BQU19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1725

1. In this matter the applicant is challenging a migration decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant seeks constitutional writ relief against the respondents in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 28 March 2019 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) not to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visas (protection visas) under s 65 of the Act.

1. In December 2014, the applicants, citizens of Fiji, arrived in Australia as the holders of tourist visas. The first applicant is the primary applicant in these proceedings. The second applicant is the first applicant's spouse, and the third applicant is their child.
2. On 19 March 2015, the applicants lodged an application for protection visas.
3. On 10 October 2016, a delegate of the First Respondent refused to grant the protection visas.
4. On 18 October 2016, the applicants lodged an application for review of the delegate's decision with the Tribunal.
5. On 3 October 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants to appear at a hearing on 9 November 2018 to give evidence and present arguments.
6. On 9 November 2018, the applicants, with their representative, appeared before the Tribunal. On the same date, the applicants requested a copy of the recording of the hearing.
7. On 14 February 2019, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a further hearing.
8. On 6 March 2019, the applicants, with their representative, appeared before the Tribunal.
9. On 28 March 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review not to grant the applicants protection visas.

1. At the Tribunal hearing, the first applicant claimed he would face harm if he returned to Fiji by reason of the following:

(a) being a sugar cane farmer and being a member of a sugar committee or organisation and his connection to the opposition party;

(b) being born in the Lau Islands, and as such being politically opposed to the Fiji government;

(c) being an indigenous Fijian;

(d) being a seventh day Adventist;

(e) being involved in Christian ministry visits to Fiji prisons and working with ex-prisoners;

(f) being associated with Fijian seditionists and/or with Ms Mereoni Kirwin;

(g) being a member or supporter of a party known as SODELPA (formerly SDL);

(h) being someone without a significant profile in Fiji; and

(i) being someone with poor employment prospects.

1. The Tribunal identified the issue before it was whether the applicants met the criteria for protection visas as set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). The Tribunal also correctly identified Ministerial Direction at the time, No. 56, being the relevant direction made under s 499 of the Act used in protection visa applications made under the Act.
2. The Tribunal next had regard to the Departmental file, the applicants' application to the Tribunal, the applicants' evidence and the first applicant's claims.
3. The Tribunal set out its consideration of the evidence and claims made by the first applicant. The Tribunal firstly addressed credibility concerns and, in assessing the totality of the evidence, the Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant previously experienced harm in Fiji on any occasion or that he would face harm upon return to Fiji.
4. The Tribunal found that the first applicant was not a credible witness, and his claims were not reliable or credible for reasons set out in the Tribunal decision at paragraphs [28]-[40]. The Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence at the Tribunal hearing in comparison to his written claims. The Tribunal was also not persuaded that there was a genuine medical reason for his inability to recall past events that led him to fear harm in Fiji.
5. The Tribunal had regard to country information. The Tribunal found the country information and other evidence and information before it did not substantiate the applicants' claims.
6. The Tribunal considered the first applicant's claims that he had been involved in political activities since coming to Australia. The Tribunal formed the view that this claim had been exaggerated and assessed the first applicant's actual involvement in these activities as minimal.
7. The Tribunal considered the first applicant's claims individually and cumulatively, along with the available country information before it, however found it was not satisfied the first applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.
8. The Tribunal stated at paragraph 51 of its decision that:

... The Tribunal is not satisfied on the information before it that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the reasonably foreseeable future by reason of his involvement with the sugar cane committee, his Lau Island heritage, his being an indigenous Fijian, his religion, his involvement with the prison ministry, any imputed political opinion, and employment prospects or any other reason he has claimed. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee.

1. The Tribunal considered the medical claims on behalf of the applicant son. The Tribunal had been provided with medical reports for the applicant son and accepted from the evidence before it that he suffers from hydrocephalus, that he is diagnosed as having an intellectual disability and he has had medical treatment for this condition in Australia. The Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence that attempts were made to access relevant medical services for the applicant son. The evidence before the Tribunal did not indicate that the applicant son would be unable to receive or be denied access to medical treatment in Fiji.
2. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicants' protection visas.

1. On 18 April 2019, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision dated 28 March 2019. The application contains ten (10) grounds of review, containing several particulars. They are as follows:
   1. Ignoring relevant material. There is little mention in the AAT decision dated 28 March 2019 of the oral submissions made by the Registered Migration Agent(s) (RMAs) at the tribunal hearings. The relevant decision is attached and marked "Annexure A".
   2. Ignoring relevant material. The tribunal member does not appear to have taken into consideration possible trauma that may result from beatings and torture.

Paragraph 27: 'The applicant is not a credible witness ... '

The Tribunal is not satisfied that anxiety or a mental condition actively impeded or obstructed him from providing information in relation to the questions asked.

At the hearing on 5 March 2019, the applicant further confirmed that he had never sought treatment for any memory-related condition and that he was not diagnosed with any conditions that could impact upon his memory.

Although the Tribunal has accepted some of his claims, overall it finds that the applicant is not a credible witness and his claims are not reliable or credible for the specific reasons as set out below.

1. Ignoring relevant material. According to the tribunal member, the various names of the organisation as referred to by the applicant, Waqanivere, are:

• Cane Farmers Association: statutory declaration (stat dec) 28 October 2015. Attached and marked "Annexure B".
• Cooperative: AAT hearing 9 November 2018
• Sugar Cane Committee: stat dec 16 November 2018. Attached and marked "Annexure C".
• Sugar Cane Cooperative: stat dec 16 November 2018
• Sugar Cane Cooperative Farmers: AAT hearing 6 March 2019

In paragraph 8 of the stat dec of 16 Nov 2018, the Applicant refers to the organisation by 3 different names in the same paragraph:

a) Sugar cane committee;

b) Sugar cane cooperative;

c) Sugar cane cooperative committee.

There is not much inconsistency in the names used to refer to the sugar cane organisation. The consistent points are:

• It is an organisation that represents sugar cane farmers in Fiji.

• The client used the word 'cooperative' to describe the organisation 3 out of 5 times.

• The 3 names used to refer to the organisation in paragraph 8 of the stat dec dated 16 Nov 2018 do not necessarily conflict. It is possible that a cooperative organisation has a committee. In which case all 3 names may be used to refer to different aspects of the same organisation.

Upon performing a Google search on 11 April 2019 with keywords: 'sugar cane cooperative fiji', I found the following two references to cooperatives related to sugar cane in Fiji on the first page of search results:

The following from The Fiji Times (subscription required to read the full article):

[image of article redacted]

This is evidence of a sugar cane cooperative in Fiji. The tribunal member's claim that the applicant is not credible because of his references to different names to refer to the sugar cane organisation is not a fair assessment. There were consistent references to the organisation, and a few of those used consistent names.

4. Ignoring relevant material.

The Tribunal was also not satisfied that that the organisation in which the applicant claimed to be involved had a profile, such that it would provide a reason for the applicant to be detained. This is because the applicant has referred to the sugar organisation with which he claimed to be involved by several different names.

In paragraph 17 of the stat dec dated 16 November 2018, the applicant stated that he thought he was blamed for being involved in burning sugar cane. He states that sugar is an important part of the Fijian economy. If that is true, it is reasonable to infer that burning a significant crop would raise a suspect's profile - regardless of the suspect. Therefore the finding that the applicant did not have a profile is questionable. The Tribunal member did not assess the potential raising of a person's profile as a result of being a suspect of a significant event such as burning sugar cane crops. Ignoring relevant material.

the Tribunal is not satisfied that as a relatively new member on this organisation on a sub-committee, the applicant had a profile that would be or interest to the authorities or anyone in Fiji.

If the applicant was suspected of burning sugar cane, this would raise his profile. This factor was not taken into consideration by the member.

1. Identifying a wrong issue [rather, identifying an issue incorrectly by way of faulty or illogical reasoning].

Paragraph 35: The fact that an applicant omits something or fails to state something that was on a stat dec does not make it inconsistent with the claim on the stat dec. The applicant did not deny the relevant statement in the stat dec.

6. Ignoring relevant material.

Paragraph 37:

[The tribunal is] not satisfied that he has any genuine interest in Fijian politics ...

Most of the topics the applicant raised in his stat >

• Democracy;

• Freedom of expression;

• Government corruption;

• Cronyism;

• Land rights;

• Agriculture;

• Indigenous issues;

• Ethnic relations;

• Representation of people from different ethnicities in government.

7. Relying on irrelevant material.

Paragraph 42

that they [people from Lau] can be physically distinguished from other native Fijians.

That was never the applicant's claim.

8. Relying on irrelevant material.

Second AAT hearing on 6 March 2019:

Member said:' So you don't respect the result of an election where the part you support has increased its representation?'

I did not say that. My point was that I did not respect the result of the election, but I did not state or claim that it had anything to do with the fact that the opposition party showed increased support during the election.

This is a loaded question, and the applicant did not mention increased representation. The tribunal member inserted the 'increased representation' factor into the question.

Second AAT hearing on 6 March 2019. The Member said: 'So the fact that the former speaker was Lauan has no value?'

I did not say or imply that. My point was that government staff are gradually being replaced by cronies.

This question from the Member was not relevant to the point raised by the applicant in the hearing at the time. The question is also a loaded one.

1. Relying on irrelevant material. At the second AAT hearing on 6 March 2019, the Member said:

'So you don't accept that he [Speight] was imprisoned on an island?'

I didn't make that point. I think I implied that Speight was moved.

It appears the Member mis-interpreted the point raised by the applicant, or the member deliberately mislead and misconstrued what the applicant said. The point the applicant intended to make was that the applicant thought that Speight was moved from one prison to another. The applicant did not say that he did not accept that Speight was imprisoned on an island. This is a loaded question that put words in the mouth of the applicant.

1. On 29 July 2025, a Registrar of this Court made an Order for both the applicant and first respondent to file an amended application (if applicable), written submissions and any further evidence in respect to the hearing. The applicant did not file any documents in accordance with this Order. The first respondent filed their written submissions as required by the Order.
2. On 21 August 2025, the proceedings were docketed to me and set down before me for final hearing on 7 October 2025.

1. At the hearing of this matter on 7 October 2025, the applicant was unrepresented, with the assistance of a Fijian interpreter. Mr Wilson, solicitor, from the Australian Government Solicitor appeared for the first respondent.
2. This Court has duties to take appropriate steps to ensure that unrepresented applicants have sufficient information about practice and procedure of the court they are appearing in, so far as is reasonably practicable, for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial: see generally SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 (SZRUR) at [37] (Robertson J, with Allsop CJ and Mortimer J agreeing) and BSQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 943 Hill J. It has been suggested that the best approach is to give the unrepresented litigant enough information to make an effective choice in the conduct of the proceedings: see, for example, SZRUR at [60].
3. I consider, in cases such as the present where the applicant is unrepresented, the appropriate procedure is to give the applicant an opportunity to explain orally at the hearing before me what was meant by each of the grounds of review as they appear in the application to this Court and why the applicant considers the Tribunal was wrong.
4. Accordingly, I took the first applicant through each of the ten grounds of review and asked what was meant by each ground. On grounds 1 and 2 the first applicant told the Court he did not want to say anything. On grounds 3 to 10, the first applicant made general submissions criticising the Tribunal's factual findings, mainly regarding the Tribunal's credibility findings in paragraphs [27]-[40] of the Tribunal decision, about why he was "disbelieved" by the Tribunal Member.
5. Mr Wilson made brief oral submissions summarising the first respondent's written submissions on the grounds. In relation to the matters which the applicant submitted orally at the hearing on 7 October 2025, Mr Wison submitted those matters went to the merit of the claims made in the Tribunal by the applicant, and could not be reviewed in this Court. I agree with Mr Wilson's submission as to the matters referred to by the applicant orally at the hearing.

1. The application, as filed, contained a technical deficiency. In the application, as filed, the applicant only sought an order for a writ of certiorari (a quashing order) and did not seek an order for a writ of mandamus. As the applicant is unrepresented, it is open to the Court, with the applicant's consent, and the agreement of the first respondent, to amend the application at the hearing, so it seeks the appropriate relief: see AYH19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 585 at [20] and Sharma v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2152 at [13] and more recently, CZL18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1301 at [29].
2. At the hearing before me, the applicant consented, and the first respondent agreed to the Court making an order amending the application that it seeks the appropriate relief.

1. As I explained to the parties at the commencement of the hearing on 7 October 2025, the issue before this Court is whether the Tribunal's decision contained a jurisdictional error; that is, a serious legal error that results in an administrative decision lacking any legal force: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [2] (LPDT).
2. To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32] and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421.
3. As I also explained to the parties, the Court does not have power to re-consider any of the factual findings made by the Tribunal, nor does it have power to re-make the decision of the Tribunal: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).
4. Finally, on an application for judicial review in this Court the review applicant bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities: see LPDT at [10]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [67], MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 at [38]-[40] and [60], and Smith v Blanch [2025] NSWCA 188 (Kirk, Stern and McHugh JJA) at [113]. These proceedings are not concerned with questions of a presumption of the regularity or validity of administrative action. Therefore, ultimately it falls to the applicant to establish a basis for drawing the inference necessary to make out any alleged jurisdictional error.
5. Below the Court sets out its consideration of the grounds of judicial review in this matter. For the reasons given below, neither of the grounds identify the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.
6. For convenience, I will deal with the 10 grounds in three groupings. First, I will deal with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 under the allegation that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant matters. Next, I will deal with ground 5 under the allegation that the Tribunal decision contained illogical findings. Finally, I will deal with grounds 7, 8, 9 and 10 under the allegation that the Tribunal unlawfully took into account irrelevant matters.

GROUND 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 6: TRIBUNAL FAILED TO CONSIDER RELEVANT MATTERS

1. In this ground the applicant alleges very generally that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant material, namely the applicant's registered migration agent's oral submissions made at the Tribunal hearings.
2. I asked the applicant at the hearing if he wanted to say anything further about this ground, for example, what particular aspects of the agent's oral submissions did he allege where not considered. Ultimately, it is for the applicant to identify the case which is to be put forward to this Court to make out a claim of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal: VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [44]- [45] and SZGUR at [67]. Despite being given the opportunity to tell the Court what he meant by this ground in the application and what particular aspects of the agent's oral submissions he alleges where not considered by the Tribunal, he declined to make any submissions on ground 1.
3. As the first respondent correctly submitted, the Tribunal's decision record demonstrates that the Tribunal Member considered the submissions made by the applicants' migration agent expressly (see paragraph [29] of the Tribunal's decision). The Tribunal said in that paragraph, "...the Tribunal has considered the submission by the applicant's representative at the hearing that the applicant had merely swapped the order of dates of these incidents. This does not explain the inconsistency to the Tribunal as the dates are still not consistent with that set out in his original claims." The applicant's argument the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's registered migration agent's oral submissions generally has no basis.
4. This ground does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error. Ground 1 has no merit.

1. In ground 2 the applicant alleges that the Tribunal did not consider the possible trauma which may have affected the applicant's memory, resulted from the alleged beatings and torture when he was living in Fiji. I asked the applicant at the hearing if he wanted to say anything further about this ground. He declined to say anything further.
2. Possible trauma, and the effect it may have had on the applicant's memory, caused by mistreatment while he lived in Fiji, was dealt with at length by the Tribunal Member. At paragraph [19] the Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant's claim of having been beaten or tortured and as a result his memory in recalling events was affected.
3. After assessing this claim, the Tribunal found (at [28]) that there was no medical or other evidence to support the applicant's claim that he suffered from memory issues as a consequence of his experiences in Fiji, and that there was nothing in how the applicant responded to the Tribunal's questions that raised concerns that his mental health was affecting his ability to answer questions or give evidence. The Tribunal found that his responses were appropriate given the questions.
4. This ground does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error. I consider this ground to be completely unmeritorious.

1. In ground 3 the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's evidence of the name of the sugar cane co-operative he was associated with as a sugar cane farmer while he was living in Fiji.
2. This ground appears to be taking issue with the following finding in paragraph [30] of the Tribunal decision:

... The Tribunal was also not satisfied that that the organisation in which the applicant claimed to be involved had a profile, such that it would provide a reason for the applicant to be detained. This is because the applicant has referred to the sugar organisation with which he claimed to be involved by several different names. In his statutory declaration of 28 October 2015, he set out the organisation as the Cane Farmers Association. At the hearing on 9 November 2018, he referred to it as a cooperative. In his statutory declaration of 16 November 2018, he referred to it as a sugar cane committee and sugar cane cooperative. When the Tribunal sought to clarify the name at the second hearing on 6 March 2019, he claimed it was called the Sugar Cane Cooperative Farmers.

1. This ground misunderstands the Tribunal decision. As paragraph [30] shows, the Tribunal considered the differing names of a 'sugar cane organisation' the applicant said he was a member of when he was a sugar cane farmer. It was open to the Tribunal to find that his membership of such an organisation did not provide a reason as to why he would be detained because the applicant referred to the organisation by different names throughout the review process. In his 2015 written claims he referred to it as the 'Cane Farmers Association'. In his 2018 written claims, he referred to it as a 'committee' and a 'co-operative'. In the hearings before the Tribunal, he referred to it as a 'co-operative'.
2. The challenge to paragraph [30] is merely a disagreement with the Tribunal's factual findings, which is not a proper basis for alleging jurisdictional error: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [31]. In this ground the applicant is in essence seeking to invite the Court to undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision regarding the applicant's evidence of the name of the sugar cane organisation he said he was a member of while he was a sugar cane farmer in Fiji, which is not permitted in judicial review applications: see Djokovic.
3. This ground does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error. Ground 3 has no merit.

1. In ground 4 the applicant argues that the Tribunal Member did not assess the potential raising of the applicant's profile as a result of being a suspect of being involved in sugar cane crop burning.
2. This appears to relate to the claim made by the applicant that he was targeted for sugar cane burning in 2008 when the applicant was allegedly taken and beaten by the military government.
3. At the hearing before me I asked the applicant what he meant by this ground. He told the Court he suffered trauma when he was in Fiji from what had happened to him in 2008. He did not say anything further on this ground.
4. A fair reading of the Tribunal decision shows that at paragraph [11(i)] the Tribunal recorded the applicant's claims that he was accused of leading other farmers to burn sugar cane in 2008. At paragraph [12] the Tribunal noted that the applicant's representative had submitted various electronic articles to support the applicant's claims, including the politicised nature of the sugar cane industry and cane burning. Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant never experienced harm on any occasion while he was living in Fiji, as alleged, or that the 2008 incident occurred: see paragraph [40] and [45] of the Tribunal decision. This was based on the finding that the applicant was an unreliable witness who invented many elements of his claims. At paragraph [41] the Tribunal accepted the applicant was a sugar cane farmer and that he worked land that had been given to him by his father-in-law. However, it found that:
   1. ...The applicant has left cane farming in 2010 and resigned from any committees involving sugar cane farmers from 2011. The Tribunal was unable to locate any evidence to suggest that the organisation that the applicant was associated with had a profile in Fiji or that current or former sugar cane farmers had an adverse profile in Fiji. As the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant suffered any harm while he was a farmer the Tribunal also does not accept that he left farming for this reason. The Tribunal is not satisfied that due to his past experience as a farmer and having involvement in a cooperative, he would be of any interest to anyone, or that for this reason he would face any harm, if he returns to Fiji now or in the foreseeable future.
5. The argument that the Tribunal Member did not assess the potential raising of the applicant's profile as a result of being a suspect of being involved in sugar cane crop burning, has no merit. The Tribunal set out the claim he was involved in cane burning in 2008 (see paragraph [11]), but found in paragraph [41] that the applicant left sugar cane farming in 2010 and resigned from any committees involving sugar cane farmers from 2011. The Tribunal also found that country information suggested sugar cane farmers did not have an adverse profile in any event.
6. Ground 4 has no merit.

1. In this ground the applicant alleges the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's evidence that he had a genuine interest in Fijian politics.
2. This ground does not contain an arguable jurisdictional error. As outlined above, I asked the applicant at the hearing what he meant by this ground. The applicant said he disagreed with the Tribunal's findings about his involvement in Fijian politics.
3. The applicant's allegations that the Tribunal failed to consider his evidence on his involvement or genuine interest in Fijian politics fails at a factual level, and is therefore misconceived. At paragraph [37]-[39] of the Tribunal decision, the Tribunal expressly considered and rejected the applicant's claims regarding his involvement and/or interest in Fijian politics. The Tribunal found at [37]-[39] that his involvement in the relevant political organisations was minimal and it was not satisfied that his claims of a close connection were reliable.
4. Ground 6 has no merit.

1. The applicant argues in ground 5 that the Tribunal's (credibility) finding in paragraph [35] of its decision were illogical or irrational. The applicant argues that if an applicant omits to state something in his statutory declaration that does not mean it did not happen, or is inconsistent with his claims. This, it is alleged, is irrational or illogical.
2. Paragraph [35] is as follows:

Sixthly, the applicant has repeatedly raised that one of the reasons he was targeted and subjected to harm was his profile as being anti-government and supporting the opposition SODELPA party, formerly the SDL. In questioning the applicant about his experiences he was asked about his experiences and role in the SDL, and yet in his narrative at the first Tribunal hearing of the incidents of harm that had occurred when he was in Fiji, he omitted any reference to a meeting at his home in Ba with six party members to discuss the new name for the party, as was described in his statutory declaration of 28 October 2015. When this omission was pointed out to him at the first hearing, the only comment the applicant offered was that this had happened too. The Tribunal did not consider this to be a plausible explanation for the omission. This is because at the hearing the applicant had been questioned regarding his involvement with the SDL. This particular incident according to the written claims was of the applicant occurred in his own home, less than 6 months prior to his departure from Fiji. It was also alleged to be time where he claimed significant physical violence including being kicked, beaten and spat upon. The fact that he did not recall this incident when narrating his experiences in his evidence at the Tribunal hearing indicates that the incident was a fabrication intended to boost his claims for protection. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it occurred.

1. Courts have held that adverse credibility findings are amenable to judicial review where the findings can be shown to be legally unreasonable, such as by being based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [50] per Yates, Wheelahan and O'Bryan JJ.
2. Credibility findings, like all findings, must be rationally made and based upon facts having logical and probative weight, and be articulated properly; minor inconsistencies and trivial errors do not constitute a valid ground upon which an adverse credibility finding may be made: see most recently CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97. See also for discussion of principles relating to the assessment of credibility findings by the Tribunal in EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518 at [36] per Stewart J; DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175, [30], and the cases cited at [30(3)]; and SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31] per Flick J.
3. In his statutory declaration dated 28 October 2015 (CB 322-329), the applicant claimed, amongst other things, he was harmed four times on 21 July 2014, and at around 10 am on 21 July 2014, the applicant was visited by and had a meeting with six old officials from the SDL party at his home in Ba to discuss the new name of the party and was asked to assist the officials in informing the villagers that the party had changed its name from SDL to SODELPA. Then, the applicant claimed in his statutory declaration, at around 12.15 pm, an army van took three of men who were with the applicant, together with the applicant, to an army camp in Ba where they were beaten, spat on and kicked until they laid down motionless and were then threatened: see Court Book pages 324-325.
4. The Tribunal noted in paragraph [35] that when questioned about his experiences, he omitted any reference to a meeting at his home in Ba with six party members to discuss the new name for the party on 14 July 2014 at around 10 am, as described in his statutory declaration dated 28 October 2015 at paragraphs [56]-[57] at Court Book page 324. The Tribunal went on to reject the claim that the meeting occurred, however, that rejection was not solely based on his omission of the meeting in his oral evidence to the Tribunal. It was also based on country information which showed that the party's name change occurred well before the alleged meeting in 2014, and that the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant had a profile which meant he would be involved in such meetings. This was based on the applicant's own evidence he was a low-level member who was not politically active.
5. I consider, for the foregoing reasons, that the Tribunal's credibility finding in paragraph [35] (which was one of several such findings) was rationally made and based upon facts having logical and probative weight. Each of the three reasons for the credibility finding in paragraph [35] were each logically reasoned facts that were based on material that was before the Tribunal.
6. When read as a whole, the Tribunal's findings were reasonably open to it on the material before it and these findings were not irrational or illogical, nor were they legally unreasonable by being based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact.
7. Ground 5 does not identify any jurisdictional error.

GROUNDS 7, 8, 9 AND 10: TRIBUNAL CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT MATERS

1. In ground 7 the applicant argues the Tribunal considered a matter in paragraph [42] of its decision which was irrelevant, namely, that the applicant was a Lauan from the Lau Islands and that people from Lau can be physically distinguished from other Fijians.
2. This ground is plainly misconceived. The applicant himself asserted as part of his written claims for protection in his statutory declaration dated 28 October 2015 that he was from Lau, and that he and his people from Lau are recognised by their faces and marked as Lauan just from their physical appearance: see Court Book page 323 at [32]. These matters were therefore, in the context of the applicant's claims, a relevant consideration on the review. I agree with the first respondent's submission that, "it was plainly reasonable for the Tribunal to consider this issue as part of its consideration of the applicant's claims for fear of harm based on being a Lauan and recognisable by his appearance."
3. Ground 7 has no merit.

1. Grounds 8 to 10 allege that at the hearings before the Tribunal, the Tribunal did not properly record his evidence, or alternatively it misunderstood his evidence. In each of these grounds the applicant sets out in first person format, in quotes, alleged questions asked by the Tribunal and answers given by the applicant at the hearings, as the basis for the grounds.
2. As the first respondent correctly submitted, these grounds cannot succeed at the threshold level. No evidence was tendered by the applicant of any transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal.
3. On 18 September 2025, the first respondent had sent to the applicant a copy of the audio recording of both Tribunal hearings. However, no transcript of the Tribunal hearings has been tendered by the applicant. As outlined above, on an application for judicial review in this Court the review applicant bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities.
4. I do not accept the questions and answers as quoted by the applicant in grounds 8-10 (as set out above in paragraph [22] of this judgment) in his application as evidence that those matters were in fact said by the Tribunal Member or the applicant as alleged. In the absence of any evidence of what was actually said at the Tribunal hearings, the applicant has failed to establish any jurisdictional error under grounds 8-10.
5. None of grounds 8, 9 and 10 are capable of identifying jurisdictional error.

1. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is vitiated by jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]; and BSQ17 at [27]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. The application is dismissed.

1. The first respondent seeks costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I will make an order for the amount sought by the first respondent against the applicant.

I certify that the preceding eighty-one (81) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.