SHOULD THE INTERVENING PARTIES BE GRANTED LEAVE TO BE HEARD?
31 Having regard to the principles that have just been outlined, the intervening parties do not, strictly speaking, have standing or a right to be heard in respect of the liquidator's applications under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act. At best, they have a right as creditors, or persons who claim to be creditors or officers of creditors, to seek leave to be heard pursuant to r 2.13 of the Rules. It is ultimately for the intervening parties to persuade the Court that the discretion conferred by r 2.13 of the Rules should be exercised in their favour given the nature of the proceeding and any relevant interest they may have in it.
32 It may perhaps be accepted that, to the extent that they are creditors, or claim to be creditors or officers of creditors, of 3 Property and Be Athletic, the intervening parties might, at least hypothetically, have some interest in the outcome of the liquidator's applications. If the funding agreements in respect of which retrospective approval is sought are ill-advised, or improper, or are the product of a lack of good faith, or some error of law or principle on the part of the liquidator, the approval of the funding agreements may have a potentially adverse effect on the returns that may be available to them in their capacity as creditors or claimed creditors.
33 For the Court to exercise the discretion in r 2.13 of the Rules in their favour, however, it is not sufficient for them to simply rely on their status as creditors, or claimed creditors, or officers of creditors. If that were so, every creditor, or claimed creditor, or officer of a creditor, might reasonably expect that they would be granted leave to be heard in respect of any application by a liquidator for approval of a funding agreement, or indeed any agreement, pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act. The authorities, considered earlier, strongly suggest that that is not the case.
34 In all the circumstances, in order to persuade the Court to exercise the discretion in r 2.13 of the Rules in their favour, the intervening parties must, at the very least, demonstrate that there is at least some evidentiary basis, beyond mere assertion or speculation, for it to be reasonably suspected that the funding agreements are or may be ill-advised, or improper, or the product of bad faith, or involve an error of law or principle on the part of the liquidator, or that the intervening parties may otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged for some other reason if the funding agreements are approved. It might also be expected that the intervening parties would have to persuade the Court that their participation in the hearing would assist the Court in considering the liquidator's approval applications: cf Thorn at [59].
35 The intervening parties have not, on balance, established any sound basis upon which the Court should exercise its discretion to allow them to be heard further in respect of the liquidator's applications. Indeed, there are a number of sound reasons for not permitting the intervening parties to participate any further in the applications.
36 First, the voluminous evidence that the intervening parties have adduced in support of their applications for leave to be heard does not give rise to any reasonable suspicion, let alone inference, that the liquidator has acted otherwise than in good faith in entering into the funding agreements. The evidence also does not establish any sound or reasonable basis for inferring or suspecting that, in entering into the funding agreements, the liquidator acted improperly or on the basis of any error of law or principle. Indeed, much of the evidence amounted to little more than assumption, speculation or bare assertion on the part of Mr Kelly and Mr Farrelly.
37 That is not to say that, when it comes to actually determining the liquidator's application, the Court will not in any event carefully consider whether the liquidator has in fact acted in good faith and in the absence of any error of law or principle. The point is that the voluminous evidence adduced by the intervening parties in support of their applications for leave to be heard does not materially advance their case that they should be heard in opposition to the liquidator's applications.
38 Second, much of the evidence adduced by the intervening parties, and many of the submissions advanced in support of their application for leave to be heard, appeared to be primarily directed at the broader allegation that the liquidator has not been acting impartially and objectively in the discharge of his duties as liquidator to date. The evidence and submissions were not squarely directed at the narrower and more confined question as to whether the funding agreements should be approved, which is the ultimate question for determination in the liquidator's applications. It follows that the intervening parties' evidence and submissions tended to distract, rather than assist, the Court in respect of the issue for determination.
39 The intervening parties' main complaint appeared to be that the liquidator has not fairly, objectively or impartially considered or investigated whether the companies have any claims against Stone. Putting to one side the fact that the evidence adduced by the intervening parties does not appear to provide any reasonable basis for that serious allegation, the more significant point for present purposes is that, if the intervening parties genuinely wish to pursue serious allegations concerning the liquidator's conduct in the winding up of 3 Property and Be Athletic generally, it would be open to them to apply, for example, for an inquiry to be conducted into the conduct of the liquidator (see cl 90-10 of Sch 2 to the Corporations Act) and seek to have the liquidator removed and replaced by another liquidator (see cl 90-15(3)(b) and (c) of Sch 2 to the Corporations Act). The liquidator's approval proceedings under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act are not the appropriate forum in which to pursue those broader allegations.
40 Third, the proposed participation of the intervening parties in the hearing of the liquidator's application for approval of the funding agreements is complicated by the fact that Mr Kelly and Mr Farrelly, who would appear to be the directing minds of the other intervening parties, are defendants or respondents in the proceedings commenced by the liquidator which are funded by the funding agreements in question. The complication is that much of the evidence adduced by, and many of the submissions advanced by, the intervening parties appeared to be directed at or driven by the interests of Mr Kelly, Mr Farrelly and companies associated with them as defendants to the substantive proceedings, as opposed to the interests of the intervening parties as creditors, or claimed creditors, of 3 Property and Be Athletic. To put it bluntly, it is perhaps not at all surprising that, as defendants to the funded proceedings, Mr Kelly and Mr Farrelly would wish to oppose the approval of the funding agreements. That is because the evidence suggests that if the funding agreements are not approved, it is unlikely that the liquidator would be able to prosecute the substantive proceedings.
41 Fourth, and related to the previous points, much of the evidence adduced by the intervening parties in support of their application for leave to be heard concerned the conduct of Stone and the merits of the substantive proceedings. The factual issues raised by that evidence are likely to be addressed in the substantive proceedings. That is the proper forum for the resolution of those issues.
42 Fifth, if the intervening parties are permitted to be heard further in respect of the liquidator's applications, complications will undoubtedly arise concerning their access to much, if not all, of the material relied on by the liquidator in support of his applications. The evidence relied on by liquidators in support of applications for the approval of litigation funding agreements is often "of a commercially confidential and sensitive kind, related to aspects of the litigation that any plaintiff, protecting its own interests and the integrity of the litigation process in which it is engaged, would take particular care to keep from the other party or parties to the litigation": Onefone at [2]. It is for that reason that confidentiality orders of some kind are usually made in respect of the liquidator's evidence in support of the approval of a litigation funding agreement.
43 The confidentiality of the material relied on by the liquidator will have to be grappled with in any event. The point is that it cannot be assumed, at this stage at least, that the intervening parties will be granted access to the liquidator's evidence. It is at best unclear, in those circumstances, that the intervening parties will be able to materially advance their opposition to the approval of the funding agreements beyond the submissions that they have already advanced.
44 Sixth, no doubt because the intervening parties have not had access to the funding agreements in issue, many of their submissions concerning the terms of the funding agreements were purely speculative. In particular, the intervening parties' submission that "there is some benefit conferred on the funder [Stone] that it will receive a priority to be paid the funding amount, and possibly its debt as a creditor" is pure speculation. The Court will, in any event, carefully scrutinise the funding agreements in question. Speculation on the part of the intervening parties is unlikely to assist in that regard.
45 Seventh, the intervening parties' contention that the funding agreements should not be approved because they were not given the same opportunity to fund the liquidator's proceedings is lacking in merit. It is, with respect, somewhat bizarre to suggest that Mr Kelly, or Mr Farrelly, or companies that they control, are likely to enter into funding agreements with the liquidator to fund proceedings against themselves.
46 Eighth, the length, complexity and cost to the liquidator of the proceedings to approve the funding agreements will almost certainly be significantly increased should the intervening parties be granted leave to be heard further in respect of the proceedings. The granting of leave to the intervening parties would also most likely result in a delay in the resolution of the liquidator's applications. That would be all the more so if the intervening parties sought to supplement their evidence, or sought access to some or all of the materials in respect of which the liquidator has sought confidentiality orders, or sought to cross-examine the liquidator. While it is at first blush difficult to see why cross-examination should be permitted in an application for approval pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act, it is equally difficult to see how some of the factual issues that appear to emerge on the evidence could be satisfactorily resolved in the absence of at least some cross-examination.
47 Ninth, the conduct of the leave applications on behalf of the intervening parties does not instil great confidence that the further participation of the intervening parties will assist the Court in any material way in resolving the question whether the funding agreements should be approved.
48 As can be seen, the discretionary considerations all tend to weigh against the Court exercising its discretion to grant leave to the intervening parties to be heard further in respect of the liquidator's applications for approval of the funding agreements. The intervening parties have failed to identify any relevant considerations which weigh in favour of granting them leave to be heard further in respect of the liquidator's approval applications. Their applications, pursuant to r 2.13 of the Rules, for leave to be heard in the liquidator's applications pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act should accordingly be dismissed, at least to the extent that the intervening parties seek to be heard further in relation to the liquidator's applications.
49 Does it follow that the intervening parties' applications should simply be dismissed? If the applications were dismissed, it would appear to follow that, strictly speaking, the evidence that has been adduced by the intervening parties' and the submissions that they have advanced should be entirely disregarded. Indeed, the intervening parties' opposition to the approval of the funding agreements would, strictly speaking, have to be disregarded if their applications for leave to be heard were simply dismissed.
50 It would be somewhat unrealistic and artificial for the Court to proceed to hear the liquidator's approval applications as if they were effectively unopposed, or on the basis that the evidence and submissions upon which the intervening parties relied in support of their applications for leave to be heard should be entirely disregarded. Judges are, of course, frequently required to put out of their minds information and material that has not been accepted into evidence. The question, however, is whether it would be appropriate to proceed in that way in the particular and somewhat unusual circumstances of this case.
51 The appropriate course, in all the circumstances, is to grant leave to the intervening parties to be heard in respect of the liquidator's approval applications, but only on the limited basis that the intervening parties be permitted to rely on the written submissions that they have filed in support of their leave applications, along with those parts of the affidavit and documentary evidence that are specifically identified in the written submissions. The Court may also have regard to such other parts of the evidentiary material that is necessary to consider to understand those parts of the evidence that are specifically referenced in the written submissions. The limits on the grant of leave mean that the intervening parties will not be permitted to appear at or take part in the hearing of the liquidator's approval applications. Nor will they be permitted to file any further evidence or make any further submissions, written or oral. It should be noted, for more abundant caution, that the affidavit evidence filed by the intervening parties to date will be received and read on the basis that it has not been tested. It will not be read uncritically or as if it has not been disputed.