Magistrates Court - Restraining orders - Exclusion of evidence - Failure to consider evidence - Failure to give weight to evidence - Allegations of actual bias - Failure to take into account alleged cognitive difficulties of the appellant

District Court Rules 2005 (WA)

Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA)

Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)

Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36

1. In 2023 Alexander Jordan Cokic (the appellant) engaged the services of Malaga Car Audio to install a car audio system into his Ford Ranger vehicle. Robert Aquilina was the proprietor of Malaga Car Audio. Once the system had been installed in November 2023, the appellant expressed his dissatisfaction with the work that had been completed on his vehicle to Mr Aquilina. There were a number of interactions between the appellant and Mr Aquilina in late 2023 which resulted in Mr Aquilina making an application for a violence restraining order (VRO). The appellant also made an application for a VRO against Mr Aquilina. That application is not the subject of an appeal.
2. An interim VRO was granted to Mr Aquilina by his Honour Magistrate Shackleton on 29 November 2023. The appellant objected to the making of a final order on 14 December 2023. The matter was listed for a final order hearing.
3. The final order hearing proceeded over two days in the Magistrates Court at Joondalup, that being 30 May 2024 and 5 December 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, her Honour Magistrate Coleman determined that the appellant had committed an act of personal violence upon the respondent, Mr Robert Aquilina and that there was the distinct possibility that if not restrained, that he would continue to do so. The magistrate made final the VRO in favour of Mr Aquilina and ordered that the restraining order would expire on 5 March 2025. A misconduct restraining order was made in favour of the appellant against Mr Aquilina. There is no appeal in respect to that decision.
4. It should be noted that the VRO was no longer in existence at the time of the hearing of the appeal. I queried the utility of the appeal proceeding with the appellant, given that the order was no longer in existence, however he was adamant that he wanted to proceed with the appeal against the decision of the magistrate. Accordingly, I have determined the appeal based on an assessment of the merit of each of the nine grounds of appeal.
5. A directions hearing was held in the District Court in Perth on 3 April 2025. At that hearing I dealt with the following preliminary matters:
   1. That the respondent could not take part in the appeal hearing on the basis that he was precluded from doing so having regard to r 53(6) of the District Court Rules 2005 (WA) which states that if a respondent does not file a Form 8 within 21 days of receipt of the notice of appeal, that the respondent is not entitled to take part or be heard in the appeal and is not a party to the appeal for the purposes of these rules. The respondent had not filed the relevant form within the prescribed period. Given that the restraining order had expired approximately one month before the directions hearing, I determined that there was no prejudice to the respondent by virtue of him not being a party to the proceedings.
   2. A refusal of an application made by the appellant requesting that the court consider that the application fee associated with the filing of the notice of appeal be reduced on the basis of the interests of justice and his financial position. I refused to make an order on the basis that I had no jurisdiction to make such an order.
   3. A refusal of an application made by the appellant to adduce further evidence on the appeal having regard to r 50(3) of the District Court Rules 2005 and s 44(b) and s 40(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) which stipulates that leave to adduce further evidence should not be granted unless the court is satisfied that there are special grounds for doing so. I refused leave to adduce further evidence on the appeal on the basis that special grounds did not exist in favour of admitting the proposed evidence.

1. A decision of a magistrate to make a final VRO may be the subject of an appeal to the District Court pursuant to s 64(1)(b)(ii) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA).
2. The appeal is by way of a reconsideration of the evidence that was before the magistrate at first instance pursuant to r 50(1) of the District Court Rules 2005. An appellant must establish that the original decision made by the magistrate was the result of a legal, factual or discretionary error.[1]

1. The grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant are as follows:
   1. Magistrate(s) refused to accept into evidence all documents provided for the applications made to have the interim violence restraining order cancelled.
   2. Magistrate refused to accept into evidence the Court Transcript from Civil Matter MINOR/12661/2023 which had the magistrate accepted this evidence would have been obvious that the Respondent was lying about the Appellant's behaviour as his motivations were simply to avoid legal liability for a consumer transaction dispute and that no violence restraining order was justified.
   3. Magistrate accepted into evidence screenshots of the Facebook post by the Respondent on 22 November 2023 and the corresponding Facebook post response by the Appellant on 23 November 2023 but did not allow the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent about this evidence.
   4. Magistrate further failed to consider that the evidence by way of Facebook Post response as conclusions to be drawn of the Appellant's behaviour towards the Respondent as being in control and nonviolent or threatening in asserting consumer rights.
   5. Magistrate is and was aware of the Appellant's delayed cognitive function yet failed to take this into account when the Magistrate refused to accept further evidence of which was evidence as to the Respondent's issuing of VRO documents to the Appellant's employer and of which the Appellant had his employment terminated and other impacts to the Appellant's life as a result.
   6. Magistrate made a number of statements about the Appellant's behaviour which was not supported by the Police Report that no offence occurred and that the Appellant had organised a private investigator to investigate the Respondent despite the Respondent providing no evidence of this for the Magistrate to consider.
   7. Magistrate disregarded evidence as to the facts of events that occurred on 10 November 2023 between the Appellant and Respondent in email dated 06 November 2023, 07 November 2023 and 17 November 2023 and made findings of the events which transpired that contradict the evidence between the parties. The Appellant wishes to draw attention to this evidence and provide further evidence to support facts of events that occurred on 10 November 2023.
   8. Magistrate refused to accept into evidence the sworn affidavits of the Respondent made in the VRO Interim Application and the Civil claims of which the Magistrate refused to accept that the Respondent was repeatedly lying through court processes.
2. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant added a further ground of appeal, being ground 9, in the following terms:
   1. The magistrate was actually biased against the appellant by virtue of an actual conflict of interest arising from her previous alleged employment.
3. I note that the appellant in this matter was self-represented. Given that fact, and his absence of legal training, he was granted significant leeway in the making of submissions which at times descended into comment and a failure to demonstrate legal error.

1. This ground of appeal asserts that the magistrate refused to accept into evidence all documents provided for the applications made by the appellant to have the interim VRO cancelled.
2. I have considered the entirety of the transcript of the proceedings on 30 May 2024 and 5 December 2024. The appellant stated the following:[2]

There are various documents that the court would have in its possession at this point, and they relate to the various attempts to have the VRO application cancelled and the reasons therein. I'm not sure how to request it, but I would like to rely on that as exhibit 7, if that possible [sic] that some of those documents from the cancellation could be retrieved. They would have been emailed on several occasions over the last 12 months, your Honour. Thank you.

1. The magistrate then allowed three affidavits of the appellant to be tendered into evidence, two of which had previously been relied upon by the appellant in support of applications to set aside the interim VRO then in existence, they being:

(a) Exhibit 7 - affidavit of Alexander Cokic dated 14 December 2023;[3] and

(b) Exhibit 8 - affidavit of Alexander Cokic dated 25 June 2024.[4]

1. The appellant then went on to cross-examine Mr Aquilina in relation to various matters addressed in the affidavits. The magistrate did not refuse into evidence all documents provided for the applications made by the appellant to have the interim VRO cancelled. To the contrary, her Honour accepted the two affidavits into evidence that the appellant tendered. He did not attempt to introduce any further material relating to the earlier applications to set aside the interim VRO.
2. When queried at the hearing of the appeal as to what specific documents the magistrate refused to accept into evidence, the appellant referred to his proof of evidence.[5] This was not a document that formed any part of the earlier hearings at which the appellant attempted to set aside the interim order.
3. Notwithstanding the fact that the proof of evidence was not part of the materials referred to in this ground of appeal, in fairness to the appellant, given that he represented himself at the hearing of the appeal, I have considered whether the magistrate refused to accept this document into evidence and if so, whether this constituted an error of law.
4. At the commencement of his evidence, the appellant advised the magistrate that he was in possession of a signed proof of evidence and that he would be reading his evidence from that document. The magistrate told the appellant that he was required to give evidence from his memory.[6] However, the magistrate subsequently advised the appellant that, '... I will allow you to refer to notes if you exhaust your memory'.[7]
5. At no point after this comment did the appellant either attempt to seek leave to refer to the proof of evidence or tender the document during the course of his evidence. As to why this did not occur, the appellant submitted at the appeal hearing that he was 'thrown off my path'[8] and that there were medical reasons which were revealed in the materials that he had forwarded in relation to his earlier applications to set aside the interim order. By this, I interpret his submission to mean the cognitive issues that he referred to a number of times during the appeal hearing.
6. It was proper for the magistrate to direct the appellant to give his evidence in the ordinary manner, that being based on his memory of disputed events. At the hearing on 30 May 2024, the respondent advised the magistrate that he had prepared a statement 'that has got all the facts there and everything else'[9] to which she replied that, '... you've got to give your evidence from what your memory is of what has happened'.[10]
7. The transcript reflects that the magistrate treated both parties equally, in that they were both required to give viva voce evidence of relevant events based on their memory. Further, it is clear that the appellant was on notice that he would not be able to rely upon his proof of evidence, given that the respondent had not been allowed to rely on a similar document when he gave evidence.
8. Ultimately, I am of the view that this ground of appeal has not been established. Having considered the entirety of the trial transcript, there is nothing that reflects the specific error alleged by the ground of appeal. To the contrary, the magistrate accepted the two affidavits that the appellant sought to rely upon into evidence that related to his earlier applications to set aside the interim order. Even considering the ground in a broader context, the magistrate did not refuse to accept the appellant's proof of evidence, but simply advised him that he was required to give evidence in a conventional manner.
9. Ground 1 has no merit.

1. This ground specifically relates to the refusal of the magistrate to allow the transcript of a civil proceeding to be tendered into evidence, that civil proceeding involving the same parties as to the restraining order matter. The appellant requested that the transcript of those proceedings be tendered into evidence. The appellant asserted that that transcript was relevant on the basis that:[11]

... it's going to the motivations behind this VRO application, and that was the excerpts that I've read out earlier in this session. That's the relevance for addition. [sic]

1. During the course of cross-examination of Mr Aquilina, the appellant referred to the court transcript of the civil proceedings and read from a portion of that transcript. The appellant then put to Mr Aquilina that:[12]

... you quite simply put this VRO application in place to ensure that I can't get a refund for the equipment that was returned to you, and that's your. that's your comments on a court transcript from 15 March. I put it to you this is quite simply a lie?

1. Mr Aquilina ultimately responded by saying:[13]

The VRO is in direct relation and direct response to your threatening emails and your threatening manner in person, via text, via email.

1. When the appellant attempted to tender the entirety of the transcript from the civil proceedings, the magistrate stated:[14]

I'm content to rely upon the excerpts that you read out that are relevant to your cross-examination. Mr Aquilina denies that was the motivation behind his application to the court. I'm not allowing the transcript to be tendered into evidence today. I will allow you to rely upon the excerpts that you read out. That's no difficulty.

1. It is therefore clear that the appellant was able to rely upon the portion of the transcript relating to the civil proceedings that he contended revealed an ulterior motive for Mr Aquilina to apply for a restraining order against him. No further transcript from the civil proceedings was relied upon to suggest that there was such a motive

and accordingly, I am not satisfied that the magistrate erred in law in refusing the appellant the ability to tender the entirety of the transcript from the civil proceedings.

1. Mr Aquilina was cross-examined as to the suggested ulterior motive and denied having such motive. Further, he explained in detail the reasons why he made an application for a restraining order against the appellant.
2. Ground 2 has no merit.

1. This ground asserts that the magistrate accepted into evidence screenshots of the Facebook post by the respondent on 22 November 2023 and the corresponding Facebook post response made by the appellant on 23 November 2023 but did not allow the appellant to cross-examine the respondent about this evidence.
2. The cross-examination of Mr Aquilina is set out in the transcript of 5 December 2024.[15] Having considered that transcript, at no stage was the appellant precluded from cross-examining on the relevant Facebook post.
3. The issue in relation to the Facebook posts arose during the course of Mr Aquilina's cross-examination of the appellant. At no stage during the cross-examination of Mr Aquilina did the appellant cross-examine him in relation to the Facebook post from 22 November 2023 and 23 November 2023. It was open to him to do so, and this would have been a permissible line of cross-examination, however the appellant did not do so.
4. At no stage did the magistrate make a ruling that the appellant could not cross-examine Mr Aquilina in relation to the Facebook posts in November 2023.
5. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant conceded that the magistrate did not disallow cross-examination of the respondent in respect to the Facebook posts. The appellant then submitted that the relevant documents had been deleted from his computer numerous times[16] and that the court had some role in this occurring. At the appeal hearing, the appellant specifically stated that this occurred:[17]

[B]ecause they're [the court] trying to find a guilty outcome where there isn't one. And if I'm providing evidence that they've deleted, then of course they're upset about it and wanting to move forward from it.

1. Putting aside the absurdity of this submission, it reinforces the lack of merit in this ground of appeal. When it was pointed out that the magistrate had not done what was asserted in the ground of appeal, the appellant changed tack and suggested that the court had acted corruptly in being involved in the deletion of documents from his computer. There is absolutely no evidence capable of establishing that the court in any way interfered with the appellant's computer and such submission is utterly scandalous and devoid of any factual foundation.
2. Ground 3 is without merit.

1. This ground alleges that the magistrate failed to consider the evidence by way of a Facebook post made by the appellant as leading to a conclusion that the appellant's behaviour towards the respondent was in control and non-violent and non-threatening in asserting his consumer rights.
2. The difficulty with this ground of appeal is that it invites a conclusion based on a Facebook post on 23 November 2023 as to the behaviour of the appellant 13 days earlier on 10 November 2023, that being the relevant date for the purposes of the VRO hearing.
3. As can be seen from the magistrate's reasons for decision, her Honour was satisfied to the requisite standard based on Mr Aquilina's evidence that there had been an incident at his workshop on 10 November 2023 which involved threats of violence made by the appellant. She relevantly stated that:[18]

Having carefully considered Mr Aquilina's evidence, I have concluded that he is not a liar. He has attended court - he has not attended court, rather, to deliberately mislead the court about the events that occurred in November 2023.

1. The magistrate went on to make factual findings as to what she accepted occurred in the workshop on 10 November 2023 and that this amounted to a threat of personal violence towards Mr Aquilina.[19]
2. Given that the disputed events in the workshop on 10 November 2023 was effectively a credibility issue for the magistrate to resolve, it was entirely open for the magistrate to prefer the evidence of Mr Aquilina over that of the appellant. It is difficult to see how a Facebook post placed online 13 days after the disputed incident had the potential to impact on the magistrate's findings as to what occurred on 10 November 2023.
3. I note that the magistrate did not refer to the Facebook post made by the appellant on 23 November 2023, however, she was not obliged to do so. Once she was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Aquilina was telling the truth as to the events of what occurred in his workshop on 10 November 2023 and that she was satisfied that the evidence was accurate and reliable, it was open to her to conclude that she could accept the evidence of Mr Aquilina over that of the appellant and act upon that evidence in determining the matter.
4. Accordingly, the appellant has failed to establish that the magistrate erred in law in effectively failing to place weight on the Facebook post made by the appellant on 23 November 2023 and this ground of appeal has not been established.

1. This ground asserts that the magistrate was aware of the appellant's delayed cognitive functioning yet failed to take this into account when she refused to accept further evidence of Mr Aquilina's issuing of the VRO document to the appellant's employer, as a result of which his employment was terminated and had other impacts on his life as a result.
2. During the course of the appeal hearing, the appellant was queried as to when during the course of the trial the magistrate refused to accept the specific evidence referred to in the ground of appeal. His response was as follows:

THE APPELLANT: Your Honour, I vaguely recall towards the end of the - the hearing, it will be in the transcript, 5 December - - -

RAFFERTY DCJ: Yes.

THE APPELLANT: - - - that I requested to submit evidence surrounding the impacts on my life and my employment. But Magistrate Coleman had refused, stating that there were - vaguely recall something along the lines of there was an opportunity to put evidence in and it was too late at - at that point in time.

1. During the course of his closing submissions at the trial, the appellant referred to the fact that Mr Aquilina had served documents at his workplace and he had effectively lost his employment as a result of his employer becoming aware of the restraining order matter.[20] There was evidence tendered during the course of the trial that the appellant's business address had been included in the paperwork submitted by Mr Aquilina and that this revealed the alleged vexatious nature of his application. This was included in the appellant's affidavit sworn on 14 December 2023, which was Exhibit 7 in the hearing.
2. The appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Aquilina in respect to the use of the appellant's address on court documents and the subsequent service of documents at the appellant's workplace. He did not do so. Further, subject to the magistrate accepting that the evidence was relevant, the appellant had the opportunity to give evidence as to the impact on him arising from the service of court documentation at his workplace. He did not do so.
3. When questioned at the appeal hearing as to the relevance of the impact of service of court documentation relating to the restraining order at his workplace, the appellant made the following observations:

(a) Had the magistrate taken the evidence of service of documentation at his workplace, as a result of which the appellant had his employment terminated, it '... would have been my belief that it would have elevated from a misconduct restraining order to an actual violence restraining order ...'.[21] The difficulty with that submission, is that it refers to the appellant's application against Mr Aquilina, that relating to application JO/RO/1176/2023. The appellant has not appealed against the order made in respect to that application and I therefore disregard this submission.

(b) The evidence was relevant to the multiple applications made by the appellant to set aside the interim VRO[22] Given that the orders made refusing those applications is not and cannot be the subject of this appeal, I also disregard this submission.

(c) The evidence was relevant to the credibility of both parties and had such evidence been admitted, '... there would have been some consideration and weighting placed upon that in the final findings itself'.[23] The appellant then went on to state that it was inconvenient for the magistrate to consider this evidence as it '... would not align with the desired outcome that Magistrate Coleman wanted'.[24]

1. There are a number of difficulties with this ground of appeal. Firstly, other than assertions made by the appellant as to his delayed cognitive functioning, there was no medical evidence before the magistrate that the appellant suffered from such a condition and the impact that such condition would have on him in the giving of evidence. The appellant asserted that medical evidence had been put before the court at a hearing to determine an application to set aside the interim violence restraining order by way of the affidavit of his mother that was read to the court and that:

... there was evidence to put forward with that affidavit, medical evidence. Yet that was refused to be accepted by Magistrate Coleman at - at that time.[25]

1. I have read the transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court on 20 August 2024. At no stage did the magistrate refuse to accept medical evidence from the appellant as none was sought to be tendered. Accordingly, there was no evidence before the magistrate in support of the underlying premise of this ground of appeal, that being that the appellant suffered from delayed cognitive functioning.
2. Secondly, there was no suggestion by the appellant at the final order hearing that he had failed to refer to evidence as a result of his purported delayed cognitive functioning.
3. Thirdly, even if the appellant had given evidence as to the impact that the restraining order had had upon him, it is difficult to see how such evidence could have advanced the appellant's position and how it was relevant to the matters that the magistrate was required to determine pursuant to s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997.
4. Ground 5 has not been made out.

1. Ground 6 asserts that the magistrate made a number of statements about the appellant's behaviour which was not supported by the police report that no offence occurred and that the appellant had organised a private investigator to investigate the respondent despite the respondent providing no evidence of this for the magistrate to consider.
2. During the course of the trial the appellant tendered a Western Australia Police Incident Report which was tendered as Exhibit 5.[26] It is clear from the transcript of the trial hearing and the submissions made by the appellant at the appeal hearing that the appellant is of the belief that if a police officer makes a determination that no offence has been committed, that means that is a finding that nothing that would fall within the definition of personal violence did actually occur.
3. The mere fact that an investigating police officer concludes that no criminal offence has occurred is not determinative of a magistrate's determination of the matters set out in s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997. It is simply the opinion of that police officer and is arguably inadmissible without further evidence as to what underpinned that opinion, for example a complainant admitting to a police officer that an incident that had originally been alleged did not in fact occur.
4. I have also considered the Western Australia Police Incident Report which was tendered as Exhibit 5 at the final order hearing. The alleged offence that was being investigated by police was one of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence contrary to s 474.17 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). This related to the online communications between the appellant and Mr Aquilina following the events at Mr Aquilina's workshop on 10 November 2023 and emails sent by the appellant to others about his dissatisfaction with the work completed by Mr Aquilina. The complaint to police and investigation had nothing to do with the alleged events of 10 November 2023.
5. In this case, the magistrate heard the evidence of both parties. She was able to make an assessment of the credibility of each party where there were factual issues in dispute and ultimately, she was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant committed an act of personal violence towards Mr Aquilina.[27]
6. Further, Mr Aquilina did give evidence as to his belief that the appellant had arranged for a private investigator to investigate him. At the hearing on 30 May 2024, Mr Aquilina gave evidence that the appellant had engaged a private investigator to follow him.[28] He reiterated this evidence at the hearing on 5 December 2024 to the effect that the appellant had admitted to this in another case.[29] Consequently, there was evidence before the magistrate that the appellant had admitted to engaging a private investigator to follow Mr Aquilina. At no stage during his cross-examination of Mr Aquilina did the appellant attempt to challenge his evidence as to the admission that the appellant was alleged to have previously made as to engaging a private investigator to follow Mr Aquilina. Further, the appellant gave no evidence denying that he had engaged a private investigator to follow Mr Aquilina or denying that he had admitted to doing so. Ultimately, the evidence of Mr Aquilina in this regard was unchallenged and it was therefore open to the magistrate to act upon this evidence.
7. Ground 6 has not been made out.

1. Ground 7 asserts that the magistrate disregarded evidence as to the facts of events that occurred on 10 November 2023 between the appellant and respondent in emails dated 6 November 2023, 7 November 2023 and 17 November 2023 and made findings of the events which transpired that contradict the evidence between the parties. The appellant wishes to draw attention to this evidence and provide further evidence to support facts of events that occurred on 10 November 2024.
2. Given that there were no special grounds established by the appellant, I refused leave to adduce further evidence on the appeal relevant to this ground of appeal.
3. At the appeal hearing, I sought clarification from the appellant as to what error was suggested to be demonstrated by this ground of appeal. I specifically refer to the following portion of transcript from the appeal hearing:

RAFFERTY DCJ: Is there any statement in any of those materials where the respondent said, 'This never happened', or he gave a version of events that was inconsistent with the evidence that he gave. Or is this material that you say that if one looked at globally, one could infer - that is, draw a logical conclusion - that what is said to have occurred on 10 November 2023 wasn't as he said?

THE APPELLANT: The - - -

RAFFERTY DCJ: The latter?

THE APPELLANT: The last two, your Honour.

RAFFERTY DCJ: Yes. Yes, I understand. And were those emails before her Honour?

THE APPELLANT: Yes. Yes, your Honour. Except for the email on 28 November which was heard as part of the prior hearing of this matter.[30]

1. I have considered the emails sent by the appellant to Mr Aquilina on various dates in November 2023 which were Exhibit 10 at the final order hearing. I could not locate an email sent on 17 November 2023, however that is not of significance to the determination of this appeal ground. I note that there was reference to such an email during the cross-examination of Mr Aquilina by the appellant, in which it was suggested that Mr Aquilina wanted the appellant to return the vehicle to him to continue work on the vehicle.[31] Mr Aquilina accepted that he had sent an email on that date for which he gave the following explanation:[32]

And at the end of the day, I still wanted to sort out your system for you. I was still trying to be the best customer service I could provide.

1. The emails sent on 6 November 2023 and 7 November 2023 between the parties reflect matters that the appellant wanted completed and/or clarified and a willingness on the part of Mr Aquilina to complete certain tasks and his position as to certain other matters. The emails do not reflect any animosity between the parties as at the date that the emails were sent.
2. However, it is clear that the nature of the relationship between the parties changed at a point sometime after those emails were sent. Nothing better reflects this fact than the email sent by the appellant on 14 November 2023 which was included in Exhibit 2 at the final order hearing in which the appellant stated:

[S]hould it be found that you have not provided the goods that I have paid for i.e. failed to supply those expensive Morel speakers, please believe me when I say, I'll fuck you 10 ways to Sunday. If there is anything that fucking pisses me off the most is cunts trying to defraud me and think they will get away with it.

1. In essence, the appellant's argument in respect to this ground is that the magistrate gave insufficient weight to the emails referred to in the ground of appeal, which are contended to show his conciliatory and non-aggressive stance towards Mr Aquilina which is said to be inconsistent with what was alleged to have occurred in the workshop on 10 November 2023.
2. As I have already noted, the magistrate had the opportunity to assess the credibility of both parties at the final order hearing. She was satisfied on balance that Mr Aquilina was telling the truth as to the behaviour of the appellant on 10 November 2023 and as a result of this, in combination with the threatening tone of the appellant in other emails, such as those already referred to, that this amounted to an act of personal violence.
3. Having considered all of the relevant materials, I do not consider that the magistrate gave insufficient weight to the emails referred to by the appellant. It is clear that the relationship between the parties changed after the email sent by Mr Aquilina to the appellant on 7 November 2023. It is clear that there was a hostility that developed between the parties, particularly on the part of the appellant, which is clearly reflected in the email sent by the appellant to Mr Aquilina on 14 November 2023 and other communications between the parties after 10 November 2023.
4. The magistrate did not err in failing to refer to or disregarding the emails referred to in the ground of appeal. There was a body of evidence before the magistrate which revealed a hostile attitude of the appellant towards Mr Aquilina directly relating to his dissatisfaction with the work completed by Mr Aquilina. It was open to the magistrate to accept the evidence of Mr Aquilina as to the events of 10 November 2023 and the emails were not of such a nature as to undermine his evidence in any significant way. As such, ground 7 does not demonstrate any error on the part of the magistrate.

1. This ground of appeal asserts that the magistrate refused to accept into evidence sworn affidavits of the respondent that had previously been relied upon by him, made in the VRO interim application and the civil claims which allegedly revealed that Mr Aquilina had been repeatedly lying through the court process.
2. At the hearing of the appeal, I queried the appellant as to where in the transcript I would find the magistrate refusing to accept into evidence sworn affidavits made by the respondent. He could not point to such a refusal in the transcript of the final order hearing. He then submitted that the transcript was generated by artificial intelligence means and that the transcript was not an accurate reflection of what was actually said in court.[33]
3. The appellant further stated that, '... the evidence of refusal will be sitting in the civil transcript that was refused to - to be entered into evidence'.[34] As I pointed out to the appellant at the appeal hearing, that submission made no sense. He was suggesting that the purported refusal of the magistrate to accept material in the VRO hearing would be found in the civil transcript which preceded the hearing on 5 December 2024.
4. I also note that Mr Aquilina's sworn affidavit of 23 November 2023 in support of his application for an interim VRO was tendered as an exhibit at the final order hearing. It was Exhibit 1.
5. At no stage did the magistrate refuse to accept into evidence any affidavit previously made by Mr Aquilina. Further, I do not accept the assertion of the appellant that the transcript of the final order hearing was generated by artificial intelligence and does not accurately reflect what was said at that hearing. There is simply no evidence that establishes this or could give rise to an inference that it occurred. Accordingly, ground 8 has not been made out.

1. This ground alleges that the magistrate was actually biased against the appellant by virtue of an actual conflict of interest arising from her previous alleged employment.
2. The argument of the appellant in respect to alleged bias, was actually based on the manner in which the magistrate conducted the final order hearing and a suggested bias based on her alleged former employment with a legal firm. I will therefore consider both limbs of the argument of alleged bias submitted by the appellant.
3. The purported evidence in support of this ground of appeal was included in an affidavit of the appellant dated 11 June 2025. The appellant requires leave to rely upon this affidavit and annexures as the material was not before the magistrate at first instance.
4. The relevant portions of the appellant's affidavit relating to the conduct of the final order hearing are as follows:

It appears that the conduct of Magistrate Belinda Coleman has not been impartial to her management of the VRO application with broad summary of her conduct as follows and expanding on this is complaint lodged against Magistrate Belinda Coleman via sworn Affidavit dated 18 October 2024.

VRO Hearing 30 May 2024 - Magistrate Coleman was demonstrating emotions at the alleged fraudulent evidence presented by Robert Edward Aquilina which sought only to defame and attack the good name and character of Alexander Jordan Cokic and was emotional abuse whilst Alexander Jordan Cokic had to sit through hours of his good name and character being unjustifiably attacked by Robert Edward Aquilina.

VRO Hearing 20 August 2024 - Magistrate Coleman appeared to have no control of the court room and allowed Robert Edward Aquilina to act inappropriately by laughing when I was addressing the court room, and it appears that Magistrate Coleman kept provoking me so as to obtain her desired outcome which never occurred. Magistrate Belinda Coleman failed to hear the application to cancel until it was brought up why it wasn't heard and then further whilst on record stated that she was born in Queensland and had no relatives in Western Australia when I referred to her conflict of interest with Travis Coleman from Acton Belle, the agency that manage the property I reside in.

VRO Hearing 05 December 2024 - Magistrate Coleman and Robert Edward Aquilina both provided running commentary on any evidence I put forward if so as to invalidate it immediately and guide the narrative to a guilty verdict. Magistrate Coleman specifically drew conclusions for a guilty narrative without any evidence to have done so and any evidence to have contradicted her required guilty narrative was refused to be accepted in as evidence despite my protest.[35]

1. I note that the paragraphs referred to above from the affidavit sworn on 11 June 2025 really amount to submissions and do not constitute evidence. On that basis, I will take these paragraphs into account in determining this ground of appeal on the basis that the appellant was not legally represented, is not legally trained and out of fairness to him.
2. Having considered the transcript of the final order hearing, it is clear that the magistrate was impartial, fair, balanced and courteous to both parties at all times. This is reflected by an objective assessment of the entirety of the transcript and the following specific matters:

(a) When it became apparent at the first day of the final order hearing on 30 May 2024 that the appellant was being investigated by police, the magistrate properly adjourned the proceedings to ensure that the position of the appellant was not prejudiced in relation to that investigation.[36] The appellant submitted on the appeal hearing that the magistrate did this so that he would incur further expense.[37]

(b) Both parties advised the magistrate that they had written documentation in front of them which they wished to read when commencing to give evidence-in-chief.[38] The magistrate properly required both parties to give evidence based on their memory of relevant events.

(c) Both parties were prevented from giving evidence about the civil matter which was properly determined to be irrelevant to the applications for violence restraining orders.

1. I do not accept the submission made by the appellant that the magistrate was biased against him and that she had predetermined the matter in any way. The ground of appeal as it relates to an allegation of actual bias is completely without merit.
2. I turn now to the suggested conflict of interest alleged by the appellant. The basis for the allegation is again set out in the appellant's affidavit sworn on 11 June 2025 in the following terms:

Further Allegations against Magistrate Coleman and her alleged association with Tronox and it is alleged that Magistrate Belinda Coleman has sought to have me discredited on behalf of Tronox and others in order to cover up the alleged financial crimes being committed to persons in relation to properties and knowledge of contaminated land.

It appears that there are links between Magistrate Coleman and Alexander Jordan Cokic's former employer Tronox, likely formed during Magistrate Coleman's time at Bunbury Magistrates Court from around 2017 to 2022 of which Tronox is a major employer in the region.

Email 21 August 2024 3:15am to Christine Williams (Tronox Legal Counsel) questioning her relationship or association with Magistrate Belinda Coleman and Magistrate Natasha Owen-Conway and requesting that Christine Williams sign a statutory declaration to this effect.

Email 22 August 2024 3:19pm almost 24 hours after the previous notification, the email from Christine Willliams (Tronox Legal Counsel) stating 'l will not be responding to any of the other matters raised in your correspondence. Should we receive any further correspondence in a similar vein a restraining order will be sought.'

From her time at Bunbury Magistrates Court, there appears to be links between Magistrate Belinda Coleman and the South West Community Legal Centre (SWCLC) facilitating formal interactions and discussions with SWCLC which in itself doesn't seem unreasonable, but specifically[39] in relation to Mr Cokic's Australind Bunbury Investment Property and being unreasonably targeted by the SWCLC former Department of Communities employee Lee Edmundson around the time of Magistrate Coleman's appointment at the Bunbury Magistrate Court, there appears to be a patten of known associates and organizations targeting Alexander Jordan Cokic.

From her time at Bunbury Magistrates Court and likely current, Magistrate Belinda Coleman appears to have strong links with The Piddington Society having held and facilitated formal interactions and discussions with The Piddington Society. These interactions themselves don't seem unreasonable until such time as it is understood that a number of young and up and coming lawyers are being either photographed with Magistrate Belinda Coleman at these events which become public posts and or Magistrate Coleman is somehow known to these individuals on a personal level.

1. The appellant went on to state the following in his affidavit sworn on 11 June 2025:[40]

The Appellant pleads the primary motive behind the allegations of corruption by Magistrate Belinda Leanne Coleman largely stem from her employment at Freehills, being the legal advisors to the Tronox Tiwest Joint Venture involving the Appellant's former employer Tronox and their previous Joint Venture Partner Exxaro Resources and specifically in relation to S647 of the Corporations Act 2001 surrounding supplementary bidder and seller statements that have been produced surrounding the many sales and acquisitions of mineral sands companies and assets that Tronox have acquired and the truthfulness as to the due diligence performed which the Appellant states had due diligence been performed properly, then certain transactions may not have taken place as the true nature of environmental liabilities would have impacted the transaction sale price or transaction in totality.

1. As I understand this argument, the appellant states that he used to work for Tronox. A legal firm at which the magistrate is said to have previously worked represented Tronox. That company is said to have engaged in certain behaviour that the magistrate sought to cover up and in doing so, the magistrate acted corruptly in her consideration of the VRO application made against the appellant.
2. The matters raised in the affidavit in relation to the magistrate are scurrilous, completely devoid of any evidentiary foundation and non-sensical. The ground of appeal reveals nothing more than a delusional belief on the part of the appellant and is not supported by any cogent evidence. On that basis, ground 9 has no merit.

1. The appellant has failed to establish that the magistrate made any factual, legal or discretionary error in determining to make final a restraining order against the appellant. Although none of the grounds specifically deal with the test for the making of such an order as set out in s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act, I am of the firm view that the magistrate was well entitled to conclude that the appellant had committed an act of personal violence as defined in s 6 of the Restraining Orders Act against Mr Aquilina and that he was likely to commit further such acts given the animosity between the parties relating to the issue of the car audio system. It was appropriate to make the order made based on the evidence adduced at the final order hearing.
2. Given that each of the 9 grounds of appeal are completely devoid of merit, the appeal is dismissed.
3. Given that the respondent was not a party to the appeal proceeding and not legally represented, there will be no order as to costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.

[1] Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36 [14].

[2] Magistrates Court (MC) ts 27 (5 December 2024).

[5] District Court (DC) ts 87 (12 June 2025).

[15] MC ts 12 - ts 20 (5 December 2024).

[19] MC ts 58 - ts 59 (5 December 2024).

[35] Affidavit of Alexander Jordan Cokic sworn 11 June 2025, par 10.

[38] MC ts 12 (30 May 2024), MC ts 21 (5 December 2024).

[39] Affidavit of Alexander Jordan Cokic sworn 11 June 2025, par 11.

[40] Affidavit of Alexander Jordan Cokic sworn 11 June 2025, par 35.