BARWICK C.J. This was a suit in the Supreme Court of Queensland in which Walter Wall (the first respondent), George Petrie (the second respondent) and Alban Pty. Ltd. (the third respondent) for declarations of right and orders for the cancellation of a dealing registered under The Real Property Acts, 1861 to 1963 (Q.) (the Act) and for amendment of the endorsements on the relevant certificate of title or in the alternative for an order that the first respondent execute a memorandum of transfer of certain land in favour of the appellant. (at p381)

2. The events which led to the institution of this suit, as found by the learned judge of the Supreme Court who heard it, are that the appellants on 5th March 1968 and until 15th October 1968 were the registered proprietors of an estate in fee simple, free of encumbrances of certain land at Acacia Ridge, a suburb of Brisbane, being the whole of the land comprised in certificate of title registered vol. 3730 fol. 104. As a means of securing a loan of $1200 made to them by the second respondent, they duly signed on 5th March 1968 a memorandum of transfer of the whole of the land comprised in the certificate of title. At the time of its execution which was expressed to be 5th March 1968 the name of a purchaser was not inserted in the memorandum. It was thus in breach of s.53(5) of The Stamp Act of 1894 (Q.) which provides:

"No instrument of conveyance or transfer executed on or

after the first day of November, 1918 of any estate or interest

in any property whatsoever . . . shall be valid either at law

or in equity unless the name of the purchaser or transferee is

written therein in ink at the time of the execution thereof.

Any such instrument so made shall be absolutely void and

inoperative, and shall in no case be made available by the

insertion of a name or any other particulars afterwards." (at p381)

3. In fact no name of a purchaser was inserted in the memorandum of transfer before September 1968. In that month the second respondent in fraud of the appellants caused the name of his grandson, the first respondent, to be inserted in the memorandum of transfer. Thereafter on 15th October 1968 the second respondent caused that memorandum to be duly registered by endorsement of the appropriate memorial on the said certificate of title. On 31st October 1968 the first respondent, by contract of sale, agreed to sell the whole of the said land to the third respondent. In pursuance of this contract, the first respondent on 7th November 1968 executed a memorandum of transfer of the said land to the third respondent. Throughout the transaction between the first and third respondents the second respondent acted as the agent of the first respondent, who, by the finding of the trial judge, was affected in relation to his registration as proprietor and that transaction by the fraud of the second respondent. The third respondent was a bona fide purchaser for value of the said land without notice of any of the matters which I have detailed concerning the appellants. (at p382)

4. In December 1968 a land agent who was endeavouring to effect a sale of the land by the appellants searched the real property register. As a result, he informed the appellants of the registration of the memorandum of transfer of 5th March 1968. The appellants thereupon on 13th December 1968 lodged a caveat with the Registrar-General against dealings with the land. On 9th January 1969 the third respondent lodged for registration the memorandum of transfer dated 7th November 1968 but registration thereof could not be effected because of the appellants' caveat. (at p382)

5. The appellants in these circumstances sought a declaration that the memorandum of transfer of 5th March 1968 was executed by way of security only and was not effective to transfer the fee simple in the land to the first respondent : that that memorandum was void by reason of s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Act : that the first respondent was at all material times a trustee of the said land for the appellants : that the appellants are and at all material times have been seised of a legal estate in fee simple in the said land and an order that the memorandum of transfer of 5th March and the entry of it in the register book be cancelled and the relevant certificate of title "altered accordingly", or alternatively, an order that the first respondent do retransfer the said land to the appellants in fee simple free of all encumbrances. Finally and as an alternative to the other relief claimed, the appellants sought damages against the first and second respondents. (at p382)

6. The third respondent by its defence claimed that upon the settlement on 8th November 1968 of its purchase in good faith and for value of the land from the first respondent it acquired an equitable interest in the land and that any interest of the appellants therein should be postponed to its, the third respondent's, interest by reason of the appellants' conduct in signing the memorandum of transfer in blank and in failing to protect their interest by caveat lodged before the third defendant acquired its interest as purchaser of the land. (at p382)

7. The learned trial judge with carefully prepared reasons (1972) Qd R 28 which refer to the principal relevant authorities, ordered the appellants to remove the caveat lodged by them on 13th December 1968 and that judgment be entered against the first and second respondents for the sum of $2,800 being $4,000 damages less $1,200 already received, with in each instance appropriate orders as to costs. His Honour found the appellants from the time of the registration on 15th October 1968 of the memorandum of transfer of 5th March 1968 to have only an equity to have that memorandum set aside and to the retransfer of the land and that, by reason of their conduct, that equity though prior in time was postponed to the equitable interest of the third respondent as a purchaser bona fide and for value and without notice. (at p383)

8. The first respondent is the now registered proprietor of the said land for an estate in fee simple free of encumbrances. The certificate of title which sets out those particulars is conclusive evidence that the said respondent is seised of that estate in that land. Section 33 of the Act is unqualified in its terms and applies to all such certificates and not merely to the certificate initially issued upon the title to the land being brought under the provisions of the Act. (at p383)

9. Section 96 reinforces the conclusiveness of the certificate by providing that in a suit by the registered proprietor against a purchaser for specific performance the certificate of title shall be conclusive evidence that the registered proprietor has a good and valid title to the land and shall entitle such registered proprietor to a decree for the specific performance of the contract of purchase. (at p383)

10. Section 125 of the Act provides that registration as proprietor of the land shall be equivalent to possession of the land by the proprietor for the purpose of bringing an action of ejectment against any person. (at p383)

11. Section 123 precludes any action of ejectment against the registered proprietor, putting aside the cases of mortgagee against mortgagor and encumbrancee against encumbrancer and lessor against lessee, other than

(a) a person deprived of any land by fraud as against a person

registered as proprietor through fraud or a person deriving

otherwise

than as a purchaser or mortgagee bona fide and for value from

or through a person registered as proprietor through fraud;

(b) a person deprived of any land by reason of a wrong description

of any land or of its boundaries ;

(c) a registered proprietor claiming under a prior certificate of

title or under a prior grant registered under the provisions of the

Act covering the same land. (at p383)

12. The section goes on to provide that except in those three classes of case the certificate of title shall be an "absolute bar and estoppel to any such action" against the registered proprietor. (at p384)

13. These sections are to my mind central to the Torrens system of title by registration: they make the certificate conclusive evidence of its particulars and protect the registered proprietor against actions to recover the land, except in the specifically described cases. Section 44 complements these provisions by providing that the registered proprietor holds the land absolutely free from all unregistered interests except

(a) "in the case of fraud" - which means except in the case that the registration as proprietor was obtained by the proprietor's own fraud - see Assets Co. Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1);

(b) in the case of a proprietor claiming the same land under a prior certificate of title or under a certificate of title issued under Pt III of the amendment of the Act in 1952, i.e. a certificate based on a possessory title, or under a prior registered grant;

(c) in the case of right of way or other easement omitted from or misdescribed in the certificate of title; and

(d) in the case of the wrong description of the land or of its boundaries.

The substantial correspondence of these exceptions to the exceptions to s.123 is readily observed, though the correspondence clearly enough is not complete. (at p384)

14. The opinions held in some places in the past that the conclusive quality of the certificate of title did not enure for the benefit of a registered proprietor, other than the proprietor firstly registered on the land being brought under the provisions of The Real Property Act seem to me to be more than difficult to maintain in the light of the provisions to which I have referred but, in any case, they were shown to be untenable by the decision of the Privy Council in Assets Co. Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1905) AC 176 where Lord Lindley pointed out that "the sections making registered certificates conclusive evidence of title are too clear to be got over". "In dealing with actions between private individuals, their Lordships are unable to draw any distinction between the first registered owner and any other." (1905) AC, at p 202 This is also made clear by the more recent decision of the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, at pp 581, 584-585 . Proceedings may of course be brought against the registered proprietor by the persons and for the causes described in the quoted sections of the Act or by persons setting up matters depending upon the acts of the registered proprietor himself. These may have as their terminal point orders binding the registered proprietor to divest himself wholly or partly of the estate or interest vested in him by registration and endorsement of the certificate of title: or in default of his compliance with such an order on his part, perhaps vesting orders may be made to effect the proper interest of the claimants in the land. Also s. 124 gives the Supreme Court power to cancel an entry in the register book and to substitute another entry in the event of the recovery of any land by ejectment from a fraudulent proprietor or from any of the persons against whom an action of ejectment is not expressly barred by the Act. This is the only power of the Supreme Court to amend the register. See Assets Co. Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1905) AC 176, at p 195 ; Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, at p 581 . Section 85 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (N.Z.) with which the last-mentioned case was concerned gives the power of amendment upon the recovery of any land estate or interest by any proceeding whereas s.124 of the Act deals only with the recovery of land by action of ejectment. The suit for declarations and orders for amendment of the register brought by the appellant in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 was held by the Privy Council in that case to be an action for the recovery of land : (1967) 1 AC, at p 586 . The appellants' suit in this case was not an action of ejectment but it was, in my opinion, an action for the recovery of land and, in any case, so far as it concerned the first respondent was within the exceptions contained in s. 123. Such a suit not within those exceptions would be effectively barred by s. 123. Thus, except in and for the purposes of such excepted proceedings, the conclusiveness of the certificate of title is definitive of the title of the registered proprietor. That is to say, in the jargon which has had currency, there is immediate indefeasibility of title by the registration of the proprietor named in the register. The stated exceptions to the prohibition on actions for recovery of land against a registered proprietor do not mean that that "indefeasibility" is not effective. It is really no impairment of the conclusiveness of the register that the proprietor remains liable to one of the excepted actions any more than his liability for "personal equities" derogates from that conclusiveness. So long as the certificate is unamended it is conclusive and of course when amended it is conclusive of the new particulars it contains. (at p385)

15. The Torrens system of registered title of which the Act is a form is not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration. That which the certificate of title describes is not the title which the registered proprietor formerly had, or which but for registration would have had. The title it certifies is not historical or derivative. It is the title which registration itself has vested in the proprietor. Consequently, a registration which results from a void instrument is effective according to the terms of the registration. It matters not what the cause or reason for which the instrument is void. The affirmation by the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 of the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Boyd v. Mayor, &c., of Wellington (1924) NZLR 1174, at p 1223 , now places that conclusion beyond question. Thus the effect of the Stamp Act upon the memorandum of transfer in this case is irrelevant to the question whether the certificate of title is conclusive of its particulars. (at p386)

16. I have thus referred under the description, the Torrens system, to the various Acts of the States of the Commonwealth which provide for comparable systems of title by registration though these Acts are all not in identical terms and some do contain significant variations. It is I think a matter for regret that complete uniformity of this legislation has not been achieved, particularly as Australians now deal with each other in land transactions from State to State. (at p386)

17. It follows, in my opinion, from the provisions of the Victorian Act which are counterpart to those of the Act to which I have referred and from the decisions of the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 and in Assets Co. Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1905) AC 176 on comparable sections of the New Zealand Act that the appeal of the registered proprietor in the case of Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 ought to have been allowed. The respondent in that case had no claim in personam against the appellant and did not otherwise fall within the category of those who might successfully claim the land from the registered proprietor. As is pointed out in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, at p 586 a claim such as that made in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 is a claim to the land for the purpose of the Torrens system. A person in the position of that appellant had no need to call in aid s. 179 of the Transfer of Land Act 1915 (Vict.) or its counterpart in the legislation of another "Torrens" Act. He was a registered proprietor: he was not merely in the situation of a person contracting or dealing with or taking or proposing to take a transfer from a registered proprietor nor did he need to rely on having dealt with a registered proprietor. It is unnecessary for the resolution of the present case to discuss the function in a Torrens system of such provisions as s. 179. It follows in my opinion from Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 that Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 was not correctly decided. Further in my opinion, Mayer v. Coe (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 549 and Ratcliffe v. Watters (1969) 2 NSWR 146 correctly applied Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 . (at p387)

18. The situation therefore immediately after the registration of the memorandum of transfer of 5th March 1968 by the endorsement of a memorial on the certificate of title was that the fee simple in the land was vested in the first respondent. It follows that it was not and still is not vested in the appellants. But according to the findings of the trial judge that registration was procured by the first respondent by his own actual fraud. Consequently, although the registered proprietor in whom the fee simple was vested, the first respondent did hold his estate subject to the rights of the appellants. He did not hold it on trust for the appellants but as between themselves and the first respondent they had a right to sue to recover the land and to have the register rectified, their ability to make such a claim being within s. 124 (d). But, as the trial judge correctly points out, such a claim is an equitable claim enforceable by reason of the principles of the Court of Chancery. The appellants require the assistance of a court having equitable jurisdiction. (at p387)

19. If there had been no transaction by the first respondent with the third respondent, the appellants would have been entitled to succeed against the first respondent. Whether or not the Supreme Court could have amended the register need not be decided. Clearly an order for the execution by the first respondent of a memorandum of transfer to the appellants and for delivery to them of the duplicate certificate of title could have been ordered: and that order appropriately enforced. (at p387)

20. But the purchase by the third respondent bona fide for value and without notice intervened before that equitable right of the appellants was fulfilled. The third respondent thus acquired an equitable interest in the land. The ability to create and the validity of an equitable estate in land, the title to which is under the Torrens system were fully established in Barry v. Heider [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197 . See also Great West Permanent Loan Co. v. Friesen (1925) AC 208 . The interest of the third respondent in the land was competitive with that of the appellants as persons deprived of their land by fraud. Their claim to the assistance of a court of equity whether regarded as a mere equity or an equitable interest in the land was not in its nature paramount or superior to that of the third respondent: nor in my opinion was that of the third respondent over that of the appellants which I think was an equitable interest in the land. As was pointed out by counsel, s. 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877 (Q.) is still operative not having been repealed. That section so far as is presently relevant provides:

"Every instrument signed by a proprietor . . . purporting

to pass an estate or interest in land . . . for the registration of

which provision is made by this Act shall until registered be

deemed to confer upon the person intended to take under

such instrument . . . a right or claim to the registration of such

estate."

I do not think myself that this provision adds anything significant to the position of the third respondent. Without that section his presentation of the memorandum of transfer with the duplicate certificate of title, which I assume he obtained on settlement of his purchase, would have entitled him to registration, subject of course to the effect of the appellants' caveat. So far as concerns an equitable interest in the land and competition with the interest of the appellants, the third respondent would, in my opinion, be in as strong a position without that section as it is with it. There is thus a competition between the respective interests of the appellants and of the third respondent to be resolved on equitable principles. (at p388)

21. Those principles are well established: see Rice v. Rice [1853] EngR 1102; (1854) 2 Drew 73 (61 ER 646) ; Shropshire Union Railways & Canal Co. v. The Queen (1875) LR 7 HL 496 ; Lapin v. Abigail [1930] HCA 6; (1930) 44 CLR 166 ; Abigail v. Lapin [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58 . The creation of the appellants' interest is prior in point of time. It arose at the time the first respondent became the registered proprietor. The circumstance that the memorandum of transfer by virtue of which the registration was obtained was executed in breach of The Stamp Act and void did not, in my opinion, prevent the appellants' right to sue the respondent arising. The priority of the creation of that right will only be lost by some conduct on the part of the appellants which must have contributed to the assumption, false as the event proved, upon which the holder of the competing equity acted when that equity was created. Here the appellants armed the second respondent with the means of placing himself or his nominee on the register. They executed a memorandum of transfer, without inserting therein the name of a purchaser; they handed over the relevant duplicate certificate of title and they authorised the second respondent, if occasion arose for the exercise of his powers as a mortgagee, to complete and register the memorandum of transfer. It seems to me that the actual decision of their Lordships in Abigail v. Lapin [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58 governs this case. Here, as there, it can properly be said that "the case . . . becomes one of an agent exceeding the limits of his authority but acting within its apparent indicia": see (1934) AC 491, at p 508; [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) 51 CLR 58, at p 72 and the cases there cited. The appellants therefore lose the priority to which the prior creation of their interest in the land would otherwise have entitled them. (at p389)

22. The third respondent also sought to postpone the equity of the appellants by reason of their failure to lodge a caveat to protect their interest in the land as mortgagors. But having regard to what I have already said there is no need for the third respondent to place any reliance on that circumstance. However, I have recently expressed myself in relation to the effect of the failure of a person to lodge a protective caveat and find no need to repeat or amplify what I have written in J. & H. Just (Holdings) Pty. Ltd. v. Bank of New South Wales [1971] HCA 57; (1971) 125 CLR 546 . I agree with the conclusion of the trial judge that the right of the appellants to recover their land from the first respondent should be postponed to the equitable interest therein of the third respondent as a purchaser bona fide for value and without notice. Consequently the order of the Supreme Court was correct. (at p389)

23. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. (at p389)

McTIERNAN J. This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Hart J.) (1972) Qd R 28 . The evidence establishes the facts of the case to be as follows. On 5th March 1968 the appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Breskvar, both signed a memorandum of transfer which purported to transfer, for a consideration of $1,200, the relevant piece of land, of which they had been the owner for some time. At the time of signing, however, the memorandum of transfer did not bear the name of any purchaser. Present at the signing was the first respondent, Petrie, who took possession of this document. The learned trial judge found that this transaction was not in fact a sale of the land but a loan of $1,200 by Petrie to the appellants. Notwithstanding the fact that there had been no sale of the land as a result of these actions the name of the second respondent, the first respondent's grandson, Wall, was inserted on the memorandum of transfer as purchaser sometime in September 1968 and the transfer was registered on 15th October 1968. On 31st October 1968 Wall sold the land to the third respondent, Alban Pty. Ltd. ("Alban") for $3,500 which was later paid. This transfer was dated 7th November 1968 but was not lodged for registration until 8th January 1969 by which time a caveat had been lodged on behalf of the appellants. The caveat had been lodged on 13th December 1968 and was entered on 6th March 1969. (at p390)

2. The learned trial judge made the following findings about these transactions (1972) Qd R, at pp 30-31 :

"I find that in transferring the land to Wall and in selling

it in the way he did Petrie acted fraudulently in that he was

attempting to cheat the plaintiffs out of the major part of

their interest in the land. He was guilty of moral turpitude.

His fraud was of the relevant kind under The Real Property

Acts. . . I find that throughout he was acting as the agent

of Wall and of his wife and that Wall is affected by his fraud.

I further find that the third defendant was a bona fide

purchaser for value without notice." (at p390)

3. It was submitted for the appellants that they always retained their estate in the land in question as registered proprietor on the ground that Wall, though at one stage on the register, had nevertheless no title and therefore no title which he could pass to Alban. It was argued that this was a consequence of the fact that Wall got on to the register by means of a transaction that was void and of no effect either because it was tainted with fraud or, alternatively, invalidated by a provision of The Stamp Act, 1894, as amended (Q.). (at p390)

4. As regards the argument that the transaction was vitiated by fraud, counsel for the appellants relied on s. 44 of the Acts. Section 44, so far as it is material, provides that :

"Notwithstanding the existence in any other person of

any estate or interest whether derived by grant from the

Crown or otherwise which but for this Act might be held to be

paramount or to have priority the registered proprietor of

land or of any estate or interest in land shall except in the

case of fraud hold the same subject to such encumbrances

liens estates or interests as may be notified by entry or

memorial on the folium of the register book constituted by

the land grant or certificate of title of such land but absolutely

free from all other encumbrances liens estates or interests

whatsoever . . . " (at p390)

5. There is no doubt that, had Wall, as the registered proprietor, attempted to eject the Breskvars, they could have set up the element of fraud and the exception made therefor in s. 44 in answer to Wall's reliance on his certificate of title and s. 33 of the Acts which states, inter alia:

". . . and every certificate of title duly authenticated under

the hand and seal of the Registrar-General shall be received

in all Courts of Justice as evidence of the particulars therein

set forth and of their being entered in the register book and

shall be conclusive evidence that the person named in such

certificate of title or in any entry thereon as seised of or as

taking estate or interest in the land therein described is seised

or possessed of such land for the estate or interest therein

specified and that the property comprised in such certificate

of title has been duly brought under the provisions of this

Act . . . "

But I do not think this element of fraud is relevant to the question of whether Wall obtained an indefeasible title to the land in question, not as against the Breskvars, which he clearly did not, but as regards a third party dealing with him on the faith of the register. In my judgment the decision of the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 requires the conclusion that Wall's certificate of title was good against all the world, except of course the defrauded Breskvars. Their Lordships said (1967) 1 AC, at p 584 while discussing certain sections of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (N.Z.) which approximate to ss. 33 and 44 of the Acts here in question:

"The decision in Boyd v. Mayor, &c., of Wellington (1924) NZLR

1174, related to a very special situation, namely, that of a

registered proprietor who acquired his title under a void

proclamation, but with certain reservations as to the case of

forgery it has been generally accepted and followed in New Zealand

as establishing, with the supporting authority of the Assets Co.

Case (1905) AC 176 , the indefeasibility of the title of registered

proprietors derived from void instruments generally.

Their Lordships are of opinion that this conclusion is in

accordance with the interpretation to be placed on those sections

of the Land Transfer Act, 1952, which they have examined. They

consider that Boyd's Case (1924) NZLR 1174, was rightly decided and

that the ratio of the decision applies as regards titles derived

from registration of void instruments generally. As regards all

such instruments it established that registration is effective to

vest and to divest title and to protect the registered proprietor

against adverse claims."

Reference was made in the course of argument to a decision of this Court on the equivalent sections of the Victorial Transfer of Land Act in the case of Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, . In that case, where the facts were that a forged discharge of mortgage and a transfer of the unencumbered land were lodged for registration at the same time on the same day, Rich and Evatt JJ. took the view that the bona fide purchaser for value gained an indefeasible title on the basis that prior to the registration of the transfer the mortgage was removed from the register by the registration of the forged discharge. Dixon J. was of a contrary opinion, to the effect that the mortgage would not have been destroyed until a person who, according to the then condition of the register, was entitled to do so, gave a transfer which was taken bona fide for value and registered. I was of the opinion that the discharge and the transfer had been lodged simultaneously with a result that at no time during the course of the transaction could the purchaser point to the register and indicate an estate unencumbered with a mortgage. In my estimation only the view of Dixon J. gives any support to the appellants' claim. It must be remembered however that in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 the mortgage was always apparent on the face of the register, notwithstanding one party's promise that he would have it removed. In this case the register, as relied upon by Alban, showed Wall as the registered proprietor of an unencumbered estate at all material times. (at p392)

6. The alternative submission made for the appellants as to the invalidity of the original transfer was based on s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Act of 1894, as amended (Q.). The material part of s. 53 (5) reads as follows:

"No instrument of conveyance or transfer executed on or

after the first day of November, one thousand nine hundred

and eighteen of any estate or interest in any property

whatsoever

. . . shall be valid either at law or in equity unless the

name of the purchaser or transferee is written therein in ink

at the time of the execution thereof.

Any such instrument so made shall be absolutely void and

inoperative, and shall in no case be made available by the

insertion of a name or any other particulars afterwards."

I consider however that the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 with respect to the indefeasibility of the title of registered proprietors derived from void instruments are equally applicable to this defect as to that of fraud. (at p392)

7. My conclusion that registration vested title in Wall leads to the result that Wall passed an interest in the land to the bona fide purchaser Alban by means of the memorandum of transfer which he gave to the company. Section 43 of the Acts, which was referred to in argument, does not, in my opinion, alter this result. Section 43 states, inter alia:

"No instrument shall be effectual to pass any estate or

interest in any lands under the provisions of this Act or to

render such land liable as security for the payment of money

until such instrument shall have been registered in accordance

with the provisions of this Act . . ."

Section 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877 however, which was also raised in argument, provides, so far as material, that:

"Every instrument signed by a proprietor or by others

claiming through or under him purporting to pass an estate

or interest in or security upon land for the registration of

which provision is made by this Act shall until registered be

deemed to confer upon the person intended to take under

such instrument or other person claiming through or under

him a right or claim to the registration of such estate interest

or security."

In my opinion this section constitutes a recognition of equitable interests in land: see Barry v. Heider per Griffith C.J. [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197, at pp 207-208 . Being prior to registration Alban's interest must of course be an equitable one : Shaw v. Foster per Lord Cairns (1872) LR 5 HL 321, at p 338 . The case then resolves itself into a conflict between the competing equities of the appellants and Alban. (at p393)

8. In my opinion the appellants are estopped from relying on their prior equity. When the transfer which the appellants had given to Petrie was completed with the name of Wall as purchaser it operated, in my judgment, as a representation, addressed to any person who might take it without notice of the appellants' rights, that Wall had an estate in the land which he was entitled to transfer in his turn. The principles to be employed in deciding such a question were laid down in Abigail v. Lapin (1934) AC 491, at p 504; [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) 51 CLR 58, at p 68 where Lord Wright, who delivered the judgment of their Lordships, said : ". . . the conduct of the parties having the equitable interests and all the circumstances must be taken into consideration in order to determine which has the better equity" and later (1934) AC, at p 504; (1934) 51 CLR, at pp 68-69 :

"Apart from priority in time, the test for ascertaining which

incumbrancer has the better equity must be whether either has

been guilty of some act or default which prejudices his claim ;

in the present case the respondents on the one hand enabled

the Heaveners to represent themselves as legal owners in fee

simple, while on the other hand it cannot be said that Abigail

did or omitted to do anything which he should have done in

lending the money on the security . . . "

In my judgment it follows from these principles that the interest of Alban should be accorded paramountcy. (at p394)

9. I would therefore dismiss the appeal. (at p394)

MENZIES J. The issue between the appellants and the respondent, Alban Pty. Ltd., which is the only issue with which this Court is concerned, is one between two persons, neither of whom is the registered proprietor, as to which of them should become the registered proprietor of the land described in certificate of title vol. 3730 fol. 104. The land is subject to The Real Property Acts, 1861 to 1963 (Q.). (at p394)

2. The claim of the appellants is, firstly, that they were the registered proprietors of the land up to 15th October 1968, and remained thereafter as registered proprietors in law, notwithstanding the registration, on 15th October 1968, of a transfer which they had, on 5th March 1968, signed in blank. This transfer was given, with the duplicate certificate of title, to afford security for a loan from one Petrie. It was, in fraud of them, registered in the name of Wall after his name had, in September 1968, been put into the transfer by Petrie to cheat the appellants out of their land. The learned trial judge found the fraud and found that Wall was a party to it. His Honour said (1972) QdR, at pp 30-31 :

"I find that in transferring the land to Wall and selling it

in the way he did Petrie acted fraudulently in that he was

attempting to cheat the plaintiffs out of the major part of their

interest in the land. He was guilty of moral turpitude.

His fraud was of the relevant kind under The Real Property

Acts. (See Latec Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Terrigal Pty.

Ltd.

[1965] HCA 17; (1965) 113 CLR 265, at pp273, 274

.) But he was an old man born on 24th March 1888

who succumbed to temptation. In the witness box he showed

himself to be partially deaf and not very mentally alert. I

find that throughout he was acting as the agent of Wall and

of his wife and that Wall is affected by his fraud." (at p394)

3. Alternatively to the claim that they have remained as registered proprietors after 15th October 1968, the appellants claim that they are entitled to registration in place of Wall by virtue of their equitable right to become registered proprietors again. (at p394)

4. Before going further it is necessary to refer to an unusual provision, namely s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Acts (Q.) which is, so far as is relevant, in these terms : "(5) No instrument of conveyance or transfer executed on

or after the first day of November, one thousand nine

hundred and eighteen, of any estate or interest in any

property whatsoever shall be valid, either at law or in equity,

unless the name of the purchaser or transferee is written therein

in ink at the time of the execution thereof.

Any such instrument so made shall be absolutely void and

inoperative, and shall in no case be made available by the

insertion of a name or any other particulars afterwards.

Moreover, for any breach of this subsection a penalty not

exceeding twenty pounds shall be incurred by each party

executing the instrument." (at p395)

5. It is apparent, therefore, that there are two objections to whatever title Wall has. The first is that it was obtained illegally by the use of an invalid instrument made in breach of s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Acts ; the second is that it was obtained by his own fraud. The appellants can, I have no doubt, displace Wall's title. To succeed, however, at the expense of Alban Pty. Ltd., they must go further than they have to go against Wall. They must show either that Wall had no title at all, or, that their claim is to be preferred to that of Alban Pty. Ltd. (at p395)

6. The claim of Alban Pty. Ltd. is that it holds a transfer from Wall to carry out a purchase of the land, made for valuable consideration by Alban Pty. Ltd. from Wall, and made, so far as Alban Pty. Ltd. was concerned, in good faith, without notice of any rights of the appellants. Their rights came to the notice of Alban Pty. Ltd. only when a caveat to prevent the registration of the transfer to it by Wall had been lodged. The learned trial judge found that Alban Pty. Ltd. was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration without notice of the appellants' rights. (at p395)

7. In support of their claim that Wall is not the registered proprietor, the appellants call in aid certain passages from the judgment of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 . His Honour cited a passage (1934) 51 CLR, at p258 from the dissenting judgment of Salmond J. in Boyd v. Mayor, &c., of Wellington which concluded as follows (1924) NZLR 1174, at p 1205 :

"The registered title of A cannot pass to B except by the

registration against A's title of a valid and operative

instrument

of transfer. It cannot pass by registration alone without

a valid instrument, any more than it can pass by a valid

instrument alone without registration."

His Honour stated that this appeared to him as an admirable statement of the true position. For himself, his Honour said (1934) 51 CLR, at p 237 :

"The principle, in my opinion, is that a prior registered

estate or interest, for the removal of which from the register

there is no authority but a forged or void instrument, is not

destroyed unless afterwards a person, who, according to the

existing condition of the register is entitled to do so, gives a

registrable instrument which is taken bona fide for value and

registered. The justification for destroying an existing legal

estate or interest, which has already been duly established

upon the register, is, in other words, found only in the necessity

of protecting those who subsequently deal in good faith and

for value in a manner, which, upon its face, the register

appears to authorize, and who then obtains registration." (at p396)

8. Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 was a case decided under the Transfer of Land Act (Vict.) but the provisions of The Real Property Act (Q.) are, with one exception to which I will refer later, substantially the same. What Dixon J. said has been followed in New South Wales and in Victoria : Caldwell v. Rural Bank of New South Wales (1951) 53 SR (NSW) 415 and Davies v. Ryan [1951] VicLawRp 39; (1951) VLR 283 . (at p396)

9. Since these decisions, however, the Privy Council has decided Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 . In their opinion in this case their Lordships made no reference to Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 , although it had been cited, but they did apply the decision of the majority in Boyd's Case (1924) NZLR 1174 , preferring the judgment of the majority to the dissenting judgments of Springer and Salmond JJ. (at p396)

"They consider that Boyd's Case

(1924) NZLR 1174

was rightly decided and

that the ratio of the decision applies as regards titles derived

from registration of void instruments generally. As regards

all such instruments it established that registration is effective

to vest and to divest title and to protect the registered

proprietor against adverse claims."

It is important, however, to observe what their Lordships meant by the words "all such instruments" in the passage which I have just cited. They meant void instruments whereby the name of the person had been registered without fraud in respect of an estate or interest. This appears clearly from the reference to Assets Co. Ltd. v. Mere Roihi (1905) AC 176 on the preceding page (1967) 1 AC, at p 583 , and from the statement (1967) 1 AC, at p 584 that the main relevant difference between the majority and the minority in Boyd's Case (1924) NZLR 1174 was whether the Mere Roihi Case (1905) AC 176 established "the indefeasibility of title of a registered proprietor who acquired his interest under a void instrument, or whether it is only a bona fide purchaser from such a proprietor whose title is indefeasible". (at p396)

11. Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 was not a case of conflict between unregistered interests. In that case mortgagees, who had registered a mortgage from registered proprietors to which one signature was a forgery, sold the land under their power of sale to a purchaser who was duly registered as proprietor. The only fraud in the case was that of one of the registered proprietors who forged the name of her husband, a co-proprietor with her. Her fraud afforded no statutory basis for impeaching the title of the mortgagees when they were registered, or, of the registered proprietor from them. Both the mortgagees and the registered proprietor acted in good faith and without knowledge of the forgery. The decision in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 cannot, therefore, govern this case. Indeed, one may perhaps be excused from wondering how the former registered proprietor, who suffered from his wife's forgery, could ever have hoped to succeed against the newly registered proprietor who took a transfer from registered mortgagees. The problem of competition for registration never arose in that case. Indeed, it is a case which would have fallen fairly and squarely within the statement of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 237 cited previously. (at p397)

12. Nevertheless, Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 is important here in establishing that, if and to the extent that earlier decisions were to the effect that an indefeasible title cannot be acquired by the registration of a void instrument, they have lost their authority. It must now be recognized that, in the absence of fraud on the part of a transferee, or some other statutory ground of exception, an indefeasible title can be acquired by virtue of a void transfer. It seems to me to follow that, where there is fraud or one of the other statutory exceptions to indefeasibility, a transferee does, by registration of a void transfer, obtain a defeasible title. (at p397)

13. In this case, as I have already indicated, Wall, although he became registered proprietor, clearly enough did not obtain an indefeasible title. He obtained registration by the fraudulent use of an invalid instrument. It is the significance of his becoming registered in these circumstances that matters here. (at p397)

14. The first critical question which I pose is, therefore, whether, when Wall became registered as proprietor of the land, the appellants ceased to be the registered proprietors. With the guidance of Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 about the effect of the registration of void instruments, I have reached the conclusion that they did, and I think so regardless of whether the transfer was invalid by virtue of s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Acts, or, that, by reason of fraud, the title acquired was defeasible. The registration was of an instrument executed by the appellants as registered proprietors, albeit in breach of law, and, upon its registration, they ceased to be registered proprietors. (at p398)

15. This is not a case where it is possible to apply Gibbs v. Messer (1891) AC 248 where, as the Privy Council has explained, there was no real registered proprietor at all but only a fictitious person. After the registration of Wall as registered proprietor the appellants' rights were no longer those of registered proprietors but were simply to impeach the defeasible title which Wall had obtained by that registration. Furthermore, as I read s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Acts, the breach of law seems to lie in the execution of the instrument and not in its use. I therefore reserve any question arising out of the illegal use of an instrument to obtain registration in the name of the law breaker. Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 was not concerned with illegality on the part of those becoming registered. (at p398)

16. This brings me to what I regard as the second critical question, namely, whether the appellants' claim in equity to registration, which is earlier in time than the claim of Alban Pty. Ltd., should nevertheless be postponed to its claim. (at p398)

17. It is at this point that I think that s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Acts does introduce an element not to be found in earlier cases where earlier claims of an equitable character have been postponed to later claims. Such cases are Butler v. Fairclough [1917] HCA 9; (1917) 23 CLR 78 and Abigail v. Lapin [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58 . What this section says is that no transfer signed in blank "shall be valid either in law or in equity". If, therefore, Alban Pty. Ltd. has to depend in any way upon that transfer to maintain the rights which it asserts, it must fail. That transfer cannot, in the face of the statute, be regarded as a good source of equitable rights. What Alban Pty. Ltd. holds, however, is a transfer from the registered proprietor, albeit a registered proprietor with a defeasible title, and it is necessary to determine what rights it has solely as such transferee. (at p398)

18. Whatever may be the position in other cases, it seems to me that in this case that question is resolved by a particular enactment which is not to be found generally in state legislation establishing the Torrens system. This enactment is s. 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877. It is as follows:

"48. Unregistered instrument to confer claim to

registration.

Every instrument signed by a proprietor or by others

claiming through or under him purporting to pass an estate

or interest in or security upon land for the registration of

which provision is made by this Act shall until registered be

deemed to confer upon the person intended to take under such

instrument or other person claiming through or under him a

right or claim to the registration of such estate interest or

security . . . "

Wall, as I have already decided, was " a proprietor" and by virtue of the section, therefore, Alban Pty. Ltd. has a right or claim to the registration of the estate which the transfer purports to pass. (at p399)

19. Accordingly, there are conflicting claims to be registered in place of Wall and the final problem is which is to be preferred. The authorities already cited establish that the appellants' right or claim should, in the absence of a good ground for distinguishing them, be postponed and it becomes necessary to determine whether The Stamp Acts, s. 53 (5), affords any such ground for distinction. By reason of the section it is apparent that what the appellants signed was not an effective transfer. It was a document without effect in law or in equity and no registration should have been based upon it. By giving it to Petrie the appellants did not put him in possession of an effective instrument of transfer. The blank transfer, however, with no effect in law or in equity, once it had been wrongly filled in and lodged with the certificate of title, became the means whereby Wall was able to become registered proprietor and to deal with Alban Pty. Ltd. as such. Upon the authorities cited, this, I think, is enough to require the postponement of the appellants' right or claim to that of Alban Pty. Ltd. They did not put Petrie or Wall in a position to have Wall lawfully registered as proprietor. Nevertheless, in executing the transfer in blank they were in breach of The Stamp Acts, s. 53 (5), and it was their breach of the law that enabled Wall, in disregard of the section, to become registered as proprietor. (at p399)

20. The learned trial judge decided that the claim of the appellants must be postponed to that of Alban Pty. Ltd. and I would, for the reasons which I have given, dismiss this appeal from his judgment. (at p399)

WINDEYER J. I concur in the judgment of the Chief Justice. I cannot usefully add anything to the reasons that he and my brothers McTiernan and Walsh have given for dismissing this appeal. I would only observe that the Chief Justice's aphorism, that the Torrens system is not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration, accords with the way in which Torrens himself stated the basic idea of his scheme as it became law in South Australia in 1857. In 1862 he, as Registrar-General, published his booklet, A Handy Book on the Real Property Act of South Australia. It contains the statement, repeated from the South Australian Handbook, that:

". . . any system to be effective for the reform of the law of

real property must commence by removing the past

accumulations, and then establish a method under which

future dealings will not induce fresh accumulations.

This is effectuated in South Australia by substituting 'Title

by Registration' for 'Title by Deed' . . . "

Later, using language which has become familiar, he spoke of "indefeasibility of title". He noted, as an important benefit of the new system, "cutting off the retrospective or derivative character of the title upon each transfer or transmission, so as that each freeholder is in the same position as a grantee direct from the Crown". This is an assertion that the title of each registered proprietor comes from the fact of registration, that it is made the source of the title, rather than a retrospective approbation of it as a derivative right. (at p400)

2. I say that only to emphasize that the doctrine of an indefeasible title arising by registration was seen as the very essence of the Torrens system from its beginning. In the present case, the decision of the Privy Council in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 recognizes that the registered proprietor has the legal property in the land, subject only to equities and such interests as the Act expressly preserves. And the decision of the Privy Council in Abigail v. Lapin [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58 means that in the circumstances of this case the claim of the appellants founded upon fraud must give way to the rights of the bona fide purchaser for value. The appellants are therefore not entitled to the land. Their remedy lies in recovering damages from those who defrauded them of it. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. (at p400)

OWEN J. I agree with the judgment of the Chief Justice and that the appeal should be dismissed. (at p400)

WALSH J. The appellants were the registered proprietors as joint tenants of an estate in fee simple in certain land under the provisions of The Real Property Act of 1861 (Q.), as amended, (the Act). On 5th March 1968 they signed a memorandum of transfer. This was expressed to be an absolute transfer of all the estate and interest of the appellants in the said land. When they signed it no name of a transferee was inserted. Later, in September 1968, the name of the defendant George Walter Wall was inserted as the transferee. The transfer was registered on 15th October 1968. It was expressed to be in consideration of the sum of $1,200. In an action subsequently brought by the appellants in the Supreme Court of Queensland, the learned trial judge found that the transaction which led to the execution by the appellants of the transfer was not a sale but was a loan for a period of twelve months made to them by the defendant Petrie, who acted as agent for the defendant Wall who was Petrie's grandson and for Petrie's wife (who died before the action was heard). In May 1968 Petrie put the land in the hands of agents for sale. On 14th October 1968 Mr. Baron, who was acting in the transaction on behalf of the defendant Alban Pty. Ltd. (Alban), paid to a firm of estate agents a deposit on the purchase of the land for $3,500, subject to contract of sale. Mr. Baron gave evidence that it was ascertained that Wall who was the vendor was not at that time registered as the proprietor of the land and that the matter "remained in abeyance" until another search was made and it was found that Wall was then registered as proprietor. On 31st October 1968 a contract of sale was made between Wall and Alban for the sale of the land for $3,500 and the balance of the price was paid. On 7th November 1968 Wall executed a transfer of the land to Alban. Up to that time no caveat had been lodged by the appellants. A caveat was lodged by them on 13th December 1968 and it was entered on 6th March 1969. The transfer of 7th November 1968 was not lodged for registration until 8th January 1969. (at p401)

2. The learned trial judge found that Petrie acted fraudulently and that his "fraud was of the relevant kind under The Real Property Acts". He found that Wall was affected by the fraud of Petrie. He found that Alban was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. He held that Alban had an equitable interest in the land superior to the interest of the appellants and was entitled to have the transfer registered. He ordered that the caveat of the appellants be removed from the register. He gave judgment for the appellants for damages against the defendants Wall and Petrie. This appeal is concerned only with the contest between the appellants and Alban. (at p401)

3. In my opinion it is clear that if the appellants had taken action against Wall, before there had been any dealing by him with a third party, seeking to have the transfer set aside or seeking a declaration that it was held by way of security only and claiming appropriate consequential relief, Wall would not have been able to rely on his registered title to defeat such a claim. It is clear, also, that if Alban had succeeded in obtaining registration of the transfer which Wall executed, its registered title would have prevailed over any claims based upon a challenge by the appellants to the validity of the transaction between them and Wall or of the instrument as a result of which Wall had become registered. But the appellants did not challenge the effectiveness of their transfer as an absolute transfer of their interest in the land or place upon the register any notification of an interest claimed by them, until after Alban had entered without notice of any such interest into a contract of purchase and had paid the purchase price and obtained, from the person who appeared on the register as the registered proprietor, a transfer signed by him. On the other hand, Alban did not obtain registration and, therefore, the problem before the Court cannot be solved, as it could be if Alban had become registered, by reference to the indefeasibility which without doubt would have attached upon registration to the title of Alban. (at p402)

4. The appellants had formerly a registered estate in fee simple. But by a transfer which was registered they ceased to be registered proprietors in fact. They claim, however, that for two reasons that was ineffective to deprive them of the right which they formerly had. One is that because at the time of the execution of the transfer the name of the purchaser was not inserted the transfer was absolutely void and inoperative. That claim is based upon the provisions of s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Act of 1894 (Q.), as amended, which provides that no instrument of conveyance or transfer shall be valid either at law or in equity unless the name of the purchaser or transferee is written therein in ink at the time of the execution thereof and provides that any such instrument "shall be absolutely void and inoperative". The second ground upon which the appellants attack the transfer executed by them is that it was intended to be by way of security only and that it was used in fraud of the appellants as if it had been intended to operate as an absolute transfer. (at p402)

5. It is desirable now to refer to some provisions of the Act to which counsel for the appellants drew our attention. Section 33 provides, in part, that:

"Every certificate of title . . . shall be conclusive evidence

that the person named in such certificate of title or in any

entry thereon as seised of or as taking estate or interest in the

land therein described is seised or possessed of such land for

the estate or interest therein specified."

The absolute conclusiveness which that provision might appear to give to the register must be regarded as qualified, in order to give meaning to s. 44, which is to the effect that the registered proprietor of land or of any estate or interest in land shall except in the case of fraud hold the same subject to such encumbrances etc. as are notified in the register book but absolutely free from all encumbrances etc., but the section specifies certain further exceptions in addition to the exception of fraud. This provision would prevent Wall in the circumstances of this case from relying on his registered title to defeat a claim of the appellants based upon fraud for which he was responsible. (at p403)

6. I shall refer later to s. 43 of the Act. (at p403)

7. Section 109 was mentioned in argument but, in my opinion, it is not of importance in this case. It provides that a transferee whether voluntary or not shall not except in case of fraud be affected by actual or constructive notice of any claims rights titles or interests other than those which have been notified or protected by entry in the register book according to the provisions of the Act any rule of law or equity to the contrary notwithstanding. Similar provisions relating to the effect of notice of unregistered rights have been construed as affording protection after and not before the registration of the interest of the person who claims protection. In this case Alban's contention that it is immune from the claims of the appellants is not based on this section but upon other grounds to which reference will be made later. (at p403)

8. Section 123 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, no action for ejectment shall lie or be sustained against a registered proprietor for the recovery of land under the provisions of the Act and the grant or certificate of title shall be held in every court of law or equity to be an absolute bar and estoppel to any such action against the person named in such grant or certificate of title as seised of or entitled to such land. The excepted cases include that of:

". . . a person deprived of any land by fraud as against a

person registered as proprietor through fraud or against a

person deriving otherwise than as a purchaser or mortgagee

bona fide for value from or through a person registered as

proprietor through fraud." (at p403)

9. Section 126 provides that a person deprived of any land or of any estate or interest in land in consequence of fraud may bring an action at law for the recovery of damages against the person who derived benefit from such fraud. There is a proviso that nothing in the Act contained shall be interpreted to subject to any action of ejectment or for recovery of damages any purchaser or mortgagee bona fide for valuable consideration of any land under the provisions of the Act although his vendor or mortgagor may have been registered as a proprietor through fraud or may have derived from or through a person registered as proprietor through fraud. Section 123 has no direct application in relation to the competing claims of the appellants and Alban in this case and, in my opinion, it does not assist the appellants to have their rights preferred to that of Alban. Because of the exceptions which it contains, it could not assist Wall if an action for ejectment had been brought against him by the appellants. If such an action had been brought by the appellants against Alban the section would not, in my opinion, have had any application since its subject matter is an action of ejectment brought against a registered proprietor. (at p404)

10. The proviso to s. 126 would preserve Alban from an action of ejectment or for damages if it applied to any "purchaser or mortgagee bona fide for valuable consideration" whether the purchaser or mortgagee had become registered or not. Its language does not restrict it to those who have become registered. In this respect, it may be contrasted with provisions relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers and mortgagees from action of ejectment or for the recovery of land contained in other legislation, such as s. 183 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (N.Z.), set out in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, at p 582 , s. 135 of the Real Property Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), as amended, and s. 44 (2) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vict.). But if, by analogy to the construction that has been put on other provisions giving protection to those who deal with registered proprietors, it should be construed as so restricted (cf. Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at pp 232, 242 ), that would not have in my opinion the consequence that Alban could not obtain before registration any rights whatever derived from a dealing for valuable consideration and in good faith with a vendor affected by fraud. Section 126 should not be regarded as stating exhaustively the rights that may be obtained from such a dealing. If Alban cannot rely upon s. 126, it is not precluded in my opinion from seeking to rely upon other statutory provisions such as s. 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877 (Q.) which will be examined later, or upon equitable rights arising out of its transaction with Wall. The question whether the appellants have rights superior to any right which Alban is able to assert is the question which I proceed now to consider. (at p404)

11. If the statements which I am about to quote from the judgment of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 237 were accepted as correct and as applicable to The Real Property Acts of Queensland, it would appear that the appellants could assert, in effect, that they must be treated, for the purposes of their claim against Alban, as if they still retained the legal estate which they formerly held. On that view, no question of competing equities would arise as between them and Alban and since Alban did not obtain registration no necessity for protecting it would exist to provide a justification for destroying the prior registered estate of the appellants. His Honour said [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 237 :

"The principal, in my opinion, is that a prior registered

estate or interest, for the removal of which from the register

there is no authority but a forged or void instrument, is

not destroyed unless afterwards a person who, according

to the existing condition of the register is entitled to do so,

gives a registrable instrument which is taken bona fide for

value and registered. The justification for destroying an existing

legal estate or interest, which has already been duly established

upon the register, is, in other words, found only in the necessity

of protecting those who subsequently deal in good faith and for

value in a manner, which, upon its face, the register appears

to authorize, and who then obtain registration" (my emphasis).

His Honour was there dealing with Victorian legislation. I am of opinion that with respect to the effect of the registration of a void instrument, there is no relevant difference between the legislation then in force in Victoria and the New Zealand legislation considered in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 , where the relevant provisions of that legislation are stated in considerable detail. I am of opinion also that the decision and the reasons in that case are applicable on the question under consideration to the Queensland legislation. (at p405)

12. I agree with respect with the learned trial judge that the case of Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 differs from the present case. In that case there was no question of fraud on the part of the mortgagees who obtained registration of a forged memorandum of mortgage or on the part of the subsequent purchasers from them. The important statements of principle which the Judicial Committee made as to the immunity from attack of a registered title were made subject to exceptions for which the Act then being considered specifically provides. Nevertheless, I am of opinion, as was the learned trial judge, that the principles laid down in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 are of great importance in considering the present case. The statements which I have quoted from the judgment of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 237 and the dissenting judgments in Boyd v. Mayor, &c., of Wellington (1924) NZLR 1174 had been accepted and followed in decisions of Supreme Courts in Australia: see Caldwell v. Rural Bank of New South Wales (1951) 53 SR (NSW) 415 and Davies v. Ryan [1951] VicLawRp 39; (1951) VLR 283 . But in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 the decision of the majority of the Court in Boyd's Case (1924) NZLR 1174 was expressly approved and the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee are quite inconsistent, in my opinion, with the quoted statements of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 237 . The result is, in my opinion, that it is no longer open to the appellants to contend, as it would have been before the decision in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 , that they still stand in the same position as they did when they were registered proprietors, for the reason that the transfer, being void, could not operate notwithstanding its registration to destroy or to affect their estate as registered proprietors. It is still open to the appellants to say that their transfer was made void by the provision in The Stamp Act. But it is not open to them, in my opinion, to contend that because of that provision the registration of Wall as registered proprietor was absolutely void and inoperative. Apart from the question of fraud, the non-compliance with the provision in The Stamp Act would not have enabled Wall's title as registered proprietor to be impeached. On this point I think that the emphatic language used in that provision ("absolutely void and inoperative") cannot make any difference. As Owen J. said in Caldwell's Case (1951) 53 SR (NSW), at p 423 , it is difficult to see how there can be degrees of nullity. An instrument which is declared by a statute to be "absolutely void and inoperative" is for present purposes no different, in my opinion, from an instrument which, as in Boyd's Case (1924) NZLR 1174 , is void because the conditions precedent to the statutory power under which it purports to be made are not fulfilled or from an instrument which is void because it is a forgery. (at p406)

13. I am of opinion that the submission that s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Act should be regarded as effecting an implied repeal pro tanto or an implied amendment of any provisions of the Act which would otherwise operate to give validity to the registration of the transfer to Wall should not be accepted. (at p406)

14. In my opinion, the principles laid down in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 as to the indefeasibility of a registered title, where the instrument by means of which registration is obtained is void, are applicable in the present case notwithstanding that it has been found here that there was fraud by which the transferee Wall was affected. The effect of the fraud upon the rights of the parties must, of course, be considered. But it is a different question from that which is raised by the non-compliance with the provisions of The Stamp Act. In so far as the appellants, in addition to their reliance upon fraud, base their claim upon the contention that the transfer was rendered void by s. 53(5) of The Stamp Act, I am of opinion that the principles stated in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 preclude them from succeeding. I am of opinion that those principles require the conclusion that when the transfer was registered then, as the learned trial judge said, "the registration of Wall as the registered proprietor was effective to vest the title in him and to divest the title of the plaintiffs". Wall was not a person who had nothing and, therefore, could grant nothing to a person with whom he dealt. Although what he had may have been vulnerable because of fraud to a claim by the appellants to have restored to them their former rights, it cannot be said that nothing had passed from the appellants to Wall. (at p407)

15. I must consider now the effect of the fraud which was found to have been practised upon the appellants. It is necessary, in the first place, to recall that the appellants were not induced by fraud to enter into a transaction in which no valuable consideration passed to them and in which they incurred no binding obligations. They obtained by way of loan the sum of $1,200. According to their amended statement of claim they signed a document in blank in order to secure to the second defendant (Petrie) the repayment of the advance, which was to be repaid in one lump sum on the expiration of twelve months from the date when the advance became effective. They alleged that they were induced to sign the document in blank upon his representation to them that it was by way of security for the repayment to him of the advance and for no other purpose. They went on to allege that the completion of the document in registrable form as a memorandum of transfer for registration was fraudulent. The learned trial judge's finding was that "in transferring the land to Wall and in selling it in the way he did Petrie acted fraudulently in that he was attempting to cheat the plaintiffs out of the major part of their interest in the land". Therefore, the case is one in which the appellants did intend to sign a document as a security for an advance and it is not suggested that they did not know when they signed it that it related to their land. (at p407)

16. The appellants claimed that an order should be made that the memorandum of transfer and the entry in the register book relating to it should be cancelled and that the certificate of title should be altered accordingly. In the alternative they sought orders that Wall should transfer the land back to them and that that transfer should be registered in priority to any other documents creating or purporting to create interests in the land lodged for registration with the Registrar of Titles. (at p408)

17. In my opinion, the appellants would be entitled, as between themselves and Wall, to have the registered title restored to them because of the fraud by which he was found to have been affected. He could not defeat their claims by reliance upon his registered title. But nevertheless the registered title was held by him and not by the appellants. It is true that the Act contemplates that there may be a recovery of land by an action of ejectment from a fraudulent registered proprietor and that the Supreme Court may then make orders to correct the entries in the register book accordingly (s. 124). But in the circumstances of this case, the appellants were not entitled in my opinion to take proceedings on the footing that they remained entitled to the legal estate. They could not assert an unconditional right to recover both possession of the land and the registered title to it. The right that they had was in my opinion of the nature of an equitable right. It was a right to ask a court to compel Wall as the holder of the registered title to deal with it in such a way that he would obtain no benefit from the fraud that had been practised on the appellants. In so far as they sought to have the legal title transferred back to them, that relief (if no right of any third party had to be considered) could no doubt have been granted but, I should think, only upon terms that they repaid the loan, which they asserted in their amended statement of claim they were willing and had offered to do. The rights which the appellants had by reason of the fraud were rights enforceable primarily against Wall as a party (through his agent) to the transaction with them and as the holder of the registered title acquired by means of the transfer. But it is important to examine the nature of their rights, not in order to determine what relief could be obtained against Wall, but to ascertain whether any relief can be obtained against Alban. In this respect what I have so far said may be summed up by stating that the provisions of the Stamp Act did not prevent the registration of the transfer from divesting the legal estate from the appellants and vesting it in Wall and that the right of the appellants against Wall to have the legal estate restored to them was, in my opinion, an equitable and not a legal right. It is not necessary in this case, in my opinion, to enter into the question whether the appellants should be regarded as having an equitable estate in the land or as having "an equity unaccompanied by an equitable interest" or, in other words, "a mere equity as distinguished from an equitable estate": see Latec Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Terrigal Pty. Ltd. [1965] HCA 17; (1965) 113 CLR 265, at pp 277, 285 . I am of opinion that, if it be assumed that the appellants had an equitable estate or interest in the land after their transfer had been registered, that interest is not entitled to priority over the interest which Alban acquired in the land. If the latter interest is to be considered as an equitable interest, arising out of the contract for the purchase of the land made by it with the registered owner of the land without notice of any defect in his title and completed by payment of purchase money and the obtaining of a transfer, Alban is entitled, in my opinion, to priority over the interest of the appellants. In my opinion, the principles enunciated in Butler v. Fairclough [1917] HCA 9; (1917) 23 CLR 78 , and in Abigail v. Lapin (1934) AF 491; (1934) 51 FLR 58 , require the conclusion upon the facts of this case that the interest of the appellants, although prior in time, is postponed to the interest of Alban. (at p409)

18. The appellants placed in the hands of Wall a memorandum of transfer in a form which enabled him to complete it in such a way as to make it appear to be a valid absolute transfer of the appellants' estate. They allowed Petrie to have possession of the certificate of title. Thus they enabled Petrie to procure the registration of Wall as the owner of an estate in fee simple. These acts of the appellants, coupled with their failure at the relevant time to place upon the register any notice of any interest retained by them in the land, enabled Wall and his agent Petrie to represent to an intending purchaser that Wall had an unencumbered estate in fee simple in the land. Although the appellants did not themselves make any direct representations to Alban, their conduct placed Wall in a position to make the representations upon which Alban acted. In this respect their conduct was precisely the same as the conduct described in Abigail v. Lapin (1934) AC, at p 506; (1934) 51 CLR, at p 70 , which was held to postpone the equity of the person who by that conduct enabled a representation to be made upon the faith of which another person acquired an equitable interest. In Lapin v. Abigail, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. said [1930] HCA 6; (1930) 44 CLR 166, at p 198 :

"In our opinion, the Lapins are bound by the natural

consequences of their acts in arming Olivia Sophia Heavener

with the power to go into the world as the absolute owner of

the lands and thus execute transfers or mortgages of the lands

to other persons, and they ought to be postponed to the

equitable rights of Abigail to the extent allowed by the

Supreme Court."

That passage was quoted in Abigail v. Lapin (1934) AC 491, at pp 499-500; [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) 51 CLR 58, at p 64 , and their Lordships expressed their agreement with Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. in regard both to their reasoning and their conclusion. The passage quoted is applicable, in my opinion, to the acts of the appellants by which Wall was empowered to present himself to the world as absolute owner of the land and to execute a transfer to Alban. (at p410)

19. Section 43 of the Act includes a provision that no instrument shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any lands or to render such land liable as security for the payment of money until such instrument shall have been registered. But despite the language used in that provision and in similar provisions in the legislation of other States, a purchaser for value has been regarded as having, before the registration of a transfer of the land to him, an equitable estate in the land which will be recognized and will in appropriate cases be given priority over a prior equitable interest. That was expressly decided in Barry v. Heider [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197 , and that decision was approved and applied by the Privy Council in Great West Permanent Loan Co. v. Friesen (1925) AC 208 . In Barry v. Heider (1914) 19 CLR, at p 207 , Griffith C.J. referred to s. 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877 (Q.) which his Honour regarded as having given express recognition to the view which he thought should be taken, notwithstanding provisions similar to those of s. 43 of the Act, as to the effect upon equitable rights and interests of legislation embodying the "Torrens system". Section 48 of the Act of 1877 provides:

"48. Unregistered instrument to confer claim to

registration.

Every instrument signed by a proprietor or by others

claiming through or under him purporting to pass an estate

or interest in or security upon land for the registration of

which provision is made by this Act shall until registered be

deemed to confer upon the person intended to take under such

instrument or other person claiming through or under him

a right or claim to the registration of such estate interest or

And the Registrar-General upon application made for that

purpose by any person other than the person immediately

claiming under or in respect of the instrument signed by a

proprietor may either reject such application altogether or

register the applicant as proprietor of the land estate interest

or security forthwith or at the expiration of some defined

period of time and may further direct such other entries to

be made as may be in his opinion necessary.

Provided that no such registration or entry as last aforesaid

which would interfere with the right of any person claiming

under any instrument previously registered under this Act

shall be made except subject thereto."

That section is still in force. In my opinion, it operated in the present case to confer upon Alban a right or claim to the registration of the estate in fee simple described in the transfer executed by Wall. I am of opinion that that right is superior to the rights upon which the appellants rely in their claim to have the title restored to them. Against a right given by the statute to Alban they cannot set up successfully their equitable right based upon the fraud practised upon them by Petrie and Wall but not by Alban. But even if the provisions of s. 48 were not part of the law by which this case is to be governed, I should be of opinion that the equitable right derived by Alban from the contract made by it in good faith with Wall must prevail, upon the application of the principles established by the authorities to which I have referred to the facts admitted or proved at the trial, against the claim of the appellants. (at p411)

20. I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed. (at p411)

GIBBS J. I have had the advantage of reading and considering the judgments of my brethren and can state very briefly my reasons for agreeing with their conclusion that this appeal should be dismissed. (at p411)

2. Before 15th October 1968 the appellants were the registered proprietors of the land in question. On that date the respondent Wall became registered as the proprietor of the land. His registration was procured by the fraud of his agent, the second respondent Petrie, who had made a loan of money to the appellants, and had obtained as security for the loan a signed memorandum of transfer of their estate and interest in the land, together with the certificate of title. The memorandum of transfer, in which the name of the transferee had been left blank at the time of its execution, was void by reason of the provisions of s. 53 (5) of The Stamp Act, 1894 (Q.), as amended. On 31st October 1968 Wall sold the land to the third respondent, Alban Pty. Ltd., which bought in good faith and for value and without notice of the fraud, and on 7th November 1968 Wall executed a memorandum of transfer in favour of Alban Pty. Ltd. However Alban Pty. Ltd. did not lodge its transfer for registration until 8th January 1969 and, in the meantime, the appellants had lodged a caveat. (at p411)

3. The first and second respondents have not appeared on this appeal, and the question for decision is whether the appellants are entitled to a declaration that they are and have at all material times been seised of a legal estate in fee simple in the subject land, and a consequential alteration of the register, or whether, as the learned trial judge has held, the appellants' caveat should be removed, thus opening the way to registration of the transfer to Alban Pty. Ltd. (at p412)

4. There is no doubt on any view of the law that Wall did not obtain an indefeasible title upon the registration of the transfer to him. He became registered as a result of the actual fraud of his agent and the case was accordingly within one of the exceptions expressly made by s. 44 of The Real Property Act of 1861 (Q.), as amended, to the paramountcy of the title of the registered proprietor. The present case therefore does not directly give rise to the question whether a person who without fraud but by virtue of a void document becomes registered as proprietor of land under The Real Property Acts obtains on registration an indefeasible title. But the claim of the appellants that they still have a legal estate does raise the question whether their registered estate was destroyed when Wall was placed on the register. Their claim can only succeed if it is possible to agree with the following dictum of Salmond J. in his dissenting judgment in Boyd v. Mayor, & c., of Wellington (1924) NZLR 1174, at p 1205 , which was cited with approval by Dixon J., as he then was, in Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217, at p 258 :

"The registered title of A cannot pass to B except by the

registration against A's title of a valid and operative

instrument

of transfer. It cannot pass by registration alone

without a valid instrument, any more than it can pass by a

valid instrument alone without registration."

This dictum, and the further remarks of Dixon J. in Clements v. Ellis (1934) 51 CLR, at p 237 , were relied on as supporting the view that the registration of a void instrument is completely inoperative, so that the person previously registered remains in law the registered proprietor. However this view cannot be successfully maintained since the decision of the Judicial Committee in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569 . In that case (1967) 1 AC, at p 584 the Board expressly approved the decision of the majority in Boyd v. Mayor, &c., of Wellington (1924) NZLR 1174 and, although Clements v. Ellis [1934] HCA 18; (1934) 51 CLR 217 is not mentioned, the reasoning of the Board is clearly inconsistent with the passages in the judgment of Dixon J. to which I have referred. As was said in Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, at p 580 , "registration once effected must attract the consequences which the Act attaches to registration whether that was regular or otherwise . . . It is in fact the registration and not its antecedents which vests and divests title". (See also (1967) 1 AC, at p 585 .) (at p413)

5. When Wall became registered in fact he became vested with the legal title to the land although his title was not immune from the adverse claim of the appellants, who had the right as against him to be restored as registered proprietors. I am prepared to assume in favour of the appellants that after Wall's registration they continued to have an equitable interest in the land, rather than a mere equity to set the transfer aside (cf. Latec Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Terrigal Pty. Ltd. [1965] HCA 17; (1965) 113 CLR 265, at pp 277-278, 280-284, 289-291 ). However Alban Pty. Ltd., which purchased the land from Wall in good faith and for value, and was given a memorandum of transfer in registrable form signed by Wall, also acquired an equitable interest in the land and the right to the registration of that interest (see s. 48 of The Real Property Act of 1877 (Q.) and Barry v. Heider [1914] HCA 79; (1914) 19 CLR 197, at pp 206-208 ). The decision of the case then depends on which of the competing equitable interests takes priority. The interest of the appellants was created first in point of time but the appellants have lost their priority by their conduct which had the effect of inducing Alban Pty. Ltd. to act to its prejudice. The appellants had armed Petrie with the power to deal with the land as owner, by entrusting him with a certificate of title and a signed memorandum of transfer in blank, and thus had enabled him to register Wall as proprietor, and had enabled Wall to sell to Alban Pty. Ltd. as owner of the land. In these circumstances Abigail v. Lapin [1934] UKPCHCA 1; (1934) AC 491; (1934) 51 CLR 58 is sufficient authority for the conclusion that the equitable interest of the appellants is postponed to that of Alban Pty. Ltd. (at p413)

6. The learned trial judge was therefore correct in holding that the claim of the appellants to be regarded as the registered proprietors must fail and that their caveat should be removed. (at p413)