The Tribunal issued orders in P537/2025 which required (amongst other matters) that St Edmonds JV give notice to any referral authority and every person who lodged a written objection to the grant of the permit ('23 June Tribunal Orders').

Letters were sent to those identified by the Council as being required to be served with the application.[4]

A statement of service was filed with the Tribunal indicating that notice had been given.

Paola Modernel and Justyn Winter received notice of the application. Paola Modernel indicated that they decided to focus on other matters and not to object to this development. She was later surprised to learn from another developer with whom Justin Winter had met learn that this development had been approved.

This is the date by which St Edmonds JV was required to give notice of the application to every person who lodged a written objection to the grant of the Permit.

Lance Bryant received notification of the application on 24 July 2025.[5] He says he received it in an envelope from Stonnington City Council posted on 21 July 2025. The Council says it has no record of sending any such letter. He has not retained the envelope but made a note on the covering letter to this effect in the following form (taken from the top of the letter covering the package of information):

Lance Bryant lodged a statement of grounds in proceeding P537/2025 and indicated that he would not attend the hearing and would not become a party. He referred to the date on which he received notification of the application in his statement of grounds in respect of that application. He did not request any particular action be taken in response to the date of notification.

Lance Bryant says he had booked a holiday prior to receiving notice but after 10 July 2025 and could not attend the compulsory conference.

His statement of grounds did not seek that the Tribunal take any action in respect of the date on which he received the material. He indicated that he did not want to be a party and would not attend the hearing as follows:

In the application to cancel the Permit Lance Bryant identifies himself as 'objector not notified'.

Lance Bryant says he rang Kellie Burns and UpCo but was not satisfied by her response. He felt she was only interested in knowing that he had received the notice not in the fact that he had little time to respond.

Lance Bryant says he thought that other objectors would attend the compulsory conference.

Lindsay-Jane Barnard also says she received notice on this day although she does not recall any details of the envelope or postage date of the letter. She says she regrets not acting more quickly and being overwhelmed by the process. She says she did not take further action like those others who did not put in statements of grounds after receiving notice.

Gemma Bryce also says she received the notification material on this date. She says she worked full time and rang VCAT on the day the statement of grounds was due. She says she formed the view from that conversation that she would have to have 'exceptional circumstances' to put in a late statement of grounds. She did not keep a note of what exactly she was told. She had tried to get advice regarding the matter before then but did not get her application in on the final day nor further pursue the matter at that time as it 'seemed very difficult'.

She considered that the developer ought to have accessed the objectors' email addresses from the Council website and that this would have meant that service would have been received.

The notification package was forwarded to the owners' corporation for distribution to other owners.[6]

Statements of Grounds were due in accordance with the Tribunal's order of 23 June 2025.

The date of the compulsory conference set down in accordance with the Tribunal's orders of 23 June 2025.

Tribunal order directs that a permit issue in accordance with and agreement between the Council and St Edmonds JV at the compulsory conference. A permit was directed to issue for:

Lance Bryant says he found out that an agreement has been reached between St Edmonds JV and the Council and that permit would issue.

Permit was issued at the direction of the parties following agreement at the compulsory conference.

Gemma Bryce applied for cancellation of the Permit and for an order to stop development.

Lance Bryant applied to the Tribunal for cancelation of the Permit, and for an order to stop development.

1. I have set out here the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic.) ('PE Act') relevant to applications to cancel or amend a permit as well as application for orders to stop development which are most relevant to the discussion below.

1. What are the grounds for cancellation or amendment of permits?

(1) The Tribunal may cancel or amend any permit if it considers that there has been - > > > (a) a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit; or > > > > (b) any substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit; or > > > > (c) any material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit; or > > > > (d) any material change of circumstances which has occurred since the grant of the permit; or > > > > (e) any failure to give notice in accordance with this Act; or > > > > (f) any failure to comply with section 55, 61(2) or 62(1). > > ... > > (3) The Tribunal may cancel or amend a permit at the request of -

(a) the responsible authority; or

(b) any person under section 89; or

(c) a referral authority; or

(d) the owner or occupier of the land concerned; or

(e) any person who is entitled to use or develop the land concerned.

...

(6) Without limiting the powers of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may, under this section, cancel or amend a permit that has been issued at its direction.

...

89 Request for cancellation or amendment

(1) Any person who objected or would have been entitled to object to the issue of a permit may ask the Tribunal to cancel or amend the permit if -

(a) the person believes that the person should have been given notice of the application for the permit and was not given that notice; or

(b) the person believes that the person has been adversely affected by -

(i) a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit; or

(ii) any substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit; or

(iii) any material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit.

(2) The request must be made in writing in accordance with the regulations.

(3) The Tribunal may refuse to consider a request under this section or section 87 unless it is satisfied that the request has been made as soon as practicable after the person making it had notice of the facts relied upon in support of the request.

...

(1) The Tribunal must give the following persons a reasonable opportunity to be heard at the hearing of any request -

(a) the responsible authority;

(b) the owner and the occupier of the land concerned;

(c) any person who asked for the cancellation or amendment of the permit under section 87;

...

(3) The Tribunal must not direct a responsible authority to cancel or amend a permit on a request under section 89(1) unless it is satisfied that -

(a) in the case of a request under section 89(1)(a) the person -

(i) could not reasonably be expected to have been aware of the application for the permit in time to lodge an objection under Division 1; and

(ii) was substantially disadvantaged by the issue of the permit; and

(b) in the case of a request under section 89(1)(b), the person was substantially disadvantaged by the matter set out in the request; and

(c) it would be just and fair in the circumstances to do so.

(1) Any person who may be affected by the grant of the permit may object to the grant of a permit.

(1A) If the permit would allow the removal or variation of a registered restrictive covenant or if anything authorised by the permit would result in a breach of a registered restrictive covenant, an owner or occupier of any land benefited by the covenant is deemed to be a person affected by the grant of the permit.

(2) An objection must be made to the responsible authority in writing stating the reasons for the objection and stating how the objector would be affected by the grant of the permit.

(2A) The responsible authority may reject an objection which it considers has been made primarily to secure or maintain a direct or indirect commercial advantage for the objector.

(2B) If an objection has been rejected under subsection (2A) this Act applies as if the objection had not been made.

(3) If a number of persons make one objection, they may give the responsible authority the name and address of the person to whom the responsible authority is to give notice of the decision.

...

83A Objectors entitled to notice

(1) A person who objected to the grant of a permit under section 57 is entitled to notice of an application by the applicant for the permit for review of -

(a) a decision refusing to grant the permit; or

(b) a failure to grant the permit; or

(c) a decision imposing a condition on the permit.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person if under a planning scheme the person is not entitled to apply to the Tribunal under section 82 for a review of a decision to grant the permit.

(1) Unless this Act or the regulations authorise or require a notice or order to be given in any other way, every notice or order which this Act authorises or requires a planning authority or responsible authority to give to or serve on the owner or the occupier of any land must be addressed to the owner or to the occupier of the land and -

...

(2) Unless this Act or the regulations authorise or require a notice or order to be given in any other way, a notice or order may also be served by post by prepaid letter addressed to the owner or occupier, and in proving service it is sufficient to prove that the notice or order was addressed to the usual or last-known place of residence or of business of the owner or occupier and was put into the post.

(3) A notice or order under this Act may be addressed by the description of "the owner" or "the occupier" of the land (naming it) in

...

1. The Council says that there is no basis for the applications. There is no suggestion that the applicants were not notified of the original permit application.
2. Its position is summarised in paragraph 2 of its submissions to the preliminary hearing as follows:

1. The Council's submissions set out details of the notice given of the original application under section 52 of the PE Act. There is no dispute that notice of application for permit was given nor that the applicants objected.
2. The Council say there is no material mistake or concealment of fact and that the applicants ought to have done more when they received notification to lodge their applications for review on time, or to raise their concerns with the Tribunal.
3. It says a stop order is inappropriate as little has happened since the Permit was granted.

1. St Edmonds JV relies upon the affidavit of Jacqueline Cottrell date 8 October 2025 ('Cottrell affidavit') who says:

(i) On 30 June 2025, UpCo received the list of objectors from Millicent Baddeley, on behalf of Stonnington City Council;

(ii) On 4 July 2025, UpCo received an updated list of objectors from Jasmine Baldock of Stonnington City Council;

(iii) On 7 July 2025, she prepared the letters to the objectors as required by Order 3 in the Initiating Orders;

(iv) She typed and printed the address labels for each objector on the list, then put them in the envelopes, ensuring they matched the list provided by Council;

(v) At approximately, 1:00pm on 7 July 2025, she posted the letters at the post office across from the UpCo office at 3/401 St Kilda Road, VCAT Melbourne, 55 King Street, MELBOURNE VIC 3000; and

(vi) On 9 July 2025, she completed a Statement of Service and electronically filed the Statement of Service with the Tribunal, by sending it to admin@courts.vic.gov.au.

1. Attached to the Cottrell affidavit were copies of the various documents referred to in it.
2. The author of the Cottrell affidavit was available to give evidence at the hearing but no one present required her to do so or wished to cross-examine her as to the contents of her affidavit. No one asserted that she had not posted the letters as set out in her affidavit or challenged her evidence. I accept her evidence that the relevant letters were posted on 7 July 2025.
3. St Edmonds JV addresses the requirements of the PE Act and says that:

(i) There is no basis to conclude any objectors have standing to bring an application to cancel or amend the application;

(ii) That it concedes the applications for cancellation were made in a timely manner after the Permit was issued;

(iii) The applications are not brought under the correct section of the PE Act because there is no failure to give notice of the application;

(iv) It does not object to the Tribunal amending the application so that it is made under section 87(1)(e) of the PE Act which provides that:

The Tribunal may cancel or amend any permit if it considers that there has been a failure to give notice in accordance with this Act.

(v) While this ground of application is theoretically available, the applicants would need to prove that there was a basis to conclude that there had been a failure to give notice in accordance with the PE Act;

(vi) They would also need to show that they are a person to whom section 89(1)(b)(iii) applies where the PE Act provides that any person who objected ... to the issue of a permit may ask the Tribunal to cancel or amend the permit if -

(b) the person believes that the person has been adversely affected by -

(iii) a material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit.

(vii) The applicant would also need to show how they were adversely affected by a material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit and that it is just and fair in the circumstances to cancel the permit.

(viii) Fundamentally, St Edmonds JV says that the application must 'fall at the first hurdle' because there has been no failure to give notice in accordance with the PE Act.

(ix) The applicants do not have standing to bring the application and it says that there is no basis for the applications to be made.

(x) It also says that it has various other arguments about whether it would be just and fair to amend or cancel the permit which it says are primarily for a final hearing if the Tribunal considers that there is a basis to consider the application.

(xi) It accepts that negotiating the sections of the PE Act is not easy but that there is ultimately no material mistake upon which to found the applications because:

1. Lance Bryant received the application and did lodge a statement of grounds;
2. Notice was in fact given to both applicants which complied with the Tribunal's order;
3. All of the applicants in fact were in fact given notice and some 26 days prior to the compulsory conference.

1. It says that on this basis, the application should be summarily dismissed under section 75(1) of the VCAT Act.[7]

Do the applicants have standing to request cancellation of the permit?

1. There are a limited number of categories of persons who may apply to cancel a permit as set out in section 89(3) of the PE Act:

(3) The Tribunal may cancel or amend a permit at the request of -

(a) the responsible authority; or

(b) any person under section 89; or

(c) a referral authority; or

(d) the owner or occupier of the land concerned; or

(e) any person who is entitled to use or develop the land concerned.

1. The only category into which the applicants may fall is 'any person under section 89' of the PE Act. Section 89(1) of the PE Act relevantly states:

(1) Any person who objected or would have been entitled to object to the issue of a permit may ask the Tribunal to cancel or amend the permit if -

(a) the person believes that the person should have been given notice of the application for the permit and was not given that notice; or

(b) the person believes that the person has been adversely affected by -

(i) a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit; or

(ii) any substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit; or

(iii) any material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit.

1. Each of the applicants are people who would have been entitled to object to the issue of a permit.
2. Section 89(1)(a) of the PE Act applies to the giving of notice of the original permit. In this circumstance subsection (a) does not apply because notice of the permit application was given and each of the applicants had notice and did in fact object. This is not in dispute. It follows that no application can be made under section 89(1)(a) of the PE Act.
3. Subsection (b) requires a person to be adversely affected by one of 3 circumstances:

(i) A material mis-statement or concealment of fact;

(ii) A substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit;

(iii) A material mistake in relation to the permit.

1. The circumstances in (ii) do not apply as there is no failure to comply with the conditions of the recently issued permit alleged.
2. The applicants do not precisely articulate the mistake or material mis-statement which they say has been made in respect of the grant of the permit but all agree that their complaints relate to the alleged defects in the notice of the Tribunal application made by St Edmonds JV. This complaint relates to the receipt of notice rather than the giving of notice.
3. This complaint does not fall within the scope of a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit as set out in 87(b)(i).[8]
4. The only potential basis for the applicants to have standing to bring the application is that there was a material mistake in relation to the grant of a permit under section 87(b)(iii) of the PE Act. Again, that mistake is not clearly defined but relates to the giving of notice. At its highest the alleged mistake would be that people were in the words of the applicants 'not given notice' or alternatively received notification too late to participate in the hearing (or not at all).
5. For the reasons elaborated upon below I do not consider that there was any material mistake because:
   1. Notice of the application was in fact given in accordance with the Tribunal's orders of 23 June 2025;
   2. Even if, contrary to my view, (i) were not sufficient to conclude this question, if the applicants had wished to make a complaint about the lateness of receipt of notification, they had the opportunity to raise this with the Tribunal and request procedural orders to address this;
   3. Lance Bryant did refer to late receipt of the application material but did not request an adjournment or to otherwise participate in the compulsory conference other than by having his statement of grounds considered;[9]
   4. The existence of other people who had chosen not to bring their circumstances to the attention of the Tribunal in any formal way, is not a 'mistake' but a consequence of not acting on this information. Had this been formally raised and, for example an adjournment sought on the basis that someone who wanted to participate in a particular manner could not, the Tribunal could at that stage have considered such a request. No evidence was provided of such a request being made prior to the matter being concluded before the Tribunal.
6. For the reasons set out below I find that notice of the application to the Tribunal by the St Edmonds JV of the application for review of the Council's notice of refusal to grant a permit was given in accordance with the Act.
7. To the extent that there was a complaint that the documents had been received late - that matter was explicitly brought to the Tribunal's attention in the statement of grounds filed by Mr Bryant. He did not seek any particular orders from the Tribunal as a result of the date on which he had received the notice.[10]
8. It follows that none of the applicants have standing to make the applications.
9. This analysis is interrelated with whether there is any available basis to make an order which I have addressed next.

Is there an available basis to make an order under section 87(1)(e)?

1. In addition to proving that a person has standing to make an application they must also prove that there is a basis upon which the application can be made. The available bases are set out in section 87(1) of the PE Act as follows:

(a) a material mis-statement or concealment of fact in relation to the application for the permit; or

(b) any substantial failure to comply with the conditions of the permit; or

(c) any material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit; or

(d) any material change of circumstances which has occurred since the grant of the permit; or

(e) any failure to give notice in accordance with this Act; or

(f) any failure to comply with section 55, 61(2) or 62(1).

1. As set out above, the applicants do not specifically assert and I have not identified any mis-statement, concealment or material mistake in relation to the grant of the permit identified by the circumstances of notification relied upon by the applicants. Nor does 87(1)(a) of the PE Act apply as this relates to notification of the original permit application.
2. There is a separate basis for making an application which most resembles the matters sought to be agitated by the applicants. This is section 87(1)(e) of the PE Act. This is available where a failure to give notice in accordance with the Act has occurred. I have considered whether the application has a prospect of success under this section. St Edmonds JV does not object to me amending the application in order to consider this issue despite this not being expressly stated in the applications.
3. There is no dispute that the applicants were entitled to be given notice of St Edmond JV's application pursuant to section 83A of the PE Act which states:

(1) A person who objected to the grant of a permit under section 57 is entitled to notice of an application by the applicant for the permit for review of -

(a) a decision refusing to grant the permit; or

...

1. The Tribunal's orders required this notice to be given by 10 July 2025. The Cottrell affidavit states the letters were posted before that date.
2. The requirement for giving notice under the PE Act is set out in section 145(2) of the PE Act:

Unless this Act or the regulations authorise or require a notice or order to be given in any other way, a notice or order may also be served by post by prepaid letter addressed to the owner or occupier, and in proving service it is sufficient to prove that the notice or order was addressed to the usual or last-known place of residence or of business of the owner or occupier and was put into the post.

1. The Cottrell affidavit deposes that service was affected in accordance with this requirement of the PE Act. It was in fact sent 3 days prior to the due date specified in the Tribunal's orders.
2. Paola Modernel submitted at the hearing that she received notice on the 9 July 2025 which corroborates the sending of letters as set out in the Cottrell affidavit.
3. Section 145(b) of the PE Act sets out what is required to prove service. That is that the letters were put in the post in the appropriate form not that they are received. That is, it is the posting not the receipt which is required by the PE Act to effect service.
4. Accepting the position submitted by Lance Bryant that the letter he received was in fact sent to him later by the Council does not affect the analysis as to whether service has been proved. Notice to him was still given under the PE Act by the posting of the letters - whether or not it was received.[11]
5. Similarly, Gemma Bryce says that she did receive notification although she does not recall any details of the envelope in which it was received. She says she received the documents on 24 July 2025 and did not submit a statement of grounds on the day it was due on 28 July 2025. She says she rang the Tribunal and was told that there would be additional requirements for applications submitted after the due date. She says this dissuaded her from lodging a late application. She also did not submit it via the Tribunal website at any time on the day it was due (or after that date).
6. I am unable to form the view that notice was not given in accordance with the PE Act, even though I accept that copies of the relevant documents were received by them later than would have been expected.
7. I am not required to interrogate the circumstances surrounding the receipt of each item of mail. This is consistent with the operation of the PE Act. If the Tribunal were required to interrogate the circumstances and fate of every item of correspondence sent to notify people of planning applications including whether the person served had actually taken delivery of notification given by mail, this would significantly impair that ability to make decisions. As Mr Bryant rightly said at the hearing he does not know whether his neighbours check their mailboxes and nor could the Tribunal.
8. My findings are consistent with those of DP Gibson in Stratiou v Darebin CC.[12] She states[13]:

It is relevant that the ground in section 87(1)(e) refers only to a failure to give notice. It does not refer to failure to receive notice. It would be most unfair to a permit holder if a permit could be cancelled or amended at the request of a third party when all the procedures specified under the Act relating to the issue of the permit had been complied with simply on the basis that, for some reason, the notice given did not come to the attention of the objector even though it was sent.

1. I find that service has been affected in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
2. It follows that the applications sought to be made by the applicants cannot succeed.
3. I note that it is, perhaps unfortunate, that each of the applicants who are now dissatisfied with the agreement made by the Council, did not more fully ventilate their concerns before the compulsory conference or even before the Tribunal gave effect to the agreement and directed that a permit issue. There are procedures available for requesting adjournments and practice day hearings to raise such matters with the Tribunal.
4. That does not however, lead to a conclusion that there is a basis for the Permit to be cancelled or amended under the PE Act or the review process recommenced.

Were the applications made as soon as possible?

1. As St Edmonds JV rightly concedes, the applications were made as soon as practicable after those making the applications had notice of the facts relied upon in support of the request. Both applications were made less than 2 days after the permit issued.
2. If there was a basis for the applications in these proceedings, they would not be precluded by section 89(3) of the PE Act by reason of any delay on the part of the applicants.

Should the matter be struck out under section 75(1) of the VCAT Act?

1. In view of the findings I have made, I have decided that the matters should be summarily dismissed under section 75(1) of the VCAT Act as both applications are misconceived.

1. The applicable principles were succinctly summarised in Axicom Pty Ltd v Melton CC:[14]

• the proceeding must be obviously unsustainable in fact or in law, can on no reasonable view justify relief, or must be bound to fail,
• the power to order summary dismissal should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried. Indeed, it must be 'very clear' that the proceeding is 'absolutely hopeless'.
• the power should not be invoked where all that is shown is that, on the material currently before VCAT, the applicant may fail adduce evidence substantiating an essential element of the complaint.
• a proceeding should not be summarily dismissed if the ultimate fate of the proceeding depends upon disputed questions of fact that could be established by evidence yet to be adduced or tested.
• the respondent to a proceeding bears the persuasive burden of showing 'that the complaint is undoubtedly hopeless'.

1. In the present case, I have formed the view that that the case is undoubtedly hopeless. The case brought by the applicants under section 87(1)(a) of the PE Act is unsustainable. Even if it were amended to take in other subsections of section 87(1) and particularly section 87(1)(e) of the PE Act it is doomed to fail because notice of the application to the Tribunal was given in accordance with the PE Act.
2. It follows that both proceedings P813/2025 and P818/2025 will be dismissed.

Application for an order to stop development.

1. Both applications include an application to the Tribunal to make an order under section 93 of the PE Act restraining St Edmonds JV from acting in accordance with the Permit. Section 93 of the PE Act states:

(1) The Tribunal may, if it considers it appropriate, order that pending the hearing of a request no development other than that specified in the order is to be carried out or continued on the land. > > (1A) Before making an order, the Tribunal must consider whether the person making the request should give any undertaking as to damages. > > (2) The responsible authority must give notice of the order without delay to the persons and in the manner the Tribunal directs or (if no direction is given) as are prescribed. > > (3) Any person to whom the notice is given who fails to comply with the notice is guilty of an offence.

2. Lance Bryant says that he requested this order because if he were permitted to 're-run' the permit application proceeding he did not want the building to be half built before that was considered. In particular he did not want that to be used as a reason not to cancel or amend the permit or to dictate the outcome of the decision making process.
3. The relevant factors for making a stop order have been likened to the considerations relevant to making an interim enforcement order and summarised as follows by DP Bisucci in 60 Martin Close Developments Pty Ltd v Whittlesea CC:[15]
   1. the effect of not granting the stop order;
   2. whether irreparable damage would occur to the applicant if the stop order is not granted;
   3. what effect the stop order would have on the respondents;
   4. whether there is a prima facie case for the making of a stop order;
   5. even if a prima facie case is established, are there other considerations that would make the granting of a stop order unjust;
   6. whether the applicant has given an undertaking as to damages;[16] and
   7. whether the Tribunal should hear from any other person.
4. I decline to make such an order because:
   1. I have found that the applications are misconceived and have dismissed them;
   2. No physical works are proposed to occur in accordance with the permit in the short term as there are a number of preconditions to commencement in the Permit requiring detailed reports, and amended plans to be prepared and submitted to the Council;
   3. No undertaking as to damages had been offered which would have weighed against making the order;
   4. Any action taken by the St Edmonds JV would have been taken in the knowledge of the applications and would have been at its own risk.
   5. The concern expressed by Lance Bryant would not have formed a sufficient basis for such an order as the Tribunal frequently considers applications for approval or works completed or partially completed. These are considered in accordance with established principles which offer no advantage to the applicant when an existing or partially constructed building is considered.

1. Two applications have been made to join the proceedings. I have addressed these briefly as I heard from Paola Modernel and Lyndsay-Jane Barnard at the hearing. In view of my decision to strike the proceedings out I have not joined any further parties. Had the proceedings not been struck out I would have joined Lyndsay-Jane Barnard and Kyle Biller but would not have joined Paola Modernel or Justyn Winter.

1. Paola Modernel attended the hearing on behalf of herself and Justyn Winter. She explained that they had both been served with the application on 9 July 2025. She said that they were involved in opposing a different application and did not think this one would be approved.
2. She would like to be involved in the proceedings if it goes ahead because she opposes the permit being issued and would like to be joined.
3. St Edmonds JV opposes this application saying that there is no possible basis for the application to cancel a permit as these people clearly received notice within time and have no standing to make an application.
4. I agree with the submissions of St Edmonds JV. I would not have granted this application to join as it is apparent from the discussion above that there is no basis upon which they could have standing to bring an application. Having received notification of the application with more than 21 days to lodge a statement of grounds and having chosen not to do so, does not demonstrate any basis for making an application to cancel a Permit resulting from a process in which they chose not to take part.
5. I have declined to join Paola Mordernel and Justyn Winter.

1. Lynday-Jane Barnard and Kyle Biller seek to be joined to Gemma Bryce's application saying that she only found out about the VCAT application on 24 July 2025 and did not have enough time to prepare and lodge her grounds for objection.
2. St Edmonds JV say that they accept that Lyndsay-Jane Barnard is in the same position as Gemma Bryce and do not oppose her being joined as a party to the proceedings if they are not struck out.
3. Had I not struck out the application I would have joined them as I agree that they are in the same position as Gemma Bryce as people whose interests were affected.[17] Had there been a basis for Gemma Bryce's application to be made, that would also have applied to them.
4. In the circumstances, I have not joined them because I have struck out both proceedings.

1. The orders reflect the reasons set out here. In addition, I have vacated the dates set down of the hearing of the matters.

[1] The submissions and evidence of the parties, any supporting exhibits given at the hearing, and the statements of grounds filed; have all been considered in the determination of the proceeding. In accordance with the practice of the Tribunal, not all of this material will be cited or referred to in these reasons.

[2] I note that the Tribunal has previously found where a person alleges failure to give notice to an owner or occupier who was not one of the applicants for cancellation the person requesting the application does not have standing to make that request relying on the failure of notification to others. See Helman v Strathbogie SC (Red Dot) [2021] VCAT 1274 at [77] to [93]. This is also consistent with the findings of DP Bisucci in Harrison v Merri-bek CC [2023] VCAT 478 at [42].