abuse of process.
Migration – Visas – Skilled visas – Criteria for grant – Proof of skills – Where primary criteria to be satisfied for grant of visa include that application be accompanied by evidence that applicant had applied for assessment of skills for nominated skilled occupation by relevant assessing authority – Where visa applicant had failed skills assessment and not applied for subsequent skills assessment at time of submitting application – Whether evidence provided to defendant Minister after that time relevant to satisfaction of criterion.
Words and phrases – "abuse of process", "accompanied by", "constitutional writs", "determination without oral hearing", "discretion to refuse relief", "extraordinary relief", "less convenient, beneficial and effective", "ordinary appellate process", "original jurisdiction", "skills assessment", "unnecessary recourse".
Constitution, s 75(v).
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, cl 485.223.
1
1 NETTLE J. This is an application for a constitutional or other writ for orders inter alia to quash the order of the Federal Court of Australia (Anastassiou J) dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Judge Riethmuller) in turn dismissing the plaintiff's claim for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") affirming the decision of a delegate of the defendant Minister to refuse to grant the plaintiff a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC), Subclass 485 (Temporary Graduate) visa in the Graduate Work stream ("the Graduate Work visa"), based on his nominated occupation of "Electronics Engineer, ANZSCO Code 233411".
3 Clause 485.223 appears in Subdiv 485.22 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations, which sets out the primary criteria to be satisfied for the grant of a Graduate Work visa1. The criterion in cl 485.223 is as follows:
"When the application was made, it was accompanied by evidence that the applicant had applied for an assessment of the applicant's skills for the nominated skilled occupation by a relevant assessing authority."
"Applicant skills assessment
IMPORTANT NOTE:
You must provide evidence of a suitable skills assessment from the relevant assessing authority, or evidence that you have booked to undergo a skills assessment with the relevant assessing authority when you lodge this application.
Failure to do so may result in you being unable to satisfy the requirements for lodging an application or being unable to satisfy the criteria for this visa.
Nominated Occupation Electronics Engineer
Name of assessing authority Engineers Australia
Date of Skills Assessment 29 JAN 2014
Reference/Receipt number 4476073"
What the plaintiff did not disclose in the application form was that he had failed the skills assessment of 29 January 2014.
6 On 27 January 2016, the delegate made the decision to refuse the plaintiff's application for the Graduate Work visa on the basis that the plaintiff had not applied for a skills assessment prior to lodging his application and, therefore, did not meet the requirements for the visa to be granted.
7 On 16 February 2016, the plaintiff applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision. At the conclusion of a hearing on 26 October 2016, the Tribunal made an oral decision to affirm the delegate's decision for the following reasons, as stated in writing:
"Based on the evidence before me, including oral evidence given at the hearing, I am not satisfied that you meet the regulation 485.223 because, when you applied for this visa on 19 August 2015 you have not provided, or that application was not accompanied by the evidence that you applied for skill assessments for your nominated occupation by a relevant assessing authority. You have also told me that the skills assessment application lodged on 5 December 2015 was subsequently refused, and that you were banned for 12 months from reapplying for skill assessment because of substantial amount of plagiarism that was discovered by the Institute for Engineers. So, based on all of that evidence, I am affirming the decision made by the Department not to grant you subclass 485 visa."
(1) that the Tribunal had erred in failing to find that the plaintiff was entitled to rely upon the previous skills assessment of 29 January 2014; and
(2) that, perforce of ss 54, 55 and 56 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the application for a visa included everything given to the Minister up to the point at which the delegate's decision was made and, therefore, included the evidence provided to the Minister in December 2015 that the plaintiff had lodged an application for skills assessment in November 2015.
9 Judge Riethmuller rejected2 both grounds as directly contrary to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection3: that cl 485.223 aims to ensure that a person who applies for a visa has already applied for a skills assessment and is thus "ready and willing to undergo the assessment at the earliest opportunity"; that, had the clause not been enacted in that form, an applicant might be able to "use the visa application process, including processes associated with merits review by the Tribunal, to expand the time in which he or she acquires the skills necessary to fulfil the substantive visa criterion"; and that ss 54, 55 and 56 did not avail an applicant because evidence of a positive skills assessment after the application has been lodged is not "relevant information for the purposes of cl 485.223". Judge Riethmuller also noted4 that the Full Court in Khan did not expressly approve5 statements in Anand v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship6 and Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection7 to the effect that an application might be "accompanied by" evidence not provided with the application, but concluded that, even if "some flexibility was contemplated", the period between the lodgement of the plaintiff's application and the provision of proper application for a skills assessment was "far too long to come within the terms 'accompanied by'".
10 On 28 March 2019, the plaintiff appealed to the Federal Court on a miscellany of grounds, which in large part repeated arguments rejected by Judge Riethmuller. The primary grounds were expressed as follows:
"The [Tribunal] and [Judge Riethmuller] committed a legal error when they failed to follow the law settled in Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship8, that a time of application criterion could be satisfied by providing an information after the lodgement of the application. Also there is an exceptional circumstances exist as skill assessment has been refused and barred at the time of the application as appellant had to wait for one year to reply for skill assessment. But at the time of Judicial Review appellant had the positive skill assessment which is to considered, but it hasn't been considered." (errors in original)
No written submissions were provided in support of the grounds.
"Tribunal did not give any extension of time to solve the problem. Tribunal did not discuss anything in it decision why tribunal cant extend the time to get the skill assessment. Further Tribunal did to accept the exceptional circumstances, during the judicial review primary judge decision is plainly unfair, unjust and unreasonable. Because s.55 minister still consider the material of appellant if primary judge had assessed the appellants review according to the act. Also s.54 was subject to my visa.
Above information hasn't been discussed in depth by Justice of Federal court That is reason I am bringing my case to High court on Show cause grounds because of I believe this all happened by tribunal if the tribunal did give extension of time I would have got the skill assessment at the Tribunal decision where I would have met the criterion of clause 485.223 Migration Regulations 1994." (errors in original)
13 As appears from the application, the plaintiff, having to this point failed at every level up to and including the Federal Court, and without troubling to apply for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Court to this Court, seeks to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under s 75(v) of the Constitution to compel the Tribunal to reconsider the matter afresh, on the basis of grounds rejected in the courts below. Such "[u]nnecessary recourse to this Court by way of the prerogative" – or constitutional – "writs" has long been deprecated9. Thus, even if grounds for judicial review were established by the plaintiff, this Court would be disposed to exercise its discretion to refuse the extraordinary relief sought unless satisfied that the remedy by ordinary appellate process is "less convenient, beneficial and effective"10 in the interests of the parties or the public11. And that is so notwithstanding that the ordinary appellate process available to the plaintiff would require him to obtain special leave to appeal12. Consequently, as this Court has recently made clear on several occasions13, to seek review of a judgment on the merits by application for constitutional or other writs, rather than by application for special leave to appeal, without any explanation for the departure from the ordinary course, is an abuse of process.
14 In any event, the application does not present an arguable basis for the relief sought. Judge Riethmuller and Anastassiou J were correct that the reasoning of the Full Court in Khan is determinative. In contradistinction to provisions of the kind considered in Berenguel14, which direct attention to whether an applicant "has" prescribed skills at the time of application, cl 485.223 refers to whether the application itself "was accompanied by" prescribed evidence. As this Court indicated in Berenguel15, the difference in terms reflects a difference in effect: that criteria of the former, but not the latter, kind may be satisfied by evidence provided to the Minister after the time of submitting the application and considered in accordance with ss 54, 55 and 56 of the Migration Act. And, as Tracey J reasoned in Khan, the form of cl 485.223 is evidently to ensure that an applicant for a visa has applied for a skills assessment and thus demonstrated a readiness and willingness to undergo the assessment at the earliest opportunity. Were it otherwise, as Tracey J recognised, an applicant could delay acquiring the skills necessary to fulfil the substantive visa criterion for so long as the visa application and any merits review processes were on foot. And, even then, the question of whether the plaintiff had acquired a positive skills assessment by the time of the judicial review proceedings would be irrelevant.
1
See Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 31; Migration Regulations, reg 1.07. ↩
[2019] FCCA 655 at [9], [13]. ↩
[2018] FCAFC 85 at [17], [23] per Tracey J (Charlesworth and Derrington JJ agreeing at [28], [33]). ↩
[2019] FCCA 655 at [14]. ↩
[2018] FCAFC 85 at [15] per Tracey J (Charlesworth and Derrington JJ agreeing at [28], [33]). ↩
(2013) 215 FCR 562 at 568 [27]‑[28] per Katzmann J. ↩
(2016) 310 FLR 339 at 346 [40] per Judge Burchardt. ↩
(2010) 84 ALJR 251; 264 ALR 417. ↩
R v Cook; Ex parte Twigg (1980) 147 CLR 15 at 34 per Wilson J. See also Re Wilkie; Ex parte Johnston (1980) 55 ALJR 191 at 192 per Gibbs J (Stephen, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing at 192); 33 ALR 660 at 661. ↩
R v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Beaumont (1979) 141 CLR 504 at 518 per Jacobs J. See also and compare Twigg (1980) 147 CLR 15 at 29 per Mason J, 30 per Murphy J; R v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185 at 193‑194 per Gibbs CJ (Mason J agreeing at 203), 204 per Murphy J, 218‑220 per Brennan J, 222 per Deane J; R v Gray; Ex parte Marsh (1985) 157 CLR 351 at 375 per Mason J, 384‑385 per Deane J; Re Griffin; Ex parte Professional Radio and Electronics Institute (Aust) (1988) 167 CLR 37 at 41 per Brennan J. ↩
See, eg, R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 230‑231 per Mason J as to matters involving a "constitutional question"; Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at 1093 [33] per Gummow and Callinan JJ (Hayne J agreeing at 1102 [95]); 197 ALR 389 at 395‑396, 408 as to the effect of privative clauses.
Bussa
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] HCA 18
(2013) 215 FCR 562
(2016) 310 FLR 339
(2010) 84 ALJR 251
(1980) 147 CLR 15
(1980) 55 ALJR 191
(1979) 141 CLR 504
(1984) 156 CLR 185
(1985) 157 CLR 351
(1988) 167 CLR 37
(1979) 143 CLR 190
(2003) 77 ALJR 1088
(2003) 77 ALJR 1195
(1999) 197 CLR 611
(2000) 74 ALJR 1148
(2001) 185 ALR 106
(2003) 77 ALJR 1165
(2013) 87 ALJR 676
(2019) 93 ALJR 1327
Application dismissed without an oral hearing under r 25.09.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), with the plaintiff to pay the first defendant’s costs.
Glennan v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 77 ALJR 1195 at 1198 [17] per Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; 198 ALR 250 at 254‑255. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 641 [103] per Gaudron and Kirby JJ; Re Carmody; Ex parte Glennan (2000) 74 ALJR 1148 at 1150 [4] per Kirby J; 173 ALR 145 at 147; Re Heerey; Ex parte Heinrich (2001) 185 ALR 106 at 109 [17] per Kirby J; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at 1190 [151] per Kirby J; 198 ALR 59 at 93; Dranichnikov (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at 1101 [84] per Kirby J; 197 ALR 389 at 406. ↩
See, eg, Plaintiff S3/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 87 ALJR 676 at 678 [13] per Gageler J; 297 ALR 560 at 563; Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 93 ALJR 1327 at 1330 [5] per Nettle J; 374 ALR 425 at 427. ↩
Migration Regulations, Sch 2, cl 885.213. ↩
(2010) 84 ALJR 251 at 254 [17], 255 [24] per French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ; 264 ALR 417 at 421, 422, referring to Migration Regulations, Sch 2, cll 885.214, 885.215, which contained relevantly identical terms to cl 485.223. ↩