Errors in the reasoning of the primary judge
24The reasoning of the primary judge is problematic in the following six respects.
25First, the only evidence before the primary judge about downward sloping forklift tines was that given by Mr Said in relation to a photograph (photograph 4 of exhibit 1) which was a reconstruction of the position of the forklift and the utility. I am sceptical that any such slope can be seen from the photograph. (It can readily be seen that the photographer did not hold his or her camera precisely level. The effect of this is to suggest a downward slope relative to the edges of the photograph.) In any event, either the outermost edge of the forklift tines sloped slightly downwards on 24 June 2011 or else it did not. But that proposition cannot be established directly by a photograph of a reconstruction of the event: see Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] NSWCA 144; [2008] Aust Torts Rep 81-956 at [7]-[13] and [167]-[172]. The fact that a witness agreed to a question asked by reference to the photograph does not alter the position.
26Although the primary judge expressly stated that he was conscious of the dangers in using photographs for such purposes, and further that he was conscious that the photograph was of a reconstruction of the scene, it is clear that he used the photograph impermissibly. The reference in the third paragraph reproduced above to the "slight incline of the tines" which his Honour had already addressed was a reference to this sentence:
"[Mr Said] also agreed, when he was shown photograph 4 revealing the outer edge of the tines, that they incline down towards the ground to some degree."
27In short, his Honour relied impermissibly on testimonial evidence derived from a photograph of a reconstruction to reach a finding that the forklift's tines sloped downwards, and failed to reconcile that finding with the evidence of Mr Borg (that the tines were level) or Mr Said (that they were inclined 15 degrees upwards). His Honour thereby used photographic evidence to trump testimonial evidence, which is impermissible: the authorities are collected in Port Macquarie Hastings Council v Mooney [2014] NSWCA 156 at [47].
28Because the primary judge's finding about the slope of the tines was material to his ultimate findings as to how the sleepers fell, that of itself would be sufficient to allow the appeal.
29Secondly, his Honour's findings amounted to an implied rejection of the evidence of Mr Palmer and Mr Said, which was consistent with the Westmead history and Bunnings' incident report, to the effect that Mr Borg had not been helping load his utility with the sleepers on the forklift. It was of course open to his Honour to reject that evidence, but if he were to do so, it was necessary for him to provide reasons for doing so. No such reasons are to be found in the dispositive portion of his Honour's judgment reproduced above, except to the extent that reference is made to the Westmead documents. Indeed, the reader of that portion of the reasons would not apprehend that every other witness and every other contemporaneous document was contrary to the findings that his Honour made.
30As noted above, his Honour addressed that evidence earlier in his reasons, and made comments in relation to it. The second paragraph reproduced above ("the reasons, in summary, why I prefer the plaintiff's evidence to that relied upon by the defendant has already been indicated thus far in this judgment") indicates that those comments are to constitute the reasons for rejecting that evidence. Accordingly, I turn to what was said about the contradictory evidence on this issue.
31(a) The Westmead medical history. The most contemporaneous history given by the plaintiff was that given at Westmead two days after the incident, and it was materially inconsistent with the plaintiff's case at trial. His Honour addressed this at p 12-13 of his judgment. He noted that there can be inaccuracies in hospital records, and then stated:
"After all, one could not be more inaccurate than indicating that the plaintiff presented with pain in his right foot. That in my view begs a real question over the accuracy of the document overall."
32His Honour gave great weight to one aspect of the documents produced by Westmead Hospital. Save for two exceptions, the Westmead documents correctly and consistently refer to Mr Borg's left foot. The exceptions are two references made when he presented at the Emergency Department ("Presenting Problem: Pain R) foot") which appear to have been made by the triage nurse. Other medical documents, including the letter from Mr Borg's general practitioner, whom he consulted the day of the incident, refer to Mr Borg's right foot. (The letter was dated May 2012, and must reflect a summary of notes taken on 24 June 2011 almost a year earlier; the original notes were not in evidence.) But the short point is that neither the error in the letter from Mr Borg's general practitioner, nor that made by the triage nurse (which was corrected by hand), is a proper basis to discount the much more detailed record reproduced in [19] above, taken at Westmead two days after the incident by a different medical professional. Yet his Honour expressly relied upon the obvious error made when Mr Borg first presented by another author, to discount the probative value of Mr Borg's history given on discharge to a different medical professional. That reasoning process is not sound.
33(b) The Bunnings' incident report. The primary judge concluded that there was a "degree of inaccuracy" in the incident report, because it was conceded in cross-examination that neither man saw what was recorded at the time, namely, "As customer moved a sleeper from the pack he lost grip on the end and sleeper fell onto his foot". That conclusion is sound so far as it goes.
34However, the report also recorded the discussions later that day about having team members only load heavy items into customers' vehicles. His Honour said that he thought that this evidence was neutral. That is not so. It represents a contemporaneous note of a perceived problem that someone other than a team member (namely, Mr Borg) was assisting loading heavy items. As such, it was inconsistent with Mr Borg's primary case. Once again, the reasoning to discount this evidence is not sound.
35(c) The testimonial evidence of the Bunnings' employees. The contradicting testimonial evidence is summarised above. In particular, there was the effectively eyewitness evidence of Mr Said contradicting Mr Borg's case. After all, Mr Said said, in cross-examination, that he saw Mr Borg still holding the end of the sleeper immediately after it had fallen onto his foot. His Honour noted this (p 20) but did not otherwise grapple with the inconsistency. Nor was there any attempt to grapple with the central differences, including that Mr Borg had said that some sleepers had been loaded onto the utility before the forklift had arrived, which was contradicted by the evidence of both Bunnings employees.
36It follows that the primary judge's reasons disclose a failure in the process of fact finding: see Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon [2005] HCA 57; 79 ALJR 1816 at [129]-[130]. In a case such as this, it is necessary to "engage with, or grapple or wrestle with the cases presented by each party": see Mitchell v Cullingral Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 389 at [116], MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council [2012] NSWCA 417 at [134] and Coote v Kelly [2013] NSWCA 357 at [39]-[52]. As explained by McColl JA in Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 at [66]:
"Where it is apparent from a judgment that no analysis was made of evidence competing with evidence apparently accepted and no explanation is given in the judgment for rejecting it, it is apparent that the process of fact finding miscarried."
37Thirdly, his Honour gave prominence to the fact that Mr Borg had not been cross-examined about the histories he gave to doctors retained on behalf of the defendants. Those histories were consistent with Mr Borg's evidence. However, Mr Borg was cross-examined carefully and thoroughly about the primary facts. It was not necessary for the cross-examiner to extend his cross-examination to the fact that Mr Borg gave medical practitioners a similar history. The fact that there was consistent, after-the-event evidence supportive of the plaintiff's case did not absolve the primary judge from grappling with the contemporaneous evidence which was inconsistent with that case.
38Fourthly, although the primary judge said that he had "no doubt" that the sleepers had been strapped and were released in the manner indicated by the plaintiff (that is to say, by Mr Said, shortly before the accident), that conclusion was contrary to Mr Said's evidence, which was plausibly supported by his recollection of procedure (to the effect that he could not leave the forklift while the tines were raised) and was not even put to Mr Said in cross-examination. His Honour failed to reconcile his conclusion with any of this evidence.
39Fifthly, what did the primary judge actually determine? His Honour said that he found that "the elements of negligence, as pleaded, in the statement of claim, have been made out". There is no explicit finding of any particular breach anywhere in the reasons.
40In order to understand the findings that led to a verdict in Mr Borg's favour, it is necessary to turn to the pleadings. That Bunnings owed a duty of care was admitted on the pleadings. Mr Borg's amended statement of claim claimed that Bunnings "was in breach of this and was negligent". He gave these particulars:
"a) Placing the plaintiff in a position of peril circumstances;
b) Failing to warn the plaintiff to stand clear;
c) Cutting the containment straps when the plaintiff was nearby;
d) Failing to have sufficient staff nearby when the containment straps were to be cut;
e) Having the sleepers on the ends of the forklift tines as opposed to near the forklift apron guard;
f) Failing to tilt the tines of the forklift upwards to prevent sleepers from falling off;
g) Failing to lower the sleepers to ground level.
h) Failing to assist, or safely assist, the plaintiff to unload the sleepers."
41The last particular was added at the commencement of the trial. It is inconsistent with the plaintiff's principal case (because it involves Mr Borg assisting to unload the sleepers). However, on one reading, his Honour's findings might amount to an acceptance of both of two inconsistent cases propounded by the plaintiff.
42A more charitable approach is to read his Honour's reasons as conveying an acceptance only of particulars (a)-(g). Indeed, this is literally what his Honour said, for those were the particulars in the (superseded) statement of claim. However, even so, those seven particulars required quite precise factual findings, and as to which the inconsistent evidence needed to be grappled with. For example, acceptance of particular (c) required findings as to the cutting of the containment straps in the presence of the plaintiff (which was contrary to the evidence of Mr Palmer and Mr Said and was not indeed even put to them). Particular (g), as to failing to lower the sleeper to ground level, was not put to any witness as something which should have occurred. In short, reference to the particulars in the unamended pleading does not cure the failure in the process of fact-finding already referred to.
43Sixthly, if the plaintiff's case were to be accepted to any extent, the critical legal questions posed by statute were: how did Bunnings or its employees breach the duty owed by it, and how did that breach cause the damage sustained by Mr Borg.
44The first question required attention to be given to s 5B of the Civil Liability Act, a section not mentioned in the judge's reasons. In particular, s 5B(1)(c) precludes a finding of breach of duty in failing to take precautions to guard against a risk of harm unless a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have taken those precautions. There is no suggestion in his Honour's reasons that he paid any regard to the matters in s 5B(2), which he was required to consider.
45It was also necessary to address s 5C, and in particular s 5C(b), for the plaintiff's case was that because the risk of harm could have been avoided by taking certain steps, there was for that reason negligence attributable to Bunnings. The steps which should have been taken were not identified.
46Further, once the breach of duty was identified, the onus remained with the plaintiff to demonstrate, in accordance with ss 5D and 5E, that the breach caused damage. Although the primary judge said that he was "mindful" of s 5D, it is unclear what he intended to convey by that statement. Without identifying any particular breaches, it was not possible to make any determination of causation, and the process required by the section was therefore not complied with.