(i) First review decision made on 19 December 2024;

(ii) Documents (A1 to A7) that had been provided by the Applicant for the first review hearing;

(iii) Extension of time application made by the Applicant on 3 October 2025 and application for second review made on 13 November 2025; and

(iv) Submissions prepared by the Respondent ("Secretary's Outline of Submissions") with Attachments A to G.

1. Subsections 131D(1) and (3) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act) provide that a person whose interests are affected by an ART social services decision may apply to the Tribunal for a second review of the decision and that this includes an eligible social services decision that has been affirmed by the Tribunal.
2. An eligible social services decision is defined in section 131C of the ART Act to include reviewable decisions made under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) and under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth).
3. The Tribunal finds that the first review decision was a reviewable decision made under the relevant family assistance legislation.
4. Subsection 131J(1) of the ART Act states that, despite a contrary intention in any other law, an application for second review must be made within the time prescribed under section 18. Section 18 of the ART Act states that an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision must be made within the period prescribed by the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (the Rules) and that the Rules must not prescribe a period ending before the day that is 28 days after the day the decision is made. Subsection 5(3) of the Rules provides for a 28-day period after the day an applicant is given notice of a decision. The effect of these provisions is that an applicant has a 28-day period after being given notice of a first review decision to make an application for second review to the Tribunal.
5. The first review decision was emailed to the Applicant on 19 December 2024 and the Applicant is taken to have been given notice of the decision on the same date, in line with section 14A of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). A second review application was required to be submitted by 16 January 2025. The Tribunal accepted the calculations undertaken by the Respondent that the application was made some eight months and 17 days out of time.
6. Subsections 19(1) and (2) of the ART Act allow an applicant to apply to the Tribunal to extend the period during which they may apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision and for the Tribunal to extend the period if it considers it is "reasonable in all the circumstances to do so".
7. The Courts have considered a range of consistent principles to be used when considering the discretion to allow for an extension of time. These include:

(a) The length of the delay (Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 153);

(b) The reasons for the delay and whether an applicant has shown an acceptable explanation for the delay (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Cohen [1984] FCA 176 (Cohen));

(c) Any prejudice to the Respondent (Cohen);

(d) The public interest (Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541); and

(e) Whether the substantive application has reasonable prospects of success (Cohen).

1. The Applicant was issued the decision by email on 19 December 2024 and the application for review was made on 3 October 2025. The Applicant did not dispute the Respondent's submissions that the application was made eight months and 17 days outside of the time prescribed in the legislation.

1. The Applicant provided written reasons for seeking an extension of time, which were that:

I was only recently notified by Centrelink that I can get my decision reviewed again if I do not agree with the decision made.

1. The Applicant was asked about her reasons for the delay at the extension of time hearing. She submitted that she had spoken to Centrelink again about the debt and had been told that a "decision was only made on one debt" and not on all three debts and that, on this basis, she should be raising an application again. The Applicant stated that she had not agreed with the first review decision but had taken it as the decision. It was when she spoke to someone on the phone that she was encouraged to seek further review.
2. The Applicant described that the length of the delay was due to her not speaking to Centrelink and not realising she could make a second review application. When asked whether she had read the cover letter sent with the first review decision (which set out the right to apply for further review with the Tribunal), the Applicant stated she probably did but she can't recall.
3. When asked to clarify whether she had not received the notice of the decision, or decided not to appeal at that stage, the Applicant stated she decided not to appeal; she then spoke to Centrelink eight months later. She stated she was sure she would have received the notice of decision, but guesses she forgot about the time. She agreed with the observations of the Respondent that she had rested on her rights.
4. The Respondent submits that the explanation provided is not acceptable, that the Applicant was properly informed of her appeal rights and that she had rested on those rights. The Respondent noted that correspondence sent to the Applicant by the Tribunal, with the first review decision, had stated:

If you think the decision is wrong, you may apply to the Tribunal for second review of the decision. An application for second review can be made online, in writing or by calling us. There is no fee for second review of Centrelink decisions. Information about how to apply is available at www.art.gov.au or by calling us on Freecall 1800 228 333. The time limit for making an application for second review is 28 days from the date of this notice.

1. The Respondent submits, in the alternative, that if the Applicant was not aware of her appeal rights, the explanation for the delay should not be accepted. The Respondent submits that:[2]

...it was incumbent upon the Applicant to examine the notice of decision thoroughly. If she had done so, she would have been aware of her appeal rights and the prescribed time limit to lodge an application for second review. The Secretary contends that the Applicant's explanation for her delay weighs against granting an extension of time.

1. The Respondent further noted previous decisions of the Tribunal where an extension of time was refused where an applicant had been aware of the right to seek review of the decision in question and did nothing (Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1988) 16 ALD 533; Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248; and Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381).
2. The Respondent's representative (in response to unclear submissions made by the Applicant about only one debt being implemented) stated he was not aware of any difficulties for the Respondent in implementing the first review decision. The Respondent's representative noted that no payments had been coming out, which would suggest the decision had been implemented.

Prejudice to the Respondent and to the wider public

1. The Respondent provided the following written submissions about any prejudice in this matter, if the extension of time is granted by the Tribunal:[3]

There are two types of prejudice which are relevant when considering the grant of an extension of time. The first type of prejudice is a direct prejudice to the Secretary. The Secretary accepts that there would be no direct prejudice to the Secretary in allowing the extension of time.

However, the Secretary also submits that "...the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension": Lucic v Nolan [1982] FCA 217; (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 416.

The second type of prejudice to be considered is the public interest prejudice of the kind discussed by Deputy President Boyle in Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd (Compensation) 2018 AATA 415. This is the prejudice that is caused:

In the administration of justice by parties such as the Applicant simply ignoring legislative timeframes. In this regard the Tribunal notes the obvious and accepted public interest in the finality of decision-making, and the need to prevent disruption to established practices (see Re Veronica Lesley Johnson and Commonwealth of Australia; Commission of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation of the Commonwealth Employees [1990] AATA 1).

The Secretary submits that this factor weighs against the granting of an extension of time.

1. The Applicant did not seek to make submissions to the Tribunal at the extension of time hearing about any prejudice to the Respondent or to the wider public.

Whether the substantive application has reasonable prospects of success

1. The Tribunal at first review noted that the debts had been raised on the basis that the Applicant had been paid family tax benefit and child care subsidy based on her income alone, without taking into account her partner's income. The Tribunal at first review noted that there was no dispute that that was correct and that the Applicant in consequence had been overpaid family tax benefit and child care subsidy. The Tribunal at first review noted that the Applicant did not dispute the calculation of the debts and the Tribunal was satisfied the debts were correct.
2. The Tribunal at first review was satisfied that administrative error was the initial cause of the debts, on the basis that the Applicant had advised she was partnered on 15 August 2021 and confirmed this in a parenting payment claim lodged on 27 August 2021. A copy of the Applicant's partner's payslips was provided to the Respondent. Her parenting payment was cancelled on 30 August 2021, however, her advice that she was partnered was not actioned in relation to her family tax benefit and child care subsidy payments.
3. The Tribunal at first review was not satisfied, though, that the debts were due to sole administrative error. The Applicant had been sent notices about her family tax benefit and child care subsidy entitlements which set out the income being used. The information included only the Applicant's income and not her partner's. The notices required the Applicant to advise if any of the information listed had changed.
4. Nor was the Tribunal at first review satisfied that the debts could be waived under the special circumstances waiver provision. The first review Tribunal noted the following evidence in respect of its consideration:[4]

It is true that the statements sent to [the Applicant] by Centrelink with the FTB and CCS payments noted her income as the income which was used in determining her entitlement. However, the Tribunal accepts [the Applicant's] evidence that, as she had provided Centrelink with details of her and her partner's income each year, she believed she was entitled to what she received. She genuinely believed that the income recorded in the correspondence was just her income and not the income which was used in the calculation of her entitlements.

The Tribunal also accepts [the Applicant's] evidence that Centrelink told her she would not be entitled to parenting payment due to her combined income, but she was not told anything about her entitlement to FTB and CCS.

[The Applicant] said, at the moment, she and her partner are really struggling financially. She is not working as she is caring for her youngest child, who is 12 months old, full-time. She has full-time care of her youngest child and 50% care of her older two children.

Their sole income is her partner's income. They have a lot of bills and debts. She said her partner has a decent income, but they are really behind on a lot of things and it has been really hard. She said repayment of the debts is currently on hold.

[The Applicant] said she wants to go back to work next year. However, she is a schoolteacher and she has to wait until after the school holidays to apply for positions.

The Tribunal accepts that [the Applicant's] current financial circumstances are straitened as she is not working.

However, [the Applicant] did not suggest that there are any other special circumstances in this matter.

The Tribunal concurs and finds there are no special circumstances in this matter which make it desirable to waive the debts. Whilst [the Applicant] did not do anything wrong, she did receive payments she was not entitled to receive.

1. The Tribunal at first review also considered write off of the debts for a period of time, based on the Applicant's assertion that she didn't think she could repay the debts while she was not working. The first review Tribunal considered the financial situation of the Applicant, as set out in the Statement of Financial Circumstances she had provided, and found that her partner's income was $1,591 per week and the family's expenses were $1,888 per week. The first review Tribunal was satisfied the Applicant had no capacity to repay the debts, that this would change when she returned to work, and that the debts were to be written off until 30 June 2025.
2. The Applicant was asked to comment on the merits of the substantive application at the extension of time hearing. She stated that she doesn't agree with the decision and still thinks it wasn't her fault as she had taken every step possible to follow the correct process. She noted that because of one detail in the letters, she was required to repay $10,000 which she doesn't have. She feels as though she did everything right.
3. In written submissions provided to the Tribunal, the Respondent noted relevant comments of the Courts as follows:[5]

It is relevant to consider the merits of the proposed appeal: Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 1221, 122 per Von Doussa J. When considering an application for an extension of time, it is not appropriate to embark on a trial of the merits but it may be that the stronger the apparent merits the more likely that an extension of time would be appropriate: Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) ATC 4515, [29], [38] per Hill J.

1. The Respondent acknowledged that it could not be said the Applicant's appeal had no prospects of success; however, the Respondent submitted that there appeared no particularly strong case on the face of the fist review decision. The Respondent noted that the Applicant had not disputed the calculation of the debts at first review. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant's failure to correct an incorrect record about her circumstances stands as a "significant hurdle" to waiver for sole administrative error. Further, the Applicant had failed to persuade the first review Tribunal that her circumstances were special as to make it desirable to waive under the special circumstances waiver provision. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant's prospects of success are limited and that this weighs against an extension of time being granted.

1. The Respondent raised an additional consideration for the Tribunal, that the Applicant has access to alternative avenues of relief. This includes her ability to approach Centrelink directly to request waiver of the debts, which would become an original decision with its own consequent appeal rights. The Respondent also noted the Applicant's ability to make a claim through the Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (the "CDDA Scheme"). The Applicant did not seek to comment on this aspect of the Respondent's submissions at the extension of time hearing.

1. The delay in this matter is lengthy, and the Applicant did not provide clear or compelling reasons for the length of the delay. Her evidence at the extension of time hearing was that she had not agreed with the first review decision. She was unclear in her evidence the extent to which she had read and engaged with the letter enclosing the notice of decision, but acknowledged she was likely to have received it. It was unclear to the Tribunal why, in circumstances where the Applicant did not agree with the first review decision, she did not take steps to seek a further review. These matters weigh against granting an extension of time to the Applicant.
2. The Tribunal finds that there would be some prejudice to the wider public if an extension of time is granted in circumstances where unclear reasons for the delay have been given, as it would unsettle notions of the end to decision-making and an end to the appeals process.
3. The Tribunal further finds that the Applicant has not provided persuasive reasons for the merits of the substantive application. The Applicant does not appear to dispute the overpayments. The first review Tribunal carefully explained the reasons that waiver was not available to the Applicant, even where she had provided correct information to the Respondent. The decision was partially favourable to the Applicant in writing off recovery for a period of time, based on the Applicant's circumstances at the time of the first review hearing. While noting that the Tribunal is not undertaking a full review of the substantive matter when considering the extension of time and is unable to foresee the outcome after submissions and evidence have been heard, the Tribunal does observe that the Applicant has not put forward compelling reasons about the merits of her substantive application.
4. The Tribunal is not limited in its consideration to the factors set out and considered above. The Tribunal accepts the Applicant has alternative avenues, including seeking compensation and seeking a new original decision be made based on her current circumstances. The Tribunal accepted the submissions put by the Respondent on this issue.
5. Taking into account the totality of the submissions and evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that it is not reasonable in all the circumstances to grant an extension of time in this matter. In so finding, the Tribunal has placed weight on the length of the delay, lack of reasons for the delay, and there being no indication before the Tribunal as to the reasons the first review decision was in some way incorrect. The Tribunal refuses to extend time for the Applicant to make a second review application.

The Tribunal refuses to extend time for the making of a second review application.

[1] Summary of relevant law taken from PKYL and SDSS [2026] ART 141.

[2] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 28.

[3] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraphs 38 - 41.

[4] First review Statement of Reasons, paragraphs 31 - 38.

[5] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 30.