Bryson [2026] FedCFamC1A 10 (15 January 2026)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Bryson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By Application in an Appeal filed 30 December 2025, the applicant who is the subject of a harmful proceedings order seeks leave to appeal interlocutory orders made 16 December 2025 by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2).
2. The applicant sought the application be determined in chambers without the necessity for an interim hearing in accordance with r 13.38 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

1. The applicant and her former partner are engaged in long standing Pt VIII proceedings. There has already been one appeal brought by the applicant against orders made by a different judge which resulted in the appeal being allowed and the proceedings remitted by the Full Court to be heard by the primary judge.
2. Following the remitter, the proceedings were listed for a final hearing for three days before the primary judge to commence on 9 December 2024. However, on 6 December 2024, the final hearing was adjourned and listed for three days to commence on 5 May 2025.
3. On 5 May 2025, the hearing dates were again vacated. The orders made that day reveal that both parties sought an adjournment on the basis that neither was ready for the trial. The hearing was adjourned to commence on 28 July 2025.
4. On 28 July 2025, both parties made an application to the primary judge to adjourn the proceedings. The application was refused by the primary judge. On 29 July 2025, the Court made orders and notations as follows:
   1. The proceedings are adjourned part heard to a date to be advised (likely in 2026).
   2. The wife shall as soon as practicable provide to the husband's legal representatives a medical certificate setting out the nature of her current illness and her capacity or otherwise to participate in the trial today and until 31 July 2025.
   3. The solicitors for the husband may subpoena the wife's medical records related to her illness today.
   4. For the purpose of the resumed hearing, the parties may each file documents necessary to update mortgage balances or similar but shall not otherwise file any further material without leave of the Court or the agreement in writing of both parties' legal representatives.
   5. The husband's costs thrown away are reserved.
   6. Order 8(a) of the orders of 7 November 2024 is further amended to permit the husband to withdraw from his superannuation interests an amount which would make the total withdrawal no more than ten per cent.

IT IS NOTED THAT:

1. At the beginning of day two of the trial, the Court was advised the wife had been admitted to hospital and was unable to participate further in the trial.
2. The first day of trial was occupied with objections to the wife's voluminous trial affidavit and those rulings remain for the purpose of the resumed proceedings.

1. On 12 August 2025, the applicant filed an Application in a Proceeding, seeking in part orders by way of spousal maintenance. On 19 August 2025, the Application in a Proceeding was summarily dismissed on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success.
2. On 27 August 2025, the applicant filed another Application in a Proceeding seeking spousal maintenance in the same terms as that sought in the earlier application. On 3 September 2025, the Court made the following orders:
   1. Pursuant to s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 the application in a proceeding filed by the wife on 27 August 2025 is summarily dismissed on the basis of there being no reasonable prospects of success.
   2. Pursuant to s102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 the wife is prohibited from instituting any further proceedings, including interim proceedings, without leave of the Court.
3. On 15 September 2025, the Court made an order listing the resumption of the final hearing to commence on 2 February 2026.
4. On 17 November 2025, the applicant filed another Application in a Proceeding seeking spousal maintenance. The application was cast in the same terms as the previous two applications for spousal maintenance. It also sought the vacation of the hearing dates and the matter be "rescheduled for mid to end June 2026".
5. On 10 December 2025, the primary judge dismissed the application for an adjournment and dismissed the spousal maintenance application on the basis that there was no time to hear the application before the part-heard hearing commencing.
6. On 15 December 2025, the applicant filed yet another Application in a Proceedings seeking orders for urgent spousal maintenance, an order she receive the respondent's superannuation, and for a further adjournment of the hearing. The application was dismissed on 16 December 2025.
7. The orders made that day which are the subject of appeal were as follows:

1. The wife's application pursuant to s.102QAE of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for leave to file an application in a proceeding is dismissed on the following bases:

(a) There is no time available to hear any interim application prior to the resumption of the part-heard trial on 2 February 2026; > > (b) A virtually identical application was dismissed on 10 December 2025; and > > (c) In all of the circumstances, the interim proceedings sought to be filed are vexatious.

1. Subsection 102QAE(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") enables a person who is subject to a harmful proceeding order to apply to the Court for leave to institute proceedings. A party seeking leave is required, pursuant to s 102QAE(3) of the Act, to file an affidavit in support of the application for leave. The section, in mandatory terms, directs the filing of an affidavit that:

(a) lists all the occasions on which the applicant has applied for leave under the section; and

(b) discloses all relevant facts about the application, whether supporting or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant.

1. I am satisfied for the purposes of the application that the applicant's affidavit substantially complies with s 102QAE(3) of the Act.
2. Section 102QAF(2) provides that the Court must make an order dismissing an application under s 102QAE if it considers the proceedings are vexatious. Pursuant to s 102QAG of the Act, the Court may grant leave only if it is satisfied that the proceedings are not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process and have reasonable prospects of success.
3. This latter section casts an onus upon the applicant and a failure to discharge that onus means that leave will not be granted (Darley (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 158).
4. Vexatious proceedings are defined in s 102Q(1) of the Act to include:

(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c) proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and

(d) proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

1. An appeal that is without reasonable grounds is a vexatious appeal and must in accordance with the structure of the section be dismissed. The focus of the application is thus upon the applicant's draft Notice of Appeal.
2. The draft Notice of Appeal comprises some 19 grounds. As Austin J observed in Garside [2024] FedCFamC1A 250:
   1. While such an expansive catalogue of alleged errors might tend to conceal an essential ground (Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49; (2017) 263 CLR 85 at [49]), it is more likely none of the grounds are meritorious when they are pleaded with such prolixity and repetition (Tame v NSW [2002] HCA 35; (2002) 211 CLR 317 at 345; Penrith Whitewater Stadium Ltd v Lesvos Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 103 at [8]).
3. His Honour's observations are apposite to the draft Notice of Appeal prepared by the applicant. The 19 grounds are a catalogue of complaints and grievances none of which identify the error that is said to have been occasioned by the primary judge.
4. An analysis of the grounds reveals none to have merit. Grounds 1 to 5, 8 to 11 and 18 to 19 are no more than bare factual assertions by the applicant. None are recognisable as a competent ground of appeal identifying error on the part of the primary judge. Ground 6 contends that by denying the applicant leave to bring applications, she was denied the right to provide further evidence. The ground is specious as no aspect of the orders prevent the applicant from adducing further evidence.
5. Ground 7 asserted that the primary judge did not consider her critical health and as she was not a lawyer, she was denied the right to obtain a legal representative. As with Ground 6, this is also specious. None of the orders have that effect and the ground is inconsistent with the notations made on 5 May 2025.
6. To the extent that Grounds 6 to 10 when properly distilled amount to complaint directed to the primary judge's refusal to grant the adjournment the applicant sought, they must fail as no appeal lies from a refusal to grant an adjournment (s 26(2)(b)(ii) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)).
7. Ground 12 is specious. The application is not denied the right to file an application. She may file any application she chooses subject to leave.
8. Grounds 13 to 17 address the applicant's grievances with the way the primary judge dealt with objections to the evidence of the applicant. In the event the applicant is dissatisfied with the ultimate determination of the primary judge then she has her appeal rights following the delivery of judgement. It remains open to her to contend that errors made by the primary judge such as rulings on evidence were so material as to give rise to appealable error (s 36(5) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth); Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478).
9. The appeal is devoid of merit and has no reasonable prospects of success. The consequence is that it is vexatious within the terms of 102Q(1) of the Act and the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.