Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Applications to reduce sentence - When refused - Particular offences - Offences against the person - Unlawful act intended to cause grievous bodily harm.

Judgment Number: [2009] TASSC 22

1 Arising from a series of events that culminated in the appellant, Benjamin Bradshaw, stabbing the complainant, Kristi Wolfe, the appellant was convicted of a number of crimes and offences for which he received a global sentence of six years' imprisonment and made eligible to apply for parole after serving four years of that sentence. He appeals against that sentence.

2 The appellant pleaded guilty to all of the crimes and offences that are the subject of the sentence, save for the crime of aggravated burglary, as to which he was found guilty by a jury. The offences that are the subject of the sentence that are not crimes under the Criminal Code Act 1924, were dealt with by the learned sentencing judge pursuant to the Code, s385A. The crimes to which the sentence relates were committed on the night of 21 October 2007 and are:

• Aggravated burglary. The appellant having broken a window in the complainant's residence, climbed through it with the intention of attacking either the complainant or a man in the residence, Riley Hamill, or both of them.

• Committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm. Having entered the complainant's residence, the appellant stabbed her twice to the right side of her stomach as she sat on a lounge.

• Committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm. After inflicting the wounds that are the subject of the above conviction, the appellant took a few steps away from the complainant and then returned to stab her twice to the left side of her stomach.

3 The learned sentencing judge's findings in relation to the circumstances of the crimes and offences have not been challenged. They include the following. I have added, in italics, references to the offences dealt with pursuant to s385A that are also the subject of the sentence.

"Mr Bradshaw cohabited with the complainant at her home in Queenstown for over a year until shortly before the night in question. The complainant's daughter also lived in the house. She was seven years old when her mother was stabbed. Mr Bradshaw had psychological problems and a drug problem.

On the 8th of September 2007, the complainant went to a netball dinner against the wishes of Mr Bradshaw. He became angry and somewhat violent towards her after the dinner. He was arrested and charged and was granted bail by a magistrate. The order of the bail included a condition requiring him not to approach the complainant directly or indirectly. In breach of that condition he resumed sleeping with the complainant on his return to Queenstown. ... (This occurred between 10 September 2007 and 14 October 2007 and for this Mr Bradshaw was convicted of a charge of breach of bail.)

Mr Bradshaw subsequently obtained a copy of the statement that the complainant had made to police officers following the incident after the netball dinner. In that statement she said something about Mr Bradshaw having firearms. Mr Bradshaw spoke to her about that. She gave evidence that she told him that she was scared that he had a gun and that he responded, 'Well why do you think I need a gun to kill you, Kristy, when you've got a hundred knives in your drawer?' That piece of evidence was neither challenged nor contradicted. I'm satisfied that Mr Bradshaw uttered words to the effect of those attributed to him. The idea of him stabbing the complainant with one of her kitchen knives had crossed his mind and he'd spoken to her about it weeks before he did that very thing.

On the 14th of October 2007, the complainant terminated the sexual relationship between Mr Bradshaw and herself. Mr Bradshaw was not happy with that decision; in fact he has wanted her to reverse that decision ever since.

On the night of the 20th of October 2007, the complainant met up with a Mr Hamill at a hotel, spent a long time talking to him, took him home and spent the night with him. Mr Bradshaw learned of that the next day and was disturbed by that news. As a result he visited the complainant at her home on at least four occasions on the night of the 21st of October, including the visit when he stabbed her. Each time he visited her contravened the bail condition that prohibited him from approaching her. ... (For these four visits on 21 October 2007 Mr Bradshaw was convicted of four charges of breach of bail.)

On the 22nd of January 2007, in the Court of Petty Sessions at Queenstown, a family violence order had been made against Mr Bradshaw. It was still in force on the 21st of October. That order required him not to damage the premises of the complainant's address. By breaking the window he contravened that family violence order. ... (For this damage, Mr Bradshaw was convicted of a charge of breaching a family violence order.)

At some stage during the evening before the stabbings, Mr Bradshaw injected himself with amphetamine. ... (For this, Mr Bradshaw was convicted of consuming a controlled drug.)

During one of his visits prior to the stabbings Mr Bradshaw ... told the complainant that he was going to kill himself and left her house. She rang two of his friends. He returned about twenty minutes later. The complainant saw him with his rifle in his mouth. His friend subsequently arrived and took him away. ... (Arising from this, Mr Bradshaw was convicted of a charge of possessing a loaded firearm - a.22 rifle - in a public place when not the holder of a firearm licence and a charge of possession of ammunition when not the holder of the appropriate firearm licence. It was established that in addition to the .22 rifle, Mr Bradshaw had a double barrel shotgun at his home that night. For his possession of the firearms he was convicted of a charge of possessing a firearm when not the holder of a firearm licence of the appropriate category.)

Before the stabbings Mr Bradshaw spent some time looking for Mr Hamill at a number of different addresses in Queenstown without success. Mr Hamill had gone to visit the complainant. Mr Bradshaw's enquiries took him to a house within walking distance of the complainant's home. No one was home there. Until then Mr Bradshaw had been travelling in his car. Its engine made a loud distinctive noise. He decided to go to the complainant's house again thinking Mr Hamill might be there. He chose to walk rather than drive in his car. He arrived at the house silently. He was empty handed. Through a front window he glimpsed Mr Hamill and the complainant in bed together. Without hesitation he smashed the window and climbed through it. Mr Hamill and the complainant fled to different parts of the house. Mr Hamill, fearing for his safety, fled to the bathroom and held its door firmly closed. The complainant ran past her cordless phone, picked it up, and rang 000 from the loungeroom. A recording of that phone call was tendered by the Crown. It was during that call that Mr Bradshaw stabbed the complainant. Twice on the first occasion and twice on the second occasion.

There are a number of facts and circumstances that strongly suggest that Mr Bradshaw intended quite serious violence if he found Mr Hamill at the complainant's home. He approached silently on foot when all his earlier visits had involved arriving in his noisy car. He had been looking for Mr Hamill for some time. As he walked to the house he had time to think about what he would do if he found Mr Hamill there. Using a kitchen knife as a weapon was something that he had thought about in the last weeks of his relationship with the complainant. He had injected amphetamine. He had been so disturbed that he'd contemplated suicide. Once he got through the bedroom window the evidence suggests that he made for the kitchen knives without delay.

Having regard to those matters, I'm satisfied that Mr Bradshaw walked to the house because he intended to launch a violent surprise attack if he found Mr Hamill there. I'm satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when he climbed through the window after having seen Mr Hamill, he'd already made up his mind to arm himself with a kitchen knife and use it as a weapon if he could. However, 1'm not able to make a finding as to whether, at the time he climbed through the window, he'd reached the stage of deciding whether he intended to attack the complainant or Mr Hamill or both of them.

The complainant gave evidence that all four stab wounds were inflicted when she was sitting on a lounge with her daughter sitting right beside her pushing up against her. ... I'm satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when each stab wound was inflicted her daughter was sitting hard up against her left side and that Mr Bradshaw knew exactly where the child was.

The complainant was taken to the hospital in Queenstown and then airlifted to the Royal Hobart Hospital for treatment. The higher wound to the left side was particularly serious. The knife had bruised a rib, pierced the lining of the abdominal cavity, passed into and through the stomach, and pierced the other side of the stomach. That wound would have been fatal without treatment. Surgeons saved the complainant's life. She spent five nights in hospital. She was in pain for weeks. She was incapacitated for months. She's been left with scars from the four stab wounds and a very long surgical scar. She continues to suffer from psychological symptoms. She had to leave her job and obtain social security benefits. Because she lives in Queenstown, travelling for counselling and psychological treatment has cost her a lot of money. Her daughter was terrified by the experience. Not surprisingly, the child has a range of psychological symptoms and has had to receive counselling.

Mr Bradshaw has just turned thirty one. He's been to prison once before for dangerous driving. For that crime he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment of which two months were suspended in June 2005. He received some suspended sentences in 1999 for assault and for being drunk in charge of a weapon. He has a lengthy record of relatively minor convictions for quite a variety of offences. He has a long history of depression, anxiety, obsessive tendencies, jealousy, insecurity in relationships, and polysubstance abuse. He's received treatment from a clinical psychologist from time to time. He's shown a significant degree of remorse in relation to the stabbing ever since the night in question. He returned to the scene of his crimes within minutes after the police had arrived and parked outside to inquire after the complainant and to give himself up. When interviewed by police officers the morning after the stabbings he made significant admissions. To a small degree he must be given credit for pleading guilty to the two most serious charges and to the various summary offences. Although there still had to be a jury trial and although the complainant still had to give evidence, the pleas of guilty resulted in the trial being a short one and the complainant's time in the witness box being shorter than it would otherwise have been.

This is a particularly serious case. If the wound that pierced the complainant's stomach had been a little higher up her body the knife could have passed through her heart. The most serious wounds were inflicted after Mr Bradshaw had already stabbed the complainant and walked away from her. He decided to go back and do her further harm. He inflicted all these wounds right in front of her hysterical seven year old daughter. He was not deterred by the fact that the complainant was on the phone to the police when he inflicted these wounds. Going to the house involved breaches of both a bail condition and a family violence order. He went there with violence. in mind. Attacks like this can have terrible psychiatric consequences. Sometimes long term psychiatric problems don't develop until months or years afterwards. There remains some risk that either the complainant or her daughter or both will have long term psychological symptoms as a result of Mr Bradshaw's violence.

Because of all those matters the only appropriate penalty is a long prison sentence. I will make an order permitting Mr Bradshaw to be paroled before the completion of his sentence, mainly because I think he should be supervised by a parole officer when first released from prison. Because of the seriousness of his crimes, the non-parole period will be well above the minimum.

... I impose a global sentence of six years' imprisonment with effect from the 22nd October 2007. [He] won't be eligible for parole until [he has] served four years of that sentence."

4 Whilst the findings of the learned sentencing judge canvass all of the relevant information that was before him, I mention the following further details of that information, to which I have had regard in my consideration of this appeal. Although the higher wound to the complainant's left side was by far the most serious of her injuries, her other wounds were not trivial. The lower wound on her left side penetrated about 5 centimetres and the two wounds on her right side penetrated about 2 centimetres. In addition to the overall effect of the attack upon the complainant bringing about the cessation of her employment, it resulted in the sale of her home because of her reduced financial circumstances and the traumatic memories the home held for her.

5 The appellant's prior convictions included a number of convictions for offences such as disorderly conduct and abusive language. In 1999 he received a wholly suspended sentence of imprisonment for assault, resisting police, abusive language and threatening police. That assault arose from his response to a woman's indication that he was not welcome in her residence. He took a knife from the kitchen and threatened to kill her. He was extremely intoxicated. In the same year he was convicted of being drunk in charge of a weapon. In the following year, he was again convicted of that offence. The circumstances of the latter conviction are that police officers apprehended the appellant walking through Queenstown at 10pm carrying a block splitter and a steel hammer. His face was covered with blood. He was intoxicated and aggressive. He told the officers he was going to sort someone out. Whilst alcohol was involved in many of the appellant's prior convictions, there is no suggestion that alcohol played a part in the convictions which are the basis for the sentence being appealed. He had not consumed alcohol since the incident on 2 January 2007 that resulted in a family violence order being made against him. He had however injected amphetamine on the night of the crimes. When interviewed by police the next morning, he said he had been using amphetamine daily since he and the complainant broke up and that he was glad he was going to prison as he would get the help he needed there and it would give him an opportunity to get off drugs.

6 The appellant had a good employment record until he broke both his legs in a motor vehicle accident and lost his employment. He then commenced using illicit drugs, suffered from depression, and attempted suicide. After meeting the woman who became his wife and the mother of his two children, he regained his stability and this coincided with a seven year period during which he was employed as a process technician in a mine. When his marriage broke up he had developed a relationship with the complainant. In 2007 he left his employment as a process technician to commence fulltime studies in a distance education course in mechanical engineering. He had completed one unit in that course by the time of the sentencing hearing. A change to his medication whilst he was in custody, coupled with his abstinence from illicit drugs, had stabilised his mental state and he was no longer suffering from intrusive thoughts. He had resolved not to use illicit drugs in the future.

7 Dr Max Jacobs, a clinical psychologist, said in a report before the learned sentencing judge that the appellant had a long history of intermittent depression, anxiety and panic attacks as well as a history of severe polysubstance abuse, including IV amphetamine, LSD and marihuana. He queried whether the appellant had adversely affected his neuroreceptors leaving him more susceptible to anxiety. He concluded that the appellant had a highly agitated, obsessive, anxious and somewhat perfectionist personality, was prone to obsessive worry, and had a chronic lack of confidence and self-esteem, and he said that these factors, together with other aspects of the appellant's personality, caused deep insecurity and jealousy. He said the appellant was well motivated to receive help.

8 In the course of his police interview on the morning after the stabbings, the appellant said that after he stabbed the complainant on the first occasion it seemed like it had not happened and as he went to leave his anger overwhelmed him and he returned and "stabbed her then for sure". After that interview, when remanded in custody, the appellant said to an officer: "I stabbed her because I wanted to hurt her like she'd hurt me".

9 In the course of the police interview, the appellant expressed remorse and concern for the welfare of the complainant and her daughter. Whilst on remand he wrote to the complainant expressing his ongoing love for her and his wish to marry her. On the Saturday prior to the sentencing hearing, he had a telephone conversation with the complainant in which they discussed a reconciliation. Since being taken into custody on 22 October 2007, the appellant had allowed the complainant the unrestricted use of his motor vehicle. As to the weight to be given to the appellant's pleas of guilty, the learned sentencing judge was told that he had indicated that he would plead guilty to the bulk of the charges at an early date.

10 The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence was manifestly excessive. It is trite that the test for manifest excess is whether the sentence was beyond the upper end of the range of sentences that would have been appropriate for the appellant's criminal conduct. As to the applicable range, I focus first on the appellant's convictions on two counts of committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm in breach of the Code, s107. Insofar as the four stab wounds were inflicted within a short period of time, it is in one sense appropriate to view this conduct as one crime, although it must be borne in mind that between the infliction of the first two wounds and the last two wounds, the appellant had time to briefly reflect upon what he had done. That reflection did not cause him to desist, instead it prompted him to return to the complainant and, in his words he "stabbed her then for sure".

11 In R v Allen [1999] TASSC 112, Wright J said with respect to a conviction for breaching the Code, s170:

"The seriousness of such criminal conduct has been reviewed in a number of previous decisions of this Court (see Lovegrove v R [1961] Tas SR 106; Brown v R (supra); Bennett v R [1990] Tas R 72; R v Marshall 70/1990; Inkson v R [1996] TASSC 13; (1996) 6 Tas R 1). In Papazoglou v R 9/1963, the Court of Criminal Appeal refused to dissent from comments made by the Chief Justice when imposing sentence upon the appellant for an offence against the Code, s170 that:

'Ordinarily I would think that this crime would require a sentence of from three to seven years.'"

12 In her text Sentencing in Tasmania, 2 edn, Federation Press 2002, at 11.303, Professor Warner says as to s170 convictions:

"Single-count sentences ranged from 4 months to 6 years and global from 9 months to 8 years. Median sentences for single and global sentences were all under 3 years. The range is clearly much wider than 3 to 7 years suggested in Papazoglou and by Wright J in Allen."

Details of single-count and global sentences for s170 convictions since 2003 were provided to the Court by counsel for the appellant; they are not inconsistent with Professor Warner's above comment.

13 I agree with the learned sentencing judge that the appellant's criminal conduct was particularly serious. It was not impulsive. He went to the complainant's home with violence in mind and in contravention of both a bail condition and a family violence order. One of the wounds he inflicted could have been fatal. That wound was inflicted after he had already stabbed the complainant twice and begun to leave. It is also pertinent that the appellant could not claim in aid a good record. He had convictions for offences that involved violence and carrying weapons. His attack had a profoundly adverse impact on the complainant.

14 It is to be remembered that the appellant was sentenced for three crimes and ten offences. The offences that preceded the three crimes were not inconsequential. Viewed in the light of the totality of the criminal conduct for which the appellant was sentenced, the sentence imposed on him was within range and was not manifestly excessive.

16 The appellant was charged with four counts on an indictment filed 20 March 2008. The four charges arose out of an incident at Queenstown on 21 October 2007. The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm. The appellant pleaded not guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of assault. The State did not proceed with the assault matter, and a jury found the appellant guilty of the aggravated burglary. When the matter came on for sentence, counsel for the appellant applied to the Court for sentence to be passed in respect of counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13 on complaint 59566/07, in addition to the three counts on the indictment. The learned sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of six years' imprisonment in respect of all matters with effect from 22 October 2007. He also ordered that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he had served four years of the sentence.

17 The appellant asserts by his notice of appeal in respect of that sentence that it was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.

18 The appellant had for a period of time lived with one Kristie Wolfe ("the complainant") in her home at Queenstown. The complainant's seven-year-old daughter lived with the parties. There were difficulties in the relationship throughout most of 2007. On 22 January 2007, the complainant obtained a family violence order against the appellant which required him not to threaten, harass, or abuse the complainant, to keep the peace towards her, and not to damage any property at her home. The order was still in force at the time the crimes, the subject of this appeal, occurred. The family violence order did not prevent the parties from continuing to live together, which is what they did.

19 On 8 September 2007, the complainant went to a dinner against the wishes of the appellant. An incident occurred between the parties after the dinner, which resulted in the appellant being charged with a number of summary offences. He pleaded not guilty to those offences and was admitted to bail. The order of bail included a condition that the appellant not approach the complainant directly or indirectly. It was the incidents on that particular night which gave rise to some of the charges on complaint number 59566/07. The parties did not thereafter live together, although a sporadic sexual relationship continued until 14 October 2007.

20 At some time between 8 September 2007 and 21 October 2007, the appellant received a copy of the statement made by the complainant to police relating to the incident on 8 September. In that statement, the complainant had alleged that the appellant had firearms in his possession. The appellant raised this allegation with the complainant and she told him that she was scared that he had a gun. He responded with words to the effect "Well why do you think I need a gun to kill you, Kristie, when you've got a hundred knives in your drawer?"

21 On the night of 20 October 2007, the complainant met a gentleman at the local hotel and took him home with her, where he spent the night. The next day the appellant became aware of this and became upset. He visited the complainant's home at least four times on the night of 21 October 2007. By these four visits, he breached bail conditions, and these breaches gave rise to counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 on complaint number 59566/07. At some stage during the same day, the appellant injected himself with amphetamine. That incident gave rise to count 13 on the complaint.

22 During one of the visits the appellant made to the complainant's home that day, he told her he was going to kill himself. He then left, returning about 20 minutes later with a rifle which he put into his mouth. The complainant telephoned a friend who came and took the appellant away. This incident gave rise to count 12 on the complaint. Police subsequently searched the property of a friend of the appellant and located firearms and ammunition. That event gave rise to counts 10 and 11 on the complaint. During the same evening the appellant began looking for the man with whom the complainant had recently spent the night. There was no suggestion he was armed during that search. The search led him to a home near that of the complainant and he decided to check the complainant's home first. Whereas previously he had been searching using a car which was particularly noisy, the appellant at this time left the car and walked to the complainant's home. There is no suggestion that he was then armed.

23 When he arrived at the complainant's home, the appellant looked through a window and saw the complainant in bed with a man. He smashed the window. That is the basis for count 8 on the complaint. The appellant then climbed through the window (count 1 on the indictment). The learned sentencing judge found that the appellant went to the complainant's home intending to launch a violent surprise attack if he found the man he was looking for there, and that when he climbed through the window, he had already made up his mind to arm himself with a kitchen knife and use it as a weapon. His Honour was unable to make any finding as to whether the victim of the intended assault was to be the complainant or her gentleman friend, or both of them.

24 When the complainant heard the sound of breaking glass, she began to telephone 000. The appellant went to the kitchen and armed himself with a knife and then returned to the complainant while she was using the telephone and stabbed her twice to the right side. He then turned away and took a few steps before turning back and stabbing her again twice, this time to the left side. While the stabbings were occurring, the complainant was holding her daughter. The gentleman with the complainant had, in the meantime, locked himself in a bathroom and was not the subject of any attack or threat. The appellant left the home and police arrived a few minutes later.

25 The appellant returned to the home while police were there, surrendered to police and enquired after the complainant's well-being. The complainant was taken to hospital in Hobart where she underwent surgery. The appellant was interviewed by police the next day and made significant admissions. He has been in custody since 21 October 2007 and did not ever apply for bail prior to his sentence.

26 The appellant disputed a number of factual assertions made by the State in relation to the charges to which he pleaded guilty. The learned sentencing judge took the view that only two of the disputed issues were sufficiently important to warrant the taking of sworn evidence. One of those was whether the complainant's young daughter was next to her when all the stab wounds were inflicted, and the other related to the comment about knives said to have been made by the appellant some weeks before the night of the stabbing. As to that sworn evidence, the complainant gave evidence but the appellant elected not to. As to both issues, in the absence of anything to contradict the evidence given by the complainant, his Honour found that the appellant had made the statement alleged and that the complainant's child was next to her at the time of the stabbing.

27 His Honour made the finding that he did in relation to the appellant's intention when he entered the house based on a number of facts which he outlined. The finding in itself was not challenged. However, counsel for the appellant suggested that his Honour's conclusion did not follow from the facts he referred to. With respect, I would disagree.

28 When sentencing, his Honour took into account the impact of the attacks upon the complainant and her daughter. He summarised the physical injuries, the time spent in hospital, the fact that medical intervention saved the complainant's life, and the effects upon her both physical and psychological. She had to leave her job, has continuing psychological problems, and became dependent on Social Security benefits. The child was also affected psychologically by the incident and needed counselling.

29 The appellant had just turned 31 at the time of his sentence. Of his personal circumstances, the learned sentencing judge said the following:

"He has been to prison once before, for dangerous driving. For that crime he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, of which two months were suspended, in June 2005. He received some suspended sentences in 1999 for assault, and for being drunk in charge of a weapon. He has a lengthy record of relatively minor convictions for quite a variety of offences.

He has a long history of depression, anxiety, obsessive tendencies, jealousy, insecurity in relationships, and polysubstance abuse. He has received treatment from a clinical psychologist from time to time.

He has shown a significant degree of remorse in relation to the stabbing ever since the night in question. He returned to the scene of his crimes within minutes, after the police had arrived and parked outside, to enquire after the complainant and to give himself up. When interviewed by police officers the morning after the stabbings, he made significant admissions. To a small degree, he must be given credit for pleading guilty to the two most serious charges, and to the various summary offences. Although there still had to be a jury trial, and although the complainant still had to give evidence, the pleas of guilty resulted in the trial being a short one, and the complainant's time in the witness box being shorter than it would otherwise have been."

"This is a particularly serious case. If the wound that pierced the complainant's stomach had been a little higher up her body, the knife could have passed through her heart. The most serious wounds were inflicted after Mr Bradshaw had already stabbed the complainant, and walked away from her. He decided to go back and do her further harm. He inflicted all these wounds right in front of her hysterical seven year old daughter. He was not deterred by the fact that the complainant was on the phone to the police when he inflicted these wounds. Going to the house involved breaches of both a bail condition and a family violence order. He went there with violence in mind. Attacks like this can have terrible psychiatric consequences. Sometimes long-term psychiatric problems do not develop until months or years afterwards. There remains some risk that either the complainant or her daughter or both will have long-term psychological symptoms as a result of Mr Bradshaw's violence. Because of all those matters, the only appropriate penalty is a long prison sentence."

31 There is no substantive challenge to the factual basis of the sentence imposed by the learned judge. The complaint by the appellant's counsel was more directed to what he said was either a lack of emphasis or an over-emphasis by the learned sentencing judge on certain matters. His submission generally was that, having regard to sentences imposed by this Court in respect of the most serious of the charges faced by the appellant, the sentence imposed on the appellant was just too much.

32 Counsel for the appellant handed up to the Court a summary of past sentences imposed by this Court. While it is impossible in a case such as this to make any direct comparison between those sentences and that imposed on the appellant because the factual bases for them are so different, it can be said that by reference to them, the sentence imposed upon the appellant would appear to be towards the high end of the range canvassed.

33 The appellant was sentenced in respect of two particularly serious crimes. His counsel submitted that they effectively constituted one course of conduct. With respect, however, the situation was that the appellant stabbed the complainant twice and then walked away. He then turned, approached her and stabbed her again. There is no suggestion on the facts put to the Court that the complainant did anything to cause the violence to continue. The only inference which can be drawn is that the appellant, having stabbed the complainant the first time and moved away, made a conscious decision to return and stab her again. While the events occurred very close together, this was not one crime, but two, a fact recognised by the appellant's pleas.

34 In addition, the appellant committed a number of other offences. By some of these he showed a complete disregard for orders of the Court. He kept visiting the complainant's home on the night of 21 October, he broke into that home on the same night, and at the time had been taking illegal drugs. He not only terrified the complainant, but also terrified her daughter. The Court took into account both the short-term and long-term physical and psychological consequences of the crimes for both the complainant and her daughter. They were clearly significant.

35 There is no doubt that there were mitigating factors. The appellant showed remorse by returning to the complainant's home and enquiring after her welfare, giving himself up, and then pleading guilty to the two most serious charges. However, this must be balanced against his very deliberate acts of violence which occurred in the complainant's own home when the appellant had no right to be there.

36 The learned sentencing judge has clearly balanced the mitigating factors against the need for a sentence of both personal and general deterrence. While it is accepted, as I have already indicated, that the sentence imposed upon the appellant is perhaps at the higher end of what might be considered a range of penalties imposed by this Court for similar crimes, the appellant has not demonstrated that the learned sentencing judge imposed a sentence which was so far outside that range, such that error in itself has been demonstrated. I would dismiss the appeal.

37 I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Tennent J. I agree with those reasons and would also dismiss the appeal.