Pursuant to the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAI Act) and Schedule 2 to the MAI Act, the Personal Injury Commission determines:

1. The claimant has provided a full and satisfactory explanation within the meaning of s 6.14(3) of the MAI Act for the delay in making the claim for damages.
2. By operation of Schedule 2, cl (l) and s 6.14(5)(b), the Commission has jurisdiction to refer with the claimant's late claim for damages to assessment.
3. Effective Date: This determination takes effect on 1 August 2019.
4. Legal Costs: As the claimant is self-represented, I make no award for costs.
5. A brief statement of my reasons for this determination is attached to this certificate.

1. This is an application for assessment of a miscellaneous claims dispute under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (the MAI Act), concerning the Personal Injury Commission's (Commission) jurisdiction to refer a late claim for damages to assessment.
2. The claimant, [BUP], was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 1 August 2019 on O'Riordan Street, Mascot. He was represented by solicitors until early 2025 but is now

self-represented in these proceedings. 3. On 7 September 2021 the insurer wrote to both the claimant and his then solicitors expressly advising that any claim for damages had to be lodged by 1 August 2022, being three years after the accident, failing which a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay would be required. The claimant forwarded that advice to his solicitor the same day, asking whether he needed to do anything. He was told: "We will take care of it." 4. No claim for damages was lodged within the prescribed period. The statutory deadline of

1 August 2022 passed without lodgement. It was not until 28 October 2024 that the claimant, then represented by new solicitors following a merger, signed an Application for Damages which was lodged with the insurer on 29 October 2024, more than two years after the statutory deadline had expired. 5. On 1 November 2024 the insurer issued a notice rejecting the claim as late and requesting a full and satisfactory explanation. On 12 November 2024 and again on 14 January 2025, the insurer issued liability notices rejecting the claim for want of a satisfactory explanation. On internal review dated 24 March 2025, the insurer affirmed that decision. 6. The claimant lodged the present application with the Commission on 25 March 2025. A direction was subsequently issued requiring his former solicitors to produce material concerning their knowledge of the statutory deadline and the circumstances of the delay. That direction has not been complied with. 7. On 7 August 2025 the insurer issued a further liability notice admitting liability for the claim, and on 18 August 2025 filed submissions contending that the matter should be withdrawn. However, the question of whether the claimant has provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay remains a jurisdictional precondition under s 6.14(5) of the Act, and must be determined by the Commission notwithstanding the insurer's recent admission of liability.

1. This dispute is governed by s 6.14 of the MAI Act, which prescribes a strict three-year limitation for the making of claims for damages. Section 6.14(2) provides that a claim must be lodged within three years of the motor accident. Section 6.14(3) permits a late claim to be made only if the claimant provides a "full and satisfactory explanation" for the delay. Section 6.14(5) is expressed in prohibitory terms: a late claim "cannot be referred for assessment under Division 7.6 unless" either the insurer has lost the right to reject or the Commission determines that a full and satisfactory explanation has been provided.
2. The phrase "full and satisfactory explanation" is defined in s 6.2. A "full" explanation requires a complete account of the claimant's conduct, knowledge and belief from the date of the accident until the explanation is given. An explanation is "satisfactory" only if a reasonable person in the claimant's position would have been justified in experiencing the same delay.

1. The insurer's submissions dated 23 September 2025 contend that the matter is "resolved" because it has admitted liability for the claim under its Further Liability Notice of

7 August 2025. 2. It submits that, in consequence, the proceedings lack substance and should be dismissed under s 54 of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 (PIC Act) and rule 77 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (PIC Rules), on the basis that there is "no dispute" between the parties. 3. The insurer points to the objects of the PIC Act, including proportionality, efficiency, and early dispute resolution, and argues that it is within the Commission's discretion to decline to determine the question of delay. 4. That submission misstates the legal position. Neither the PIC Act nor the MAI Act confers on the insurer the power to determine whether a late claim may proceed. Section 6.14(5) of the MAI Act is cast in mandatory and jurisdictional terms: a late claim "cannot be referred" unless the statutory preconditions are met. The Commission is therefore required to determine whether the claimant has provided a full and satisfactory explanation for delay, unless the insurer has lost the right to reject under s 6.14(6). In this case, the insurer rejected the claim for delay within the required timeframes. It therefore did not lose its right, and the matter falls squarely within s 6.14(5)(b). 5. It follows that the insurer's subsequent admission of liability does not cure the statutory requirement under s 6.14(5). The right to pursue damages is not dependent on the insurer's consent but on satisfaction of the legislative condition imposed by Parliament. To treat the insurer's concession as dispositive would invert the statutory scheme by allowing a private party to determine the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. Jurisdictional preconditions must be independently satisfied, and with the principle that Parliament, not the parties, sets the boundaries of statutory entitlements.

1. On 1 August 2019, the claimant, [BUP], was involved in a motor accident at O'Riordan Street, Mascot.
2. During 2020 and early 2021 the insurer moved through the statutory benefits phase, culminating in a revised notice on 2 March 2021 accepting benefits beyond 26 weeks. Those steps are background only and do not bear on the present jurisdictional issue.
3. By September 2021 the claimant was represented by Elmassian Lawyers. On

7 September 2021 the insurer wrote to the claimant (copied to his solicitor) advising, relevantly, that while a damages claim could be lodged from 20 months after the accident, it must be lodged within three years of the accident (by 1 August 2022) and that a claim made after three years would require "a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay" with the possibility that the entitlement to claim would be lost. The email records the insurer had received an approach from Elmassian Lawyers on 31 August 2021. 4. Later that evening, the claimant forwarded the insurer's warning to Mr George Elmassian and others, asking whether he needed to do anything or whether his solicitor would act on his behalf. On 8 September 2021, Mr Elmassian replied: "We will take care of it. If your injuries are greater than 10% whole person impairment (WPI) we can claim a lump sum." 5. On 16 September 2021 the insurer wrote again to the claimant (copied to his solicitor) closing the statutory benefits file on the basis that he had returned to work and was not receiving ongoing treatment. That letter repeated the damages-claim timing advice in terms materially identical to the advice given on 7 September 2021. The claimant forwarded that letter to his solicitors the same day. 6. On 15 October 2021 the insurer wrote to the claimant estimating WPI would not exceed 10% and again recorded that any damages claim must be lodged by 1 August 2022, failing which a full and satisfactory explanation would be required. 7. Elmassian Lawyers arranged a psychiatric assessment with Dr Bertucen for 2 March 2022; the claimant attended as directed. He then wrote on 29 March 2022 asking for the result and "what is required next", pasting beneath his request the insurer's three-year deadline extract emphasising the 1 August 2022 date and the need for a "full and satisfactory explanation" if late. The firm responded on 30 March 2022: "The claim has already been lodged. Once we have Dr Bertucen's report we will propose an informal settlement conference ... If [that] cannot be resolved ... we will file an application with PICs to formally proceed with the matter." 8. Through April-September 2022 the claimant sent a series of follow-ups to the firm: on 20 and 28 April 2022 (funding/report queries and "what stage is my claim at"); on 6 July 2022 ("Has there been a date for settlement as it is almost 4 years since the accident"); on

11 August 2022("has this [informal settlement conference] been successful?"); and on

31 August 2022 and 19 September 2022 ("please provide an update regarding settlement"). The firm's 11 July 2022 reply said only that an invitation to an informal settlement conference had been sent to the insurer and "we are continuing to follow this up". 9. On 3 April 2023 Elmassian Lawyers recommended lodging a Medical Assessment Service WPI application because the insurer had closed its file on 13 March 2023; that same day the claimant instructed the firm to proceed. In October 2023 the firm wrote that no reply had been received to its November 2022 email about psychological treatment; the claimant responded that he had replied and that no one had contacted him, and he again queried progress. 10. In September 2024, with no apparent movement, counsel Ms Denise Kaiti emailed

Mr Elmassian asking "as a matter of urgency" for the file to provide advice to "reopen it as it is now over a year since [BUP] has had any correspondence. We need to settle it."

Mr Elmassian responded that he would get the file ready and asked whether to call "the other side and set up an ISC". Ms Kaiti directed that he telephone the insurer to reopen the case and ask for mediation. The claimant asked that the file be sent to counsel to "finalise it off ... It has been over five years." 11. On 28 October 2024 the claimant signed an Application for Damages under common law; the insurer received it on 29 October 2024. On 1 November 2024 the insurer acknowledged receipt, rejected the claim as late, and asked for a full and satisfactory explanation. On

12 November 2024 the insurer issued a liability notice rejecting the claim for delay. 12. On 16 December 2024 the claimant's then solicitors provided:

(a) the claimant's signed statement dated 13 December 2024, saying he was not aware that a damages claim had to be lodged by 1 August 2022, that he had left matters in the hands of Elmassian Lawyers and only in October 2024 learnt no claim had been lodged, and

(b) a statement from Mr Elmassian dated 16 December 2024 acknowledging he was aware the damages claim had to be lodged by 1 August 2022 but saying he was unaware until October 2024 that the claim had not in fact been lodged, and referring to a May 2022 merger/transition.

1. On 14 January 2025 the insurer issued a further liability notice rejecting the explanation as neither full nor satisfactory; on 24 March 2025 the insurer affirmed that decision on internal review.
2. The claimant lodged this miscellaneous claim application on 25 March 2025.

On 22 April 2025, following a preliminary teleconference, the Commission issued directions. A Dispute Officer's email to the claimant on 11 June 2025 recited that the directions (items 3-4) required information from the claimant by 10 June 2025 and noted the claimant's understanding that his material would follow responses sought from Mr Elmassian and Thornton & King. On 17 and 21 July 2025 the claimant uploaded to the portal his further correspondence bundle in response to the directions. 3. A direction for production was made to Mr Elmassian to produce a signed statement addressing his awareness of the statutory limitation, systems for managing deadlines and the circumstances of non-lodgement. No production was made in response. 4. On 7 August 2025 the insurer issued a "Further Liability Notice - Claim for Damages", expressly admitting liability while indicating quantum remained to be determined and listing the claimant's email communications as part of the information relied upon. 5. On 23 September 2025 the insurer filed reply submissions asserting that, because liability had now been admitted, the dispute had been resolved and should be dismissed under s 54 of the PIC Act and rule 77 of the PIC Rules for lack of substance or want of a "real dispute". Those submissions emphasise the objects of the PIC Act (efficiency, proportionality, early resolution), refer to s 54(b) and (c), and submit that the Member (or the President's delegate) has power to dismiss proceedings at any stage.

Oral Hearing - Evidence of the claimant (22 September 2025)

1. The claimant gave oral evidence before me on 22 September 2025. His account may be summarised in the following terms.
2. He said that he well remembered receiving the insurer's correspondence in September 2021 that warned of the three-year deadline for lodging a damages claim. He said he did not disregard it. Instead, he immediately forwarded it to his solicitors and asked what was required of him. The response he received was that "we will take care of it." He said that, from that point, he believed the obligation had been discharged.
3. He said that in March 2022 he was told by a secretary at Elmassian Lawyers that "the claim has already been lodged." He said that, as a layperson unfamiliar with legal processes, he accepted that statement as true. He said that he had no experience of litigation and no reason to doubt the competence or reliability of his lawyers.
4. He emphasised that he did not sit idly by after that point. He referred to numerous emails he had sent in 2022 and 2023 pressing for updates, asking whether settlement was imminent, and requesting to know what was required of him. He described his experience as "chasing them and getting nowhere."
5. He said that at all times he believed the claim was on foot. He said that he never intended to miss the statutory deadline. When told in October 2024 that no claim had in fact been lodged, he said he was "shocked" and "devastated." He said that he signed the damages claim form immediately.
6. He said that he trusted his lawyers because they had told him that the matter had been lodged and that they would "take care of it." He said that he did not understand why nothing had been done but maintained that he had done everything he reasonably could by engaging solicitors, forwarding them the insurer's letters, and persistently asking them to progress his case.

1. Section 6.14 of the MAI Act is in the following terms, so far as presently material:

1. Repealed;
2. A claim for damages must be made within 3 years after the date of the motor accident to which the claim relates;
3. A claim for damages may be made after the time required by subsection (2) (a late claim) if the claimant provides a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the claim. The explanation is to be provided in the first instance to the insurer;
4. ...
5. If a late claim for damages is made, the claim cannot be referred for assessment under Division 7.6 unless:

(a) the insurer has lost the right to reject the claim on the ground of delay, or

(b) the Commission has determined that the claimant has a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the claim..."

1. The expression "full and satisfactory explanation" is defined in s 6.2(1) and (2) of the MAI Act. That definition is materially identical to the definition contained in s 66(2) of the former Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999. The authorities decided under the former Act are therefore directly relevant to the construction and application of s 6.14 of the MAI Act.
2. An explanation is full if it is complete in the sense that it sets out what happened and why. Neither perfection nor prolixity is demanded. In Walker v Howard [2009] NSWCA 408; 55 MVR 9 at [104], Allsop P observed that the account must be sufficient to allow the evaluative judgment to be made. At [106] his Honour emphasised that the acts and omissions of all relevant persons, including solicitors, must be included in the explanation insofar as they bear on delay. Mancini v Thompson [2002] NSWCA 38 and Laidlaw v Touma [2002] NSWCA 190; 36 MVR 388 make plain that "full" means complete; the claimant cannot select which facts to disclose.
3. The concept of a satisfactory explanation requires the making of an evaluative judgment. The question is whether, by reference to an objective standard and having regard to the claimant's position, the delay was reasonably justifiable: Karambelas v Zaknic (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 433 at [17]. There is a spectrum of reasonableness. It is enough that some reasonable person in the claimant's position might have experienced the same delay: Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643 at [4]; see also Hunter v Roberts [2019] NSWCA 116; 88 MVR 456 at [20], noting that considerations such as the claimant's age, life experience, and reliance on legal advice are relevant. Reliance on solicitors can constitute a satisfactory explanation: Smith v Grant [2006] NSWCA 244; 67 NSWLR 735 at [60].
4. It is established that the explanation must cover the conduct of those acting for the claimant. In Nominal Defendant v Browne [2013] NSWCA 197; 64 MVR 214 at [21], Basten JA explained that the explanation may not be full if it fails to describe the instructions given to, and the advice received from, solicitors. That is because those matters form part of the claimant's position. In Rahman v Al-Maharmeh [2021] NSWCA 31 at [39]-[44], Brereton JA (Meagher and Leeming JJA agreeing) confirmed that the explanation must narrate solicitor conduct so far as relevant to delay, but the claimant is not required to speculate on the solicitors' knowledge or reasons for inaction. The explanation is judged by reference to what was within the claimant's own knowledge and control.

1. The claimant submits that he has provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging his damages claim.
2. He points to the following matters.
3. He engaged Elmassian Lawyers in December 2020 and relied on them to act in accordance with their professional obligations.
4. He received correspondence from the insurer in September and October 2021 which he forwarded to his solicitors and was expressly told by Mr Elmassian that "we will take care of it". He says he understood that the lodgement of the damages claim would be attended to.
5. He maintains that throughout 2022 and 2023 he followed up with his solicitors, by repeated emails, seeking updates and asking whether his claim had been lodged or progressed. He says he was assured on 30 March 2022 that "the claim has already been lodged" and he acted in reliance on that representation.
6. He says that he was unaware, until October 2024 when advised by Thornton & King following the merger of firms, that the damages claim had in fact not been lodged. He signed the claim form immediately.
7. He says that his explanation is "full" in the sense that it covers his conduct, knowledge and belief from the date of the accident until he provided his written statement on

13 December 2024, and that it covers also the relevant conduct of his solicitors so far as it was within his knowledge. 8. He says that his explanation is "satisfactory" because a reasonable person in his position, having engaged solicitors and been reassured that the claim had already been lodged, would have relied on those assurances. He points to his lack of legal experience, his unfamiliarity with motor accident procedure, and his repeated attempts to obtain information from his solicitors as factors which support the objective reasonableness of his conduct. 9. He emphasises that he is now self-represented and has done his best to place before the Commission the record of his attempts to progress the claim, including his emails to Elmassian Lawyers over 2022-2024.

1. The insurer initially rejected the claimant's explanation on 12 November 2024,

14 January 2025 and again on internal review on 24 March 2025. In those notices it was said that the claimant's explanation was neither full nor satisfactory for the following reasons. 2. The claimant had been expressly informed of the three-year deadline in the insurer's letters of 7 and 16 September 2021 and again on 15 October 2021. He was therefore on clear notice of the need to act. 3. His statement of 13 December 2024, to the effect that he was "not aware" of the deadline, was inconsistent with the contemporaneous documentary record. 4. He had not explained the period between September 2021 and October 2024 when no damages claim was lodged, notwithstanding repeated reminders from the insurer. 5. The statement of Mr Elmassian did not provide detail of the systems in place or the reasons why the claim was not lodged despite his knowledge of the deadline. 6. The insurer subsequently changed its position. By Further Liability Notice dated

7 August 2025 it admitted liability for the damages claim. 7. In submissions dated 18 August 2025 and in reply submissions dated 23 September 2025 the insurer contended that, because liability had been admitted, the dispute has been resolved and should be dismissed. It submitted that:

(a) there is no longer a "real issue" between the parties as to liability for the damages claim;

(b) pursuant to s 54 of the PIC Act and r 77 of the PIC Rules, the Commission has the power to dismiss proceedings which are lacking in substance;

(c) the guiding principles in s 42 of the PIC Act require disputes to be resolved justly, quickly, and cost-effectively, and dismissal in the present case would be consistent with those principles, and

(d) the Commission should not devote further resources to determining an issue which, in its submission, has been overtaken by its acceptance of liability.

1. The insurer reiterated that position in its 23 September 2025 submissions, adding that the matter could be dismissed either by the Member directly or by referral to the President or Division Head under s 18 of the PIC Act.

1. Section 6.14 of the MAI Act establishes a bright line. A claim for damages must be lodged within three years of the motor accident. A late claim can only be referred to assessment if the claimant provides a "full and satisfactory explanation" for the delay. The expression is defined in s 6.2 of the MAI Act. The obligation that the explanation be "full" is directed to completeness. The obligation that it be "satisfactory" is directed to objective justification.
2. The provision is cast in prohibitory language. A late claim "cannot be referred" unless the Commission is satisfied of the explanation, or unless the insurer has lost the right to reject. The insurer in this case did not lose its right. It rejected the claim within time. The jurisdiction of the Commission therefore depends upon the jurisdictional pre-condition of the explanation.
3. The insurer's later admission of liability cannot displace that requirement. The Commission's jurisdiction is statutory, not consensual. It is not for the insurer to decide who falls within the statutory scheme and who does not. Parliament has conferred that responsibility on the Commission.

1. The chronology is not in dispute. The accident occurred on 1 August 2019. The statutory period expired on 1 August 2022. No damages claim was lodged until 29 October 2024.
2. The insurer wrote to the claimant and his solicitors in September and October 2021, warning in terms that a damages claim must be lodged by 1 August 2022. The claimant received those warnings. He forwarded them to his solicitor. He was told: "We will take care of it." He was later told, on 30 March 2022, that "the claim has already been lodged."
3. The claimant thereafter pursued his solicitors repeatedly, asking when his matter would be settled, whether it had been progressed, and whether there was anything further to do. His emails throughout 2022 and 2023 attest to persistence rather than indifference.
4. When ultimately asked for his explanation in December 2024, the claimant said he "was not aware" of the three-year deadline. That statement is not accurate if read literally. He had been told of the deadline. He had queried it. The more charitable and more probable interpretation is that he believed, in light of his solicitor's assurances, that compliance had already been achieved.
5. The solicitor's statement of 16 December 2024 acknowledges awareness of the deadline but is otherwise bereft of detail. It does not disclose what systems were in place or why the claim was not lodged. The Commission directed production of that information. The direction was ignored. That failure tells against the solicitor, not against the claimant.

1. The question is whether the explanation is both full and satisfactory.
2. The explanation is not perfect. The claimant's written statement omits reference to his actual knowledge of the deadline. That omission might, on its own, suggest incompleteness. But the email record cures the deficiency. Read as a whole, the material covers the claimant's conduct, knowledge and belief, and narrates the conduct of his solicitors so far as it was within his knowledge. The explanation is therefore "full".
3. The harder question is satisfaction. The claimant knew of the deadline. A reasonable person, so informed, might be expected to do more than chase for updates and then wait for years after the deadline had passed. But the test is not whether the claimant could have done more; it is whether a reasonable person in his position might have acted as he did.
4. The claimant was inexperienced in legal process. He had engaged solicitors. He received express assurances that his claim was in hand and had already been lodged. He continued to follow up. In those circumstances it cannot be said that reliance was unreasonable. The law recognises that reliance on legal representatives can constitute a satisfactory explanation. Here, the reliance was not blind. It was accompanied by repeated attempts to obtain reassurance.
5. I am satisfied that a reasonable person in the claimant's position, having received the same assurances and having made the same inquiries, could have acted as the claimant did. The explanation is therefore "satisfactory".

1. The claimant has provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging his claim for damages. The statutory precondition in s 6.14(5)(b) is met. The Commission has jurisdiction to refer with the claim for assessment of damages notwithstanding that it was lodged outside the three-year period.
2. Pursuant to s 6.14(5)(b) of the MAI Act and Schedule 2, cl (l), I determine:

(a) the claimant has provided a full and satisfactory explanation within the meaning of ss 6.14(3) and 6.2 of the MAI Act, and

(b) by operation of s 6.14(5)(b), the Commission has jurisdiction to refer the claimant's late claim for damages to assessment.

1. As the claimant being self-represented, I make no award of costs.