Briginshaw v Briginshaw

1. All previous parenting orders regarding the child X (born 2017) ('the child') be discharged.
2. The mother have sole responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues regarding the child and she forthwith notify the father upon the making of any decision in the exercise of that responsibility.
3. The child live with the mother.
4. The child spend time with the father from the conclusion of school on Friday (or 3.00 pm if a non-school day) until the commencement of school on Monday (or 9.00 am if a non-school day) each alternate weekend.
5. During school holidays, the time the child spends in the father's care be extended as follows:
   1. For holiday periods occurring following the conclusion of term 1, term 2 and term 3, on the first occasion that the child is to spend time with the father, the child spend an additional two nights in the father's care, such that the time conclude on Wednesday at 3.00 pm rather than concluding on Monday; and
   2. For the holiday period occurring following the conclusion of term 4, the time the child is to spend in the father's care be extended by two nights on each occasion the child is due to spend time with the father during that school holiday period in accordance with the usual rotation, such that the time conclude on Wednesday at 3.00 pm, rather than concluding on Monday.

1. Notwithstanding any other care arrangements, the child spend time with the parties on special occasions as follows:
   1. With the father from 3:00 pm Christmas Eve until 3:00 pm Christmas Day in 2025 and each alternate year thereafter;
   2. With the mother from 3:00 pm Christmas Day until 3:00 pm Boxing Day in 2025 and each alternate year thereafter;
   3. With the father from 3:00 pm Christmas Day until 3:00 pm Boxing Day in 2026 and each alternate year thereafter;
   4. With the mother from 3:00 pm Christmas Eve until 3:00 pm Christmas Day in 2026 and each alternate year thereafter;
   5. In the event that the child is with the mother on Father's Day the child spend time with the father from 10:00 am until 5:00 pm on Father's Day; and
   6. In the event that the child is with the father on Mother's Day the child spend time with the mother from 10:00 am until 5:00 pm on Mother's Day.
2. All handovers that do not take place at school do take place inside McDonald's Restaurant at Suburb B.
3. The parties do communicate with each other via text message (or telephone in the event of emergency), to communicate with respect to matters regarding the care, health and welfare of the child.
4. By this order each party be at liberty to obtain from any school which the child attends from time to time at their own expense copies of all newsletters, school reports, photographs and material to which parents are ordinarily entitled to receive.
5. Both parties be entitled to attend at all of the child's school events including but not limited to activities such as school concerts, all sports days, parent/teacher interviews and the like NOTING THAT neither party is to approach the other.
6. The parties keep each other informed at all times of a contact mobile telephone number and their current residential address.
7. The parties each be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining each of them from:
   1. Denigrating the other party in the presence of the child or permitting any other person to denigrate the other party or any member of the other party's family or friends in the presence or hearing of the child;
   2. Discussing these proceedings with the child;
   3. Abusing, threatening, harassing or intimidating the other parent;
   4. Using physical discipline to chastise the child or permitting others to do so; and
   5. Allowing the child to be exposed to any violence or aggressive behaviour.
8. The parties each be restrained and an injunction is hereby granted restraining them from attending at the other party's residence or place of employment or otherwise approaching within 50 metres of the other party, unless invited by the other party to do so.

1. The father be and is hereby restrained from discussing ionised radiation, x-rays, CT scans or any other medical procedure involving ionised radiation with the child or in his presence, or allowing any other person to do so, including but not limited to exposing him to any videos on such topics as educative tools or otherwise.
2. In the event that the child becomes unwell whilst in the father's care, the father notify the mother immediately and advise her of the child's symptoms and the mother is at liberty to collect the child for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment.
3. The parties each follow all reasonable recommendations of any medical or allied health practitioners treating the child, including but not limited to following all instructions for any medication prescribed, and ensuring they administer or cause to be administered any prescribed medication to the child while the child is in their care.
4. The parties each be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them from causing the child to miss more than three school days in any calendar year for the purpose of interstate travel and from travelling interstate with the child without prior written notice to the other party.
5. The parties each be restrained and an injunction is hereby granted restraining them from travelling outside the Commonwealth of Australia with the child without the written consent of the other party.

1. During any travel with the child, the mother shall facilitate FaceTime/telephone communication between the child and the father once per week and provide to the father a mobile contact number that is to remain operational for the duration of the travel.
2. Each party inform the other as soon as possible of any medical emergency or serious medical condition affecting the child.

1. As soon as practicable after the making of these orders, the Independent Children's Lawyer meet with the child and explain the terms of the orders to him.
2. The parties each be restrained by injunction from informing the child of the existence of the orders or discussing their contents with him prior to the Independent Children's Lawyer's meeting with the child pursuant to paragraph 21 hereof.
3. Upon compliance with paragraph 21 hereof, the appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.
4. All extant applications are otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Before the court are the parties' competing applications for parenting orders with respect to the child X, who was born in 2017 and was aged 8 at the time of the trial.
2. The applicant father, MR BEUMERS, was born in 1981 and at the time of the trial was aged 43. The respondent mother, MS STOICA, was born in 1988 and at the time of the trial was aged 36.
3. The parties commenced cohabitation in late 2010 or early 2011 and were married on in mid-2011. They separated in early 2019. A divorce order became final in early 2025.
4. There was a dispute between the parties as to the extent of the roles they each played with respect to X's care prior to separation, upon which little turns. X has resided with the mother in the years since the parties' separation and it is an agreed fact that she has been his primary carer since that time.
5. The parties disagreed as to the precise details of the time X spent in the care of the father prior to the commencement of the proceedings and whether he coped with extended periods in the father's care. However, they agreed that X spent frequent time with the father, initially every weekend and later each alternate weekend, that there was a brief period of time where they implemented a week about arrangement (which the mother alleged was imposed against her will), and that there was ongoing disputation between them with respect to the issue of X's care arrangements.
6. At the time of trial, interim parenting orders made by consent on 21 November 2022 provided for X to spend time with the father each alternate weekend from the conclusion of school (or 5.00 pm if a non-school day) on Friday until the commencement of school (or 5.00 pm if a non-school day) on Monday. It is an agreed fact that the father has also cared for X for additional times on occasion, including during times when the mother has travelled to China to care for her mother, who has been ill.
7. At the time of the trial, neither parent was engaged in paid employment. The father resided in the former matrimonial home. The mother and X resided in separate accommodation.
8. The matter was originally listed for trial with respect to property as well as parenting issues, but final property orders were made by consent on 14 July 2025, being the first day of the trial listing, leaving only parenting matters for determination.

1. When the trial commenced, the father was legally represented. On the second day of the listing, the father's solicitor, who had been appearing on his behalf, sought leave to withdraw from representing the father on the basis that his duty to his client had become irreconcilable with his duty to the court. That irreconcilability persisted after the father had consulted with a duty solicitor and the father's solicitor was granted leave to withdraw.
2. Following the withdrawal of his solicitor, the father sought an adjournment of the trial on the basis that his solicitor had withdrawn on short notice and he considered he would be disadvantaged if the trial proceeded if he did not have legal representation.
3. Although it was not raised by the father, I took into account when considering his adjournment application the fact that, by virtue of the existence of an order made pursuant to section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('the Act'), in the absence of legal representation, the father would not be permitted to cross-examine the mother.
4. For reasons that were given ex tempore, the adjournment application was refused. Those reasons included (but were not limited to):

(a) An assessment that further protraction of the litigation was likely to be contrary to X's best interests in light of the evidence of both parties suggesting that he had been exposed to the conflict between them and the assessment of the family report writer that X presented as burdened by the current situation;

(b) The potential for risk to the mother and her parenting if the litigation were to continue, in light of her evidence of serious family violence inflicted upon her by the father;

(c) The fact that the proceedings had been on foot since October 2022, being a period approaching three years, which represented a significant portion of X's young life;

(d) The fact that the trial had already been adjourned on one prior occasion as a consequence of lack of proper preparedness on the part of the father and/or his former lawyers;

(e) The lack of availability of alternative trial dates for the balance of 2025, meaning that any further delay would be for a significant period;

(f) The fact that the mother's evidence would be subjected to cross-examination by counsel for the ICL, who would no doubt canvass many matters relevant to the determination of X's best interests, albeit that the ICL could not cross-examine on the father's behalf and this would not be a substitute for cross-examination by or on behalf of the father; and

(g) The fact that the father's documents had been prepared by lawyers and he had had the benefit of legal advice prior to the trial, which would assist with mitigating any prejudice arising from being self-represented.

1. Prior to the trial proceeding, the father was given detailed information about the trial process and the applicable procedures, copies of the most relevant legislative provisions, copies of the documents relied upon by all parties, and a further opportunity to consult with the duty lawyer. Although he was informed that he could consult with lawyers during the period of a part-heard adjournment of the trial between 18 July and 23 September 2025, which occurred prior to the mother giving her evidence, he remained unrepresented when the trial resumed.

1. At the commencement of the trial, the parties and the ICL jointly tendered a minute setting out the orders in relation to which there was agreement and the respective positions of each of them in respect of issues that were not agreed.[1] Their positions developed to some extent during the course of the trial and an updated minute was tendered at the conclusion of the trial.[2] The positions of the parties and the ICL each also evolved further during their closing submissions.
2. Ultimately, the major issues requiring determination were the allocation of decision-making with respect to major long-term issues for X and any conditions to be attached to the exercise of that responsibility, the time X would spend in the care of each of his parents (with the mother seeking to continue the existing parenting arrangement and the father seeking to increase X's time with him initially to four nights per fortnight and ultimately equal time in a week about arrangement), and whether the mother would be at liberty to travel overseas with X.
3. The parties also differed as to whether an order should be made with respect to X's secondary schooling, whether there should be orders and injunctions with respect to X's medical care, and whether there should be restrictions on interstate travel with X during school terms.
4. A number of other proposed orders were sought by the consent of the parties and the Independent Children's Lawyer ('ICL'). To the extent that this was the case, I am satisfied that such orders are in X's best interests, and those orders will be made.

(a) Amended Initiating Application filed 29 July 2024;

(b) Trial affidavit filed 15 October 2024;

(c) Case outline filed 5 September 2024; and

(d) Updating affidavit filed 9 July 2025.

(a) Amended Response to Initiating Application filed 10 July 2025;

(b) Trial affidavit filed 12 August 2024;

(c) Case outline filed 6 September 2024;

(d) Affidavit of Mr C filed 24 June 2025; and

(e) Updating affidavit filed 10 July 2025.

1. The ICL relied on a case outline filed 6 September 2024.
2. Although each and every aspect of the evidence relied upon by the parties has not been referred to in these reasons, I have had regard to the totality of the evidence before the court and the submissions of each of the parties.

1. As a consequence of the existence of an order made pursuant to section 102NA of the Act, being self-represented, the father was not permitted to cross-examine the mother. The mother's evidence was not wholly untested, as she was cross-examined by counsel for the ICL. Nonetheless, significant aspects of the mother's evidence were not specifically challenged, and this was entirely appropriate, as it is not the role of the ICL to conduct a party's case on that party's behalf and there were aspects of the evidence of both parties which could not be within the knowledge of the ICL.
2. Although the court is not bound to accept unchallenged evidence, rejection of such evidence must be approached with caution.[3] I am conscious that in the present case, the father did not deliberately elect not to challenge the evidence of the mother, and nor did he elect to proceed with the trial once he became unrepresented. He sought an adjournment and was not successful, at which time the option of challenging the mother's evidence by cross-examination was not open to him. The lack of challenge to the mother's evidence arose by operation of the statutory prohibition in section 102NA and not by way of forensic decision taken by the father.
3. It cannot, therefore, be inferred that failure to challenge the mother's evidence constitutes acceptance of its accuracy or acquiescence to its acceptance. Indeed, it was evident from the father's evidence and the manner in which he presented his case that he disputed significant aspects of the mother's evidence. As was properly conceded by counsel for the mother, in these circumstances, the fact that the mother's evidence was unchallenged cannot be given the same weight as would ordinarily be the case.
4. In order to guard against undue prejudice to the father, and to avoid the risk that section 102NA might operate to impede the court's ultimate objective of determining X's best interests and ensuring his safety, the mother's evidence has been given careful consideration and scrutiny in the context of the evidence before the court as a whole and has not simply been accepted as a consequence of being unchallenged.
5. Subject to the limitations on the court's ability to assess the evidence of the mother in the absence of testing of that evidence by or on behalf of the father, the mother presented as a generally reliable witness. She was responsive to the questions asked of her and made appropriate concessions.
6. The father was polite and generally endeavoured to give responsive answers to the questions asked of him. At times, he presented as angry when describing disputes between himself and the mother.
7. There were aspects of the father's evidence which were unconvincing, including aspects which were unsupported by contemporaneous records. There were also aspects of the father's oral evidence which had did not appeared in his affidavit material (which material had been prepared by two separate solicitors) and appeared not to have been mentioned in his interview with the family report writer when it would have been expected that they would have been, and no plausible explanation for this failure was supplied. These aspects of the father's evidence had the flavour of having been spontaneous inventions in the witness box. Those issues are discussed as they arise throughout these reasons.
8. As a result of the difficulties arising with respect to the operation of section 102NA and the consequential impact on my ability to assess the mother's evidence, considerably more weight has been given to those aspects of her evidence which were corroborated by other evidence, including independent records, than to evidence given by her which was unchallenged but also uncorroborated.
9. The mother's evidence has largely been accepted where it conflicts with the evidence of the father. This is primarily as a consequence of my reservations with respect to aspects of the father's evidence, and not as a consequence of the mother's evidence being unchallenged.
10. Both parties had the assistance of an interpreter but rarely used it, each demonstrating a high level of proficiency in English.
11. In accordance with section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), all findings of fact in this judgment are made on the balance of probabilities. Some of the findings in these reasons relate to conduct of a very serious nature, being findings of family violence. I have had regard to the matters outlined in section 140(2) of the Evidence Act, particularly the gravity of the matters alleged, when making such findings, and am satisfied to the extent of 'actual persuasion'[4] with respect to each of my findings.

1. The court was assisted by a family report prepared by Panel Family Consultant Ms D dated 20 October 2023. Ms D gave evidence and was cross-examined by counsel for the mother, by the father and by counsel for the ICL.
2. Ms D recommended, in her family report, that X continue to live with the mother and spend time with the father each alternate weekend. She further recommended that the father engage in therapeutic intervention to address allegations of family violence made by the mother and what Ms D assessed as being his poor relationship with X, and that if he did not do so, consideration be given to reducing the time X spends with him. Ms D also recommended that the mother have sole parental responsibility for X.
3. The father alleged that Ms D was an 'unreliable, and bias [sic] witness' and asked that the court ignore and disregard the contents of her report as a consequence. In particular, he complained that Ms D had 'clearly believed' the mother's allegations of violence, which had influenced her opinions. On this basis, at the time of the trial, he had not adopted her recommendations with respect to therapeutic intervention.
4. The father took Ms D to a number of typographical and other minor errors in her report and suggested that she had been careless with its preparation. Whilst those errors are unfortunate, I do not consider that they demonstrate that Ms D did not take the requisite care in applying her expertise and experience to her assessment of X, his family circumstances and his best interests.
5. The father cross-examined Ms D about the lack of reference in her report to an allegation he had made that the mother had assaulted him at a handover in May 2019 (which is referred to later in these reasons), which he contrasted with her detailed recounting of the mother's allegations of violence. He queried why Ms D had not made recommendations for therapeutic intervention for the mother in light of his allegation. Ms D explained that the majority of the information with which she had been provided raised significant concerns about a propensity for family violence on the part of the father. She was clear that her role was not to make findings but to take into account the information with which she was provided in order to make her assessment.
6. The father also suggested to Ms D that her report had been focused on punishing him rather than assessing X's best interests, which she denied.
7. Ms D gave her evidence in a calm, measured and thoughtful manner. She did not waver from the key aspects of her recommendations. Her observations and recommendations were not successfully undermined in cross-examination. There was no challenge to her qualifications or expertise. The father did not establish that she was biased or unreliable. Nor did he establish any other basis for the rejection of her evidence. I accept Ms D's evidence as to her observations and give weight to her opinions.

1. Part VII of the Act guides the process of decision-making in relation to the making of parenting orders. Section 60CA of the Act provides that when deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, the court must consider the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. Section 60CC of the Act sets out how those best interests are to be determined, and includes a list of considerations to be taken into account. Each of those considerations is considered below.
2. The parties each also sought injunctions. The power to grant injunctions is found in subsection 68B(1) of the Act, which provides, in summary, that the court may the court may make such order or grant such injunction as it considers appropriate for the welfare of the child. Although the paramountcy principle in section 60CA does not apply to the granting of an injunction, the child's best interests are a relevant consideration.[5]

What arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of the child and each person who has care of the child

1. The word 'safety' is not defined in the Act. It is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'the state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; freedom from danger.' In Oyama & Oyama,[6] Gill J held that 'safety' in this context is a term that is wide in nature, and bounded only by its object, being to keep children, and those who care for them, from harm, and that it should not be taken to have a fixed content or standard.
2. In Denton & Denton (No 3),[7] Altobelli J expressed the view that 'safety' is a state in which hazards or conditions leading to physical, psychological, or material harm are controlled in order to preserve the health and wellbeing of an individual. It is not the complete elimination of risk of harm, but rather making such order as affords the child the most optimal protection from harm.
3. In Melounis & Melounis (No 4),[8] Altobelli J held that to promote safety, for the purposes of s 60CC(2)(a), means 'to advance the interests of, and move to a stronger or more prominent position, the safety (ie to be free from hurt, damage, harm or danger) of children and those who care for them' and that the statutory requirement to promote safety involves advancing a positive outcome, which would necessarily include protection from harm but would not be limited to this.
4. I respectfully adopt these definitions in considering the arrangements that would promote X's safety and that of his parents, particularly, given the nature of the competing allegations in this case, his mother.
5. In considering this factor, it is necessary for the court to consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child) and any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.[9]
6. 'Family violence' is defined in section 4AB of the Act to mean 'violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.' It is not necessary that violent or threatening behaviour coerce or control or cause fear in order to be characterised as family violence.[10]
7. Section 60CG of the Act provides that in considering what order to make, the court must, to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration, ensure that the order (relevantly) does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.

1. In this matter, the mother alleged that the father had subjected her to family violence on a number of occasions prior to their separation, particularly following X's birth. Ms D described family violence as 'a salient issue of concern in this matter.'
2. The mother deposed to incidents of violence, including, by way of example, the father having pushed her out of the house during arguments with a pillow, quilt and her car keys, requiring her to sleep in her car; and having subjected her to physical violence including two incidents of strangulation. She estimated that she had been subjected to physical assaults on approximately 2-5 occasions per month prior to the parties' separation.
3. The mother's evidence was that significant disputation had arisen between the parties with respect to the issue of breastfeeding X, with her having been unable to produce sufficient milk to feed him and having wanted to top up with formula, and the father having insisted she breastfeed. The mother's evidence was that the father's insistence on her breastfeeding exclusively had manifested in a number of violent behaviours, some of which had involved the father's parents, who had then been staying with the parties following X's birth, including:

(a) Becoming angry, blaming her, yelling at her, and verbally abusing her, calling her names such as 'fucking useless woman;'

(b) Physically assaulting her, including slapping her hard across the face, punching her, kicking her, pulling her hair and holding her tightly by the neck when she was unable to produce sufficient breastmilk;

(c) Supervising her breastfeeding and asking his mother to do so when he was not home;

(d) Grabbing her by the hair, tearing off her top and bra, and demanding she breastfeed, in front of his parents, causing her to feel terrified and humiliated;

(e) Grabbing her from the toilet to breastfeed X and kicking her down the hallway and outside before she could pull up her pants, leading her to seek help from a neighbour, who called the police; and

(f) Holding her by her neck against a wall and kicking her legs, while threatening to kill her if she did not breastfeed X.

1. The father called no evidence from his parents to contradict the mother's evidence with respect to these events.
2. In late 2018, the mother and X were provided domestic violence shelter housing for a period of three months after the mother telephoned a domestic violence helpline. The mother's evidence was that they remained there throughout that time, returning to the former matrimonial home in approximately January 2019 after the father apologised for his behaviour and promised to change. The father's evidence was that although the mother had initially left and had access to shelter accommodation, she had spent most of the relevant period staying at the former matrimonial home with him.
3. The mother deposed to an incident which occurred in early 2019, which involved the father having kicked her in the back, punched her in the face, grabbed her by the hair and pushed her against the wall in the context of her having applied ointment to X's skin, which he considered to be 'poison.' The mother alleged that the husband had yelled that he would kill her and that she had been afraid that he would do so. She gave evidence of having 'fought back' on this occasion and having thrown a toy at the father.
4. The mother's allegations were described by Ms D as 'significantly concerning.'
5. The father largely denied the mother's allegations of violent conduct. He agreed that the parties had had disagreements with respect to the issue of breastfeeding but denied that the mother had struggled to produce sufficient milk, asserting instead that she had chosen to stop breastfeeding X and instead give him formula. His evidence was that there had been 'a few incidents during the relationship' where the parties had had 'heated verbal disagreements' and that the police had sometimes been called and had attended at their home.
6. The father admitted that there had been a physical altercation in early 2019. He said that the mother had been the aggressor and had scratched and pushed him after he had questioned her use of a non-prescription ointment on X and that he had pushed and kicked her away to protect himself and stop her from attacking him. His evidence was that the ointment used by the mother could cause nerve damage, he was not happy with it being applied to X, he asked the mother if she had been aware of this potential side effect and asked her to do research before applying medication to X, and in response she had physically attacked him.
7. The parties agreed that the father had called the police during the incident in early 2019 and that ultimately the father was arrested and charged with assault, and an interim family violence order was issued against him with the mother named as the protected person. The father's evidence was that this had occurred as a result of the mother having made a false statement to police. The mother's evidence was that the police had observed marks on her back, arm and legs. This was consistent with the police records in relation to this incident.[11]
8. This was the time at which the mother asserted the parties had separated. The father agreed that they had not lived together after this time, but his evidence was that their relationship had not entirely ended until a later date. Nothing turns on this issue.
9. The charges against the father were withdrawn in July 2019. The mother deposed that this occurred after she was subjected to considerable pressure by the father and his parents, and after the father apologised and promised not to behave in an abusive manner towards her again.
10. A final family violence order was made on the same day the charges were withdrawn but was subsequently also withdrawn with the mother's consent in mid-2020. She deposed that this again occurred following pressure and apologies from the father.
11. The mother alleged that the father's verbal abuse recommenced upon revocation of the family violence order, and that he said things such as '[X] should be ashamed to have you as a mother' and that she was a 'fucking stupid woman and useless mother.'
12. In mid-2019, at a handover which descended into a dispute between the parties which ultimately resulted in the police being called, which is discussed later in these reasons, the father handed the mother a handwritten letter.[12] The English translation of the letter which was in evidence before the court was as follows:

Ms [Ms Stoica],

I am sorry to you! Since we had [X] and for the child to grow safer and healthier, I have neglected your feelings, broken through the boundary line and infringed upon your dignity as an independent individual. I have physically abused you violently time and again during our arguments, which although has not caused any organic harm, but has brought tremendous mental harm to you. Here, I only want to say, no matter what the reasons were and no matter how heavy pressure we were facing then, I should take the responsibility for my inescapable wrong doings. I only want to say to you I am sincerely sorry.

In consideration of the fundamental interests of the child and for the sake of my starting point being for the wellbeing of the child, I am hoping you will sincerely forgive me for my wrong doings. Let us completely put aside the past, steadfastly step forward on firm footing and start a new life step by step. I am aware of and acknowledge my mistakes and apologize to you sincerely! I am sorry!

This letter is for the resolution of the relationship between [Ms Stoica] and [Mr Beumers], for a sincere conciliation between the two of us and for the child to have a better and healthier parent and future. This does not have any legal effectiveness, let alone being applied to any form of evidence to the court, and shall not be photocopied, photo taken, visually-recorded or duplicated.

[Ms Stoica] admitted that she had promised to give [Mr Beumers] ¥500,000 RMB prior to marrying [Mr Beumers], to show appreciation for [Mr Beumer]'s assisting her to obtain Australian permanent residence through marriage. Meanwhile, she has also promised to have the intervention order against [Mr Beumer] removed immediately after [Mr Beumer] signed and dated on this letter of apology.

The two parties have achieved sincere conciliation and [Mr Beumer] has sincerely apologised to [Ms Stoica]! The two parties have agreed to have any dispute resolved through negotiations from now on and seek the maximum interests of the three people including the two parties and the child! The two parties have affirmed that they will try their utmost without any selfishness to love and raise [X] up to his adulthood!

Signature: (Signature)

Date: [...]

1. The father's evidence with respect to this letter was unsatisfactory. He initially said that he had written the letter on the mother's instructions, under duress, in circumstances in which he was facing criminal charges with respect to assaulting the mother. This allegation was denied by the mother.
2. The father's evidence was that he feared he would be sent to prison if the mother made a further police statement against him and that she had threatened to do so in order to have him imprisoned if he did not comply with her direction with respect to the letter. This was also denied by the mother.
3. This serious allegation had not appeared in an affidavit that had been filed by the father after the filing of an affidavit on behalf of the mother to which copies of both the original letter and its certified translation were annexed. The tenor of this evidence was that the contents of the letter were untruthful and had only been written at the mother's insistence.
4. This evidence was quite difficult to follow, as a written admission of conduct of the type with which he had been charged could only have been expected to result in an increased, rather than decreased, likelihood of conviction and criminal penalties. I accept the submission of counsel for the ICL that the contents of the letter were inconsistent with the father's asserted purpose in writing it.
5. The father subsequently asserted that only the first part of the letter had been written on the mother's instructions, and that the second part of the letter had defied her instructions, which had upset her. With this evidence, his explanation for having written the letter, being fear of the mother's reprisals if he refused, fell away.
6. The father's asserted willingness to risk angering the mother by departing from her instructions in the second half of the letter completely undermined his claim to have been in fear of imprisonment if he did not appease her by submitting to her demands. He was unable to explain why, if he had been in fear of the mother taking action to have him sent to prison in the event of failure to comply with her demands, he had not written exactly what she had wanted him to.
7. Counsel for the mother put to the father that the contents of the letter had been truthful, in that he had assaulted the mother 'time and again.' He denied that allegation but raised no issue with the suggestion that that was what he had written. Nor had any such issue been raised in his affidavit.
8. Two days later, when cross-examined by counsel for the ICL, the father asserted for the first time that there was an issue with the translation of the letter. He claimed that the use of the plural expression 'wrong doings' and the words 'time and again' did not reflect his original words as written in Chinese. He claimed that the references to violence in the letter were truthful references to the incident in early 2019, being the sole occasion upon which he admitted there had been a physical fight between the parties, and that suggestion that there had been more than one occasion upon which he had engaged in violence towards the mother resulted from a translation error.
9. In addition to having failed to raise this issue earlier, the father had not required the translator who prepared the translation to present for cross-examination, despite having been legally represented until the second day of the trial listing. It is also notable that his evidence shifted from a suggestion that the letter had been written untruthfully (under duress) to an assertion that its contents had been written truthfully but had been incorrectly translated. The father's evidence with respect to this issue was lacking in credibility and I reject it.
10. I accept the submission of counsel for the ICL that considerable weight should be placed on the admission of family violence contained within the letter authored by the father.
11. The mother's account of family violence was considered by Ms D to be compelling. As submitted by counsel for the ICL, her allegations were detailed, consistent and not implausible.
12. Independent records before the court record that the mother's reports of family violence predated both the parties' separation and the commencement of the proceedings.[13] These records demonstrate that police and the Department for Child Protection ('DCP') had had repeated involvement with the parties from as early as February 2018 in relation to allegations of family violence. The available independent documentary evidence is consistent with the mother's evidence given in these proceedings. It is an agreed fact that prior to the parties' final separation, the mother and X had accessed domestic violence support housing.
13. The father submitted that actions taken by the mother, such as parking her car at his home while she travelled overseas in December 2024, undermined her claims of family violence. I do not agree. Evidence of ongoing voluntary post-separation interactions is not evidence of absence of a history of family violence.
14. Exercising particular caution with respect to the seriousness of the allegations and the fact that the father was prevented from challenging the mother's evidence, I accept the mother's evidence of her experiences of family violence and find that the father subjected the mother to violence during their relationship as alleged by her.
15. Ms D opined that if the mother's allegations were accepted, as they have been, X's experience of his father was likely to have been terrorising and potentially unsafe and may have jeopardised his psychological, emotional and developmental wellbeing.
16. In the witness box, the father demonstrated somewhat limited insight into the potential impact for X of exposure to family violence. Even on his own version of the events of early 2019, which involved a violent physical fight between the parties, he insisted that X had not been at risk of exposure to family violence, because on his version of events, X had been in a different room.
17. The letter written by the father to the mother on 7 May 2019[14] contained apologies, express acknowledgments of the harm caused by the father's violence, and expressions that the father took responsibility for his actions. To that extent, the letter could be interpreted as demonstrating some insight and remorse on the part of the father, which would be encouraging.
18. However, in the witness box, the father expressly disavowed those aspects of the letter and gave clear evidence that they had been written on the mother's specific instructions rather than representing his own views and feelings. In light of that evidence, the court can have no confidence that the father understands or appreciates the consequences for the mother of the violence to which I have found that she was subjected.
19. Notwithstanding her evidence of family violence, mother made it clear when interviewed by Ms D that she did not allege that X's physical safety was at risk in the father's care. Rather, she expressed concern about X's emotional safety in the context of the father's unstable moods and propensity towards controlling behaviour. Furthermore, as submitted by counsel for the ICL, the history of family violence informs the current and future co-parenting dynamic and the parties' ongoing interactions with one another.
20. The father pointed to the fact that the mother had left X in his care from early May to mid-June 2023 while she travelled to China, and had engaged in limited communication with X while she was away, as evidence that she did not genuinely hold concerns about X's emotional safety in his care.
21. The mother's evidence was that she had needed to travel to China because her mother had been very unwell, was having high-risk surgery and needed her support. She deposed, and the father accepted, that she had only expected to travel for two weeks but had been required to stay for longer than she had originally anticipated as a result of her mother's needs. The mother's evidence was also that poor internet coverage had hampered her ability to communicate regularly with X.
22. The mother had been unable to take X with her to China, and the father had refused to agree to her leaving him with a friend while she was away, which had been her preference. Ms D gave evidence that the mother's actions in this regard did not undermine the concerns she had identified. I do not accept that the evidence supports the conclusion that the mother does not hold concerns about X's emotional safety in the care of the father.
23. The evidence as outlined above supports the need for caution with respect to the issue of X's emotional safety in the care of the father. There is also cause for concern with respect to X's physical safety arising from a risk of unmet medical needs. This issue is considered later in these reasons.

1. The father deposed to an incident which occurred on 29 April 2024 when X suffered a burn caused by a leak from a hot water bottle while in the mother's care. It is an agreed fact that the mother informed the father of the burn the day after it occurred. The father deposed that the mother had characterised the burn as 'minor' and that she had told him that she had treated it with cold water and pawpaw cream.
2. The mother deposed that she had secured the lid to the hot water bottle tightly but that it had leaked. Her evidence was that X's leg had been red but had not been blistering, that she had placed him in a cold bath and then applied pawpaw cream, and that she had checked it again the following morning and it had not been blistering but X had said his leg was sore, so she had permitted him to stay home from school and rest.
3. The father's evidence was that when X was getting ready for bed on 3 May 2024, being the next occasion on which he was in the father's care, he observed the burn and considered it to be 'a large and serious injury' with 'blisters everywhere,' and not minor as the mother had indicated. Notwithstanding his evidence as to the seriousness of the burn, the father took no action that evening.
4. The following morning, the father took X to a doctor and was referred to the outpatient clinic at E Hospital. A doctor at the hospital made a notification to DCP. The father submitted that this was strong evidence that the mother posed a risk to X. I do not agree. The doctor was a mandatory reporter with an obligation to make a notification upon being presented with a child who may have been at risk.[15] The notification is evidence of no more than fulfillment of that obligation. It was the role of DCP, not the doctor, to undertake an assessment of whether X was actually at risk. DCP records indicate that they did not open an investigation, much less substantiate harm to X in the mother's care.[16]
5. In mid-2024, the father also made a report to DCP in relation to X's burn. He was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for why he had not made this report until around a month after the burn had occurred.
6. In his trial affidavit, the father criticised the mother for having filled the hot water bottle with boiling water and for not having closed the lid securely. Despite insisting that he did not blame her, the father not only made the DCP notification, but criticised the mother before this court for having been 'so busy with her own issues' that she had failed to seek appropriate medical attention for X. This criticism was unwarranted, particularly in circumstances in which the father had been made aware that those 'issues' had been a serious and potentially fatal health crisis suffered by the maternal grandmother in China which had required urgent travel by the mother.
7. The evidence supports the conclusion that the incident involving the hot water bottle was an accident and does not support a finding that X is unsafe in the mother's care.
8. The father also alleged that there were safety issues for X in the form of the mother being chased by people with whom she had had disputes with respect to failed business ventures. He deposed that the mother had spent time 'in hiding' from such people and that 'dozens' of people had shown up at the parties' home. The mother acknowledged that one potential employee had attended at the parties' home on one occasion when X was a baby to ask why her proposed employment had not eventuated, and that she had at one time been contacted by the debt collection division of a bank in relation to an outstanding credit card debt. She otherwise denied the father's allegations in this regard. The evidence does not support a finding that X is at risk from any person chasing the mother.
9. As noted above, the father made allegations of violence against the mother, including that she had scratched and pushed him during the incident in early 2019. He also alleged that she had ripped his jacket during an altercation at a handover in May 2019. Even if it were accepted that the mother had engaged in situational violence as described by the father, it is of significance that his allegations, unlike those of the mother, are of isolated incidents and not a course of controlling and violent conduct.
10. I note that the father's proposal involves X continuing to live in the primary care of the mother for a period of approximately two further years and then spending half his time living with her. Although he disavowed the suggestion, I infer from this that the father accepts that the mother does not pose a serious risk to X's safety.
11. I do not accept that there is a risk to X's safety in the care of the mother.

1. Ms D reported that X struggled to provide her with information about his family, finding the process difficult and burdensome. Using bear cards designed to assist with identification of emotions, X identified feeling sad when spending time with the father, explaining he did not want to be there when he was with him.
2. To Ms D, the father described it as 'normal' for X to want to remain with his mother. The father acknowledged that X usually wanted to remain with his mother and indicated that he was not surprised by X's refusal to spend time with him for the observation session.
3. The mother told Ms D that X was resistant to spending time with the father because he did not feel listened to by him and because he complained that his father did not talk to him or play with him.
4. In the witness box (but not in his affidavit filed less than a week prior to the commencement of the trial), the father asserted that as X had matured, he had increasingly asked why he could not stay longer with the father, had indicated a lack of happiness with the existing arrangement, and had expressed a view that that arrangement was not 'fair.' This evidence did not sit well with Ms D's observations of X. Notwithstanding the father's assertions to the contrary, I formed the impression that X is likely aware of the father's desired outcome in the proceedings. This awareness may well have informed any comments that were made by X to the father.
5. The totality of the evidence before the court as to X's views does not suggest that he wishes to increase the time he spends with his father.

The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child

1. Both parties were born in China and emigrated to Australia as adults. X's Chinese heritage and culture is an important consideration in this matter.
2. To Ms D, the father expressed resistance to X learning or being spoken to in Mandarin, being the native language of both his parents. He explained this as being borne of a desire to ensure that X did not fall behind in English and that his English was clear and 'local and Aussie.' The mother expressed a view that it was important for X to speak both languages to enable him to converse with extended family, including his maternal grandparents, who speak only Mandarin. In the witness box, the father acknowledged the importance to X of his Chinese culture.
3. I otherwise have regard to X's young age and his clear attachment to his mother in particular in considering his developmental, psychological and emotional needs.

The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs

1. The father raised concerns about X's school attendance in the mother's care and the extent of her commitment to encouraging him to attend school. He alleged that the mother allowed X to stay up late, making it difficult for him to get up in time for school, and attributed what he considered to be X's poor performance at school to this. He deposed to having received communications from the school with respect to X's attendance rate and focus at school.
2. The mother denied that she kept X up late or kept him out of school without good cause. She deposed that many of his absences had resulted from illness. In the witness box, the father accepted that the issues raised by the school might simply be childhood development issues, rather than issues arising from problems with the mother's parenting.
3. The father also alleged that there were issues associated with the mother's parenting capacity arising from her mental health. He linked this to a thyroid condition suffered by the mother, which he considered had an impact on her hormones, manifesting in a risk of erratic behaviour and causing her to yell at times. This assertion was not supported by medical evidence. The father asserted this was 'just common sense' which 'everyone knows.' I do not agree. The father did not establish that the mother's parenting capacity was compromised by any mental or physical health condition.
4. The father alleged that X had made comments indicative of his inappropriate involvement in the parental dispute by the mother, such as asking the father if he had 'slept with another girl' while the mother had been pregnant and asking the father whether he had 'slammed' the mother on her face. To Ms D, X reported that his father did not 'let' him go to China, suggesting that the father's stance in this regard may have been communicated to him by the mother, but did not otherwise make comments indicative of any influence from the mother.
5. The father also alleged that the mother undermined his relationship with X by consistently arriving late to handovers (though it is noted that the majority of handovers occur at school) and by failing to respond in a timely manner, or sometimes at all, to his communications with respect to X. During the trial, he alleged that the mother used X to control and pressure him, both financially and emotionally.
6. Ms D did not express any concerns about the mother's parenting capacity. She recorded that the observations of X with his mother were lovely to watch, that it was clear that he relied on her for comfort and reassurance, and that she was able to recognise and respond to X's cues. When interviewed by Ms D, the mother demonstrated awareness of X's need for warm and emotionally attuned caregiving. Ms D described her as child-focused and opined that she impressed as well placed to meet X's needs for safe, predictable and nurturing care. This evidence was not successfully challenged. I accept it.
7. The evidence, considered as a whole, does not support a finding that there are limitations to the mother's capacity to provide for X's needs.

1. The mother alleged that X had made statements to her which suggested that he had been pressured by the father, such as 'Mummy is bad;' 'Daddy said if you sue him in court for property he will have nowhere to live;' 'Daddy told me that if I chose to say seven days with him, then you and Daddy don't have to go to Court anymore and that I could save Daddy a lot of money;' 'Daddy said that if I don't promise to live with him for seven days, then Daddy will never promise me anything again;' 'Daddy says he will win the court case;' and a report that his father had offered him an iPad, cash and 'lots of toys' if he expressed a preference for equal time. The father denied having made such comments to X or having discussed the court proceedings with him.
2. The mother also alleged that in the context of a dispute between the parties regarding X undergoing x-rays (which is discussed later in these reasons), X had reported to her that the father had told him 'doctors kill people, you cannot trust them.' The father admitted to having 'expressed [his] concern' about the 'harmful effects' of x-rays to X and to having shown him what he considered to be age appropriate videos about radiation. The father demonstrated limited insight into the potential for this to cause X fear if he needed an x-ray in future, stating that he had not told him that it was 'so scary or so bad,' just that it is 'harmful and has side effects.'
3. Ms D raised concerns about the father's insight into the issues in his relationship with X. She described the father as being unable to countenance that his relationship with X might not be positive, and reported that he had not demonstrated a capacity to understand the situation from X's perspective, instead remaining focused on what she considered to be his sense of entitlement as X's parent.
4. This observation was supported by evidence given by the father to the effect that X had been 'quite happy' with the week about arrangement the parties had trialled prior to the commencement of the proceedings, which did not sit well with his acknowledgment to Ms D that wanting to remain with his mother was 'normal' for X.
5. Ms D also expressed concern about the father's capacity to be child-focused and considered that his views about the future arrangements appeared to be reflective of what he considered he was entitled to, rather than what might support X given his current preference for remaining with the mother. The father told Ms D that he considered that the mother's power 'must be balanced,' which he considered would be achieved by an equal time arrangement.
6. The father was cross-examined about his failure to adopt recommendations made in a Child Impact Report that had been prepared earlier in the proceedings that he undertake parenting courses, which might have assisted with improvement in his relationship with X and X's sense of security in his care. He responded that he had felt unable to read all of the Child Impact Report because he had experienced its contents as 'torture' and as 'an insult to a father who loves his son.'
7. I accept that the father loves X immensely and that reading a report suggestive of deficiencies in their relationship would have been very difficult for him. Nonetheless, the father's focus on his own emotional needs and his unwillingness to engage with the issues raised by an expert did nothing to assist X or to reassure the court with respect to the issues raised in relation to the father's insight.
8. Ms D further reported that the father appeared unable to recognise the value for X of his relationship with his mother, and that he struggled to appreciate the impact of his own behaviours on X. For example, she reported that the father remained focused on his own needs when discussing physical 'tug of war' incidents that had taken place between the parties over X (which incidents are discussed later in these reasons) and did not give consideration as to what this experience might have been like for X until asked directly to reflect on it. While he acknowledged it would not have been a nice experience for X, the father appeared unable to put himself in X's position, remaining focused on his own needs.
9. The father was dismissive with respect to the concerns raised by Ms D regarding his ability to focus on X, characterising them as demonstrative of her 'severe bias.' The father similarly dismissed Ms D's recommendation that he engage in therapeutic intervention to address the allegations of family violence.
10. In the witness box, the father asserted that his desire for a week about arrangement was based on 'fairness.' He asserted that X was aware of the 'unfairness' and had volunteered that perspective without pressure or influence from the father. This evidence is at odds with Ms D's observations with respect to X.
11. Although it is evident that the father cares deeply for X and takes his role as his father very seriously, taken as a whole, the evidence gives rise to some cause for caution with respect to the father's capacity to meet X's needs, particularly his emotional needs.

The benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so

1. It is evident that X is dearly loved by both of his parents.
2. The father expressed concern during the trial that there may be a perception or allegation that he did not care about X. It was clear throughout the father's evidence that this was not the case. The father quite obviously loves X. It is evident that he is deeply committed to his role as X's father and to pursuing outcomes, both inside and outside the courtroom context, which he considers to be in X's best interests.
3. However, notwithstanding the father's protestations to the contrary, the evidence reveals that there are difficulties in the relationship between X and his father. When interviewed for the purposes of the family report, X steadfastly refused to spend time with his father for the purpose of an observation despite encouragement from the mother. The father did not appear to Ms D to be appear surprised by X's refusal to spend time with him and considered his preference to be with his mother was normal for X.
4. Ms D described X's refusal to participate in the observation session with his father as worrying, as having spent regular time with his father for the majority of his life, such reluctance would not be expected. She noted however, that if considered in the context of a history of family violence, his reluctance would not be surprising.
5. Under cross-examination, Ms D accepted that what she had observed might not be representative of X's presentation in his everyday life. However, she did not consider it likely to have been caused by other factors suggested to her by the father, such as X feeling pressured or being conscious that it was not a day upon which he was scheduled to be in the care of his father.
6. The mother gave evidence that X exhibits emotional and clingy behaviours upon returning to her care approximately 80 per cent of the time, that at times he expresses reluctance to continue returning to his father's care, and that at times he reports his father having yelled at him upon having learnt of actions taken by the mother whilst X was in her care. That evidence was consistent both with Ms D's observations of X's behaviour with respect to the father and with other evidence before the court with respect to the father's attitude towards the mother's parenting decisions and actions. I accept it.
7. The mother accepted that the father loves X but observed that 'the way he loves is controlling.' This observation is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence before the court.
8. Notwithstanding these concerns, I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests to have a relationship with both his parents to the extent that this can be done safely.

Anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child

1. The nature of the co-parenting relationship between X's parents, their level of respect for each other's roles in X's life, and their levels of trust in one another as parents are important considerations in the circumstances of this case. As submitted by counsel for the ICL, whilst both parents plainly want what is best for X, their views of what this entails diverge in significant respects. It is clear from the evidence of both parties that their co-parenting relationship is highly conflictual.
2. It is also evident that the conflict between the parties is having a negative impact on X. Ms D described him having presented as burdened and being caught in the middle. Neither party, particularly the father, presented as motivated to make meaningful change with respect to their own approach to the conflict and their interactions with one another.
3. A particular matter of concern is the father's negative attitude towards the mother. In the witness box, the father repeatedly insisted that he respects the mother, and said that he respects her love for X. However, this was not borne out by other aspects of the evidence before the court, nor by the manner in which the father presented his case, both before and after the withdrawal of his legal representatives.
4. Ms D reported that when interviewed by her, the father remained focused on his negative views of the mother, frequently deflecting to those during his interview, and that rather than appearing child-focused, he presented as focused on portraying the mother in a negative light. She also reported that the father demonstrated a lack of support for the mother's role as X's parent and for X's relationship with her. This observation was consistent with assertions made by the father during the course of the trial, including statements to the effect that the mother did not love X enough to perform the role of primary carer and did not love him 'to the same level' as did the father.
5. The father's complaints about the mother included allegations of her failing to take X to swimming lessons, yelling and shouting, not washing his food containers, and failing to facilitate his attendance at choir (being an activity arranged for X by the father which fell during X's time in the mother's care). In his closing submissions, the father suggested that the mother's inability to give an immediate answer to the question of the number of years before X commenced high school was indicative of limited attention being paid by her to X's education. He also took the mother's actions in parking her car at his residence while she travelled overseas not as an opportunity to demonstrate the parties' ability to work together, but as an opportunity undermine her before the court.
6. Despite some protestation from the father, it was implicit in his case that he did not seriously contend that the mother posed a risk to X or that X should not spend extended time in the mother's care. These complaints demonstrated more about the father's negative view of the mother than they did about the mother's parenting.
7. In addition to being critical of the mother, it is apparent that the father deeply mistrusts her. There were a number of instances during his evidence when this became apparent. One example of this was his evidence of having arrived at X's school in July 2022 to collect X despite already having been told by the mother that she had attended to collect him. The attendance of both parties at the school culminated in an altercation between the parties in X's presence which required police intervention, as discussed later in these reasons.
8. When asked why he had attended at the school knowing that the mother had done so, the father said that he had gone to the school 'to check' and 'to make sure he was safe.' He was unable to explain why X might have been unsafe having been collected by the mother. He gave similar evidence of having wanted to be sure and to see for himself by attending at X's school on an occasion in May 2025 when the mother had told him that X had not been well.
9. The father also demonstrated mistrust in the mother by alleging that she had taken X to the hospital on a number of occasions during the proceedings not because she was genuinely concerned about his health but because she was 'trying to show the court how much she cares.' He maintained this allegation in his closing submissions, alleging that the mother had shown limited interest in X's medical care prior to the commencement of the proceedings.
10. The father also questioned the mother's 'real intention' in subjecting X to an x-ray on 27 February 2024 (an incident discussed in greater details later in these reasons), despite the fact that the parties agreed that X had been unwell and despite the fact that he had ultimately been diagnosed with pneumonia. He admitted that he had deposed in March 2024 to a belief that the mother's motivation in taking X to hospital on occasions upon which he had had x-rays was not X's best interests, but to maximise his (the father's) pain by exposing X to radiation. As at the time of the trial, he still held concerns about her motivation.
11. When asked directly whether he trusted the mother to do what is best for X, the father responded that that was 'a very hard question.' He was unable to express a view as to whether X's best interests were at the heart of the decisions made by the mother. Ultimately, he conceded that he does not trust her and that the parties cannot work cooperatively.
12. By contrast to the father's attitude towards the mother, the mother presented to Ms D as focused on best supporting X, and as recognising the importance for X of having both parents involved in his life and having a continued relationship with his father, notwithstanding her own reported experiences with the father.
13. Notwithstanding some aspects of her evidence which could be taken to suggest a lack of support for X's relationship with his father at times in the past, such as her acknowledgment that she had not been concerned when X had spent no time at all with the father between July and October 2022, the mother's commitment to facilitating X's relationship with his father was reflected in her comments to Ms D that notwithstanding her evidence as to violence, 'he is still [X]'s daddy' and that X needed the love of both of his parents.
14. It was also reflected in her proposal to continue the regime of alternate weekend time between X and the father, notwithstanding X's resistance and notwithstanding the recommendation in the family report that the time be reduced if the father failed (as he did) to undertake appropriate therapeutic intervention. The mother's evidence in this regard was that she was conscious that this was a longstanding arrangement to which X was accustomed and she did not want to impose any changes which might impact on X. This was a child-focused approach.
15. The mother gave evidence of her view that notwithstanding the difficulties in the relationship between X and the father, there were long term benefits to X of 'staying in' the relationship with his father. She said that at times when X has exhibited reluctance to enter the father's care, she has told him that he has to have a relationship with his father and has to respect him.
16. The mother said that despite X's reluctance, he was aware that there was a court order in place and that refusal to attend was not an option. The father did not allege that the mother had failed or refused to make X available in accordance with the interim orders.
17. Both parties gave evidence of two incidents which had occurred at X's school in early July 2022, prior to the commencement of the present proceedings and shortly after the mother had informed the father that she no longer agreed to continue the week about arrangement as she considered that X was not coping. Both incidents involved disputes between the parties as to which of them X would leave with, resulting in both parties physically holding onto X in a 'tug of war' and police intervention being required.
18. The mother asserted that on the first such occasion, which occurred in July 2022, she and X were on their way to her car, which was parked on the street outside the school, when the father approached and grabbed X around the waist, following which she grabbed X's torso to prevent the father from taking him. The father described his conduct as 'cuddling' X. The mother deposed that the father yelled at her that he would attend the school each day and take X, and that X was crying and clinging to her.
19. Although the father acknowledged he had been aware prior to arriving at the school that the mother had attended to collect X, he repeatedly asserted that the mother had tried to prevent 'us' (being the father and X) from leaving. The parties disagreed as to how long it had taken for the police to arrive, but agreed that it had been at least 30 minutes. Both parties physically held onto X until the police arrived, following which they told the father to leave.
20. The father asserted, and I accept, that he considered that X was scheduled to be in his care on this occasion irrespective of whether the week about arrangement was to continue, but the mother had attended at the school early to collect X to prevent him from leaving with the father. However, the father presented as focused on the fact that it was '[his] day' rather than on the impact on X of what had transpired.
21. The second such occasion occurred approximately five days later, in July 2022. On this occasion, the parties agreed that the mother had been on school grounds with X when the father approached. The police arrived quickly on this occasion and again X remained in the care of the mother. The father was told by police that they had spoken to X and he had expressed a desire to go with the mother.
22. In the witness box, the father insisted that his actions in attending the school to collect X had been justified because 'it was week about' despite acknowledging that he had been aware that the mother had not, at that time, agreed to the continuation of a week about arrangement. Again, the father presented as focused on his own entitlements rather than X's needs.
23. Information produced by DCP[17] suggests that on at least one of these occasions, the police determined that X should leave with the mother because he was 'clinging to' her.
24. These incidents reflect poorly on both parties and their ability to prioritise X's needs over their conflict. Counsel for the ICL submitted that both parties exhibited ongoing deficits with respect to their levels of child focus with respect to these incidents. Both also exhibited limited insight into their own role in the unfortunate circumstances that had arisen.
25. Under cross-examination, when asked why he had not left on the first occasion in order to make things less distressing for X, the father gave the self-focused answer that X had been supposed to be with him and that the mother had 'caused' the incident. He said that he had not thought to leave. This was despite the fact that he had been made aware prior to his arrival at the school that the mother had attended to collect X. When asked to consider whether the incident would have been distressing to X, he said he had not thought about it at the time, though in retrospect he could see that this would have been so. However, he repeated his view that it had been the mother's fault.
26. The mother, whilst also presenting as lacking in insight as to the consequences for X of her choice to engage in conflict with the father rather than allowing X to leave with him and addressing the conflict through other means, appeared somewhat more child-focused, in that she explained her refusal to leave by reference to X's distress about the prospect of continuing to spend extended time in his father's care, X's stated views, and her fear that the same situation would continue to arise in future if she allowed the father to take X.
27. There was also an incident that occurred at a handover in mid-2019, being the date upon which the father provided the mother with the letter, as discussed earlier in these reasons. The father's evidence was that after handing X to him, the mother had suddenly angrily approached him from behind and tried to stop him leaving with X, ripping the father's jacket in the process. The father deposed that X had tried to push the mother away and said words to her to the effect of 'let go, let go.'
28. The mother's evidence was that the father and his mother had attended and demanded, in X's presence, that the mother seek the withdrawal of the criminal charges that were then pending against the father, and that she became intimidated and overwhelmed and requested that X be returned to her. The mother called the police and the father ultimately left with X. The father deposed that the police officers had told him that what the mother had done was 'clearly wrong.'
29. The parties' poor co-parenting relationship and lack of cooperation was also demonstrated by a dispute which emerged between them in or around May 2025 with respect to X's participation in a youth choir. The father was eager for X to participate in the choir. His evidence was that this had been recommended verbally by X's music teacher and that X had been keen to participate. The mother did not agree that X was keen to participate and did not agree to X attending the choir sessions, which fell during times when X was in her care. Rather than respecting the mother's decision in this regard, the father wrote an email to the choir office which was critical of her.[18]
30. The parties' mutual mistrust and lack of respect for one another as parents was also reflected in allegations they each made that the other had offered to trade financial outcomes for outcomes with respect to X. The father alleged to Ms D that the mother had agreed following their separation to allow him to have full-time care of X in return for a payment of $5,000. He alleged that the mother had used X as a 'tool' with respect to financial matters.
31. The mother alleged that the father had proposed to pay her the sum of $55,000 over a period of 10 years if she agreed to an equal time arrangement, and that he had proposed to provide the mother with the outcome she sought with respect to financial matters in return for primary care of X for 10 years. The father's evidence was initially that he could not recall the specific details but it was possible that he had said this. He later said that he had made this offer and the mother had smiled in response.

1. The father sought to increase the time X spent in his care to the conclusion of school on Wednesday until 5.00 pm on Sunday each alternate weekend (being four nights per fortnight), together with afternoon time on the Wednesday in the other week (for the purpose of facilitating X's attendance at choir); with a week about arrangement during school holidays.
2. The father otherwise proposed that from 1 July 2027, the arrangement transition to a week about regime at all times.
3. The mother sought to continue the longstanding arrangement whereby (save for alternative arrangements made between the parties from time to time), X lived with her and spent time with the father from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday each alternate weekend (being three nights per fortnight).
4. The mother's formal position was that the regular fortnightly time with the father should continue during school holidays. She made an open offer at the commencement of the trial,[19] which provided for X's time with the father to be extended so that he would spend five consecutive nights in lieu of each regular occasion of three nights with the father during school term holidays, and five consecutive nights each alternate week during the long summer school holidays. Her ultimate position as pressed at the conclusion of the trial was that X spend one additional night in each school holiday period with the father commencing immediately, and a further additional night commencing in the 2026/2027 long summer school holidays.
5. The ICL's proposal, which mirrored the open offer that had been made by the mother, was that the time X spends with the father be extended by an additional two nights in each school term holiday period and by an additional two nights on each occasion of time during the long summer school holidays, commencing from the date of the orders.
6. The father's evidence was that he had consented to the existing arrangements only under significant pressure from a lawyer whose services he had terminated shortly afterwards, had never been of the view that those arrangements were in X's best interests, and had not been aware that it was possible to bring an interim application to vary those arrangements. Irrespective of the father's position in this regard, the interim arrangements had been in place for a significant period of time prior to the trial.
7. Ms D did not support any increase in X's time with the father due to concerns about the nature of their relationship as well as the allegations of family violence. She expressed concerns about the father's capacity to provide X with a parenting environment conducive to meeting his needs as the arrangements currently stood, but considered there was also merit in school being used as the handover point to avoid X being further exposed to conflict or violence between his parents.
8. In the witness box, Ms D agreed that, particularly in light of the incidents which had occurred at handovers in July 2022, it would be best for X not to see his parents conducting handovers regularly, to avoid both further circumstances where he was caught in the middle, and to avoid him worrying that such a development may occur. She opined that for this reason, the benefits of having handovers occur at school likely outweighed any benefits X may derive from a reduction of time in the care of the father. Ms D further opined that the longstanding nature of the existing arrangement and X's familiarity with it weighed in favour of its retention.
9. Ms D gave evidence that any increase in X's time with the father was contraindicated as a consequence of the parties' poor co-parenting relationship. She also opined that parallel parenting would be unlikely to be able to be implemented successfully in light of the extent of the parties' differing views as to X's best interests, and that it could result in X being required to pass messages between his parents and keep each of them up to date with respect to his routine.
10. When asked whether there as any real difference between an arrangement involving three nights per fortnight with the father and one involving four, Ms D responded that it would probably feel that way for X, and that four could be more than he could handle. Ms D was also of the view that an increase in time with the father in the face of his ongoing reluctance could be perceived by X as a message that his views had been disregarded and could lead to further resistance on his part.
11. Ms D gave evidence that for an equal or substantially shared arrangement to work effectively in X's best interests, the parties would need to be able to co-parent effectively, be child-focused in the decisions they made and share similar ideas concerning their child and parenting. She indicated that a high level of conflict is a contraindicator to a successful shared care arrangement, and that an attempt to implement such an arrangement in circumstances of high conflict could place a child in 'a difficult predicament.'
12. The father accepted that for equal time to work effectively, the parties would need to cooperate. It is abundantly clear from the evidence before the court, including the father's own evidence, that the parties in this case do not share the attributes which could be expected to enable a shared care arrangement to operate in X's best interests.
13. For these reasons, I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests to remain in the primary care of his mother and am not satisfied that it would be in his best interests to increase the time he spends with his father during school terms to equal time or at all.
14. With respect to school holidays, Ms D opined that X may not even be able to tolerate additional time with the father during school holidays, but was also of the view that the opportunity to engage in fun experiences together during school holiday time without the pressure of their routine could assist with their relationship and could be of benefit.
15. It was submitted on behalf of the mother that her proposal for a modest and gradual increase in school holiday time would enable X to become used to the additional time and reduce the risk that his reluctance would develop into refusal. Counsel for the ICL submitted, and I accept, that in light of X's age and the fact that he has been spending extended overnight time in the care of the father for an extended period of time, there is no basis for any delay in implementation of the additional time.
16. Having regard to these considerations, and in particular, balancing the competing risks and benefits to X of increasing the time he spends with his father during school holidays as identified by Ms D, I am satisfied that the arrangement proposed by the ICL with respect to school holidays will meet X's best interests.

1. The findings I have made with respect to family violence suggest that requiring the parties to engage in joint decision-making with respect to major long-term issues is unlikely to be either appropriate or in X's best interests. However, Ms D opined, and I accept, that family violence is not the only factor militating against an order for joint decision-making in the circumstances of this case.
2. The level of conflict between the parties, their mutual mistrust, and their lack of a functional co-parenting alliance has already been discussed, as has the father's negative view of, and tendency to criticise, the mother.
3. The limited ability of the parties to manage their conflict and shield X from it was demonstrated in the fact that police were required to attend on two occasions to diffuse stand offs at X's school. All of these matters militate against the appropriateness and workability of an order for the parties to have joint decision-making responsibility with respect to major long-term issues concerning X.
4. A particular flashpoint for conflict between the parties following their separation has been their divergent views with respect to medical issues and their consequential disagreements as to the appropriate decisions to be made with respect to medical treatment for X. The mother's approach is to be heavily guided by the advice of medical professionals, whereas the father is more sceptical and more likely to doubt or question medical advice.
5. This has manifested in particular in disputes surrounding whether x-rays should be administered to X. On two occasions whilst in the care of the mother, being in May 2023 and in February 2024, X has been taken to the emergency department of E Hospital and given x-rays. On both occasions, this occurred on medical advice. On the first occasion, it was to investigate a lump or growth on X's chest, and on the second, to diagnose pneumonia. The mother's evidence was that the x-rays had not been requested by her, but had been agreed to by her upon being recommended by medical staff.
6. The father was extremely upset about X having been exposed to ionising radiation, and his lingering anger about this was evident in his presentation in the witness box when questioned about these incidents. He deposed that the first x-ray had not been necessary, though he is not medically qualified and adduced no expert evidence to support his assertion. He also deposed that he would have liked to question the treating doctors about alternative options which did not involve exposure to ionising radiation prior to X undergoing an x-ray.
7. The father wrote to the mother's solicitor and the ICL on 6 June 2023, referring to the mother's 'reckless/brutal behaviour' which he considered might 'bring risk or irreversible damage to [X]'s development.'[20] In the witness box, he confirmed that he had intended to convey that the mother's actions had been reckless and brutal towards both X and himself. In closing submissions, he continued to assert that the mother had caused damage to X, asserting that she could 'never be absolved of suspicion of having intentionally caused harm' to him.
8. The second occasion upon which an x-ray was administered to X occurred in the wake of another demonstration of the parties' fundamental lack of agreement with respect to medical decisions regarding X. X had become unwell on Wednesday 21 February 2024 and the mother had kept him home from school. On Friday 23 February 2024, X was due to enter the father's care, and the father met the mother and X at a medical centre where the mother had taken X.
9. X was diagnosed with pharyngitis and prescribed antibiotics. The father then took X home with him and took X's prescription with him, but did not fill it. His evidence was that he had not filled the prescription because he favoured a 'natural' approach and had wanted to observe X for longer before taking action because he considered that recovery from sickness takes time. He said that he would likely have given X the antibiotics if he had not improved after approximately seven days.
10. The father acknowledged that he had been present when the doctor had prescribed the antibiotics, had not raised any concerns with the doctor, had not expressed his view that the medication was unnecessary, had not objected to the prescription being given, and had not asked about the likely consequences of failure to administer the antibiotics. His evidence was that he had considered it necessary to do 'homework,' by which he meant online research, before deciding whether the administer the medication as prescribed, but he acknowledged that his research had given rise to no basis for concern about X taking the antibiotics.
11. When X was returned to the mother's care in February 2024, he was still unwell and had a fever and a high temperature. The mother took him to the hospital where the x-ray was performed and a diagnosis of pneumonia was made. The mother's evidence was that the doctors had told her that the antibiotics which had been prescribed by the general practitioner (and not administered by the father) 'should have worked.'
12. The father's approach towards the question of x-rays has led to the mother being hesitant to inform him of any hospital visits until after the event, for fear that a dispute will emerge and police intervention will be required, causing emotional harm to X, and for fear that the father will prevent X from receiving recommended medical care. The mother's failure to communicate or consult with him with respect to medical issues has been a point of significant grievance for the father.
13. In the witness box, the father dismissed the mother's concern about conflict between the parties, saying 'conflicts do not exist, they are imaginary.' This was an astonishing statement in the context of the history of extremely high levels of conflict between the parties with respect to medical issues and more broadly, which is clearly revealed by the evidence of both parties. This statement demonstrated that the father is either completely lacking in insight as to the nature of his interactions with the mother, or is so unwilling to concede that she may be correct that he will go to extraordinary lengths to avoid doing so.
14. The father complained that the second x-ray, in particular, had taken place after he had expressed his concerns and had been assured by the mother's solicitor that he would be notified immediately of any future emergency department attendances. He adduced no documentary evidence demonstrating that such an assurance had been given. He maintained his complaint about the x-ray having been administered despite acknowledging that the mother had not subjected X to the x-ray for no reason, and despite his knowledge that it had resulted in X's diagnosis of pneumonia.
15. The father adduced no medical evidence to support his assertion that the mother had unnecessarily exposed X to risk and did not establish that, in circumstances in which the mother had followed medical advice, she had acted other than consistently with an entirely reasonable interpretation of X's best interests.
16. The father insisted in the witness box that it was not a foregone conclusion that he would refuse to allow X to undergo x-rays if they were recommended by medical professionals in future. He asserted that he simply sought the opportunity to enquire about other available options and to have his voice heard, and indicated that if the doctors advised that there were no safer alternatives available, he would agree to an x-ray taking place.
17. This evidence did not sit well with a text message he had sent the mother on 29 February 2024 saying 'the fall of [X] will do nothing good but only damage not only to me but also to you. I am his father, strongly oppose you to use ionizing radiation on [X], why? For who??' Nor did it accord with an affidavit he acknowledged having filed in March 2024 in which he deposed that the mother had known that he would have said 'no' to an x-ray unless the situation was life-threatening.
18. Furthermore, I accept the submission of counsel for the ICL that the events concerning X's prescription for antibiotics must inform the court's assessment of the father's protestations in this regard, noting that on that occasion, the father had had the opportunity to have his voice heard, had declined to exercise that opportunity, and had nonetheless denied X treatment contrary to medical advice.
19. In the witness box, the father made reference to many people having died from exposure to ionising radiation following the 1986 nuclear explosion at Chernobyl. This was an immensely disproportionate comparison. The father refused to accept the proposition that x-rays performed at hospitals in Australia are safer than exposure to the Chernobyl nuclear explosion on the basis that this was 'a medical question,' despite his refusal to accept the validity of the opinions of medical professionals with respect to treatment of X, both with respect to x-rays and with respect to the antibiotics, and his criticism of the mother for having accepted and acted upon such advice.
20. Such was the strength of the father's opposition to X undergoing x-rays that on 8 March 2024, he filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking an injunction restraining each of the parties from permitting X to undergo such procedures (together with other medical treatment including vaccinations) without the consent of the other party. This application was filed by the father personally despite the fact that he was legally represented at the time it was filed. It was later withdrawn. The ICL submitted, and I accept, that this application was emblematic of the difficulties and potential medical risks to which X would be exposed if decision-making with respect to medical issues were to be held jointly by the parties.
21. The events outlined above weigh against an order providing for decision-making with respect to major long-term issues to be shared between the parties, both for what they reveal about the fundamental inability of the parties to reach agreement with respect to such issues, and for what they demonstrate with respect to the father's fixed views, suspicions and mistrust of medical professionals and reluctance to follow medical advice with respect to X's care.
22. In the witness box, the father acknowledged that he was unlikely to accept medical advice without first doing his own research and 'due diligence.' It is not unreasonable for a parent to seek a second opinion, to endeavour to optimise their own knowledge with respect to medical issues concerning their child, and to think carefully about medical decisions. The father expressed a wish that his approach to medical issues could be understood and respected, and that is a reasonable desire. However, the fact remains that the parties have very different approaches to medical advice and treatment and little capacity for compromise, and this provides a significant obstacle to their likely ability to engage in effective joint decision-making.
23. The father was somewhat dismissive with respect to the relevance of the parties' entrenched conflict to their prospects of successfully co-parenting. He repeatedly expressed a view that once the court proceedings were over, co-parenting would not be a concern. He said the mother's position and conduct with respect to the areas of conflict between the parties were 'just for show,' 'for the court to see,' and 'not her true beliefs,' and that her motives were 'not pure.' He showed no recognition of the extent to which this view demonstrated both a dismissive attitude towards the mother and her opinions and a serious allegation against her, neither of which bode well for successful co-parenting.
24. I accept the submission of counsel for the ICL that the manner in which the father put his case reflected a lack of genuine willingness on his part to take on board and consider the mother's views.
25. Ms D expressed concern about long-term decision-making being shared between the parties. She acknowledged (as do I) concern about the exclusion of one parent from significant issues concerning X's life, but worried about about the likely inability of the parties to reach agreement about salient issues for X should decision-making be shared between them.
26. In the witness box, Ms D gave evidence that children need their parents to be able to come to decisions about medical and like issues relatively quickly. She agreed that the history of this matter, particularly the parties' polarised views and differing priorities, as demonstrated with respect to the circumstances of X's pneumonia diagnosis and the administration of the x-rays, indicated concerns about their ability to reach joint decisions and to put their own views aside in order to reach agreement about X's interests. She opined that for X to have the best prospects of decisions being made in a timely manner, one party should have sole responsibility for decision-making.
27. Ms D also gave evidence that the absence of the same characteristics of inter-parental relationships required for successful implementation of a shared care arrangement, as already discussed, would also be a contraindicator to successful sharing of decision-making.
28. Ms D was asked whether co-parenting counselling could assist with repair of the parties' co-parenting relationship, but opined that such a process would be unlikely to be successful in this case because it would require both parties to approach the process in a manner that was open to criticism of their positions, which did not appear likely.
29. I am not satisfied that the parties have the requisite level of cooperation, mutual trust or respect to enable joint decision-making to work effectively. Despite the father's hopes for improvement in the future, the history of this matter demonstrates that the parties simply cannot consistently cooperate effectively and that they often fundamentally disagree about important long-term issues, particularly medical decisions.
30. Against this backdrop, requiring the parties to engage in joint decision-making can only be expected to lead to ongoing conflict, which will undermine X's best interests and potentially prevent him from obtaining important medical care. In this regard, I accept the submission of counsel for the ICL that a requirement of joint decision-making would likely ultimately result not in genuinely joint decision-making and implementation but in either one party capitulating to defuse the inevitable conflict, or one party undermining any decision that was made, as occurred with respect to the antibiotics.
31. I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests for the mother, being X's primary carer, to have sole decision-making responsibility with respect to major long-term issues.
32. The mother readily acknowledged that it was important for the father to be kept aware of developments concerning major long-term issues for X, including his health and his education. However, she resisted any requirement for communication with respect to decisions regarding major long-term issues ahead of the making of such decisions, for fear of being subjected to a barrage of communications by the father seeking to impose his fixed views upon her, leading to increased conflict.
33. Ms D opined that there could be benefit in the father's views being considered and taken into account by the mother in exercising decision-making responsibility and for the father to have the ability to liaise with education and healthcare providers. However, she acknowledged that this could create additional avenues for conflict, and considered that it might be preferable for the mother to provide information to the father than for the father to have direct involvement.
34. The ICL opposed there being any requirement for the mother to consult with the father prior to making decisions regarding major long-term issues, citing the father's ongoing criticism of the mother, his minimisation of what could have been a very serious situation involving X's diagnosis of pneumonia, and the risk that consultation would lead to disruption and conflict and thereby undermine X's best interests.
35. I accept the submissions of the ICL in this regard and will not make an order requiring the mother to consult with the father prior to making decisions with respect to major long-term issues. The orders will provide, however, that the mother is to inform the father of decisions made by her in the exercise of her responsibility in this regard, as she agreed was appropriate.
36. In the event that the mother was awarded sole decision-making responsibility with respect to major long-term issues, the father sought to impose a requirement that the mother ensure that his views regarding x-rays, ionising radiation and the like were brought to the attention of any doctors treating X before any decisions were made. The father pointed to no evidence to suggest that he held knowledge or information with respect to the safety of such procedures beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to be within the knowledge and contemplation of medical professionals.
37. In my view, such a requirement would undermine the operation of the order for sole decision-making responsibility, would lead to more, rather than less, difficulty in ensuring important decisions for X could be made in a timely manner, and would invite conflict over the extent of the mother's compliance with the stipulated requirement. The proposed order will not be made.

1. The mother sought liberty to travel overseas with X. She initially proposed that travel occur on one occasion each long summer school holiday period for up to three weeks, upon compliance with conditions as to the provision of notice and information to the father. She also sought related orders providing for communication between X and the father during such travel and for the acquisition of a passport for X.
2. The open offer made by the mother at the commencement of the trial[21] provided for the mother to be at liberty to travel overseas with X on the condition that such travel be limited to countries which were signatories to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ('the Hague Convention').
3. The mother's position ultimately pressed at the conclusion of the trial was that she be permitted to travel to China from the time X reached the age of 12, but be permitted to travel to countries which were signatories to the Hague Convention immediately. It was submitted on her behalf that this would enable X to enjoy many of the benefits of international travel and to spend time with family members in locations proximate to China.
4. The father opposed any order permitting overseas travel and sought an injunction restraining each of the parties from travelling outside the Commonwealth of Australia with the child without the written and certified consent of the other party.
5. The ICL proposed that the mother be permitted to travel overseas with X upon him attaining the age of 13 years, upon conditions including but not limited to the payment of a bond of $30,000.
6. As already mentioned, both of the parties are from China and X is therefore of Chinese culture and background. It would undeniably be of benefit to him to travel to China and experience, be immersed in and learn about this culture directly.
7. Furthermore, all of X's grandparents live in China. He has developed relationships with his grandparents, as they have all spent extended periods of time in Australia during his lifetime. This is another reason why travel to China could be expected to be of considerable benefit to X.
8. The mother deposed, and the father accepted, that the maternal grandmother had been in poor health during the early part of 2025 and had suffered multiple chronic health conditions which had rendered her future ability to travel to Australia uncertain. The combined effect of the maternal grandmother's poor health and the mother's present inability to take X to China was that that the mother had undertaken a large number of short trips to China to see and care for her mother.
9. However, in the witness box in September 2025, the mother gave evidence that her mother's health was 'steady,' that she had not been required to travel to China to assist with her health care since June 2025, and that she did not anticipate being required to travel to China again within the coming six months.
10. The mother also gave evidence that her mother's health was such that she would be able to travel to Australia, and that the mother was intending to attempt to arrange for her parents to travel to Australia for a period of one year. She said that whilst this was dependent on obtaining a visa, she had never had difficulty obtaining a visa for them in the past.
11. X told Ms D that he wanted to go on holiday to China to see his grandparents.
12. It is also highly likely that X would benefit significantly from the enriching and educational experience of travel to countries other than China.
13. The father's opposition to the mother's proposal for travel was based not on a suggestion that X would not benefit from such travel, but on the risk that X would not be returned to Australia.
14. The evidence before the court suggests that the mother has limited ties to Australia other than X. She migrated to Australia on a partner visa following the commencement of her relationship with the father and has since obtained Australian citizenship. She does not own real estate in Australia, has received her property settlement payment from the father in the form of a cash payment, and is not in employment. Her parents reside in China and her mother has experienced poor health and has required her support. The evidence does not reveal that the mother has any family members in Australia other than X.
15. The mother gave evidence that her life was established in Australia, that she valued the Australian education and health systems and the employment opportunities that existed here, and that she had no desire to reside in China.
16. The mother gave evidence that she had approximately $200,000 left over from her property settlement after payment of legal fees and that she intended to use those funds to purchase a home in Australia. She agreed that a portion of the funds could be applied to the payment of a bond to secure her return with X if she were permitted to travel overseas with him.
17. It was of significance to the father's opposition to the mother being permitted by order to travel with X to China that China is not a signatory to the Hague Convention. I accept that this is a significant factor going to the risks associated with permitting the travel as sought by the mother.
18. The father pointed out, and I accept, that any order permitting any overseas travel, even if limited to countries that were signatories to the Hague Convention, would enable the mother to travel from Australia to a country that was a signatory to the convention and from there to China, and such orders would not therefore protect against the risk that she would travel to China with X and stay there either permanently or for a period exceeding that permitted by any court order.
19. The father accepted that at the commencement of the proceedings, he had sought an order permitting each of the parties to travel overseas with X from the time he reached the age of seven. He also accepted, as general propositions, as do I, that it would be beneficial for X to be able to explore the world, and that X's Chinese cultural heritage was important to him.
20. The prospect of payment of a bond to secure X's return was put to the father, but he did not consider that this would provide adequate protection against the risk. Although this position did not sit well with the father's allegation that the mother was motivated by money and not interest in X, I accept that a bond would not eliminate the risk about which the father is concerned with respect to international travel.
21. Ms D gave evidence that if X was unable to travel to China before he reached adulthood, he would likely miss out on some experiences. I accept also that the longer any travel is delayed, the less likely it is that X will still be fortunate enough to have all of his grandparents and have the opportunity to further develop his relationships with and experiences of them.
22. Ms D was unable to say whether there was a particular age at which it was likely that any risk of X not being returned to Australia would be diminished by reason of his autonomy. She agreed that as X became older, it would become more difficult for the mother to take him away against his wishes.
23. As accepted by counsel for the ICL, however, X's level of autonomy goes only to any attempt to remove him from or retain him outside Australia against his wishes, and provides no protection in the event that he is a willing, neutral or even reluctant but compliant participant in any such removal or retention.
24. I have regard to the fact that the mother has, even on the father's case, largely been compliant with court orders throughout the proceedings. I have also had regard to my findings, as discussed earlier in these reasons, as to the mother's ongoing support for X's relationship with his father.
25. Nonetheless, I am not satisfied that the likely benefits to X and the protective measures proposed by the mother and the ICL are sufficient to overcome the risk identified by the father that X would not return to Australia, the consequences of which would, as submitted by the father, be life changing for X.
26. I do not discount the possibility that there will come a time when X's age, level of autonomy and other circumstances will be such that overseas travel, including travel to China, will be in his best interests, but any attempt to identify that time now would be no more than speculation.
27. For these reasons, the orders will provide that the parties are each restrained from travelling overseas with X without the written consent of the order, and orders will not be made with respect to the issue of a passport to him.

Orders and injunctions regarding medical treatment

1. The father sought an injunction restraining each of the parties from 'arranging for the child to undertake an x-ray or CT scan or any other form of procedure that uses ionising radiation, or otherwise arranging for him to undergo invasive surgery or cosmetic procedure without the written and certified consent of the other parent, including allowing the child to be subjected to anaesthetic or arranging for the child to be vaccinated.' The proposed injunction was opposed by the mother and by the ICL.
2. In light of the father's strongly held opposition to X undertaking certain medical procedures, particularly x-rays, it is very likely that the imposition of an injunction as sought by the father would result in X being unable to obtain medical treatment recommended by doctors and other medical staff. Such an injunction would, as submitted by counsel for the ICL, undermine the entire purpose of the order for the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility with respect to major long-term issues.
3. For the same reasons as provided with respect to the question of long-term decision-making, I am not satisfied that the injunction sought by the father is appropriate for X's welfare.
4. The mother sought an injunction restraining the father from discussing ionised radiation, x-rays, CT scans or any other medical procedure involving ionised radiation with X or in his presence, or allowing any other person to do so, including but not limited to exposing him to any videos on such topics as educative tools or otherwise. This proposed injunction was supported by the ICL.
5. The father opposed this proposed injunction and submitted that X should receive education not just from his school but from his parents as well. He insisted that he would only expose X to age appropriate material but did not otherwise engage with the risk that exposure to his views could cause X to feel fear if he was required to undergo procedures in future.
6. In circumstances in which the mother will be responsible for decisions regarding X's medical care, and in light of the father's fixed views with respect to these issues, his history of strong opposition to medical decisions made by the mother and his admitted conduct in seeking to share his views regarding ionised radiation with X, there is a real risk that in the absence of an injunction, the father would act in a manner which would undermine decisions taken by the mother by seeking to persuade X to adopt his views in this regard. I am satisfied that such an injunction is appropriate for X's welfare.
7. The mother sought an order requiring that in the event that X becomes unwell in the father's care, the father notify the mother immediately and advise her of his symptoms, and the mother be at liberty to collect X for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment. The father opposed this. It was submitted on behalf of the mother that the necessity for this order had been demonstrated by the father's actions in deliberately failing to follow medical advice and administer the antibiotics which had been prescribed to X, following which X was diagnosed with pneumonia. This proposed order was supported by the ICL, who submitted that it was 'appropriately protective.'
8. I accept that the father's deliberate inaction in relation to X's illness on that occasion put X at risk. I am not satisfied that the father, who continued to insist during the trial that X had been 'stable' and there had been 'no red flags' and to defend his desire to wait longer before obtaining or administering medical care, fully appreciates the risk at which X was placed or the importance of obtaining and following medical advice in a timely manner when X is ill in future. I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests to make the order as sought by the mother.
9. For the same reasons, I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests to make a further order as sought by the mother and supported by the ICL requiring that the parties each follow all reasonable recommendations of any medical or allied health practitioners treating X, including but not limited to following all instructions for any medication prescribed, and ensuring they administer or cause to be administered any prescribed medication to X while X is in their care.
10. The father opposed this proposed order, at least insofar as it would require him to administer prescribed medication, and submitted that it should be up to X's parents, rather than medical professionals, to make decisions for X's care. However, he did not engage meaningfully with the difficulty that X's parents have exhibited fundamentally divergent views as to the approach to be taken to X's medical care on several past occasions, nor with the risks to which X could have been exposed as a result of his failure to administer X's prescribed antibiotics.

1. The father sought an injunction restraining each of the parties from taking X interstate during school terms. His evidence with respect to this issue was that during the first school term in 2025, the mother had taken X to Melbourne for a weekend, and that he was 'concerned for [X] travelling interstate during school term particularly in light of the concerns by the [s]chool as to his attention to his school work.'
2. There was no nexus identified in the evidence between the interstate trip referred to by the father and any issues with respect to X's school performance. However, the mother gave evidence of a further trip she had taken interstate with X during the period when the trial was adjourned part-heard, for which he had missed three days of school early in the school term.
3. The mother sought to justify this by saying that she had promised to take X interstate during the July 2025 school holidays but had been unable to do so because the first tranche of the trial had proceeded during that time. She was unable to explain why she had made such a promise in circumstances where she acknowledged that she had been aware that the trial had been listed, nor why she could not have undertaken the travel during the next school holiday period or a long weekend rather than during school time.
4. The mother's evidence was that X had missed a total of five school days for recreational travel in addition to approximately the same number of school days missed when he had been unwell, during the 2025 school year to date. She admitted that she had not spoken to X's teacher about the schoolwork he would miss or work he could do during the journey. In this regard, the mother exhibited a somewhat dismissive approach to the issue of the importance of X's school attendance.
5. The mother's evidence was that X had enjoyed the interstate travel they had undertaken together and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. However, the mother did not adequately explain why she had chosen to undertake this travel at times that impacted on X's school attendance.
6. The ICL's position was that recreational travel should be limited wherever possible to school holidays. I agree, noting in particular, that X spends extensive time with the mother during school holidays and will continue to do so, thereby providing them with ample time to travel together without impacting upon X's education.
7. The ICL proposed that there should be a limit of three days per school year during which X could miss school for the purpose of interstate travel. It was submitted on behalf of the mother that such a limitation would not be practical. I do not agree. Other than in exceptional circumstances, travel and other recreational activities should be undertaken outside school time to avoid any impact on X's schooling.
8. The mother acknowledged in the witness box that she had not informed the father in advance of interstate travel she had undertaken with X and that he should have been informed by her and not by X, which is what had ultimately occurred. She also agreed that X should not be placed in a situation where he may feel the need to keep secrets from his father. She agreed to a requirement that she inform the father of any interstate travel, though she was clear that she resisted a requirement to obtain his consent, as she anticipated that this would lead to arguments.
9. Noting that the mother did not propose that there be any restriction on the father's ability to travel interstate with X, I accept that it is appropriate that the parties each be required to inform the other of any proposed interstate travel with X, but that to require consent to be obtained can only be expected to lead to conflict and would not be in X's best interests.

1. The mother sought an injunction restraining the father from engaging in discussions with X as to how he spends his time whilst in the care of the mother. This was based on evidence given by the mother to the effect that X had reported that the father had yelled at him upon being told by X that he had travelled interstate with the mother without the father's knowledge.
2. In my view, the appropriate means of ensuring that the father is not informed by X of significant developments which might lead to such interactions is for the mother to inform him of such matters herself. In circumstances in which X will be spending the majority of his time in the mother's care, the injunction sought by her would unduly restrict the father's ability to communicate meaningfully with X about his day to day life and events of significance to him. I am not satisfied that such a restriction would be appropriate for X's welfare.

1. The father sought an order requiring each of the parties to do all things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to facilitate X's attendance at F School for his secondary schooling. No such order was sought by the father in his Amended Initiating Application or in his case outline. This proposal emerged for the first time as a contribution made by the father to the joint minute of proposed orders tendered at the commencement of the trial. Unsurprisingly, in those circumstances no evidence had been adduced by either party with respect to this issue.
2. Under cross-examination, the mother indicated that she had no objection to X's attendance at the proposed school but that X was not presently zoned for that school. The order sought by the father will not be made as there is no evidence to support it and a risk that it could not be complied with as a result of the zoning issue.

1. The mother proposed that prior to the discharge of the appointment of the ICL, she meet with X to explain the orders to him, and that the parties each be restrained from discussing the contents of the orders with X prior to his meeting with the ICL. The ICL consented to this proposal and the father did not speak against it.
2. In light of the divergent views of the parties with respect to the extent to which the orders that will be made will meet X's best interests and the history of disputes between them as to the appropriateness of the communications of each of them with him, I am satisfied that it is in X's best interests for the contents of these orders to be communicated to him in an independent and child-focused manner and that he not be informed by either of his parents of the contents of the orders before this occurs. These orders will be made as sought.

1. Having regard to all of the considerations as outlined above, I make orders as set out at the commencement of these reasons, which I am satisfied are in X's best interests.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and sixty-eight (268) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker.

[3] Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 at 587-588; Scott & Scott [1994] FamCA 12; (1994) FLC 92-457; Bain & Bain (Deceased) [2017] FamCAFC 80; (2017) FLC 93-772.

[4] As distinct from a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities: Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336; see also Morley v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2010] NSWCA 331.

[5] Bennett & Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC 93-088; Flanagan & Handcock (2002) FLC 93-102.

[6] [2024] FedCFamC1F 738.

[7] [2024] FedCFamC1F 476.

[8] [2024] FedCFamC1F 778.

[9] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC(2A).

[10] Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 (per Aldridge & Carew JJ, with whom McClelland DCJ agreed).

[12] Exhibit M10. The translation was confirmed by the affidavit of accredited interpreter Mr C filed on 26 June 2025.

[13] For example, Exhibits ICL1, M2, M4, M5, M6.

[14] Exhibit M10. The translation was confirmed by the affidavit of accredited interpreter Mr C filed on 26 June 2025.

[15] Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA), chapter 5.