Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Standard Module)

FURTHER ORDER - whether a further order is warranted.

1. This application to cancel the interim orders made on 6 February 2026 is hereby dismissed.

[1] On 6 February 2026, I granted interim orders in the following terms:

1. The Body Corporate for Broadwater Tower CTS 9041 ('body corporate') must within 48 hours of receipt of this direction, issue written notice to the owner of Lot 78 at Broadwater Tower CTS 9041 ('scheme'), i.e., Athina Giannes (the 'second respondent') requiring her to keep the exclusive use space marked '42' under the plans and Schedule E of the scheme's prevailing Community Management Statement ('Parking Space 42') vacant within four hours of the delivery of such notice until further advice by the body corporate.
2. The body corporate must as soon as reasonably practicable, upon issuance of the aforesaid notice and subsequent completion of relevant waste removal activities, cleaning and bin rotation at the scheme, advice the second respondent in writing that she may resume ordinary use of Parking Space 42.

1. The second respondent must, within four hours of the delivery of the written notice under Direction 1 above, ensure that Parking Space 42 remains vacant, until she receives further advice from the body corporate in terms of Direction 2 that she may resume ordinary use of the same.
2. The second respondent must ensure that Parking Space 42 remains vacant for the body corporate and persons authorised by it to carry out waste removal activities and bin rotation at the scheme between the hours of 6:00 am to 8:00 am on every Monday, Wednesday and Friday until further or final order.
3. Jimmy Vivlios (the 'first respondent'), the second respondent and Lily Vivlios (the 'third respondent') (collectively the 'respondents') must not, without prior body corporate approval in writing, interfere with any components and infrastructure associated with the garbage chute and the bins at the scheme, until further or final order.
4. Until further or final order, the respondents must not without prior body corporate approval in writing, obstruct or otherwise prevent the body corporate and any persons authorised by it in terms of Orders 3 and 4 above, from:

(i) Accessing Parking Space 42, or any common property area including but not limited to the area between Parking Space 42 and the space marked as the 'Bin Room' in the plans attached to the scheme's prevailing Community Management Statement; and

(ii) Carrying out waste removal activities and bin rotation at the scheme until further or final order.

I hereby declare that:

1. For the avoidance of doubt, a party under application bearing reference 0151-2026 can seek a variation or cancellation of the orders made hereunder by further application.
2. This application is otherwise dismissed.

[2] On 24 March 2026, the respondents made an application for the setting aside of the said interim orders on the basis of what they claim to be three errors on my part:

The test for the grant of a mandatory injunctive order is different from the cases cited in the interim order decision i.e., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O' Neill and SDW2 Pty Ltd v JLF Corporation Pty Ltd & Ors all of which deal with interlocutory prohibitory orders.

The test for the grant of a mandatory injunctive order is different from that for prohibitory orders because it requires a high degree of assurance of the likely final order.

The serious legal question to be identified, depends on a remarkable construction of section 163 of the Act, because it would, if final orders were made in those terms, prevent the use of that exclusive use car space unlike any other exclusive use car space the body corporate has granted to others.

The basis of an undertaking as to damages is a fundamental reason why no injunction, let alone a mandatory injunction, should be granted because there is no recompense otherwise available in respect of undertaking the orders - the non-compliance being a statutory offence.

[3] Subsequently, the body corporate made a submission, a copy of which has been provided to the respondents on my direction.

[4] The respondents have not argued any change in circumstances, or an error in the facts on the basis of which I granted the interim orders on 6 February 2026.

[5] Rather, the grounds described above have been presented by the respondents as 'errors', seemingly purely errors of law that they allege I have made.

[6] Therefore, this application must if at all be heard by QCAT exercising its appellate jurisdiction with respect to the interim orders I have made. The respondents are free to pursue this avenue.

[7] I will however for the sake of clarity, repeat that I was satisfied that Interim Order no. 4 made on 6 February 2026, despite being mandatory in nature, was warranted in the circumstances of the dispute. I refer to my reasoning at paragraphs [78] to [80] in this regard.

[8] I will also repeat that I was satisfied that a serious legal question had been raised. Any arguments as to the application of section 163 of the Act ought to be reserved for the final order stage, whereupon I can make an unhurried consideration of the same, after the audi alteram partem rule has been appropriately observed.

[9] Accordingly, I am not persuaded that a cancellation of the aforesaid interim orders is warranted.