Bryon & Meadows [2026] FedCFamC1F 43 (15 January 2026)

1. The child shall live with the Applicant mother.

1. The child shall spend no time with the Respondent MR MEADOWS born in 1988 ("the father").
2. The child shall have no communication with the Respondent father.

1. The Applicant mother is authorised to apply to the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for the State of New South Wales to change the name of the child to X BRYON, born in 2018 without the consent of the Father.
2. The Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for the State of New South Wales is to do all acts and things to register the change of name in accordance with Order 2 pursuant to s 28 of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) notwithstanding that the consent of the Father has not been obtained.
3. The mother will serve a sealed copy of these Orders upon the Registrar of Birth Deaths and Marriages for the State of New South Wales.

1. Pursuant to section 11(1)(b)(ii) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 the Mother is permitted to apply for a passport for the child X Bryon born in 2018 without the consent of the Father.
2. Pursuant to section 65Y(l)(c)(ii) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Mother is permitted to travel to a place outside Australia with the child X Bryon born in 2018 whether or not the Father has consented to such travel.

1. The mother shall be permitted to provide a copy of these orders to any educational institution, medical or allied health provider, or other person or body who reasonably needs to be informed of her sole parental and decision-making authority and of the prohibition on the father spending time with or communicating with the child.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Bryon & Meadows has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are oral reasons for decision in a final hearing in parenting proceedings to determine the parenting orders which are in the best interest of the subject child, X, born in 2018, currently aged seven, who I will refer to as "the child".
2. The applicant mother is Ms Bryon, born in 1992. The respondent father is Mr Meadows, born in 1988.
3. The mother relies on a further amended application for final orders filed 24 November 2025, supported by an affidavit filed 13 February 2024.The father relies on his response to final orders filed 13 January 2025 and his affidavit filed 13 January 2025.
4. The mother seeks sole decision-making and parental responsibility for the child, that the child live with her, that there be no time and no communication with the father, and that she have permission to change the child's surname from Meadows to Bryon. This was all in dispute at the commencement of the proceedings.
5. The factual issues in the proceedings were complex, including allegations by the mother of family violence, in particular psychological and financial abuse, and those issues were, I note, hotly in dispute, with the father denying these allegations.
6. The issues for determination by this Court have, however, been significantly narrowed by reason of the fact that the father has now been convicted of sexually abusing his ex-partner's child when that child was under the age of ten.
7. As a consequence of that conviction, he has been sentenced to a head term of 25 years of imprisonment with a minimum term, or non-parole period, of 16 years. By that time, the child will be an adult.
8. It is also relevant to note that it is common ground that the child has not spent any time with, nor had any communication with, the father since 2020 when he was two years of age.
9. While the child has engaged with a psychologist, and is interested in knowing who the father is, it is clear that, not having had anything to do with the father since the age of two, the child has no current relationship with the father.
10. In this context, where the child will be an adult, indeed, in their 20s, before the father's earliest possible release date, at a mention on 1 December 2025 the father, sensibly, consented to the majority of the mother's application, leaving only one issue for determination, which is the change to the child's surname.
11. On that basis, I listed the matter for a short final hearing on the discrete issue today with all parties appearing electronically, as the father is incarcerated. I note that an independent children's lawyer had been appointed to represent the child, and the ICL also appeared electronically.
12. Neither party was legally represented.

1. The short background is that the father and mother commenced a relationship in August 2016, were married in 2019, and separated on a final basis in around December 2020, it appears, as a result of the allegations in respect to which the father was convicted.
2. The father's parole conditions prevented contact with the child, and the father points to the fact that it is not through disinterest that he has not spent time with or communicated with the child since then.
3. These proceedings commenced on 13 February 2024, when the mother filed her initiating application. On 13 March 2024, the matter was transferred to Division 1, allocated to the Magellan list and the independent children's lawyer was appointed.
4. On 19 August 2024, interim orders were made for the child to live with the mother, and restraining the father from having any contact with the child on a without admissions basis.
5. The father was convicted in the latter part of 2025, and as I have said on 1 December, consented to the majority of the mother's application, and the matter was set down.
6. The father appeared on his own behalf, from prison, the mother appeared on her own behalf, and the independent children's lawyer also appeared, all electronically.
7. Both the mother and father gave brief evidence directed to the specific issue of the name was given orally at the final hearing on the single issue. The parties agreed cross examination was not required.
8. The mother relied, in particular, in her affidavit on paragraphs 109 to 114 under the heading Change of Name.

109. I am very proud of my recovery and continue to be supported psychologically.

1. I have returned to my maiden name of "[Bryon]'· and want [X] to have his name changed to [Bryon] also. This is part of my new sense of self identification.
2. I also associate the name "[Meadows]' with a time that I was psychologically abused and in a different place and [Bryon] is the name of my new self.
3. [X] has just started school so this would be a good time so that there is no disruption to his schooling/identification as he is young.
4. The community knows about the charges against [Mr Meadows], and I don't want [X] to be associated with that name. lf [Mr Meadows] is convicted, it is unlikely that [Mr Meadows] will be out of jail until after [X] becomes an adult; at which point [X] can make his own choices.
5. [X] has limited connection with his father as he was incarcerated when [X] was only 2 years old; and therefore, he has limited memory of him

1. The mother said she appreciated that a change of surname was not trivial, as, indeed, it is not, and should be approached cautiously, as she accepted that the child's emotional and psychological welfare were the Court's primary concern, but also pointed to the practical issues.
2. She said that her view was that the child would have greater stability and a better sense of identity if he has the same name as the parent with whom he lives, and as the maternal grandparents with whom he spends time.
3. While it is not uncommon for a child to have a different surname to one or other parent, where there is only one parent and the surname is different, the mother says this creates more complexity. She said it creates confusion for the child who has no relationship with the father whose surname he bears. She also points to the fact that the child has cousins from a maternal aunt. The maternal aunt has the same name as her husband and the children. So although the cousins have a different surname to the child, in the context of what the child sees, his cousins have the same name as the parents they live with.
4. The mother also says that there are day to day issues with doctors and others as she has changed her name back from Meadows to Bryon. She says it creates confusion and the need for either her, or the child, to repeatedly explain that the parent with sole responsibility has a different surname.
5. She also says she is concerned the child has a sense of being different to or set apart from her. She is concerned that, as the child gets older, it will create more confusion, particularly in circumstances where the father is not involved in the child's life, and also where she says the community are aware of the fact that the father has been convicted of these serious offences, and the fact that the child has the same surname may lead the child to need to explain repeatedly about his relationship, or non-relationship, with someone who has been convicted of serious child sex abuse charges.
6. The father's starting position before me today was that he maintains his innocence of the criminal charges, saying he had done nothing wrong and that he is confident in the likely success of an appeal. I note that the conviction prima facie stands and must be accepted by me as correct, although I do take into account the fact there is an appeal and that, in parenting proceeding, there is no true finality, so that if the appeal is successful it may be necessary and appropriate to revisit the child's parenting orders which are premised on his guilt as a child sex offender.
7. The father, very reasonably, says that he is proud of the mother's parenting, how well she has done, and of the good results her mothering of the child have been achieved.
8. He accepts the sole decision-making and live-with orders, which, I think, is also very sensible, not only in the context of the conviction, but given he has had no relationship with the child since the child was two.
9. However, he said he did not feel changing the child's name would be of benefit to the child. Obviously, any name change, when a child is old enough to understand it had change, is going to potentially create some psychological confusion.
10. There may be an issue of the child asking, "Well, am I the same person that I was" in the child's mind. And also the father notes that the child is visiting a psychologist, and the child does want to know who is.
11. The ICL has spoken with the child. The ICL supported the mother's case, starting with the basis that, regardless of the reasons, the child has no current relationship with the father and no personal knowledge of the father. The ICL submitted the child would benefit, both psychologically and practically, in the long run in having the same surname as the mother and as the maternal grandparents with whom the child also has significant relationships.
12. The also submitted that, noting the assumed correctness of the decision, the child would benefit from reducing his association with the father, given the community is aware of the nature of the conviction.
13. The ICL also raised, in a more direct way than the mother, the Re Andrew issue, picking up on the mother's concerns about any association with the father through having to deal with his surname on an ongoing basis, taking into account not on the conviction but also the mother's other evidence of family violence.
14. Although I cannot determine the family violence issue, the conviction for child sex abuse and the mother's desire to no longer be associated with the father is a basis upon which think I reasonably accept that the mother does find that having to deal with the child having the father's surname on a daily basis to be a distressing factor. Further, I accept the ICL's submission that it may negatively impact on her parenting capacity over the long run.
15. In terms of the child's views, the ICL's position was that the child is a happy, content child and too young to have any views to which weight should be given noting the gravity of the facts.
16. I have considered whether I should stand the matter over, awaiting the determination of any appeal. However, given the decision is assumed to be correct, the child's lack of relationship with the father, and the absence of any information about an appeal date, and weighing all of the evidence, and taking into account my obligation, when considering the conduct of the proceedings, to prioritise the child's best interest, I am satisfied that it was and is appropriate to proceed on the basis that the question of the determination of the child's surname should be considered today, and not put off, again the father was unable to say when there would be an appeal, even given the risk that if there is eventually an acquittal and an application to review the parenting orders the issue will be complicated by the order having been made now.
17. The legislative objects of Part VII of the Act are to ensure that the child's best interests are met, including by ensuring their safety, as well as to give effect to the Convection of the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.
18. The paramount consideration is the child's best interest, see sections 60CCA and 65AA.
19. Parental responsibility and long-term decision-making is agreed, and I approve the agreement. I approve the agreement in respect of the other matters that are agreed.
20. It is inevitable the child also live with the mother.
21. The question of surname, although sometimes dealt with discretely in authorities, is merely one example of the Court's requirement to consider what is in the child's best interests.
22. Applying the legislative pathway under section 60CC, noting that, whilst the pathway has been amended, the process remains substantially the same, there is a non-hierarchical list set out in the general considerations.
23. Considering what arrangements would promote the safety of the child as well as each person who has the care of the child, the sole issue here is the psychological safety of the child, and to some extent, the psychological safety of the mother.
24. On balance, it seems to me that, where the father has not been involved with the child, and where the child lives with the mother, where she and the maternal grandparents have the same surname, and noting the father's conviction and the potential for notoriety of that conviction in the community, the child's psychological safety is best promoted by allowing the change of surname.
25. I accept that there is the likelihood of a short period of confusion as the child, who has known himself with one surname until now, will have to learn a new surname, but on balance, I think the long-term psychological safety of the child is promoted by allowing the change of surname.
26. The child is too young, given the complex issues, to have any views which would be relevant. The developmental, psychological, emotional, cultural needs of the child are, I find, more likely to be supported by allowing the change of surname.
27. The mother has the capacity to care for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional, cultural needs and is aware of the complexity of the issue, and I'm satisfied is likely to assist the child, including through counselling, to deal with the short-term psychological issues associated with the change of name.
28. In terms of the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with each parent, the child will not have a relationship with the father, and I think that is appropriate given the conviction and the father's imprisonment.
29. In the circumstances of this case where there is only one parent involved in school and other matters, and where even if the conviction is overturned there seems to be no real question that the mother will be the primary person responsible for the child's education, health and other matters, I am satisfied that the practical considerations also, as the ICL submitted, weighs heavily in favour of the change of surname.
30. The child is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent through the father's side. However, the father is not in a position to do anything about that. I would encourage the mother to do what she can to assist the child to enjoy the child's Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture to the extent she can, given the father will not be involved in the child's life as a consequence of his conviction.
31. I make the consent orders and order the change of name.

I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Smith.