Unless the terms of the Act and regulations require some other meaning be applied, the words "good character" should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community. The former is an objective assessment apt to be proved as a fact whilst the latter is a review of subjective public opinion. ... A person who has been convicted of a serious crime and thereafter held in contempt in the community, nonetheless may show that he or she has reformed and is of good character. ... Conversely, a person of good repute may be shown by objective assessment to be a person of bad character.

4. The Federal Court of Australia has also considered the state of satisfaction that is required in determining whether a person is of good character. In BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574, O'Bryan J observed at [54]-[55] (citations omitted):

Section 21(2)(h) requires the Minister to form a judgment as to whether he or she is satisfied that the applicant for citizenship is of good character. The word "satisfied" in that context is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as balance of probabilities. That is for at least two reasons. First, the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite. Second, the matter of which the Minister must be satisfied, the applicant's good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgment. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion. ... > > The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean that there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context of s 21(2)(h) of the Act, satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character. ...

5. The Respondent has published policy guidance in the form of Citizenship Procedural Instructions. The Citizenship Procedural Instruction No.15 (CPI-15) provides some guidance as to the assessment of whether a person is of good character.
6. I am not bound by this policy, however I recognise that governmental policy should generally be applied unless it is inconsistent with the Act or there are cogent reasons to depart from it.[3] I do not consider CPI-15 is inconsistent with the Act nor do I consider there are cogent reasons to depart from it. The proper application of lawful policy promotes consistency in decision-making and is a cogent reason to apply the policy rather than depart from it.
7. CPI-15 guides decision makers to assess good character holistically. That approach is consistent with the evaluative nature of the assessment required discussed in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574.
8. In particular I observe that among other things CPI-15 guides decision‑makers to take into account the fact of a conviction does not automatically mean a person is not a person of good character; to consider mitigating circumstances including the length of time since the offence was committed, the person's age at the time of the offence and their behaviour since completing a prison sentence or any obligations to a court, any remorse regarding their offending behaviour, community supports such as referee reports and changes in the applicant's life.
9. It also requires that I take into account as to the qualities that a person of character would be expected to have including respecting and abiding by the law in Australia and that the citizenship character assessment is informed by the applicant's conduct prior to applying for a visa and during their time in Australia, requiring an assessment of all of the available information including any information provided in the visa application process and while the applicant has been a visa holder in Australia and during the processing of the citizenship application.
10. CPI-15 further provides that a person of good character would not practise deception in their dealings with the Australian government such as intentionally providing false personal information or engaging in other forms of material deception during visa and citizenship applications. However where an applicant has provided incorrect information CPI-15 indicates that it will only be of a concern if it was provided knowingly. CPI-15 also instructs that where character references are relied on such references should, where application, acknowledge any offence or other incident and explain why nonetheless the applicant is of good character.
11. Conversely CPI-15 also instructs that caution should be exercised by the tribunal if relevant references do not acknowledge the behaviour which is of potential concern in relation to the question of good character.

1. The Tribunal had before it the documents provided by the Respondent under the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), comprising the T-Documents provided on 14 February 2024, the Supplementary T-Documents provided on 7 June 2024, and some further supplementary T-Documents provided on 19 December 2024.
2. In addition, during the course of the review application, the applicant provided to the Tribunal:

(a) an email from the applicant dated 27 July 2024; > > (b) two emails from the applicant dated 28 November 2024, including a copy of an email with SAPOL and a crime stoppers ID. > > (c) a photograph of a vehicle; > > (d) seven photographs of a wound to the applicant's arm; > > (e) a reference from Amber Stevens; > > (f) a reference from Shikira Stevens;

3. The applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing of the review application and was cross examined by Mr Burgess, counsel for the respondent. The applicant's evidence can be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant gave oral evidence. He stated that while he "was a bad person" and an alcoholic in the past, he is "trying to be a good person" and is "better than I was yesterday". He claimed his past issues stemmed from family members putting substances in his food and from misunderstandings with SA Police.
5. Regarding his criminal history, the applicant admitted some offences but denied others. He admitted to his 2011 and 2012 drink-driving convictions. In relation to a 2013 offence, which involved a blood alcohol reading of 0.184, he admitted driving while his licence was suspended after consuming nearly a pint glass of straight scotch. However, he claimed a chef "forcefully" gave him the drink and that the incident was a "set-up" by an AFP officer. He denied the police account that he was driving erratically.
6. The applicant denied his 2023 conviction for possessing methamphetamine, claiming the police officer "planted it on him". He admitted police found a "metal pole" in his house, which they recorded as a tomahawk, but denied having it on his person. He did, however, admit to taking methamphetamine "a few times" in late 2022 or early 2023. He also denied a 2013 incident involving a vehicle collision, stating police "made up" the story.
7. The applicant gave several different explanations for his repeated failure to declare his convictions on official forms.
8. For his 2015 citizenship application, he claimed it "was a mistake" and that he "didn't understand that driving offences was a criminal offence." In relation to his 2023 Resident Return visa application, he claimed he thought the question referred to convictions in other countries, not Australia. In relation to the 2023 citizenship application (which is the decision under review), he stated the person assisting him, Ryan Ross, filled out the form and he was "not sure whether my mistake or his." For the 2024 incoming passenger card, he variously claimed he "must have been not in a proper mental state" or that he thought the question meant "other criminal charges" besides drink-driving.
9. In his evidence in chief, the applicant made numerous references to him not being "well in the head," but clarified this meant he was concerned for his mother. In cross-examination, he denied having schizophrenia, asserting it was a "label" forced on him by police. He confirmed he is not currently taking any medication for a mental illness.
10. The applicant stated he wishes to gain citizenship to visit his mother and to travel more easily, noting that citizenship would allow him to travel to Europe and the United Kingdom without a visa. The applicant's evidence which I accept is that his mother is unwell and he wishes to visit her, having not had the opportunity to visit his father when he was unwell.

1. The applicant submits that he is now a person of good character, stating that although he "was a bad person" and an alcoholic in the past, he is "better than I was yesterday" and "trying to be a good person." He seeks citizenship for compassionate reasons, primarily to visit his concerned mother, and for the practical benefit of visa-free travel.
2. I infer that the applicant contends that his criminal convictions should be viewed in light of mitigating, and often external, factors. He argues that many of his interactions with police were "misunderstandings" or "set-ups." He denies his 2023 conviction for drug possession, claiming the police officer "planted it on him" because he was a police informant. In relation to his serious drink-driving convictions, he submits that in one instance he was "forcefully" given a large glass of scotch and that the police "made up" their report of his erratic driving. He also denies other incidents in the police records, calling them "a lie."
3. Regarding his repeated failure to declare his convictions on government forms, the applicant submits these were not knowing acts of deception. He attributes the omissions to a series of mistakes to which I will return. Finally, the applicant denies that he has schizophrenia, asserting it was a "label" forced on him by police.

1. The respondent submits that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the applicant is of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h) of the Act. This submission is principally based on the applicant's extensive criminal history, which involves approximately 15 convictions since 2011. The respondent emphasises the repetitive nature of this offending, which includes five convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol or under the influence, and five convictions for offences such as driving while disqualified or in contravention of a licence. It is contended that this history demonstrates a lack of regard for Australian laws and that the applicant, by driving under the influence, put members of the community at risk.
2. This pattern of disregard is argued to be ongoing, with that submission said to be supported by a 2023 conviction for possession of a controlled drug and the applicant's stated intention not to comply with a drug diversion notice. The respondent also submits that the applicant has practised deception by knowingly failing to declare his convictions on his 2023 citizenship application, his 2023 resident return visa application, and a 2024 incoming passenger card. In these circumstances, the respondent contends that insufficient time has passed to establish rehabilitation, particularly as the applicant has provided no evidence of rehabilitative steps and has not demonstrated abstinence from illicit drugs. Accordingly, the respondent submits the decision under review should be affirmed.

1. The issue I must determine is whether the applicant is of 'good character'. This requires an evaluative judgment as to the applicant's enduring moral qualities. I must, considering the evidence holistically, reach an affirmative belief that he is of good character. Having considered all the evidence, I find I am unable to reach that state of satisfaction.
2. The applicant's record of offending is set out in the delegate's decision which I reproduce below:

1. In my view these offences suggest a failure to respect and abide by Australian law. I must consider the significance of those offences. The applicant has, I accept, a significant criminal history, including multiple convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and driving while disqualified. I acknowledge that there appears to have been a lengthy break between the applicant's most recent offence in or around May 2023 and the offence before that, which was in October 2014. That represents a period of 8 and a half years. However, it is telling that the May 2023 offence related to possession of a controlled drug (not cannabis), which suggests that the applicant continues to have issues with substance abuse, noting his previous conviction for driving under the influence of drugs.
2. In relation to the applicant's denial of a number of the offences which he has been convicted of, I accept the submission made by the respondent's counsel that I ought not go behind those convictions. I accept that it is inappropriate to go behind those convictions and accept those convictions as being proof of the offences instead.
3. However, it is not the applicant's history of offending alone that is of concern in relation to his character.
4. The policy guidance in CPI-15, which I find no reason to depart from, makes clear that a person of good character is expected to respect and abide by the law and not practise deception in their dealings with the Australian Government. This includes not intentionally providing false personal information during visa and citizenship applications. CPI-15 clarifies that providing incorrect information is of concern only where it was provided knowingly.
5. The evidence reveals four distinct instances where the applicant failed to declare this history:

(a) in his 2015 citizenship application, the applicant ticked "No" to the question of whether he had any convictions in Australia, despite having been convicted of numerous offences between 2011 and 2014. > > (b) in his resident return visa application which was made on 17 May 2023 the applicant declared that he had not ever been convicted of an offence in any country; > > (c) in the application which is currently under review, dated 9 March 2023, he again ticked "No" to the same question. This was despite his previous convictions and a 2018 Tribunal decision affirming a refusal of citizenship on character grounds. > > (d) on 5 July 2024, while this review was pending, the applicant completed an incoming passenger card and ticked "No" to having any criminal convictions. This was little more than a year after his most recent conviction on 1 May 2023 for possessing a controlled drug.

6. The applicant has an extensive criminal history, including multiple convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and driving while disqualified. The evidence reveals three distinct instances where the applicant failed to declare this history:
7. In his 2015 citizenship application, the applicant ticked "No" to the question of whether he had any convictions in Australia, despite having been convicted of numerous offences between 2011 and 2014.
8. In the application under review, dated 9 March 2023, he again ticked "No" to the same question. This was despite his previous convictions and a 2018 Tribunal decision affirming a refusal of citizenship on character grounds.
9. On 5 July 2024, while this review was pending, the applicant completed an incoming passenger card and ticked "No" to having any criminal convictions. This was little more than a year after his most recent conviction on 1 May 2023 for possessing a controlled drug.
10. The repetition of these false declarations across multiple applications to the Australian Government over a nine-year period is powerful evidence that this conduct was knowing and deliberate, rather than an accidental oversight.
11. At the hearing, the applicant offered various explanations for these omissions. He claimed his 2015 declaration was a "mistake" and that he "didn't understand that driving offences was a criminal offence". For the 2023 application, he suggested that the person assisting him, Ryan Ross, fill it out. For the 2024 passenger card, he claimed he "must have been not in a proper mental state".
12. I do not accept these explanations. They are inconsistent, self-serving, and lack credibility. The applicant's claim that he did not understand his multiple, serious court-adjudicated convictions were "convictions" is inherently implausible. Crucially, the applicant admitted that this "mistake" was pointed out to him during his previous Tribunal review. He was, therefore, put on express notice of his obligation. His repetition of the same false declaration in 2023 and 2024 cannot be excused as a misunderstanding.
13. I also find that the applicant's attempts to shift responsibility, whether to Mr Ross or to his mental state, are unconvincing. An applicant remains responsible for the contents of an application made on their behalf. Furthermore, the applicant's claim to not be in a proper mental state directly contradicts his evidence that he does not have a mental illness and that schizophrenia was merely a label. I am satisfied these explanations are ad hoc and contradictory. I am satisfied the applicant knowingly provided false information to the Australian government on these occasions.
14. This pattern of deception strikes at the heart of the assessment of good character. It is not an isolated lapse of judgment but rather a sustained course of conduct intended to mislead. Such conduct demonstrates a profound lack of integrity and a disrespect for the obligations of honesty inherent in the Australian legal and administrative systems.
15. I have also considered the references provided by the applicant. Those references are from Mr Ryan Ross, Ms Shikira Stevens and Ms Amber Stevens. Mr Ross gave a statutory declaration and a letter. Mr Ross is a social worker who was engaged with the applicant. Mr Ross indicated that he considered the applicant of be of good character based on the seven months that he had known him.
16. The references from Ms Shikira Stevens and Ms Amber Stevens were provided to the Tribunal shortly prior to the hearing. They have known the applicant for 7 and 5 years, respectively. They both discuss the support the applicant provided to Shikira.
17. Amber Stevens talks of the applicant having 'turned his life around' but does not otherwise explain what is meant by that. Shikira Stevens talks about how the applicant has faced 'challenges' and how she has witnessed his growth and improvement.
18. In considering the weight to be given to those references, I note that none of the references provided expressly deal with the applicant's criminal convictions nor do they demonstrate any awareness of the applicant's false statements to the Australian government. Those matters considerably undermine the weight that I am prepared to attach to them. Indeed, in the circumstances, I am not prepared to give any weight to those references in support of an overall conclusion regarding the applicant's character other than that, in the eyes of the authors, the applicant has good moral qualities and good fame. However, as the decision in Irving indicates, that is not the enquiry.
19. The respondent also made submissions, citing Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 22 (Taulahi), about his mental health and uncharged conduct found in police records. While I have considered this evidence, I find it unnecessary to make conclusive findings on these matters. The applicant's criminal convictions and his repeated dishonesty in relation to those convictions are, in my view, matters to which I would attach determinative weight such that even putting to one side the respondent's submissions based on Taulahi, I am satisfied that the applicant is not a person of good character.
20. I am unable, therefore, to form the requisite affirmative belief that the applicant possesses the enduring moral qualities of a person of good character, such as to satisfy s 21(1)(h) of the Act. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character. As such, I am not satisfied that the applicant satisfies s 21(1)(h). It follows that the decision under review should be affirmed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

............[SGD]............................................................

[1] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422; [1996] FCA 663.

[2] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422; [1996] FCA 663, 431-432.

[3] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 640.