NSWNSWSC

Brickworks Ltd v Wright

[2026] NSWSC 554

Supreme Court of NSW|2026-05-21|Before: Schmidt AJ

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-05-21

Before

Schmidt AJ

Catchwords

WORKERS COMPENSATION — judicial review of Personal Injury Commission Appeal Panel decision — s 323 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) — cl 11 of the NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment — whether s 323 was misapplied — deduction for a pre-existing condition — whether Panel’s reasons were inadequate — matter remitted to Personal Injury Commission

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

WORKERS COMPENSATION — judicial review of Personal Injury Commission Appeal Panel decision — s 323 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) — cl 11 of the NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment — whether s 323 was misapplied — deduction for a pre-existing condition — whether Panel’s reasons were inadequate — matter remitted to Personal Injury Commission

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Brickworks Ltd v Wright [2026] NSWSC 554

Hearing dates: 21 April 2026

Date of orders: 21 May 2026

Decision date: 21 May 2026

Jurisdiction: Common Law

Before: Schmidt AJ

Decision: (1) The Panel’s decision be set aside;
(2) The matter be remitted to the Personal Injury Commission to be dealt with according to law, by a differently constituted appeal panel; and
(3) The parties are each to bear their own costs of these proceedings.

Catchwords: WORKERS COMPENSATION — judicial review of Personal Injury Commission Appeal Panel decision — s 323 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) — cl 11 of the NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment — whether s 323 was misapplied — deduction for a pre-existing condition — whether Panel’s reasons were inadequate — matter remitted to Personal Injury Commission

Brickworks Ltd v Wright [2026] NSWSC 554 | Case summary | Zoe

In 2023 Mr Wright brought proceedings under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) seeking lump sum compensation for a psychological injury he claimed he had suffered at work in 2019, which Brickworks unsuccessfully resisted. He having earlier successfully pursued weekly workers compensation payments, which Brickworks had unsuccessfully appealed.
Brickworks now seeks judicial review of the decision of the Appeal Panel which assessed Mr Wright’s whole person impairment to be 22%, which it reduced by 10% to reflect the contribution of a pre-existing condition which had contributed to his impairment: Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW), s 323(2).
The parties’ medical dispute after Mr Wright’s workplace injury concerned both his WPI and the contribution which a pre-existing condition had made to it.
There was thus no issue that in assessing Mr Wright’s WPI, account had to be taken of earlier injuries he had suffered in 2008, when he had been involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident while working. He then having suffered both significant physical and psychological injuries and later being diagnosed to be suffering post-traumatic stress disorder and a major depressive disorder. He was assessed to have suffered 22% WPI.
Despite this, Mr Wright had later succeeded in having a long, ongoing history of employment and self-employment. From 2013 until 2020, he was employed as a heavy vehicle driver by a subsidiary of Brickworks. The deemed date of his injury during that employment was in August 2019.
After his workplace injury, Mr Wright’s WPI was assessed by the psychiatrists Dr Rastogi to be 22%, with no deduction for his prior condition; by Dr Bertucen to be 24%, with a 10% deduction for that condition; and by Dr Roberts to also be 24%, but a substantial proportion of which he concluded was attributable to Mr Wright’s prior condition.
The assessor concluded that Mr Wright’s WPI was 24%, with a 30% deduction for his pre-existing condition.
Brickworks successfully appealed the assessor’s decision, persuading the Appeal Panel that in arriving at his conclusions, the assessor had not paid required attention to cl 11.10 of the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
But on its fresh assessment, the Appeal Panel came to a different view about both Mr Wright’s WPI and the amount of the deduction, despite also not having been able to apply cl 11.10 to arrive at its conclusions about the amount of the deduction. Brickworks challenges its decision in these proceedings, that raising the proper construction of s 323(2), by which there is no issue that the Panel was bound, as well as other issues.

Despite the cases the parties advanced before the Appeal Panel, in these proceedings there was no issue about the validity of cl 11.10 of the Guidelines.
As the Panel explained in its reasons, conflicting views have been expressed about the validity of cl 11.10 by Simpson AJ in Marks v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 616 and Basten AJ in Matheson v Baptistcare NSW & ACT [2025] NSWSC 213. It was common ground in these proceedings that the validity of the Guidelines did not arise to be considered on this application.
There was also no issue about the applicable principles, which shortly include:
The task of construction begins, as it ends, with the statutory text, in this case that of s 323. It having, from beginning to end, to be construed in context, with an understanding of context having utility “if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text” : Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664; [2014] HCA 12 at [22], quoting Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55 at [39], referred to in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [37];
Integral to making a choice between a range of potential meanings being discernment of the statutory purpose: SZTAL at [39];
Having upheld the appeal, the Panel had to form and reach its own opinion about the parties’ medical dispute, having considered what they each advanced on the appeal, in light of the information it had to consider: Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43 at [44]-[48];
The Panel was not called on to choose between the competing arguments, or to opine on the correctness of other opinions about the medical dispute. It had to form its own opinion, its members applying their own medical experience and expertise to what was in issue;
In forming that opinion, the Panel did have to take into account the opinions of other medical practitioners, including those expressed in earlier certificates, by treating doctors and those practitioners who had expressed medico-legal opinions. It also had to take account of earlier diagnostic findings and other available notes and reports, including those from allied health professionals;
The Panel also had to explain its conclusions. While the reasons given did not have to be elaborate, they had to disclose the actual path of reasoning by which it arrived at the opinions it formed, on the issues which it had to resolve;
If there was a medical controversy over a particular issue, more expansive explanations needed to be given: Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; [2006] NSWCA 284 at [122];
There can be circumstances where the failure to give reasons supports an inference that the decision-maker had no good reason: Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 663-664; [1986] HCA 7;
But on judicial review, a Panel’s reasons are not to be scrutinised overzealously with an eye attuned to error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272; [1996] HCA 6;
Given the statutory scheme under which the Panel’s decision was made, any failure to take into account a relevant consideration involves jurisdictional error: *Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-*Walsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40; [1986] HCA 40; and
Such an error involves an error of law, which results in the decision-maker exceeding the powers given by the statute: Minister for Immigration v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 323 at [80]-[82].
What was in issue was:
The proper construction of s 323;
Whether Dr Glozier, whose report the Panel had adopted, had undertaken the exercise s 323(2) requires, or had rather come to a legally unreasonable conclusion;
Whether that exercise could be undertaken by a partial application of the PIRS categories provided by the Guidelines; and
Whether the reasons which the Panel gave for its conclusions were adequate.

As has been explained in a number of authorities, the assessment of Mr Wright’s impairment having attracted s 323, three steps had to be taken: see Quintiliani-Johns at [64]-[66]. They were:
Determine the level of Mr Wright’s WPI after his workplace injury;
Determine whether a proportion of that impairment was due to the conditions he had suffered as a result of his 2008 accident; and
If they did contribute to his impairment, determine the resulting deduction which reflected that contribution.
This exercise depended on a consideration of the available evidence. If it was concluded that the extent of the deduction for Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition would be “difficult or costly to determine”, the adoption of a 10% deduction only being available in one situation. Namely, when it is concluded on medical evidence accepted or preferred, that this assumption is not “at odds with the available evidence”: s 323(2). If it was, the assumption could not be applied and the deduction had to be either less or more than 10%.
It follows that s 323 requires the available evidence to be considered and the medical evidence accepted or preferred identified by the assessor: s 323(3).
“Medical evidence” is not defined, but logically in this statutory context, must include clinical records, whether kept by a GP or hospital, as well as reports of treating doctors, and medico legal experts on which parties are entitled to rely, in advancing their cases about the medical dispute.
Despite what the Panel said in its reasons, its review notices establish that it was not cost which precluded the extent of the contribution of Mr Wright’s prior impairment being determined. It having required the parties to provide additional documents, no doubt at considerable cost.
It seems rather to have been the difficulty of applying the PIRS categories which drove the Panel’s consideration of the s 323(2) assumption. Dr Glozier having found that he did not have the relevant information on which application of the PIRS categories depended, given the applicable criteria, despite the additional information the Panel had received. With the result his conclusion that it was “impossible to accurately determine” that impairment: Panel decision at page 26.
As the parties agreed in these proceedings, the result was that having concluded that Mr Wright’s WPI was 22%, s 323(2) and (3) required the Panel to consider the available evidence, to determine whether a 10% deduction was at odds with the medical evidence it accepted or preferred.
If it was, the amount of the deduction, more or less than 10%, had to be determined by application of clinical judgment to the evidence, as the Guidelines required: cl 1.27-1.28. It there being noted that “the deduction is 1/10th of the assessed impairment, unless that is at odds with the available evidence”.
Having been delegated the assessment, Dr Glozier thus not only had to consider the available evidence, he also had to identify the medical evidence he accepted or preferred. His conclusions about the amount of the deduction being driven by his consideration of that evidence, having applied his clinical judgment to arrive at a conclusion about whether the statutory assumption provided by s 323(2) could be applied.
Whether, given its adoption of Dr Glozier’s report, the Panel had erred in its approach to determining the amount of the deduction was disputed. As was whether the result was legally unreasonable and whether the actual path of reasoning which led to the conclusions reached, had been disclosed as it had to be.

This is a complex exercise. The Guidelines also requiring a median class score and aggregate score to be determined, which is then translated into a range of impairment: cl 11.13-11.20. That finally resulting in an exact percentage of impairment, by use of a conversion table, to arrive at the injured person’s WPI. A PIRS rating form is provided to assist with this exercise, it providing for reasons to be given for conclusions reached about each category.
The Guidelines also require account to be taken of the injured person’s cultural background, as well as activities that are usual for the person’s age, sex and cultural norms: cl 11.12.
Although the form was not used by Dr Glozier to arrive at the amount of the deduction, he did have regard to the PIRS categories in considering whether a 10% deduction was at odds with the available evidence. Neither party urged the view that this approach was impermissible. But Brickworks contended that the result of the approach Dr Glozier so adopted was that the Panel failed to adhere to what s 323(2) required it to consider and determine.
Also necessary to take into account is that the Guidelines require:
the exercise of clinical judgment: cl 1.6.b;
that deductions for pre-existing injuries/conditions be clearly identified in the report and calculated: cl 1.6.c;
if a related injury/condition has not previously been identified, its nature and causal connection to the compensable injury or condition be recorded in the report: cl 1.6.c;
the degree of permanent impairment that results from the injury/condition be determined using the tables, graphs and methodology given in the Guidelines and the AMA5, where appropriate: cl 1.8;
if more than one method for establishing permanent impairment is specified, the method that yields the highest degree of permanent impairment must be used, except in the case of derangement: cl 1.9;
deductions for pre-existing injuries requiring account to be taken of all available evidence to calculate the degree of permanent impairment that pre-existed the injury being assessed: cl 1.27; and
the assessor being required to indicate the degree of permanent impairment due to any previous injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality: cl 1.28.
It follows that the Guidelines do contemplate that there may be circumstances where it is not appropriate to apply the PIRS categories.
This was such a case.
The Guidelines also regulate the contents of reports, requiring:

The case advanced in Brickworks’ written submissions to the Appeal Panel relied on the prior assessments of Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition, as well as medical evidence of his functioning before his workplace injury. That, it then contended, having enabled the assessor to consider the PIRS table in assessing his pre-existing condition, which the assessor had incorrectly failed to undertake.
Brickworks also challenged the 30% deduction for Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition, which it complained did not accord with the preponderance of the medical evidence which the assessor had to consider, which it explained.
Brickworks also complained that the assessor had failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusions he had arrived at, in relation to Mr Wright’s pre-existing PTSD, major depression and their respective contributions to his impairment after his workplace injury.
This was disputed. It then being contended that cl 11.10 of the Guidelines was invalid and that the conclusions which the assessor had reached were open on the evidence and had been adequately explained.
In these proceedings Brickworks also complained that the Panel had failed to give the required reasons, despite its permissible adoption of Dr Glozier’s report. It contending that the Panel had, as a result, not correctly applied s 323(2).
This was also disputed, the view urged being that Brickworks had misapplied the applicable principles in its submissions. Section 323(2) required consideration to be given to the effect of the earlier injury and resulting conditions, in accordance with the requirements of the statutory mechanism, which had no common law equivalent. Although it required the application of clinical judgment.
On the appeal, Brickworks had relied on the opinion of Dr Roberts that the workplace injury had not contributed to his impairment, it being solely the result of the 2008 accident. That had correctly not been accepted by the Panel.
While the Panel accepted that the assessor had erred in his approach, as Brickworks complained, it did not accept that the preponderance of the medical evidence showed that a deduction of more than 30% had to be made, as was its case. It applying the statutory deduction, satisfied for reasons which it properly explained, that it was available in the circumstances which arose to be considered.
Brickworks not being entitled, to cavil with the exercise of clinical judgment: Pitsonis v Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission [2008] NSWCA 88 at [59].

I have been persuaded that s 323(2) was misapplied.
As I have explained, despite what was said in the Panel’s reasons, it seems to have been the difficulty of applying the PIRS criteria, Mr Wright having died before he could be examined by the assessor, which prevented their application and made the contribution of his pre-existing condition difficult to determine. That the course Mr Wright’s life took after he had been assessed in 2012 to have suffered a 22% WPI as the result of the 2008 accident, had not accorded with that assessment, no doubt contributing to this difficulty.
The result it was not disputed, was that the Panel did not have all of the relevant information which would usually be gleaned when applicants are examined by an assessor, which is then considered on application of the PIRS criteria.
Section 323(1) still required there to be a deduction for any proportion of the impairment that was due to Mr Wright’s previous injury or pre-existing condition or abnormality.
Section 323(2) requiring a comparative exercise to be undertaken, in arriving at the deduction: Coca*-*Cola at [86]. It only being when the extent of the deduction is difficult or costly to determine, that it will be assumed that the deduction is 10%, “unless this assumption is at odds with the available evidence.”
What s 323(2) did not require was an attempt at the application of the PIRS criteria, when only inadequate information was available. The Guidelines contemplating as they do, that there will be circumstances where they cannot be applied.
Adoption of the s 323(2) 10% deduction assumption rather depended on three things:
the view being formed on the available evidence that the extent of the deduction will either be difficult, or costly to determine, which may be the result of insufficient information being available, as it was in Mr Wright’s case;
if that view is formed, that the medical evidence which is to be accepted or preferred be identified:
that evidence then being considered, in order to determine whether a 10% deduction is at odds with that evidence.
If it is concluded that a 10% deduction would be at odds with the medical evidence which is to be accepted or preferred, the amount of the deduction may be less or more than 10%. Its amount then having to be arrived at by application of clinical judgment in the way explained in Vega**n.
Section 332(2) does not depend on any view being formed about the application of the PIRS criteria to the limited evidence available, which makes their application difficult.
Whatever conclusion is arrived at about the amount of the deduction which has to be made for the contribution of the pre-existing injury, condition or abnormality, the reasons given have to disclose the actual path of reasoning which led to that result. That requires disclosure of what the conclusions reached rested on, with an explanation of what evidence was available to be considered alone, being insufficient.
The template reporting form provided by the Guidelines for the conclusions reached in arriving at WPI, it should be noted at this point, is apt to lead to error, which I will explain further. Although in Mr Wright’s case, neither the Panel nor Dr Glozier used that template to help explain its conclusions.

Dr Glozier’s reasons show that he attempted, but was unable to, apply the PIRS criteria to the assessment of Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition, not having all of the pertinent information about what happened to him after he was assessed in 2012 to have suffered 22% WPI, despite the further information the Panel had been provided. Despite the result being that the Panel had more information to consider than the assessor had.
Under this statutory scheme, the provision of such further information can be the result of a call for production of records under s 324(1)(b), or fresh or additional evidence being provided in accordance with s 328(3).
In Mr Wright’s case, the additional evidence was presumably called for by the Panel, because of the light it might have shed on histories Mr Wright must have given before his death. The assessor’s challenged conclusion having been that his prior condition had made only a 30% contribution to his impairment, contrary to Brickwork’s case.
On the reassessment, it was only if the Panel concluded that a 10% deduction was at odds with all of the then available evidence, that a deduction of either less or more than 10% could be made for Mr Wright’s prior condition.
Dr Glozier’s conclusion that the PIRS categories could not be applied to arrive at the deduction for his pre-existing condition was not challenged in these proceedings, contemplated as that is by the Guidelines. But how he and, as a result of its adoption of his report, the Panel undertook the exercise s 323(2) required, was.
The Panel considered that the assessor had fallen into the same error as that which had arisen in Quintiliani-Johns, where a 50% deduction had been arrived at: at [75]. It there being explained to have incorrectly involved a focus on “the contribution to the current injury by the pre-existing bipolar disorder”: at [77]. It having concluded that the contribution of it and the psychological injury being assessed had been about equal.
The statutory question which the Appeal Panel had to consider, being whether a 10% deduction was at odds with the medical evidence it accepted or preferred. If it was, the amount of the deduction had to be arrived at applying clinical judgment.
I am satisfied that in Mr Wright’s case, this was also not how the Panel approached its task.

Nepean Hospital notes from 2016, when Mr Wright was brought in by police due to concerns about suicidality;
Admission and discharge records and notes taken at St John of God hospital, which reflected increased PTSD symptoms;
A March 2017 report from Ms Seydler, who had provided Mr Wright with outpatient counselling and therapy after a flare up in symptoms after another motor vehicle accident;
Brickworks payroll records from 2018 and 2019 which did not reflect any sick leave; and
Clinical records and letters from 2019, postdating the workplace injury.
Dr Glozier then turned to consider records after the workplace injury, before turning to his pre-injury impairment from his pre-existing conditions, to which I will return.
He then turned to his WPI at the time of his death. There Dr Glozier also referred to:
Dr Bertucen in January 2023, having assessed Mr Wright’s WPI to be 24%, having applied the PIRS categories, with a s 323 1/10 deduction;
Dr Ravimohan had assessed him to be unfit for all forms of employment the week before his death in May 2023;
Dr Rastogi in July 2020 assessed his WPI then to be 22%, for very different reasons, which Dr Glozier did not explain, his report understandably differing in relation to certain classes, but not providing relevant information for the ascertainment of impairment in 2023;
Dr Roberts’ 2021 report, which was a review of an earlier report which had not been located, but with which Dr Glozier did not agree, Dr Roberts not there having explained how he had arrived at the WPI and his views not being supported by Mr Wright’s asymptomatic conditions, which had possibly been in remission, given his high functioning at times;
the fact that he also disagreed with Dr Roberts’ 2023 report, provided a month before Mr Wright died, when he considered that Mr Wright’s presentation was not reflective of his response to employment by Brickworks. Quoting conclusions Dr Roberts reached about four of the PIRS categories, despite which he could not assess his WPI;
Mr Wright’s hospital admission in December 2022, and what was noted on a January 2023 discharge summary about his mental health and ongoing problems; and
text messages Mr Wright sent to his solicitor, in the months before his death.
Dr Glozier concluded that after his workplace injury, Mr Wright’s WPI was 22%, explaining under the heading Summary, firstly:

The reasons given, I accept, do reveal that s 323(2) was misapplied.
Dr Glozier concluded that on the available evidence, the extent of the required deduction was difficult or costly to determine, it not permitting that assessment to be undertaken by use of the six PIRS scales and the five categories it provides for each scale. They being concerned with the behavioural consequences of a disorder, about which there was limited and somewhat contradictory information, given the 2012 assessment.
Dr Glozier approached the determination of the deduction, having explained his views about what the available evidence revealed about the pre-existing condition, that having allowed him to indicate ratings for some of the PIRS categories, there being no information about others.
Despite it being common ground in these proceedings that Dr Glozier’s explanation was permissibly given by reference to the PIRS ratings, Brickworks contended that his conclusions about whether a 10% deduction was at odds with the available evidence, could not rest on that exercise. Given his unchallenged conclusion that the evidence did not permit the PIRS calculation to be made.
That was disputed. Dr Glozier’s approach, it being contended, being permissible. It having resulted in a conclusion about the median class score which cl 11.16 of the Guidelines required be considered. With the result that it was apparent that a PIRS rating, had it been able to be completed, would have resulted in a deduction for the pre-existing condition of between 0 and 3%.
While no positive PIRS findings were made by Dr Glozier, his approach established, it was argued, that the deduction was incapable of being more than 10%. The Act and Guidelines not requiring that the PIRS categories be ignored when s 323(2) was applied. With the result that the deduction “was never going to be at odds with 10 percent” and that the 10% deduction was, accordingly, correct.
That submission, it seems to me, underscores the problem with the approach Dr Glozier adopted.
Dr Glozier concluded that no findings about two of the scales were possible, on the available evidence. It must be accepted that it is not valid to conclude that if such evidence had been available, the result would have been a conclusion that the contribution to the impairment of the pre-existing condition fell in the 0-3% range, as was also submitted.
If the submission that this would have been the result of a complete application of the PIRS scales could be accepted, it would necessarily follow that the deduction should have been less than 10%. Because the evidence then would have been at odds with a 10% deduction.
Brickworks’ case, that a consideration of the available evidence could not be approached by a partial application of the PIRS scales, thus has force. Section 323(2) did not require such a consideration and the Guidelines only require the PIRS categories to be applied, when appropriate. In Mr Wright’s case, given that there was insufficient information available to undertake that rating assessment, the consideration which Dr Glozier gave to the application of the scales to the evidence which was available, was irrelevant.
What s 323 required, but Dr Glozier did not undertake, was to consider the available evidence in order to identify the medical evidence he accepted or preferred. Then determining whether a 10% deduction for the contribution of Mr Wright’s prior conditions, was at odds with that evidence. That not depending on a partial application of the PIRS categories, but his clinical judgment.
I am satisfied that was not how Dr Glozier approached his task.
Had Dr Glozier done so, his reasons would have:
not only identified the available evidence he had to consider, but would have clearly identified the medical evidence he accepted or preferred and why;
explained why his views departed from those expressed in the medical evidence he accepted or preferred, if they did;
thereby revealed more than his report did about the basis of the opinions he had to consider, they having shed light not only on relevant factual matters which had to be considered, given histories Mr Wright must have given those who did have the opportunity to examine him, but also on the basis of their respective views about the deduction which had to be made for Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition;
thereby disclosed, in the required way, his path of reasoning to the conclusion that a 10% deduction was, or was not at odds with the evidence he accepted or preferred; and
if it was, would also have disclosed his path of reasoning to the deduction applied.
The absence of such explanations, when considered with Dr Glozier’s unnecessary concentration on the requirements of the PIRS categories, in light of the limited available evidence on which their application depends, supports the conclusion that s 323(2) was misapplied.

Despite this conclusion, I am not satisfied that the Panel’s conclusion about the amount of the contribution was shown to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable. That involving an error of law.
These proceedings do not permit a merits review of the Panel’s decision. Nor a review of Dr Glozier’s exercise of his clinical judgment.
It is apparent from the reasons given that the Panel agreed with Dr Glozier, that despite the PTSD and major depression which Mr Wright had suffered, following the 2008 motor vehicle accident — resulting in the assessment that he had then suffered 22% WPI and was unable to work— he recovered much more than expected over time. Before his workplace injury, to such an extent that he was able to pursue employment and work full-time, including for quite a number of years, as a truck driver for Brickworks, as well as undertaking a union role.
That alone, it must be accepted, logically left open the conclusion that Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition had a more limited role in the impairment which resulted from his workplace injury than the assessor had concluded, despite what Brickworks contended on its appeal.
That depending on the Panel’s assessment of the nature and extent of the injuries Mr Wright suffered in the 2008 accident, the conditions they caused and their consequences. Rather than on what had been assessed and anticipated in 2012.
It was undoubtedly fortunate for Mr Wright that he had such a significant recovery. Although the evidence also shed light on the considerable ongoing problems he still had to contend with, before he was injured at work. It was not in issue that after his workplace injury, the level of his impairment was significantly greater.
That Mr Wright’s unanticipated recovery may properly have left open a basis for the conclusion that the available evidence was not at odds with a deduction of only 10% for the contribution his pre-existing condition to his impairment after the workplace accident, should be accepted as a matter of logic alone. It is not for this Court to determine if that conclusion was correct.
The submissions Brickworks advanced thus did not persuade me that this ground of appeal was established.

But I have been persuaded that the reasons the Panel gave were inadequate. That is driven by its adoption of Dr Glozier’s report, which I have already explained.
The reasons the Panel gave initially noted the relevant factual background and what had occurred during its preliminary review. It also referred to the assessor’s certificate and what he had concluded, as well as to the submissions which the parties had advanced on the appeal.
The Panel then turned to its findings and reasons. Beginning with the obligation to give reasons explained in Campbelltown City Council v Vegan & Ors (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; [2006] NSWCA 284 and the procedural requirements imposed by s 328. It also noted the grounds of appeal Brickworks pressed.
The Panel observed that there was no issue that Mr Wright had sustained a psychological injury while in Brickworks’ employ: at [51]. It then referred to the requirements of s 323 and the applicable Guidelines. Accepting that the assessor had erred in not utilising the applicable PIRS categories in his assessment: at [54].
The Panel reiterated its view that the assessor had fallen into the same error as that dealt with in Quintiliani-Johns*:* at [55]-[56].
The Panel noted the submission that cl 11.10 of the Guidelines was invalid: at [57]. It then gave an extensive explanation of inconsistencies which it perceived in various decisions to which it referred: at [57]-[61]. Finally indicating that it intended to apply the approach of Basten AJ in Matheson v Baptistcare NSW & ACT [2025] NSWSC 213. His Honour having concluded that the Guideline was not inconsistent with the operation of s 323: at [34].
In these proceedings it was common ground that what was dealt with in Matheson arose in a context where it was an asymptomatic earlier condition which had to be considered. Factual circumstances far removed from this case. And that the Guidelines are valid, given how they deal with the requirements of s 323.
At [63]-[64], the Panel explained the consequences of its conclusion that the assessor had erred:

The Panel concluded that the assessor had not complied with all of these obligations. The Act imposes no express obligation on an Appeal Panel to also give reasons for its decision. As the Panel observed, there is an implied statutory obligation to do so: Vega**n at [117].
There it was explained that where, as in Mr Wright’s case, “more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary for the Panel to give some explanation of its preference for one conclusion over another.” That may “have particular significance in circumstances where the medical members of a Panel have made their own assessment of the applicant’s condition and have come to a different conclusion from that reached by other medical practitioners, as set out in reports provided to the Panel.”: at [121].
This was such a case.
Although “to fulfil a minimum legal standard, the reasons need not be extensive or provide detailed explanation of the criteria applied by medical specialists in reaching a professional judgment”: at [122].
In this case, the reasons given were extensive, that reflecting the difficulty of the task which the Panel had to undertake, given what was in issue on the appeal. But that does not preclude the conclusion that they were inadequate.
In Vegan, the challenged reasons were concluded not to have been adequate because they demonstrated “no attempt to explain significant departures from the assessment made” by the approved medical specialist appointed to resolve the parties’ dispute. Nor “any attempt to explain the errors which were said to exist in his reasons and findings, other than the bald statement of the preferred levels of impairment.”: at [128]. With the result that the reasons were manifestly deficient: at [129].
The adequacy of the Panel’s reasons depended on those Dr Glozier gave in his report, it having adopted the report as it did.
The explanation for why, unlike the assessor, Dr Glozier concluded that a 10% deduction was not at odds with the available evidence, may have lain in the additional material he had to consider, although that is not what his report suggests.
Dr Glozier’s explanation of the evidence relevant to the PIRS categories could not relieve the Panel of the obligation to give reasons which satisfied the requirements explained by the High Court in Wingfoo**t, to which it did not refer, in relation to the exercise s 323(2) required be undertaken.
That requiring the Panel to disclose the path of reasoning which had actually led it to the conclusion that the evidence it accepted or preferred was not at odds with a 10% deduction. The Panel could undoubtedly have given further reasons, if not satisfied that Dr Glozier’s report had disclosed the actual path of reasoning which had led to that conclusion, in the required way.
It did not do so, being satisfied that the report met the requirements explained in Vegan. Attention also had to be paid, however, to what was explained in Wingfoot. Had attention been given to this, the error into which I am satisfied the Panel fell may have been avoided.

Even though the Panel’s reasons must be read as a whole and without an eye to error and despite the explanations given, I am satisfied that it must be accepted that they were inadequate, not adhering to its obligations as it needed to.
Section 323(1) required a deduction to be made for any proportion of Mr Wright’s post workplace injury impairment that was due to any previous injury, pre-existing condition or abnormality.
The Appeal Panel concluded that cl 11.10 of the Guidelines was not invalid and had to be utilised in the assessment of the deduction which s 323(2) required: at [61]. The difference between cl 11.10 and s 323(2) was that the Guideline did not require a consideration of whether a 10% deduction was at odds with the available evidence. The Panel, properly, did give consideration to this, the PIRS categories not being able to be applied, as I have explained.
Dr Glozier understandably concluded that the PIRS categories could not be utilised, given the limited information available about the applicable criteria. That reflecting that Mr Wright had not been able to be examined, as applicants ordinarily are, at least by an assessor, when such information is typically elicited from them. And that he had recovered more than had been anticipated in 2012.
The available evidence having established that Mr Wright’s work history had been inconsistent with the 2012 assessment of his then WPI. The deduction which s 323(2) required be made for the contribution of the conditions which he suffered as the result of the injuries the 2008 accident caused, was thus undoubtedly difficult to determine.
Those who had examined Mr Wright before his death had come to differing conclusions about the deduction. They having had the opportunity to examine him. Reference is made to their reports in Dr Glozier’s report. But there is no explanation of the reasons for their differing opinions, what their reports revealed about the histories Mr Wright had given them, or why Dr Glozier departed from Dr Bertucen’s opinions, even though it seems he preferred his report.
There could only be a 10% deduction for Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition, if the Panel concluded that deduction was not at odds with the available evidence, the medical evidence preferred or accepted having been identified. What had to be explained was the actual path of reasoning which had led to the conclusion that a 10% deduction was not at odds with that evidence.
Those who had examined Mr Wright and received the histories he gave them, reached different views about his WPI and the deduction which had to be made for his pre-existing impairment.
How these opinions and the other evidence to which Dr Glozier had to apply his clinical judgment, drove his path of reasoning to the conclusion that a 10% deduction was not at odds with the evidence accepted or preferred, was in my view thus not explained, as it needed to be.
Dr Glozier’s explanation of his views about what conclusions the available evidence permitted in respect of some PIRS categories and criteria, was incapable of providing the required reasons.
In these proceedings, on the analysis which it was urged supported the conclusion Dr Glozier reached, the deduction for Mr Wright’s pre-existing condition should have been even less than 10%.
As explained in Vegan:

Brickworks Ltd v Wright

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

JUDGMENT

The grounds pressed

Conclusion

Issues

The course the appeal took

The requirements of s 323

The requirements of the Guidelines

The parties’ cases

Was s 323(2) misapplied?

Dr Glozier’s approach

Dr Glozier’s report

Section 323(2) was misapplied

Was the conclusion that there should be a 10% deduction illogical, irrational or unreasonable?

The Panel’s reasons

What was required?

The reasons the Panel gave were inadequate

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority form

Costs

Orders

Amendments

26 May 2026

26 May 2026

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (24)