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[2026] ACAT 23
ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2026-05-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (www.acat.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
BROOKMAN v REGISTRAR, DOMESTIC ANIMALS ACT 2000 & ORS (Administrative Review) [2026] ACAT 23 AT 56/2025 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – Domestic Animals Act 2000 – review of decision to refuse to issue a dangerous dog licence – review of decision to destroy dog –whether dog behaviour due to fear-based aggression or predatory-based aggression – whether expert is a dog trainer or a dog handler – dangerous dog licence conditions – unacceptable risk to the safety of the public or other animals – Impacts upon neighbours – neighbourhood canvasing – both decisions confirmed
Legislation cited: Administrative Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 Domestic Animals Act 2000 ss 4B, 24, 25, 53B, 120
Subordinate Legislation cited: Domestic Animals Regulation 2001 r 6B, 23, Schedule 1
Cases cited: Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8 McInnes v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000 AT71/2023
Tribunal: Senior Member W Hawkins
Date of Orders: 7 May 2026 Date of Reasons for Decision: 7 May 2026 Date of Publication: 15 May 2026 AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY ) CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) AT 56/2025
BETWEEN: WENDY BROOKMAN Applicant AND: REGISTRAR, DOMESTIC ANIMALS ACT 2000 Respondent AND: SAMANTHA KOURTIS First Party Joined AND: FIONA LESTER Second Party Joined AND: ALLEN WILLIAM JONES Third Party Joined
TRIBUNAL: Senior Member W Hawkins DATE: 7 May 2026
ORDER The Tribunal orders that:
The decision of the respondent to refuse to issue a dangerous dog licence is confirmed.
The decision of the respondent to destroy dog “Matai” is confirmed.
……………………………….. Senior Member W Hawkins REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction and background 1. In the reasons below, a reference to “ACAT” or “tribunal” refers to the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal generally, whereas “Tribunal” refers to the current member.
As of 5 February 2025, the applicant owned the registered and microchipped non-desexed male American Staffordshire Terrier dog named Matai (Matai). Matai resided at the applicant’s premises at Wanniassa, in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).
On 5 February 2025, Matai left the applicant’s premises and was at large without a keeper. Matai was involved in an incident that included attacking a nine-month-old miniature dachshund cross named Greg (Greg) and shaking Greg in its mouth. Greg was owned by the second party joined (Lester). At the relevant time, the third party joined (Jones) was walking Greg and Greg was leashed. During the course of the attack, the first party joined (Kourtis), came to the aid of Jones and Greg. Both Jones and Greg were injured during the attack and required treatment.
Jones sustained several punctures to his left forearm and to his right hand and arm. His injuries required surgery. Greg was taken to the vet and, for at least a time after the attack, was nervous and afraid of other dogs. Later that day Matai was seized by rangers from the respondent and impounded at the respondent’s facility. Matai has resided at the respondent’s facility since then.
On 23 March 2025, the respondent declared Matai a dangerous dog. On 24 March 2025, the applicant applied for a dangerous dog licence. On 20 May 2025, the respondent refused to issue a dangerous dog licence under section 25 of the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (DA Act) and also issued a decision to destroy Matai (collectively the Decisions).
On 29 May 2025, the applicant filed an application for review of the Registrar’s Decisions pursuant to section 120 of the DA Act and regulation 23 and items 17 and 18 of Schedule 1 of the Domestic Animals Regulation 2001 (the DA Regulations). The applicant sought to set aside the Decisions and to substitute them with decisions that the applicant be issued with a dangerous dog licence to keep Matai.
On 18 and 19 June 2025, applications for orders to be joined as a party were filed by Kourtis, Lester and Jones.
On 21 July 2025, orders were made joining the third parties and further orders were also made as to how the matter was to proceed. In accordance with those directions, the parties filed statements, evidence and submissions and the matter was listed for hearing on 25 September 2025.
On 25 September 2025, the matter was listed for hearing before me. Within the Agreed Tribunal Documents were two statements by the applicant, statements by each of the joined parties and a statement by Peter Hockings (Hockings), on behalf of the respondent as well as other documents. In addition to the Agreed Tribunal Documents a number of other documents were also tendered. I do not identify all of the documents here but will refer to them as necessary in this decision.
At the conclusion of the hearing, I ordered that closing submissions be filed by the parties and submissions in reply by the applicant. I also ordered that the parties joined could also file closing submissions. The applicant and the respondent have filed submissions and the applicant has filed submissions in reply.
Legislative Provisions Decision regarding issuing a dangerous dog licence
Division 2.3 of the DA Act pertains to dangerous dogs. Section 24 regulates applications for dangerous dog licences. Section 25 regulates approvals or refusals for an application for a dangerous dog licence. Pursuant to section 25(2)(b), the Registrar must refuse to approve the issue of a licence if the Registrar reasonably believes that there would be an unacceptable risk to the safety of the public or other animals if the licence were issued; or if an applicant for a licence has failed, or is unable to exercise responsible dog management, care 1 or control.
When making a decision as to whether an applicant has failed or is unable, to exercise responsible dog management, care or control, the Registrar must have regard to the criteria set out in section 4B of the DA Act.
Section 25(3) of the DA Act stipulates that in making a decision under the section, the Registrar must consider the size and nature of the premises where an applicant intends to keep the dog; the security of the premises; the suitability of facilities for keeping the dog on the premises; the potential impact on the occupiers of neighbouring premises; any conviction or finding of guilty of an applicant within the last ten years for any offence against a law of a territory or state in relation to the welfare, keeping or control of an animal; and the safety of the public and other 2 animals.
Decision to destroy Matai
Subsections 53B(1) and (2) of the DA Act provide that if the Registrar is reasonably satisfied that a dog attacked a person or animal, and the attack caused serious injury or death to the person or animal, the Registrar must destroy the dog. The Registrar only needs to be reasonably satisfied that the attack caused the death of another animal.
Section 53B(3) of the DA Act provides an exception to section 53B(2), namely, that the Registrar must not destroy the dog if, and only if, the Registrar is reasonably satisfied the dog is not likely to be a danger to the public or another animal. When making a finding under this exception, the Registrar may take into account the factors outlined in section 53B(4). These include: the circumstances of the attack; whether the person or animal provoked the dog; whether the person or animal was attacked because the dog came to the aid of a person or animal that the dog could be expected to protect; if the attack was on premises occupied by the keeper of the dog, that the person or animal was on the premises without
1 DA Act section 25(2)(b)(i) and (ii) 2 DA Act section 25(3)(a)-(f) lawful excuse; whether reasonable steps can be taken to reduce the risk of the dog 3 endangering the public and other animals; and any other relevant matter.
Evidence for the applicant Wendy Brookman
3 DA Act section 53B(4)(a)-(c) 4 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 70 (j) There has been some canvassing of neighbours, but she and her family normally keep to themselves. There has been some abuse by neighbours which may be racially motivated. (k) She has tried to reach out to her neighbours to resolve things but without success. She offered to pay for Greg’s veterinarian costs. (l) Since Matai has been impounded, she has visited him regularly. (m) In about April and May 2025, she contacted Hockings, and although he was originally receptive, he advised that he could no longer train Matai. Since then, she has contacted other trainers with limited success but is confident that if she obtains the dangerous dog licence, some trainers will be able to assist. (n) Since the attack she has built an enclosure for Matai; installed three latched doors, changed the front door locks and added an additional door within the 5 house. (o) Matai received some training as a pup. (p) She knew that Matai had to be registered, but she did not know that she required a permit to keep an undesexed dog. She mistakenly believed a permit was only necessary if he was to breed (and this would be through 6 the breeder). Since he has been impounded, Matai has been desexed. (q) In relation to fines imposed following the attack, she has set up a payment 7 plan. (r) When Brookman visits Matai, any staff who are in his enclosure are not wearing protective clothing and Matai is not muzzled. There have also been 8 no complaints about his behaviour.
5 The Department of Animal Services visited the applicant’s home following the attack complained of and recommended latched doors. The latched door locks automatically once opened. See Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 37 and page 42 6 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 40-41 7 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 45-46 8 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 57-59 (a) She had owned dogs for over ten years of different breeds and with the exception of one dog named Ellie, none had been desexed. She acknowledged Matai and Ellie had only been desexed when Matai was impounded. She had never held any licences to keep a dog that was not 9 desexed. (b) She also acknowledged that Matai’s registration had lapsed for two months 10 and the lapse may have occurred the previous year as well. (c) She said that apart from puppy training, her family took Matai to a dog park when he was about six or seven months old. However, he was too large for the smaller dog area and too small for the larger dogs’ areas. He was never 11 aggressive there. (d) She said that Matai was walked usually twice a week by her husband in the 12 mornings. (e) She said that in relation to obtaining trainers for Matai she had made enquiries but agreed that this occurred after Hockings indicated that he had a conflict of interest. Hockings recommended two possible trainers and had made recent contact with a trainer that charges $100 for each session. Unfortunately, initial assessments had not been completed and it was not 13 clear how many sessions were required. (f) She said that Jones’ involvement in the proceedings following the attack only occurred after Jones became aware that Matai was owned by the applicant and was motivated by “revenge” rather than because of the 14 seriousness of his injuries. (g) When asked about the canvassing of neighbours for their responses or attitude should Matai be returned, she said that this had not occurred, and 15 that this was because of the actions of one of the parties joined.
9 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 65 10 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 68 11 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 73-74 12 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 75 13 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages -82-93 14 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 96-97 15 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 99 (h) When asked about the payment of fines since April 2025, she said that she had contacted Domestic Animal Services (DAS) at that time and it had taken some months for DAS to respond. She has set up a payment plan and had made a payment recently. In the meantime, there had been two lapsing 16 registrations, but these were paid within two months. (i) She acknowledged that she had not shown that she could pay for the training but would likely set up a payment plan and although there had been a DAS inspection of her home’s fencing on 1 April 2025, she had not arranged a 17 follow up inspection visit from DAS.
Evidence for the respondent Peter Hockings
16 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 99-101 17 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 101-102 18 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 108-118 2023. Prior to that he had been a member of the Royal Australian Airforce and he remains a police officer in the Australian Federal Police (AFP). (b) In the AFP, he had been a member of the Specialist Response Group (SRG). Within the SRG he was a founding member of the SRG Tactical Canine Program and then moved to the ACT Dog Team. (c) In addition to earlier studies, he has completed a Diploma level course in Police Dog Handling along with training programmes with private trainers. (d) He has conducted hundreds of dog assessments with DAS and other agencies over the last 18 years. Assessments include dog suitability tests for police, corrections, military, private security along with assistance/therapy dogs. (e) On 6 February 2025, he provided a behavioural assessment in relation to Matai. At the time of this assessment Matai was not desexed (although he acknowledged that Matai now is desexed). To complete the assessment, he conducted a number of assessments including testing sociability, interaction with other dogs, prey/drive response, non-reactive and reactive dog tests, and behavioural assessment in relation to overall obedience and responses to commands. Based upon those tests, he formed the view that Matai displayed a lack of control, had low level of confidence, and had a strong predatory response to both dogs that were introduced to Matai through a fence. The responses indicated that but for the fence, Matai would have attacked both dogs and that Matai was willing to engage in dangerous unsolicited behaviour with the other dogs. In a conclusion to the report, he provided three recommendations that were to address his observed issues and promote safer interactions with other dogs and people. (f) He believed that Matai is a dangerous dog and without immediate intervention will continue to be a dangerous animal. Although there are some trainers in Canberra that might be able to assist, the trainers would require the use of tools that are banned in Canberra. If Matai is declared dangerous, he would be required to live in an enclosure, which Hockings considered to be cruel and will diminish Matai’s quality of life. (g) Ultimately, in his statement he recommended euthanasia for Matai for the safety of the public and the lack of suitable training options. (h) He said that even though in his original assessment on 6 February 2025 he did not recommend euthanasia and believed that training possibly might extinguish the behaviours, upon reflection he did not think that Matai’s owners have the necessary skills to perform this level of training. (i) Since February 2025, he had the benefit of being able to observe Matai and how Matai interacts with him when Hockings attends the DAS. His opinion was that Matai on these interactions exhibits the same level of aggression 19 that he displayed when Hockings first visited him in February 2025. (j) He was taken to the DAS Case File dated 11 February 2025 that reported 20 that Matai showed aggression towards staff at DAS including “whale eye, lunging…and growling.” He was also taken to the DAS Case File dated 8 February 2025 that reported that Matai had bitten a worker and had their hand in his mouth causing a red mark and a tooth drag mark but no skin break. He said that this was a possible reaction to his new environment and that Matai’s first reaction is to “act out” and has learnt that this is a 21 favourable way to move people away from him. (k) He said that a dog that goes forward and attacks another animal is showing a predator-prey response and that tenacity is bred into the bull breed of dogs. After it has attacked once the chances of it doing it again are elevated meaning one event can trigger a cascade of further events. If the attacking dog latches onto an animal, if that animal is still struggling, the attacking 22 dog won’t stop until the animal dies.
19 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 121 20 A behavioural response where you see more white to a dog’s eye than the pupil .It is caused by the dog opening their eye more and is a sign of fear. See Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 123 21 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 124 22 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 125-128 (l) To possess dangerous dogs you need a “really high skill level” and professional dogs like police dogs are dangerous but they are highly trained 23 and have a high level of obedience.
(e) He agreed that at the time of the original assessment in February 2025 and at the time of writing his statement in September 2025, he believed that Matai was a dangerous dog but he did not state this in his original 28 assessment.
(f) He agreed that trying to extinguish innate predatory behaviour would require a trainer to use tools that are illegal in the ACT and if a dog is declared dangerous, it is not always a requirement that they live in an 29 enclosure.
23 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 129-132 24 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 133 25 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 143 26 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 148-149 27 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 153-154 28 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 165 29 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 170-178 (g) He agreed that his recommendation of euthanasia as the only conceivable option in his statement dated 5 September 2025 was not expressed in his original assessment in February 2025. He said that his opinion in his September statement was based upon his observation between February and 30 September 2025. (h) In relation to his opinion that the applicant did not have the necessary skills to be able to perform the necessary training of Matai, he based this upon 31 Matai having no obedience.
Applicant’s submissions dated 18 August 2025
30 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 178-180 31 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 181 32 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 184 33 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at page 185 exploring training options. No further inspection of the premises was made by DAS. Notwithstanding the lack of inspection, the respondent on 20 May 2025 refused the applicant’s application for a dangerous dog licence. (b) A dangerous dog licence should be issued with appropriate conditions. (c) Although not a model pet owner, the applicant has shown responsible dog management, care or control as required for the Registrar to exercise their discretion pursuant to section 25(2)(b)(ii) of the DA Act. (d) In relation to the mandatory consideration for decision concerning a dangerous dog licence (being the potential impact on occupiers of neighbouring premises required by section 25(3)(d) of the DA Act), the applicant disputed that the responses were from “neighbouring premises” and that responses in any event should take into account the mitigation measures referred to above.
Decision to destroy Matai (e) The respondent has incorrectly interpreted section 25 of the DA Act in that the respondent has incorrectly assumed that once a decision has been made not to issue a dangerous dog licence that it is mandatory that a decision must be made to destroy the dog. (f) If there is a dog attack and the injury is serious, the Registrar must destroy the dog pursuant to section 53B(2), unless the Registrar can be reasonably satisfied that the dog is not likely to be a danger to the public or another animal taking into account the considerations under section 53B(4). Here, the Tribunal can be reasonably satisfied that Matai is not likely to be a danger to the public or another animal having considered the circumstances of the attack. It was due to an unusual sequence of events; Greg was not injured and although Jones was injured, he was not the “target” of Matai. (g) In determining if Matai is not likely to be a danger to the public or another animal, the Registrar may consider whether reasonable steps can be taken 34 to reduce the risk of the dog endangering the public and other animals. The applicant submitted that Matai’s temperament, the behavioural
34 Section 53B(4)(b) of the DA Act assessment by Hockings, the conditions that can be attached to a dangerous dog licence and the likelihood of Matai being a danger to the public operated in Matai’s favour.
(h) As a consequence of the foregoing, the applicant submitted that a dangerous dog licence should be issued to the applicant subject to conditions.
Respondent’s submissions dated 10 September 2025
The respondent made the following submissions: Decision to refuse to approve the issue of a dangerous dog license (a) The respondent submitted that the applicant should not be issued a dangerous dog licence because there would be an unacceptable risk to the safety of the public or other animals if a licence for Matai were issued. The respondent relied upon the evidence of Hockings and contended that the community where the applicant lives do not want Matai to return there and their concerns are reasonable. In the alternative, the respondent submitted that the applicant has failed to exercise responsible dog management, care or control as shown by the applicant’s failure to apply for a special licence as Matai was not desexed and that this could be considered pursuant to section 4B(b) of the DA Act. Decision to destroy Matai (b) The respondent submitted that Matai should be destroyed. The respondent argued that Matai attacked Greg by the neck and ear and was shaking him back and forth. When Jones came to Greg’s aid, he was attacked by Matai and the attack only stopped with the assistance of neighbours. Jones has suffered a serious injury and suffers ongoing effects that are likely to be permanent.
At the conclusion of the hearing, I made orders for the filing of closing submissions and closing submissions in reply.
Applicant’s closing submissions dated 22 October 2025
Decision to refuse the issue of a dangerous dog licence (g) The steps that the applicant has taken to prevent the incident happening again indicates that she takes responsibility for and has insight into what happened. This is evidenced by the applicant taking meaningful steps to organise training for Matai and being able to afford the ongoing cost. (h) The applicant argued that Matai was registered within the required timeframe. The applicant conceded that although she had not desexed her dogs (and by extension apply for a special licence) this was due to a misapprehension on her part. (i) In relation to the potential impact on the occupiers of neighbouring premises, the applicant conceded that although it is a factor, it should not be the deciding factor lest it allow community divisions to determine the fate of animals. In any event, any risks can be managed by appropriate conditions and referred to the decision in McInnes v Registrar, Domestic 35 Animals Act 2000 (McInnes).
Respondent’s closing submissions dated 5 November 2025
35 AT71/2023 (Unreported. Date of Order and Reasons 11 December 2023) respondent argued that it is complex and the evidence and any submissions by the applicant do not rebut the proposition that the risk of injury remains unacceptable. The respondent summarised the main points of Hockings’ evidence as being that the behaviour was “predatory-prey” and as it is pleasurable, the chances of repeat behaviour are increased. The behaviour is not stimulus specific and cannot be counter conditioned and can only be extinguished by training tools that are illegal in the ACT.
(e) The respondent referred to Hockings’ opinion that lifelong confinement is cruel and this together with the unchanged arousal of Matai led Hockings to change his opinion from conditional training to a euthanasia recommendation. Crucially, the applicant lacked the skills to control Matai in public, and hence Hockings believed that Matai was confident to again exhibit predatory behaviour in public.
(f) Referring to the applicant’s submission that the Registrar applied an incorrect test in relation to section 25 of the DA Act, the respondent said that even if it was correct (and they did not concede that it was), then it does not impact or change the analysis that the Tribunal now needs to make standing in the shoes of the original decision maker.
Decision to refuse to issue a dangerous dog licence (g) The main concerns of the respondent are that even if there are self-closing gates, a single lapse would expose the community to dangerous behaviour; even if a muzzle is used the applicant would not have the necessary skill and control of Matai when in the community; the applicant lacks training and insight into the attack and the aftermath; and the failure of the applicant to desex her dogs and delay in paying fees does not assist her application. (h) The applicant has not undergone any training to obtain the necessary skills whilst Matai has been impounded. The applicant continues to lack insight into the circumstances and events of the attack and Matai’s impounding was not assisted by her failure to desex Matai or to obtain the necessary licences even if it was due to a misapprehension on her part. She had not taken reasonable steps to familiarise herself with the obligations of a dog owner despite having dogs for lengthy periods of time. (i) The respondent relied upon the statutory criteria in the DA Act, in that the Registrar must refuse where the granting of a licence would pose an unacceptable risk and as a consequence, there is an emphasis on future safety. The respondent’s expert evidence by Hockings was uncontested, and his evidence established that there was a likelihood of repetition of behaviour. The seriousness of Jones’ injuries in applying the Dunbar Dog 36 Bite Scale was Level 5. (j) There have been other impacts upon neighbours and concern for the safety of their children should Matai be returned. The respondent has undertaken neighbourhood canvassing reports and these indicate that the community is not willing to have a declared dangerous dog in their community. The applicant has not been able to contest the accuracy of the reports. Notwithstanding that neighbourhood reports are not determinative, they should be taken into account. (k) Hockings’ determination that Matai’s level of arousal together with his lack of response to cease his aggression make Matai incompatible with him living in a public setting as he could act aggressively and there being no possibility of him stopping even if told to do so. (l) Ultimately, the respondent submitted that the decision under review is the correct or preferable decision and the applicant has adduced no evidence to cause the Tribunal to grant a dangerous dog licence and consequently the Tribunal should affirm the decision that Matai should be destroyed.
Applicant’s closing submissions in reply dated 10 November 2025
36 Dr Ian Dunbar’s Dog Bite Scale, The Association of Professional Dog Trainers, Greenville South Carolina, USA. Grade 5: Multiple -bite incident with a least two Level 4 Bites or multiple -attack incident with at least one Level 4 bite in each. Level 4-Deep puncture. (b) Responding to the respondent submitting that Hockings’ overall assessment of Matai did not change, the applicant argued that in reality nothing had changed in training methods or in the law, and as a consequence, the applicant submitted that either Hockings provided inadequate advice to the respondent initially, or in the alternative, he changed his mind for reasons unknown. (c) Responding to the respondent’s submissions that the applicant did not have the necessary skills to be able to handle Matai, the applicant submitted that it is not a reason to destroy Matai but rather emphasises the need for ongoing training of both Matai and the applicant and that the applicant has attempted to do this and has not been assisted by the respondent. (d) Replying to the risk if the gates were inadvertently left open, the applicant said that this would apply in all cases where there is a dangerous dog licence, but of itself does not prevent dangerous dog licences being issued. (e) The applicant said she had attempted to familiarise herself with dog ownership responsibilities but made an error and has now rectified her error. (f) Responding to the respondent’s neighbourhood canvassing, the applicant submitted that little weight should be placed upon this as it is unrealistic to expect an applicant with limited resources to do so.
Consideration and findings
The tribunal is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is determined solely by the Administrative Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 or other enabling legislation such as the DA Act. Section 53B of the DA Act provides a tight legislative constraint on what the Registrar, and upon review, the tribunal can decide. The Tribunal is now the decision maker and stands in the shoes of the original decision maker.
Section 53B(1) of the DA Act provides relevantly, that if the Registrar is reasonably satisfied that Matai attacked Jones and that attack caused a serious injury to Jones, then pursuant to subsection 53B(2), the Registrar must destroy Matai.
The applicant submitted that there was some distinction in that Greg was the original target of the attack and that Jones was only attacked after he came to the aid of Greg. Luckily for Greg it would appear that he was not injured. I do not accept that submission. Greg may have been the original target, however when Jones intervened to protect Greg, he at the very least became the target and sustained injury. 37
It was not contested that Jones suffered a serious injury. The applicant was correct to not do so. Mr Jones required hospital treatment and surgery. The effects of his injury are ongoing. I therefore find that the injury was a serious injury.
This brings into play subsection 53B(3) of the DA Act which provides an exception to the destruction of Matai pursuant to subsection 53B(2). The language of the subsection is expressed in somewhat restrictive terms. Namely, “if, and only if, the Registrar is reasonably satisfied the dog is not likely to be a danger to the public or another animal.” The respondent argued in its closing submissions that the DA Act is drafted so that the wellbeing of the people cohabiting with domestic animals is a paramount consideration. Although I do not necessarily agree with the submission, it is in my view clearly a core consideration in relation to attacking dogs.
Subsection 53B(4) sets out a list of matters that may be considered in reaching a conclusion about the provision in 53B(3). Subsection 53B(4) details circumstances that made the attack unusual. This includes provocation by the subject of the attack; a dog coming to the aid of a person or animal the dog could be expected to protect; or if the attack was on premises occupied by the keeper of the dog; and that the person or animal the subject of the attack was on the premises without lawful excuse. None of those circumstances apply here.
This leaves two further exceptions, that are provided by section 53B(4)(b) as to whether “reasonable steps can be taken to reduce the risk of the dog endangering the public and other animals” and the broader exception provided by section 53B(4)(c), namely, “any other relevant matter.”
37 See Domestic Animals Act 2000 Dictionary, “serious injury”
Decision to destroy Matai
Unless the applicant can bring into play the exception afforded by section 53B(3) of the DA Act, the decision to destroy Matai must be affirmed.
The applicant emphasised the lack of any relevant history before the February 2025 attack and that any incidents whilst Matai has been impounded were minor. The explanation for the incidents may have been due to him being anxious as he was impounded. In making these submissions, in my view, the applicant is seeking to draw attention away from the unprovoked nature and seriousness of the February 2025 attack.
The respondent relied upon the evidence of Hockings. The applicant did not have their own expert. The respondent submitted that it would be open to the Tribunal 38 to infer that the evidence would not have assisted the applicant. Although the strict rules of evidence do not apply in the tribunal, in my view, the applicant has been able to explain why they have not been able to provide such evidence. As a consequence, the applicant was tasked with seeking to discredit the expertise and the opinions expressed by Hockings and submit that his opinions could not be relied upon by me.
The applicant spent considerable effort challenging Hockings’ qualifications. The applicant drew a distinction between a dog handler (which they say Hockings is) and a dog trainer (which they say Hockings is not). The applicant argued that the appropriate expertise in the matter would be a dog trainer rather than a dog handler. Although there is some merit in the argument, Hockings’ present job title in the AFP is that of a dog handler. In his evidence he referred to his secondary 39 business as that of a dog trainer. I am satisfied that Hockings could be both a dog handler and a dog trainer and therefore is suitably qualified to provide an opinion in the matter. Indeed my understanding of his evidence is that he is both
38 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8 39 Transcript 25 September 2025 at page 119 a dog trainer and a dog handler particularly when his experience with Von Sentinel and with the respondent are taken into account. Hockings outlined his experience performing dog assessments at the respondent’s premises over some years. I do not accept the applicant’s submission that his evidence should be given no weight. Indeed, in my view he is a suitable expert and has significant experience in assessing and training dogs over a number of years in various professional environments.
The applicant emphasised an apparent change of view or inconsistency between Hockings’ original assessment in February 2025 and his statement of September 2025 in combination with his evidence at the hearing. Essentially, the applicant argued that Hockings’ view had changed from providing some recommendations to address Matai’s observed issues and thereby promote safer interactions with other dogs and people (in essence supporting a dangerous dog licence with conditions) to one where the only conceivable option was euthanasia. The respondent submitted that there was no inconsistency between the assessment and his statement and his evidence at the hearing.
I am mindful that the scope of the February 2025 assessment is limited. It was conducted soon after Matai’s impounding. At that time no decision had been made by the Registrar concerning Matai. Conversely, the September statement and evidence was made some months after a decision had been made. It was also made after Hockings had had an opportunity to observe Matai (albeit on a limited basis) over those months. Hockings did not accept that there is an inconsistency in his opinions.
Hockings did not resile from his original assessment that Matai had a significant or pronounced predatory response when other dogs were presented to him and that Matai had a heightened prey drive towards live animals. The applicant argued that Matai’s response was due to a fear-based aggression rather than a predatory response. This became particularly relevant with regards to what training might have to be undertaken. A difficulty for the applicant is that although they submit that the behaviour during the assessment was “overwhelmingly” consistent with fear based defensive responses rather than predatory aggression stemming from instinctive and innate drives, there is no expert evidence in support of the submission. At its highest, there is some evidence that Matai was stressed (which was understandable) but anything beyond that is conjecture.
In both his statement and in his oral evidence, Hockings maintained this position. Admittedly, Hockings was optimistic in his original assessment that there could be training that might (by extension) possibly permit a decision that Matai should not be destroyed and the applicant possibly be granted a dangerous dog licence, but in all the circumstances this change is understandable given his limited observations of Matai at that time.
The applicant argued that even if Matai was exhibiting some level of predatory response, it is reasonable to suggest that he may not exhibit the behaviour again. With all due respect to the applicant, bearing in mind that the wellbeing of the people cohabiting with domestic animals is a core consideration in relation to attacking dogs, the community requires much greater certainty. I note that Hockings expressed the opinion that the prey drive is a pleasurable drive and that as a consequence, once Matai exhibited the behaviour once, there is an increased likelihood of Matai doing it again should he be released or escape.
As discussed above, Matai’s aggression is either fear based or predatory based behaviour. Even if Matai’s behaviour is fear based and possibly managed by behaviour modification techniques, there is no evidence or certainty that the training could satisfactorily be carried out and more importantly would be successful. I recognise that the applicant has reached out to trainers, but as at the time of the hearing, no assessments and no training been undertaken nor has the applicant herself undertaken any training since Matai was impounded in February 2025.
As the applicant correctly submitted, in the ACT there is no prescribed condition 40 requiring enclosures for dangerous dog licences. This means, that Matai, as a dangerous dog, would not have to live in an enclosure for the rest of his life with restrictions whenever he was outside. However, even if he was contained in an enclosure, there remains the risk of escape and resulting danger to the community.
40 See Applicant’s Closing Submissions dated 22 October 2025 at [34] and Domestic Animals Regulation 2001 ACT, reg 6B Thus even if it was fear-based aggression, without training and based upon the past attack, I find that the applicant would not have the necessary skill to handle Matai in public.
In the alternative, if I find it is a predatory response, Hockings opined that any potential suitable training methods would not be possible as they are unlawful in the ACT. In my view, it was this aspect that caused him to state that Matai was a dangerous dog and that without immediate intervention will continue to be a dangerous animal. Although Hockings believed that there were some trainers in Canberra that could help Matai, it would require the use of tools that are unlawful in the ACT. As a result the training could not take place here. In these circumstances, Hockings recommended euthanasia. In my view, Hockings satisfactorily explained this conclusion due to his determination that Matai’s behaviour was a predatory response and essentially there are no lawful suitable training options for Matai in the ACT.
Considering all of the above and particularly the opinion of Hockings, it is my view that Matai’s behaviour is a predatory-based response.
As a consequence of the view that I have reached, I find that the exception provided by section 53B(4)(b), namely that there are reasonable steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of Matai endangering the public and other animals is not satisfied.
It follows from the foregoing that the application in relation to the Registrars decision to destroy Matai is the correct or preferable decision and the application must be dismissed. The Tribunal confirms the decision under review to destroy Matai.
Decision to refuse to issue a dangerous dog licence
At its broadest, the applicant maintains that she is a responsible dog keeper. That view is challenged by the respondent.
The applicant emphasised their compliance with the respondent’s recommendations regarding conditions that would apply to a dangerous dog licence and that one could be issued with appropriate conditions. In contrast, the respondent emphasised that there is an unacceptable risk to the safety of the public or other animals should a dangerous dog licence be granted.
The applicant has been a registered dog owner for over ten years and her dogs were not desexed (at least until Matai was impounded). The applicant did not hold any licences or permits to keep a dog that was not desexed and did not consider 41 the additional registration obligations that apply in these circumstances. There were some periods where the registration of dogs has lapsed. In my view this was more likely due to oversight than by any conscious design.
In my view, not desexing her dogs and then not applying for a licence or permit did not assist the applicant. The lapsed registrations also did not assist the applicant’s case. Indeed, the applicant conceded that she has not been a model dog owner.
There was significant evidence and discussion about the steps that the applicant had taken with installation of an enclosure and the self-closing gates. The respondent emphasised that even one mishap could lead to Matai’s escape that could expose the community to dangerous behaviour by Matai.
It was not in dispute that the applicant had taken those steps but the adequacy of those steps remains in contention. However, in my view even if the applicant had adduced their own evidence as to the adequacy of the steps taken by her, there would remain the potential risk of escape by Matai and the potential to expose the community to dangerous behaviour by Matai.
The applicant’s case was not assisted by her failure to familiarise herself with her obligations as a dog owner and her apparent delay in organising a suitable trainer. Earlier on, Hockings may have been a suitable option, but that did not eventuate for various reasons. However, apart from possible alternative trainers, nothing had been put in place as at the time of the hearing. As there have been no assessments, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the length of possible training and its cost. The applicant regularly manages finances with payment
41 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 65-66 plans, but it is not known whether any potential trainers would agree to such an arrangement for the training of Matai.
Community reaction to the attack has been significant. There is clearly community disquiet at the thought of Matai being returned to the community as shown by Kourtis, Lester and Jones. In my view, even though the neighbourhood reports do not determine the outcome of the application by themselves, they are persuasive because the applicant has not been able to contest the adequacy of the reports. I note that the applicant in the case of Jones sought to categorise his actions as “revenge” and based upon a “vendetta” against the applicant rather than 42 him sustaining a serious injury. The respondent submitted that this showed a lack of insight by the applicant and I agree with this submission.
The applicant referred to McInnes. The decision in that matter focussed upon how a dangerous dog licence scheme should be allowed to operate in the ACT. In my view McInnes is of limited assistance. Importantly, in that matter, the respondent conceded that with appropriate specialist assistance, the dog concerned was 43 trainable. That concession is not present here and although the decision to destroy the subject dog was set aside, the matter was remitted to the Registrar to issue a control order based on conditions that were to be agreed between the 44 parties.
It follows from the foregoing that the Registrar’s decision not to issue a dangerous dog licence is the correct or preferable decision. The Tribunal confirms the decision under review not to issue a dangerous dog licence.
42 Transcript of hearing dated 25 September 2025 at pages 96-97 43 AT71/2023 (Unreported. Date of Order and Reasons 11 December 2023) at [11] 44 AT71/2023 (Unreported. Date of Order and Reasons 11 December 2023) at [13] Order 1. The decision of the respondent to refuse to issue a dangerous dog licence is confirmed.
……………………………….. Senior Member W Hawkins
Date of hearing: 25 September 2025 Applicant: In person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms A Costin Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms S Lane, ACT Government Solicitor
BROOKMAN
REGISTRAR, DOMESTIC ANIMALS ACT 2000 & ORS (Administrative Review)