Brauner & Brauner [2025] FedCFamC1F 851 (24 November 2025)

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Brauner & Brauner has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Following a four-day hearing, final parenting orders were made by Strum J on 8 November 2024 ("the final orders") in relation to the children X, aged 17 and Y, aged 15. The final orders provide as follows:-

1. All previous parenting orders be discharged.

1. The father have sole parental responsibility for the children [X] born [2008], and [Y], born [2010] (collectively referred to as "the children").

3. The children live with the father.

1. The children spend professionally supervised time with the mother at [C Family Services] (or such other supervised contact service as the father may nominate in writing from time to time) as follows:

(a) In the case of [X], on Friday, [...] November 2024, and thereafter on the first Friday of every second calendar month, commencing in January 2025 and bi-monthly thereafter, from 4.00pm until 6.00pm; and

(b) In the case of [Y], on Friday, [...] November 2024, and thereafter on the third Friday of every third calendar month, commencing in February 2025 and quarterly thereafter, from 4.00pm until 6.00pm -

or such other like times as can be accommodated by the said contact service.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer be at liberty to provide a copy of this Order and a copy of the reasons delivered this day to [C Family Services] and the father have liberty to provide this Order and a copy of the reasons to such other supervised contact service as the father may hereafter nominate from time to time.

2. In the event that any occasion on which either of the children is to spend time with the mother pursuant to order 4 falls on a day when the contact service is closed, time be spent on the next day immediately available at the said service.

3. The mother otherwise be at liberty to communicate with the children by sending letters or cards to the children, as well as gifts for them, by delivering or causing the delivery of same to the office of the husband's solicitor, [Ms M], [U Street, City O], Victoria, [...], or to such other address as the father may hereafter notify her in writing from time to time.

8. The appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.

1. All extant applications be otherwise dismissed and the proceeding be removed from the docket of the Honourable Justice Strum.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. Insofar as these Orders are inconsistent with any family violence order made in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria, pursuant to section 68Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), to the extent of the inconsistency, the family violence order is invalid.

2. In accordance with section 68P(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Court will provide a copy of these orders to:

(a) Victoria Police; and

(b) The Registrar of the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at [City O].

1. Pursuant to ss 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in the fact sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

1. By Application in a Proceeding filed 21 July 2025 the applicant mother, Ms Brauner ("the mother"), seeks orders as follows:-

(1) Both children to be returned back to the mother full custody full care as previous court orders where both children where [sic] safe. Both children have told three children courts they want to live with mum and their dog where they are safe. Both children X and Y have told all case workers at Child Protection they are scared of dad and want to go home and go home to mum.

1. That application is opposed by the respondent father, Mr Brauner ("the father"), who relies upon s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), it being his position that there has been no significant change of circumstances since the final parenting orders were made. In addition, the father seeks a harmful proceedings order against the mother pursuant to s 102QAC of the Act.
2. The father's applications are supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer, who submitted that the final orders should remain in full force and effect.
3. For the reasons that follow, I will dismiss the mother's application and make a harmful proceedings order against her, as sought by the father.

1. The parties commenced cohabitation in 2001 and married in 2007. Separation occurred in 2019.
2. The father commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court (as it then was) in December 2019. Those proceedings were stayed in March 2020 due to the Department of Families Fairness and Housing ("DFFH") commencing proceedings in the Children's Court of Victoria. DFFH obtained an interim accommodation order with respect to the children, and they were placed into the father's care; they have lived with him since that time.
3. The parenting proceedings resumed in 2022. The final orders were made following a contested hearing before Strum J which was conducted over four days. The final orders provide for the children to live with the father, for the father to have sole parental responsibility regarding long-term decision making and for the children to spend supervised time with the mother.
4. On 25 November 2024 the mother filed a Notice of Appeal in relation to the final orders.
5. On 16 April 2025 the Full Court (Alstergren CJ, Baumann and Williams JJ) dismissed the mother's Notice of Appeal.
6. Some three months later, the mother filed the current application, effectively seeking to re-agitate the parenting issues dealt with by the final orders.
7. In addition to the proceedings before this Court, the mother has filed at least one application seeking special leave to appeal in the High Court of Australia. During her oral submissions she stated that "the High Court did accept [her] application and everyone in [City V] was very concerned." In fact, that application was dismissed. Further, the mother submitted that she had attempted to file numerous other applications for special leave to appeal in the High Court, saying that she had been told by "the Registrar" at that court to "keep filing it" and that "it's serious, it's a risk, so just keep sending it in."
8. The father identified in his application that the mother served upon him applications for special leave, purporting to be applications filed in the High Court of Australia, dated 14 May 2025, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26 and 28 August 2025, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 12 September 2025. The mother conceded during submissions that she had served a number of such applications on the father.

1. The mother relied upon the following documents:-

(a) Application in a Proceeding filed 21 July 2025;

(b) Affidavit of the mother filed 21 July 2025;

(c) Affidavits of the mother filed 1 August 2025 (5);

(d) Affidavit of the mother filed 30 October 2025.

1. The father relied upon the following documents:-

(a) Application in a Proceeding filed 9 October 2025;

(b) Affidavit of the father filed 9 October 2025.

(a) Outline of Case document filed 28 October 2025;

(b) Department of Families, Fairness and Housing response to Order for Particulars (s 67ZBD) dated 1 September 2025 (ICL-1);

(c) Section 67ZBD response from Victoria Police dated 13 August 2025 (Exhibit ICL-2).

1. The circumstances in which the Court may reconsider final parenting orders is governed by s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975. Pursuant to s 65DAAA(1) the Court must not reconsider a final parenting order unless the Court has considered whether there has been "a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made" (s 65DAAA(1)(a)).
2. Section 65DAAA provides as follows:-

(1) If a final parenting order is in force in relation to a child, a court must not reconsider the final parenting order unless:

(a) the court has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made; and

(b) the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances (and taking into account whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made), it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be reconsidered.

(2) For the purposes of determining whether the court is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), and without limiting section 60CC, the court may have regard to any matters that the court considers relevant, including the following:

(a) the reasons for the final parenting order and the material on which it was based;

(b) whether there is any material available that was not available to the court that made the final parenting order;

(c) the likelihood that, if the final parenting order is reconsidered, the court will make a new parenting order that affects the operation of the final parenting order in a significant way (whether by varying, discharging or suspending the final parenting order, in whole or in part, or in some other way);

(d) any potential benefit, or detriment, to the child that might result from reconsidering the final parenting order.

(3) Despite subsection (1), the court may reconsider a final parenting order with the agreement or consent of all the parties to that order.

(4) The failure of a court to comply with subsection (1) does not affect the validity of any order made by the court.

1. The application of s 65DAAA was considered by the Full Court in Radecki & Radecki [2024] FedCFamC1A 246. There the Full Court concluded that s 65DAAA is merely a codification of long-established jurisprudence arising from the earlier decisions of Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 and Marsden v Winch (2013) 50 Fam LR 409. At [79] Justices Austin and Williams observed:-
   1. We therefore conclude, for the purposes of s 65DAAA(1) of the Act, and having regard to the principles espoused in Rice and Asplund and subsequent authority, the proper interpretation of "consider" should not be a literal one. The word "consider" in s 65DAAA should be construed to mean the Court is required to contemplate the evidence and to make findings of fact as to what changes in circumstances (if any) there have been since the making of the anterior parenting orders. If there is no positive finding of changed circumstances, that is the end of the matter. If there is a positive finding as to changed circumstances, the second stage of the process requires the Court to make its determination, subject to the overarching best interests principle, as prescribed by s 65DAAA(1)(b) and otherwise having regard to relevant s 60CC considerations and the matters referred to in s 65DAAA(2).
2. As to the question of how the term "consider" in s 65DAAA(1) ought be applied, Carew J stated as follows:-
   1. The use of the term "consider" in s 65DAAA(1) should be understood in the context of the Court being asked to accept the applicant's evidence taken at its highest but only for the purposes of the application. The suggestion that a court would consider whether there has been a significant change in circumstances without it having any consequence is an interpretation which would give no effect to s 65DAAA(1). Further, it has always been the case that applying the rule in Rice and Asplund is but a manifestation of the best interest principles and s 65DAAA(1)(b) and (2) merely reflect that part of the rule.
3. Having regard to that statement, it is plain that the time at which the enquiry takes place is central to the evidence required to determine whether there has been a significant change of circumstance. For example, if the determination occurs at an early stage in the proceedings that is without the benefit of cross-examination, then the Court is to take the applicant's evidence at its highest. If no significant change of circumstances is established, then the application must be dismissed. However, if the Court is satisfied, accepting the evidence of the applicant, that there has been a significant change of circumstance, then the Court must consider, consistent with s 65DAAA(1)(b), all of the evidence to determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to reconsider the final parenting order.
4. A final parenting order can only be reconsidered if there is a significant change of circumstances and it is in the child's best interests for the order to be reconsidered.

1. In order to determine whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the making of the final order, it is necessary to consider the Reasons for Judgment of Strum J in Brauner & Brauner (No. 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 748 ("his Honour's Reasons").
2. A central issue in the matter was the mother's mental health and whether it compromised her capacity to care for the children. As to the mother's relationship with the children and the impact of her mental health upon her relationship with them, his Honour records:-
   1. The children have not had a meaningful relationship with the mother in recent years, having spent no or minimal time with her, other than, most recently, on one brief occasion shortly prior to trial, in the case of [X]. Any benefit to them of a meaningful relationship with the mother in the future must, on the evidence, be subordinate to the need to protect them from, in particular, psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence by her (as defined). In particular, I refer to paragraph (c) of the definition of the term "abuse" in s 4(1) of the Act, which term is defined to include (but is not limited to) "causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm".
   2. On the evidence, as a whole, I find that the mother is psychiatrically very unwell, but that she refuses and/or is unable to acknowledge same, let alone seek the treatment recommended by [Dr E]. As referred to above, much of the evidence of both [Dr E] and [Dr D] regarding their interactions with, and observations of, the mother was corroborated by her evidence and demeanour in cross-examination. She deposes to attending upon psychologists, from none of whom evidence was adduced by her; however, in any event, that falls far short of the expert opinion of [Dr E] regarding the necessary treatment.
3. His Honour undertook careful consideration of the evidence of the experts engaged in the matter, being Dr E who undertook psychiatric assessment of both parties as well as Dr D who prepared the Family Report in the matter. Both experts were cross-examined at length and their assessments of the parties were unshaken.
4. As to the nature of the children's relationship with the mother and the father, his Honour found:-
   1. As to sub-paragraph (b), namely, the nature of the relationship of the children with each of their parents, on the evidence referred to above, I accept that the children have a warm and loving and, in all the circumstances, appropriate relationship with the father. Unfortunately for them, by reason of the mother's psychiatric ill-health, they have been unable to maintain or enjoy a similar relationship with her since soon after separation. That is not to lay active (as opposed to passive) blame at her feet; she has been, and has increasingly become, psychiatrically unwell. However, she has been, and remains, untreated therefor, notwithstanding the recommendations of [Dr E], of which she has long been on notice.
5. His Honour accepted the evidence of Dr D as to the children's wishes, namely that they wished to continue living with the father and not to live with the mother. His Honour afforded considerable weight to those expressed views.[1]
6. As to allegations of family violence, his Honour recorded that save for one instance of violence alleged to have been perpetrated by the father in October 2019, the father otherwise denied perpetrating family violence and was not challenged in relation to those matters. His Honour found that the instance alleged occurred at the time of the parties' recent separation and should be viewed in that context. His Honour noted:-

...Whilst the Court takes family violence extremely seriously, in this case, it is the mother's poor mental health, and the impact thereof on the children to date and likely into the future, that is of the greatest concern and which is ultimately determinative of what is in the children's best interests. There have been no allegations by the children and no concerns expressed by any of the experts or the Department or the Children's Court in respect of any family violence by the father.[2]

1. In relation to the determination of the principal issues in dispute, being the allocation of parental responsibility for the children, with whom they should live and with whom they are to spend time and the terms and conditions thereof, his Honour found as follows:-
   1. On the evidence and my findings in relation thereto, which do not bear repetition, it is inconceivable that orders could, or would, be made for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the children; for them to live with her; or for them to spend unsupervised time with her. The level of disharmony between the parents which, on the evidence, I find to be primarily attributable to the mother, albeit cognisant of the fact that it is likely by reason of her poor mental health, precludes them being able to share equally parental responsibility for the children, nor do either of them seek or propose such an order. I am, in any event, amply satisfied that the presumption in s 61DA(1) of the Act is rebutted by the evidence and that it would not be in the best interests of the children for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them.
   2. I am similarly satisfied that, on the evidence and my findings in relation thereto, and for the reasons herein, the children should continue to live with the father (as they each told [Dr D] they wish to do), with whom they have lived, without complaint or incident, and in whose care they have relatively flourished (in the difficult circumstances of their mother's poor mental health and the impact thereof on them), for the past four years. They have been well cared for whilst living with him in recent years and are settled in his care.
   3. In the circumstances, the gravamen of this case is what time each of the children should spend with the mother, and whether such time should be supervised. Turning to the latter of those issues first, both the father and the ICL seek that the mother's time be professionally supervised. I take into account the mother's poor mental health and the outward manifestation thereof, to which the children were exposed soon after separation, which ill-health has only worsened over time, including between the first and second psychiatric assessments of her by [Dr E], during which time they have spent little, if any, time with her. In the circumstances, I conclude that time spent between the mother and the children should be professionally supervised. I am fortified in so concluding by the reticence and reservations of each of the children, but especially [Y], regarding time to be spent with the mother, expressed to, and reported by, [Dr D]. Further, in relation to [Y], I take into account the recent evidence of the professional supervisor, [Ms F], regarding his initial agreement, and subsequent refusal, to spend time with the mother. The mother's manifest inability to self-regulate, reported by the experts and heard and observed by the Court, renders professional supervision of her time with the children necessary. Having found that the mother's time with the children should be professionally supervised, it will necessarily not be overnight time. However, in any event, in the circumstances of this case, which do not bear repetition, the mother's poor mental health and the manifestations and ramifications thereof, together with the requirement for professional supervision at a contact centre, militate against anything other than short periods on each occasion the mother spends time with the children. That will minimise the risk posed by her dysregulated behaviour.
2. It is as a result of those findings that the final orders were made.

1. The hearing was conducted on the papers. The mother and the father were self-represented at the hearing and the Independent Children's Lawyer was represented by counsel.
2. At the commencement of the hearing I informed the parties as to the process, including the order in which each party would make submissions, and that I would allow each party 45 minutes to make their submissions. I also confirmed that the applicant would have the opportunity to reply to the submissions of the father and the ICL. In addition, I provided each party with a copy of the relevant legislation, including s 65DAAA and s 60CC of the Act, as well as Part XIB, Division 1B of the Act (Exhibit A-1).
3. The matter was stood down prior to the commencement of submissions to enable each party to consider that legislation. Prior to commencing the hearing, each party confirmed their understanding of the process and confirmed they had had the opportunity to read and consider the relevant legislation.

What are the significant changed circumstances contended by the mother?

1. I have read all of the evidence relied upon in the proceedings, including the exhibits. I do not propose to repeat that evidence in these reasons as the High Court has confirmed in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447:-
   1. ...A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.
2. The mother has filed seven separate affidavits in support of her application notwithstanding the orders made 8 September 2025 which required her to file and serve a single consolidated affidavit relevant to issues of the change in circumstances asserted by her since the making of the final orders. Those affidavits are poorly drawn, make sweeping statements and conclusions, lack particulars as to the matters contained and frankly are of little assistance in the determination of the matter. Throughout those affidavits, there is little attempt to engage the central question requiring determination, being what significant changes of circumstance have occurred since the final orders were pronounced that would support a reconsideration of the parenting issues.
3. The mother's case was not assisted by her oral submissions. The mother's submission lacked focus, was replete with extraordinary assertions as to the father's conduct, her involvement with the greater cause of the protection of children and the harm occasioned to the children by the father. The mother's behaviour was dysregulated and her submissions were florid; at times she raised her voice. The mother had difficulty in focussing her submissions on the issues before the Court, to the detriment of her application.
4. At [21] of his Honour's reasons, Strum J observed of the mother's cross-examination and closing submissions as follows:-

...The mother, both in cross-examination, as well as in closing submissions, by which stage she was self-represented, was extremely agitated, dysregulated and immoveable in her fixed ideas. The mother asserts, albeit unsupported by any medical evidence, that she suffers from hearing difficulties, which, she says, explains her raised voice. However, her alleged hearing difficulties were not disputed. Even if that be so, it does not explain the substance and tone of what she said, and her agitation, both in cross-examination and, when self-represented, in her cross-examination of the family report writer and in closing submissions. Further, much of her evidence and her allegations are fantastical in nature, making wide-ranging allegations of poor mental and physical health on the part of the father, which is simply unsupported by any expert evidence as the present time.

1. The observations by Strum J as to the mother's presentation were consistent with the mother's demeanour in the presentation of her case before me.
2. Doing the best I can to discern the mother's case, it would appear from her oral submissions and her affidavits that the asserted change of circumstances includes that:-
   • Child Protection intake has re-opened the case and has indicated that both children are to be returned to the mother's care;[3]
   • The children are "in [sic] dangerous risk of their extremely dangerous father";[4]
   • The father ought submit to drug tests, hair follicle, MRI, CT scan, delirium test, memory assessment, neurologically, and a colonoscopy as he has suspected cancer. The mother also asserts that the father has "Belima" [sic] and has attempted to kill himself three times in front of the children;[5]
   • The father has assaulted the children,[6] albeit that those allegations appear to pre-date the final orders;
   • The child X sent her a text message on 3 January 2025 at 9.09pm which read as follows:-

Hi Mum, it's [X]. I know you can't reply but I was wondering for the visit on Wednesday if you could bring my money from all my birthdays and stuff (I'm pretty sure it's in my top drawer). Love you and can't wait to see you xx

The mother contends that that message indicates that the child has been "dangerously hurt", punished and that she has also been dangerously assaulted.[7]

1. Each party was permitted 45 minutes to make oral submissions in support of their case. Upon commencing her oral submissions, the mother made a rambling series of assertions as to what she alleged was the father's aberrant conduct. Many of her complaints referred to events that pre-dated the final orders. The mother's submissions were difficult to understand. At times during her oral submissions, I attempted to redirect and refocus her attention on the provisions of s 65DAAA, with little effect.
2. During the course of her submissions, the mother stated:-
   • That she had not spent time with Y for six years;
   • That she had introduced the children to the activist, Ms W;
   • That she had spent the previous six days in court and that the children are both frightened of the father;
   • That DFFH alleged that the children had been abused in the father's care;
   • That the father had assaulted her on three occasions but that the police had refused to charge him;
   • That she was jailed for ringing "triple-zero";
   • That she had referred the matter to the Premier and the Attorney General;
   • That the father needs to be drug-tested, and undergo CT scan, MRI and colonoscopy.
3. The mother's submissions were unhelpful and misguided. She was histrionic at times. When I attempted to guide or redirect her to the issues at hand the mother retorted with "just let me finish".
4. Dr E's assessment of the mother is detailed in his Honour's reasons at [82]. There, Dr E is reported to have observed of the mother under the rubric of "Impression and mental state examination" as follows:-
   1. Most of the assessment consisted of [Ms Brauner] directing a stream of invective directed chiefly against the father, alleging threats to kill her and stating that the father was suffering from [mental illness], rather than herself. She was also quite aggressive in the interview towards for having recommended anti-psychotic medication in the prior assessment three years ago. By barraging me with thoughts and accusations, she made it very difficult to be able to think during the assessment. Her thought stream was a torrent of words but centred on specific themes of injustice done to her, through taking away her children. She was able to be interrupted with great effort but then she only answered questions in a highly perfunctory manner before quickly returning to her central theme and invective.
   2. She had a bedraggled appearance and seemed to have not taken care of her grooming or appearance. She was markedly agitated, moving around the room frequently in the assessment showing me her crutches and photos of her children taken with a whistleblower celebrity, [Ms W]. There were continued highly persecutory themes throughout the assessment particularly in that the father was making false allegations against her and that I was colluding with the father's solicitor and doing the father favours by writing "lies" about [Ms Brauner], eg, that she needed anti-psychotic medication. There was an underlying sense of a systematised delusional system that others were in league with the father against her.
5. The observations of the mother recorded by Dr E accord with my own observations of the mother during her oral submissions.
6. The mother's submissions were confusing and were not directed to the issues in the case. Neither the mother's evidence as contained in her affidavits nor her oral submissions engaged with the question of what, if any, significant change of circumstances had emerged since the final orders were made that would invite a reconsideration of the issues.

1. The father's submissions were succinct and brief. He submitted that the final orders ought to continue with full force and effect. He submitted that there was no new evidence that indicates a significant change of circumstances.
2. That position was supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer who relied upon the s 67ZBD Response to Order for Particulars produced by the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing on 1 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL-1).
3. That report provides a history of DFFH engagement with the family. It records at page 10 that there were eight reports made to DFFH between August 2024 and July 2025 which were comprised of concerns that the father was "a dangerous man and posed a significant risk towards the children". There were also concerns raised that the father was destroying the mother's life and her reputation, and, in addition, concerns raised by the handling of those reports by Victoria Police, Child Protection and other authorities. There were also reports raised about historical violence, emotional and verbal abuse perpetrated by the father and concern that there had been "cover-ups" by the courts and Child Protection and that the concerns for the children were never investigated thoroughly.
4. In response to those allegations, DFFH records that between February 2025 and March 2025 it reviewed the Victoria Police Family Violence Portal. In addition, DFFH liaised with the children's school which confirmed that it held no concerns for the children in the care of the father; X was described by the school as "kicking goals", passing all her subjects and making positive choices.
5. DFFH also reports that it followed up with mental health services supporting the mother and it was reported by those services that the mother had been diagnosed with complex and enduring mental health conditions, that her current diagnosis is [...] and delusional disorder and that the mother is not currently engaged in treatment.[8]
6. In conclusion, DFFH reported as follows;-

It is Child Protection's assessment that there is no credible evidence of physical, emotional or psychological harm to the children in [the father's] care. [X] and [Y] remain in a stable living arrangement with [the father], and it is assessed that protective factors are strong, including current court orders, ongoing school monitoring and oversight and [the father's] willingness to engage with services on a needs basis.

The current Child Protection report raises no new allegations or evidence to indicate that the children are at risk of significant harm and the reported information has been thoroughly assessed or investigated previously and found to be unsubstantiated. Follow up with professionals working with the children reveal no current concerns for [X] and [Y's] safety and wellbeing to warrant Child Protection statutory intervention currently. There is no evidence to support [X] and [Y] are at risk in [the father's] care. Child Protection assess that concerns would be held for [X] and [Y's] emotional, psychological and physical safety if they were to have contact with [the mother] at this time.

1. It was submitted on behalf of the ICL, and I accept, that having regard to the totality of the mother's evidence and her submissions the Court is unable to discern any evidence that would point to a significant change in circumstances since the making of the final orders.
2. It was also submitted that the mother's evidence relates to matters that pre-date the final orders. For example, the mother referred to the fact that she had not spent time with the child Y for six years and had not seen X since April 2024. In light of that position, the mother has no current or recent knowledge as to the children's circumstances. The reality is that any submissions made by her as to the children suffering injury, illness or assault at the hands of the father is not information in relation to events that have arisen since the final orders were made in November 2024.
3. It was also submitted on behalf of the ICL that the final orders and his Honour's Reasons gave careful consideration to the views expressed by each of the children and the final orders were consistent with those views. The ICL noted that the final orders and his Honour's Reasons withstood scrutiny by appeal.
4. Having regard to all of those matters and particularly the information contained in Exhibit ICL-1, as to DFFH's recent assessment of the children's circumstances which confirmed that it held no concerns for them in the father's care, I am not persuaded that the mother has established a significant change of circumstances. The final orders were made one year ago and were the subject of an appeal determined and dismissed some six months ago. The mother adduces no evidence of any matters that would indicate a significant change of circumstance since the final orders were made.
5. I am satisfied that there is no evidence before the Court that the father poses a risk of harm to the children as contended by the mother.
6. The mother made numerous allegations of the abuse apparently endured by the children at the hands of the father during the course of the final hearing before Strum J. His Honour's Reasons amply demonstrate that those allegations were considered by him, that no evidence was adduced to support those allegations and that ultimately, findings were made that the children were not at risk in the father's care.
7. The mother in her current application seeks to re-agitate those matters. There is no evidence of any significant change in circumstance with respect to the children that would indicate that a revisiting of those issues is warranted. This is particularly so having regard to the ages of the children and the desirability for them to continue to enjoy the stability and routine which has been afforded to them in the aftermath of the final orders.
8. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the mother's application ought be dismissed.

1. The father seeks orders pursuant to s 102QAC of the Act that a harmful proceedings order be made against the mother. Part XIB or the Act was enacted by the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) and commenced on 6 May 2024. Its purpose was explained in the explanatory memorandum as follows:-
   1. ...The purpose of this measure is to protect the respondent and/or children who are the subject of proceedings from the harmful impact of frequent and unnecessary applications filed by an applicant. This measure aims to limit systems abuse, which is a form of family violence that is prevalent in the family law system.
   2. This measure addresses a gap in the Court's powers to scrutinise the institution of further proceedings, cited in the case of Marsden & Winch (2013) 50 FamLR 409. The ALRC report found that the Court's existing vexatious proceedings and summary dismissal powers do not provide sufficient scope for courts to make appropriate orders in cases where one party oppresses the other by repetitive filing of applications and the serving of those applications on the other party.

(1) A court exercising jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act may make an order (a harmful proceedings order) prohibiting a party (the first party) to the proceedings from instituting proceedings under this Act against another party to the proceedings without the leave of the court under section 102QAG, if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:

(a) the other party would suffer harm if the first party instituted further proceedings against the other party; or

(b) in the case of child-related proceedings (within the meaning of Part VII) - the child who is the subject of the proceedings would suffer harm if the first party instituted further proceedings against the other party.

Note: Proceedings includes cross proceedings and incidental proceedings (see subsection 4(1)).

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), harm may include, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) psychological harm or oppression;

(b) major mental distress;

(c) a detrimental effect on the other party's capacity to care for a child;

(d) financial harm.

(3) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (1), the court may have regard to:

(a) the history of the proceedings under this Act between the first party and the other party; and

(b) whether the first party has frequently instituted or conducted proceedings against the other party in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section); and

(c) the cumulative effect, or any potential cumulative effect, of any harm resulting from the proceedings referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

(4) The court may make a harmful proceedings order on its own initiative or on application by a party to the proceedings.

(5) The court must not make a harmful proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

(6) An order made under subsection (1) is a final order.

Order about notifying other party in relation to application for leave etc.

(7) If the court makes an order under subsection (1), the court must also make an order as to whether the court is to notify the other party, in the event that the first party makes an application under section 102QAE for leave to institute proceedings against the other party, of either or both of the following:

(a) that the application has been made;

(b) if the application is dismissed - that the application has been dismissed.

(8) The court must have regard to the wishes of the other party in making an order under subsection (7).

1. An order pursuant to s 102QAC is not a parenting order. Nonetheless, s 102QAC(1) directs the Court's attention to the impact and harm that may be occasioned upon a child who is the subject of child-related proceedings.
2. Section 102QAC(2) provides a non-exhaustive definition of harm which includes psychological harm or oppression, major mental distress, a detrimental effect on the other party's capacity to care for a child and financial harm.

1. The father during his oral submissions contended that the parties had been in court in relation to parenting matters over the past six years and that this had had a significant detrimental impact on both he and the children. The father pointed to the history of proceedings as between he and the mother. The proceedings in relation to parenting matters, which culminated in the final orders, commenced in December 2019 and were not concluded until the final orders made in November 2024.
2. During the intervening period, the parenting proceedings were stayed as a result of the intervention of the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing which commenced proceedings in the Children's Court in 2020, resulting in both children being placed in the father's care.
3. Since the final orders, the mother has filed a Notice of Appeal which was dismissed in April 2025.
4. Following the dismissal of that appeal, the mother filed an application for special leave in the High Court of Australia, which was dismissed. She confirmed during submissions that she has attempted to file several other applications in the High Court, without success. Nonetheless, as identified earlier, the mother has served those applications on the father, as set out in his Application in a Proceeding.
5. In relation to her current application, the mother has filed seven affidavits, including five filed on 1 August 2025.
6. In addition to the proceedings before this Court, there have been family violence intervention order proceedings in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at City O. In his affidavit filed 8 October 2025, the father deposes that the mother has breached the final intervention order made against her in February 2024 on multiple occasions and has been charged with breaches of the intervention order.
7. The father submitted that the impact of the ongoing proceedings and the service by the mother of multiple applications and court documents, has had a significant and deleterious impact on him and the children. I accept that submission,
8. The father pointed to the significant loss of time by him at work as a result of the ongoing proceedings. He submitted that he had spent 30 days in court in the past 12 months, necessitating that he take many days off work. As a result, he has suffered significant financial harm due to his inability to attend work.
9. The father also submitted that the children are aware of the proceedings and have suffered harm as a result; he submits that the children have been distressed and suffered anxiety as a result of the ongoing litigation.
10. The ICL supports the father's application for an order pursuant to s 102QAC. The ICL submitted that the ongoing proceedings have been tortuous for the parties and particularly for the children.
11. Having regard to the above matters, I am satisfied that there has been a long history of court applications filed by the mother in this Court, the High Court of Australia and the Magistrates' Court. The mother herself submitted that there had been 144 court proceedings.
12. On any view, the repeated filing and attempted filing of applications both in this Court and in the High Court of Australia over the past year has been onerous and placed a significant burden upon the father. I am satisfied that those applications cumulatively have had a significant harmful impact upon he and by virtue of his role as the children's primary care-giver, upon the children.
13. I accept the submissions of both the father and the ICL that the repeated filing and attempted filing of applications by the mother has caused both the father and the children psychological harm. The father contended that the proceedings and the nature of the multiple applications served by the mother has caused him distress and anxiety and has also caused distress and anxiety for the children.
14. I am also satisfied that the ongoing proceedings has caused the father financial harm due to his inability to attend work as a result of Court fixtures. I am satisfied that financial loss suffered by the father due to those work absences has been felt by the children.
15. The filing and attempted filing of applications for special leave in the High Court of Australia has been onerous and distressing to the father. In my view the filing or attempted filing and service of those applications, which, according to the father's application occurred across consecutive days, was an abuse of process by the mother which inevitably adversely impacted the father and the children.
16. Similarly, the filing of multiple affidavits by the mother on the same day for the purposes of the current application is conduct that can only be viewed as an abuse of the Court's processes and again is conduct likely to trigger anxiety and distress in the father.
17. I accept that the mother's conduct in filing multiple applications and affidavits has caused the father financial hardship and has been detrimental to his capacity to parent the children and caused anxiety in his household. I am satisfied that that conduct was psychologically harmful and oppressive to the father and the children.
18. The mother has been wholly unsuccessful in her Notice of Appeal in this Court, and in her application filed in the High Court of Australia.
19. The purpose of the order sought by the father is to ensure that the mother cannot commence proceedings without the leave of the Court first obtained. The mother will have the ability to commence proceedings but there will be a restraint on the potential impact of those proceedings on the father and the children as the Court's leave will be required before the proceedings can progress.
20. The reality is that the mother has repeatedly sought to re-agitate matters determined in the final orders made in November 2024. The children and the father are entitled to live peacefully without the interruption of court processes in the aftermath of those proceedings.
21. Further, the mother's persistence in filing multiple applications has placed a significant burden upon the Court's resources. Significant Court time has been expended in the disposition of the applications filed by the mother since the final orders were made.
22. It is well accepted that ongoing litigation in relation to a child is likely to visit enormous psychological harm upon them (McEnearney & McEnearney [1980] FamCA 43; (1980) FLC 90-866). Both children the subject of this application are in their late teenage years. Indeed, X will turn 18 in 2026. The children have been the subject of ongoing litigation since 2019.
23. Having regard to that history, I am in no doubt that further litigation with respect to parenting arrangements, issued without leave, would likely cause both children further harm and will also impact and visit harm upon their primary carer, the father. The time has come to ensure that the children can live peacefully without the shadow of court events impacting their lives.
24. Taking into account all of the above factors, pursuant to s 102QAC(3) of the Act, I am satisfied that:-

(a) The history of the proceedings under the Act relate to parenting issues;

(b) The mother has frequently filed and attempted to file applications in this Court and in the High Court of Australia as identified earlier;

(c) The proceedings commenced by the mother have had the cumulative effect or potential cumulative effect of harm to the father and the children.

1. I am also satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that one or both of the father and the children will likely suffer harm if the mother brings further proceedings in the future.
2. Given those findings, I will make a harmful proceedings order as sought by the father.
3. I have had regard to the wishes of the father in accordance with s 102QAC(8) to the extent that they were canvassed, and having regard to the provisions of s 102QAC(7), I will make an order that the father be notified if an application for leave is dismissed (s102QAC(7)(b) of the Act). Inevitably, if leave is granted to the mother to proceed with an application, the father will be served with that application. In my view, there can be no advantage to the father in having notice of an application for leave that has been made but not yet determined, as to do so would impart further anxiety and distress upon him. The reality is he need not know of such application until such as time as a decision has been made as to whether leave ought be granted.

I certify that the preceding ninety (90) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Johns.

[1] Brauner & Brauner (No. 2) [2024] FedCFamC1 F748 paragraph 173

[2] Brauner & Brauner (No. 2) [2024] FedCFamC1 F748 paragraph 185

[3] Affidavit of the mother filed 21 July 2025

[4] Affidavit of the mother filed 1 August 2025 at 10.02pm, paragraph 1

[6] Affidavit of the mother filed 1 August 2025 at 10.12pm

[7] Affidavit of the mother filed 1 August 2025 at 10.10pm